Books Summarised

Question 1

The Prince (Niccolò Machiavelli)

Question 2

Prisoners of Geography (Tim Marshall)

Question 3

How to be a Dictator: The Cult of Personality in the Twentieth Century (Frank Dikötter)

Question 4

The Communist Manifesto (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels)

Question 5

Utilitarianism (John Stuart Mill)

Answer 5

UTILITARIANISM:

Mill is a consequentialist vs Kant who is deontological (treats certain actions as being right or wrong in themselves, irrespective of their consequences).
Mill involves Epicurus 341-270 bc as an advocate for utilitariasm
EXPEDIENT
SUMMUM BONUM - the chief or highest good
Transcendental moralists
Different between act and rule utilitarianism - uses secondary principles of morality
How important is Mill’s grading of pleasure when choosing how to act?
Why should we care about others happinesses?
Secondary and primary principles can clash
Is happiness really the only end goal?

CHAPTER 1 (General Remarks)

The book is an attempt to prove that the principle of utility is the foundation of morality

CHAPTER 2 (What Utilitarianism is)

Actions are right to the extent that they promote happiness
Intellectual pleasures (pleasures of the mind) are higher than physical ones
It is preferabe to be Socrates dissatified than a fool satisfied
Must try to apply Jesusu folden rule and concern for the general hsppiness
Requirs impartiality and equsality if peoples happinesses in your eyes
Happiness is not a permant state of pleasure
Do not have to calclaye uiity of every action but lean from the past
Subbordinae principles?

CHAPTER 3 (Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility)

All moral systems lack obligation - sabtions available to it are same as other systems too - public opionion/ infuence of conscience
Need to devote resources to cultivating sense of caring about others wellbeing in order to create a functioning community

CHAPTER 4 (Of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible)

Analogy of visibility and desirability
Happiness is both an end to human conduct ansd a criterion by which we jude morality
Virtue is a thing that creates happiness in the end

CHAPTER 5 (Of the Connection Between Justice and Utility)

Justice is a perfect obligation because ther is something that a person can claim from us as a moral right, unlike generosity for example
Imvolves a desire for punishment - equal good for good and bad for bad - and a person whose right has been violated has a valid claim on society to uphold those rights
The oly reason why we should protect those rights is utility
Justice indicates moral requirements that are higher i the scale of social utility and must matter more

Question 6

On Liberty (John Stuart Mill)

Question 7

The Social Contract (Jean-Jacques Rousseau)

Question 8

Second Treatise of Government (John Locke)

Answer 8

Locke on the state of nature
Locke agrees with Hobbes that the state of nature is a state of perfect freedom (about our natural right to do whatever we think necessary for self preservation) and equality (about our ability to gain power)
Law of Nature - no person may subordinate another, harm his health, liberty or possessions except in self defence, and we should help each other when this does not harm ourselves THUS the state of nature is a state of liberty not ‘license’ because it falls under this law
He argues the law comes from god - we have a duty to preserve life - but it is also discoverable by reason
He disagrees about scarcity - thus peace is possible

Question 9

Why Nations Fail : The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson)

Question 10

Leviathan (Thomas Hobbes)

Answer 10

“Leviathan” is part of the genre of enlightenment writings, hence why I read the book, both hoping it would further my understanding about the foundational principles of political philosophy, relevant for my desired degree PPE, and also allow me to reframe how I saw the French Revolution in my A-Level studies. During the French Revolution, the collapse of the old monarchical order and the ensuing political instability echoed Hobbes’ fears about the dangers of anarchy and the breakdown of social order in his “state of nature” (especially under Robespierre!). Further, Hobbes’ concept of ‘the social contract’ between a sovereign and their people, later modified by, among others, Rousseau in “The Social Contract” (which I also read several chapters of over Christmas as it felt like the logical next step from ‘Leviathan’), drove revolutionary theorists and arguably some of the action that led to The Tennis Court Oath . The support of the notion of popular sovereignty, where the authority of the state is derived from the will of the people, can be seen as gaining prevalence in the 18th century due to works like Hobbes’ and Rousseau’s, even though Hobbes himself advocated for absolute sovereignty.

Hobbes: the state of nature as a state of war
Self preservation is our fundamental desire
Our ‘natural rights’ conflict with others’
Everyone will live in a state of ‘continual fear, and danger of violent death’
‘ In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, no culture of the Earth…no knowledge of the face of the Earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters.’
As a result, our lives will be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’
We desire power (to now possess the means to get what we want in the future), our desires are never-ending, there is scarcity and we are vulnerable THUS we will attack others because they might attack us and the best form of defence is premature attack
The benefit of the state is thus it protects us from harm

Question 11

Freakonomics (Steven D.Levitt)

Question 12

The Republic (Plato)

Question 13

The Economic Naturalist - Why Economics Explains Almost Everything

Answer 13

Robert H Frank
His idea of the economic naturalist is using economic principles to answer interesting questions about some patterns of events of behaviour observable and society. The book is a collection of the most interesting economic naturalist examples intended for people who take pleasure in unravelling the mystery is of every day human behaviour: for example “

He analyses evolution in an economic way, calling it an evolutionary “arms race” as males grow in size over generations due to attracting more females, claiming “ The balance of costs and benefits is reflected in the characteristics of surviving males”.

He said the opportunity cost of peoples time in London is very high there because it has a high wage rate and a rich many things to do so people there are quicker to show impatience.

He talks about a paper submitted to him in 1997, asking “why do brides spend so much money on wedding dresses they will never wear again, while grooms often rent cheap suits, even though they will have many future occasions that call for one?” - the answer to which followed: Brides wish to make a fashion statement, that’s a hire company would have to carry a huge stock of distinctive gowns, each garment would only be hired infrequently, the company would have to charge a higher fee greater than the purchase price of the garment to cover its costs, and since buying will be cheaper, no one would rent. In contrast, grooms are willing to settle for a standard style, a company can serve this market with an inventory of only two or three suits… Getting hired several times a year and enabling a fee that is only a fraction of its purchase price.

Question 14

KAPUT by WOLFGANG MÜNCHAU
Germany’s great decline
- FT Article

Answer 14

The German car industry has long been seen as a metaphor for the state of Europe’s largest economy. The recent announcement by Volkswagen, the country’s biggest carmaker, that it plans to close plants and lay off workers, has quickly become a symbol of Germany’s current political and economic malaise — and its ever dimming future.

After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine shook all the assumptions of the old German foreign policy, Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a complete rethink of his country’s basic model to suit a new age of geopolitics. It was, Scholz proclaimed, a Zeitenwende, or epochal turning point.

Angela Merkel’s neo-mercantilism, when German exports “took off like never before”, provided an export vent to compensate for low investment during her 16-year chancellorship. The notorious debt-brake that limited public expenditure, including investment, has now become the cause of the collapse of the coalition government.

Germany was once a model, in the 19th century when it dominated scientific and industrial advance, but also recently when a commitment to workers’ rights and job security looked more appealing than the ruthless US version of capitalism.

Is terrible industrial devastation always needed for rebirth and new development, or does incrementalism have some role?

The model of focusing on powerful export industries is German, but as Münchau acknowledges not uniquely so. This is the story of Japan, but also of modern China, and China is becoming the testing ground for the German model. China is replacing Germany, as the world’s manufacturing and export dynamo, because it was able to leapfrog to new technologies, notably in electric vehicles.

What happens when the growth models collapse? Japan after the bubble burst in the 1990s, with an ever more striking ageing problem, had very slow growth, but no political or social, let alone a civilisational collapse. It still plays an important foreign policy role, and it still leads in some areas of design. Maturing is not the same thing as sudden death. A future Münchau may write a parallel analysis of Chinese stagnation, where the political fallout is likely to be much more destructive. The EU provides a protective framework for a broken wunderkind, and there is dynamism elsewhere, notably to the north and to the east, where the likes of Denmark and Poland have become the new economic exemplar.

Question 15

Anthony Downs ‘An Economic Theory of Democracy’

Answer 15

Theory of the Median Voter:
Normal distribution - move further towards the Center = Nash equilibrium / hotellings law to maximise votes = can be good cause now parties are so similar they are more competitive = hold each other more accountable BUT virtually all voters are not decisive

Down’s recognises that his is an incomplete analysis of the act of voting.

Rationality may be interpreted broadly as the ability to order preferences and to choose the more preferred action over the less preferred. In this sense, almost all behavior is rational and the assumption of rationality is close to tautological (rhetorical argument that is logically irrefutable). Because he thinks the tautology is sterile, Downs rejects this definition of rationality, which is the one customarily used by economists, for a narrower interpretation in which rational behavior is only that behavior directed toward the goals that the theorist postulates as appropriate for a particular realm of action. As a result Downs cannot include “non-political” benefits (i.e. those calculated in (7) but not in (1)) in his analysis, although many of the benefits he cannot include are clearly political. It seems to us that he is unduly bothered by the tautology, which after all does affirm something, namely that people calculate about their actions and that their calculations can be understood by others. It seems to us also that in a descriptive theory it is unwise for the theorist to impose his own interpretation of goals on the observed behavior. By so doing, he falls into the trap (that all the natural law theorists fall into) of saying that one goal is rational and another is not. Because it is not possible to judge the “rationality” of goals- unless one adopts some sort of natural law theory -we will adopt here the broader interpretation of rationality, recognizing its tautological character, in order to develop a theory that may more ade- quately describe behavior. EXPLAIN THIS??

Caplan - myth of the rational voter

Question 16

A Theory of the Calculus of Voting: 1968

Answer 16

Recent theorising about the utility concludes that voting is an irrational act in that it usually costs more to vote than one can expect to get in return = disconcerting ideologically to democratic. This paper hopes to resolves paradox in theory, explaining political behaviours with a calculus of rational choice.

R= (BP) - C
R>0 then it is reasonable to vote

This paper examines R C P and B individually.
- about 92% of white prosperous males 46-64 in the Midwest voted in 1964, vs 20% black, poor females 21-25 in the South
- Any theory of utility of voting must reflect and explain this difference

TAKEAWAYS:
- Interesting way of breaking down & analysing, i.e. considering the assumption that C<0 because times is always consult

Question 17

Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1709)

Question 18

Defence of Usury: Jeremy Bentham

Question 19

An Introduction to Political Philosophy
Jonathan Wolff
1. The State of Nature

Answer 19

Hobbes
Hobbes Leviathan, published 1651, used Galileo’s theory of the conservation of motion to justify that humanity will eternally seek out felicity in a state of nature, come to conflict over scarcity of goods and thus end up in war.. The moral ‘Laws of Nature’, of which there were 19, based on the golden rule, Matthew 7:12, would be undermined by perpetual fear and a lack of collective rationality, and because of the ‘Natural Right of Liberty’ - moral applications have no application in a state of nature as all violence can be seen as (preemptive) self-defence - war would break out. Thus we need the state to enforce the ‘Laws of Nature’, prevent war and enable long term enterprise and possession of happiness. He defines power as ‘the present means to satisfy future desires’.
Locke
Locke wrote explicitly against those who argued for the divine right of kings, although his writings very much include a theological aspect. He claims that a state of nature is a state of equality, in which no person has a natural right to subordinate any other. He believed the law of nature is simply the idea that mankind is to be preserved as much as possible, as we are all creatures of God, and thus we have a clear duty not to harm others in the state of nature. Hobbes defined ‘natural liberty’ as the right to do what is appropriate to help secure our own survival, what is rational and beyond moral criticism, while Locke argued we have the liberty to do only what is morally permitted by the law of nature. He argues every person must have the natural right - the ‘Executive Power of the Law of Nature’ - to punish those who offend against the law of nature, who harm another’s life, liberty or property, motivated by the fact that these ‘criminals’ disturb their peace. Another key difference is that he assumes there is not a scarcity of goods, and thus little reason for conflict. However, the primary fault he sees is with the administration of justice, the interpretation of the Law of Nature civil government must be established because of this, and once the land becomes scarce because of greed and the ‘invention’ of money.
Rousseau
All three philosophers assume humans are motivated by self preservation, but Rousseau also believes we have ‘an innate repugnance at seeing a fellow creature suffer’. He does not doubt that if modern citizens, corrupted by society, were placed in a state of nature, they would act just as Hobbes depicted them, but he sees Locke & Hobbes as having projected the qualities of man-in-society on to savage man - socialized traits aren’t natural. He denies our natural condition is one of extreme scarcity, but also that morality has no place in the state of nature. He does not advocate for a return to the state of nature, but is rather regretful that we have grown civilized. Émile, his treatise on education, begins ‘God makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become evil’. But he admits pity is not a strong enough motivator in the face of scarcity, even though supposedly, he sees the state of nature as necessitating a solitary life, where nature has equipped the savage to survive alone. He argues away all Hobbes’s drives to war under the assumption the savage man is far less developed intellectually. He reckons the source of all human progress, and all human misfortune can be attributed to free will, and the capacity for self improvement. He sees innovation, not Hobbesian competition as the primary response to scarcity, and from here draws how savages reached organized society.
Anarchism
And the kids are more optimistic in their attempts to avoid the conclusion that the three philosophers did, that you cannot avoid severe conflict forever. William Godwin & Peter Kropotkin believed that all species profit from mutual aid, Kropotkin putting forward an alternative to Darwin’s theory of evolution through competition. Most thoughtful anarchists don’t rely on the goodness of humanity, although it is one of the fundamental assumptions of anarchists, and instead argue that other social controls can influence behavior even without a state - the fear of ostracization for example. There is also the need for authority of experts within society, but the existence of antisocial people who refuse to join in the voluntary society places anarchism in a dilemma.

Question 20

An Introduction to Political Philosophy
Jonathan Wolff
2. Justifying the State

Answer 20

Locke & the social contract theorists think the state is justified if every individual over which it claims authority has consented, giving great weight thus to the idea of personal autonomy or natural liberty. They believe our political institutions must be justified in terms of the will, choices, or decisions of those over whom they have authority. However, in the utilitarian theory of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the primary value is not autonomy but happiness; The state is justified, only if it produces more happiness than any alternative.The state is justified, only if it produces more happiness than any alternative. These interpretations are debatable, but primarily, in order to justify the state, we must show there are ‘universal political obligations’, that there is a duty to obey laws, pay taxes, etc…
The State
Locke defined political power as the right to make laws, with the right too to punish those who failed to obey them. The sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) said that states possess a monopoly of legitimate violence / coercion. It also accepts the responsibility of protecting everyone who resides within its border from illegitimate violence, but this only seems to define an ideal type of state, not a realistic one.

The Social Contract:
Voluntaristic Obligation & Tacit Consent
For Locke, the problem of political obligation is to show how the existence of the state can be explained in voluntaristic terms. It needs to be shown that somehow every last individual has given the state its authority over them, has voluntarily consented to the state. How is this consent communicated? An ‘original contract’ made generations ago? By voting? What about tacit consent? By quietly enjoying the protection of the state, is one giving one’s tacit consent? Locke in the Second Treatise proposes this, that receiving benefits is a way of tacitly consenting to the state, and it is this consent that binds one, although opposed by David Hume in ‘Of the Original Contract’. Rousseau argues in ‘Social Contract’ that in a free state, the act of dissenting, leaving the territories of the state, is simply enough, but we must overall agree with Hume, as the conditions for tacit consent are not met in the modern world, and the state cannot be justified in these terms.

Hypothetical Consent
The theory that if we were in a state of nature, then, if you were rational, you would do everything in your power to re-create the state and freely consent to it / join in a contract. But hypothetical consent is not actual consent and us. This interpretation implies that it is the features of the state and not our consent, which provides the main basis of its justification, ultimately meaning the hypothetical contract argument is not a form of voluntaristic defence of the state and is closer to utilitarian theories.
it would seem that universalism – the thesis that everyone has political obligations – cannot be delivered by contract or consent theory in any of the forms discussed here.

Utilitarianism
The fundamental idea of utilitarianism is that the morally correct action in any situation is that which brings about the highest possible, total sum of utility. The problem of finding a way of comparing happiness is known as the problem of ‘interpersonal comparisons of utility’. According to Jeremy Bentham (Fragment on Government), we should obey our rulers as long as the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Indirect utilitarianism is the idea that if we all reasoned directly and utilitarian terms, things will go very badly, hence, we need to follow non-utilitarian reasoning – obey the laws – to maximise happiness. The state is justified, if, and only if it contributes more to human happiness than any feasible, competing arrangement. The problem is that utilitarian thinking often seems to justify great injustices for the sake of general maximised happiness.

Principle of Fairness
Hume argues it is in our favour to obey the law but humans do not always act rationally, thus we need the motivation of punishment. He uses this argument to explain the advantages of the state, even if it isn’t funded on our consent. Hart, a theorist of fairness, believes we have a duty of fairness to accept the duty to obey the state, because, since we will all benefit from the state, it would be unfair to our fellow citizens to take those benefits without also accepting the burdens necessary to create them. These burdens are political obligations. But how do we stop the acceptance of benefits, becoming purely automatic?

David Hume on the benefits of society
Grouping together means we have greater power, by division of Labour and exchange of goods we obtain what we don’t have the ability to do for ourselves, and through mutual support we are less vulnerable to misfortune
A society of justice removes the threat of self-interest tempting us to become better through robbery - thus a just society is better for everyone
BUT self interest is not always long sighted = no motivation is as strong as self interest but there is a conflict through short (theft) and long (stability & peace) THUS we need is a way of acting that benefits us long and short term = this is what the law does = it is better to obey and avoid punishment in the short term = doing what is in our interests is rational thus it is rational to submit to the state
Locke, Hume and Hobbes disagree about the benefits of the state, but agree that living in a state is in our self-interests and thus it’s is rational to submit

Question 21

An Introduction to Political Philosophy
Jonathan Wolff
3. Who Should Rule?

Answer 21

Democracy
Bentham calls democracy ruling ‘in the interest if the governed’, but so could other types of government; Voltaire argued in favour of a ‘benevolent dictatorship’. Contemporary Theorists sometimes claim ‘democracy’ is not a political system, but a term of praise as there is no single coherent theory of democracy. This certainly has basis, though may be an exaggeration, in that democratic theory contains serious tensions. For example, the idea of majority rule versus individual rights, and representative versus direct models, or which system is most democratic, proportional representation or FPTP. Mill developed De Tocqueville’s ‘tyranny of the majority’ by pointing out that before the large scale establishment of democratic regimes, it was generally assumes that, if people are ruling in their own interests, it would be impossible for political oppression to exist, but this ignores minorities, individual and conflicting interests. If 51% of people think one idea is great, but it greatly harms the other 49%, is that undemocratic? The ‘Madisonian’ view (after James Madison 1751-1804, often known as ‘the father of the American Constitution’) is that democracy requires the protection of minorities. We must justify that democracy has value both instrumentally, as a way of achieving the common good and the ‘best result’, and value in itself, as an expression of freedom and equality.

Plato
‘Democracy’ = ‘rule by the demos’, ‘demos’ being ‘people’, or equally ‘mob’, in Greek. Plato uses the ‘craft analogy’ to reason that professionals with great skill & education should rule, not a gathered uniformed mass. Ruling is a skill, training is required, and not everyone is fit. If the people are left to decide they will be swayed by those who speak loudest with most conviction - the Sophists - ignoring those truly skilled with the art. A just society is impossible unless the kings become philosophers, or the philosophers become kings.

Mixed-Motivation Voting

The Marquis de Condorcet (1743-94) argued that if we assume everyone on average has a better than even chance of choosing the ‘right result’, a mathematical model proves that the chance that we reach this ‘right result’ in a large vote tends towards certain, showing voting may indeed be the best way to decide the ‘common good’. This relies on the aforementioned assumption however, and also the assumption that people won’t vote for their preference rather than by their moral compass, i.e. mixed-motivation voting.

Rousseau

We can see Rousseau’s ‘Social Contract’ as an attempt to show the conditions under which democracy will be superior to guardianship. The ‘Sovereign’ is the term he uses for the body of citizens acting collectively, with authority over themselves. He argues that a democratic state should: place much weight on the education of citizens, involve much public service, and should heavily involve the people in active political decision making. Unfortunately he also concludes ‘were there are people of Gods, the government would be democratic. So perfect a government is not for men’. Rousseau believed their is a ‘general will’, laws should be expressive of the general will, equally apliccable to all and thus no unjust laws can be created. The elected aristocracy, the ‘wisest should govern the many, where it is assured that they will govern for [ the many’s ] profit and not for it’s own’. Does he suggests a model in which the ‘sovereign cannot act save when the people is assembled’, the sovereign exclusively make laws and the government only applies or administers them. The correct policy is one that benefits all citizens equally (except for women, who, of course, Rousseau saw as inferior and even Mary Wollstonecraft, the first major advocate for women’s rights, argued that women should be included in citizenry in her Vindictaion of the Rights of Women (1992) but not, for example, their female servants). For laws that express the general will, however, there must be common interests, and this can only happen when large inequalities are absent, e.g. monetary, classes, thus no political parties. People must also be made to identify very strongly with the group as a whole - education for civic virtue - so that people will seek to advance the general will. This would also include a censor who’s role was to discourage and ridicule certain forms of antisocial behaviour, and a civic religion. Overall his model seems to create the ‘right result’ effectively, including great amounts of equality but limited freedom, as one is not allowed to be ‘unconventional’ but is ‘forced to be [what the general will defines as] free’. The same measures which makes democracy instrumentally defensible in his model, also make it intrinsically undesirable, as social unity must be so tight that it is repressive, and this is all assuming that a ‘general will’ actually exists.
A “participatory democracy” is a theory that adjusts Rousseau’s model, allowing more space for dissent and individual involvement with all decision making. But it seems unrealistic to suggest participatory politics on every level, it’s time consuming and often not always effective. Thus, a representative democracy, as defended by Mill, one of the founders of modern liberal theory. He argues government has the aim to ‘improve’ citizens and to manage their public affairs. He argues ‘good despotism’ leads to passivity: “ let a person have nothing to do for his country and he will not care for it“ - Representative Government. His key assumption is that human beings flourish only under conditions of independence. He also emphasises the importance of educating the citizens for citizenship, and agrees with Plato that the best people equipped for ruling are those least likely to want to.
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804) discussed how to protect ourselves from unsavoury powers in The Federalist Papers. John Locke and Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755) proposed the ‘separation of powers’ to stop representative democracies falling into tyranny. Mill says it is vital that citizens vote in accordance with their ideas of the general interest, much like Rousseau. Mill argues that some, such as those who cannot read or write or receive relief, should not have the vote while people who are especially qualified should have more than one to avoid the system being swayed by stupidity or class interest.

Question 22

An Introduction to Political Philosophy
Jonathan Wolff

Answer 22

We must feel political obligation to follow the law, not just having specific moral reason which applies to specific laws, or following the law because although it is rational ( as we have no obligation to act rationally). How does one acquire an obligation? Through consent: the Social Contract.
Power, In the context of politics, can be defined as the ability to get others to do things even they might not want to do, operating through persuasion, on the basis of reasons, they accept, or through coercion.
in the descriptive sense of practical authority, a state has authority if it maintains public order and makes laws that are generally obeyed by citizens; Authority goes beyond power, because it can secure public order, which depends in part on people respecting the law, thus citizens must believe the status is legitimate
In the normative sense, a state has practical authority if its authority in the descriptive sense is legitimate
A state is legitimate, literally if it exists and operates according to the law, from the Latin for ‘lawful’ BUT ACTUALLY ONLY if it is right or justified that those in power hold power
Many philosophers argue that legitimacy depends on popular approval, but Plato objects that legitimate practical authority depends on theoretical authority, this involves those in power have a knowledge of what is good for the state and the skill to rule it. A state based on popular approval will not get such leaders.
Many philosophers have argued that people only have a political obligation if the government has a legitimate authority.

Question 23

An Introduction to Political Philosophy
Jonathan Wolff