Banking crises Flashcards

1
Q

Defenition of banking crisis

A

Bank runs that lead to closure of bank

Closure mind be inplicit: take-over by other bank

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2
Q

Systemic banking ciris

Definition

A

When a large number of institutions is hit

example: US housemarket spread all over the world

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3
Q

Systemic risk

Simultaneous faulure of several banks: problem

A

Risk complete meltdown financial system

Asset prices collapse: banks have to liquidate to obtain liquidity –> economic losses –> feedback to the banking system

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4
Q

Source of systemic risk

3 sources

A
  1. Failure of a large bank
  2. Contagion
  3. Correlated exposures
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5
Q

Reasons for contagion banks (source of systemic risk)

4 reasons

A
  1. Depositors at other banks panic
  2. Direct losses trough credit exposure
  3. Information contagion
  4. Collapse in asset price
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6
Q

Is bank deversification always good?

A

No, social and individual optimal is not the same. Banks neglect the effect if diversification on systemic risk.

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7
Q

Proof that deversification reduces risk

Take 2 assets, random return, same variance and uncorrelated

Portfolio + variance

A

Minimal variance when r =0.5
Expected return of portfolio, than variance and minim

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8
Q

Model of banking Wagner

Each bank has d deposit

Date 1 and date 2

A

Date 1: invest in everything, after returns are known. Date 2: look when they fall: x < d and y < d
Drawing

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9
Q

Diversification at bank 2 in Wagner model

r is fraction of funds invested by B2 in asset X

How does it affect the outcome in period 2?

A
  • Less failure when asset Y performes badly
  • More faiure when asset X performes badly
  • Less failure but more systemic crisis

Make drawing

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10
Q

Definition liquidation cost

A

One bank fails: sell to other bank: loss = c
both banks fail: sell to outsider: loss = c x q (where q>1-

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11
Q

Value of the banks: expected return

A

W = expected return on assets - liquidation costs

E(Vi) - Pi I x c - piS x c x q

Pi I: probability individual failure, pi s: prob. systemic failure

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12
Q

Expected return on the bank when no diversification

A

Return on asset: v1 = x, v2 = y
Expected return on asset = mu
Expected return on bank= mu - c x (pi I + piS x q)

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13
Q

Expected return on bank with diversification at bank 2

A

E(w2) = E(v2) - c (pi I 2 + pi s q)
V2 = r2 x + (1-r2)y

Both assets same expected return so E(v2) = mu, independent of r2

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14
Q

What is the effect of r2?

r = fraction of funds invested by bank 2 in assets x

A

Higer r2, reduces pi I Z
Increases pi S

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15
Q

Optimal r2 from bank perspective

A

R2 > 0: diversification
R2 < 0,5: less than full diversification becasue of higher costs of systemic risk (q>1)

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16
Q

Externalities of diversification

A

Diversification at bank 2 increases pi S
pi s affects bank 1
for bank 1: pi I 1 + pi S does nog change but piS increases: larger fraction of bank 1 failutes during systemic risk
Diversification at bank 2 does not increase the probability of failure B1 but BA suffers higher expected liquidation costs because higher systemic risk

Drawing of puntje 2

17
Q

Diversification at both banks

A

choose rE1 = rE2 = rE > 0
Individual optimal diversificaton ratio: rE = 1 / 1 + wortel q
No extra cost of systemic risk (q = 1) –> RE = 0,5

18
Q

Social optimum

Bank optimizes only thinking about own return: write down total welfare

A

W1 + W2 = E(v1) + E(v2) - c(pi I1 + pi I 2 + 2pi S maal q)

19
Q

Value of social optimal diversification

A

rster = 1 / 1 + wortel (2q-1)
Lower than rE: because takes negetive externality into account

20
Q

Policy implication

A

Regulation should discourage diversification
More diversified banks should have higher capoital requirements

Enough motivation to diversify but negles effect dive on pi S