Authority

Question 1

Political authority

Answer 1

When entity issues binding laws enforced by coercive means

Question 2

Reasons legitimate political authority might depend on democracy?

Answer 2

1. consent
2. promotion of substantive outcomes (e.g. equality)
3. Moral obligation to obey, due to egalitarian principle embodied in democracy and equal respect for persons
4. Value of autonomy

Question 3

Raz’ service conception

Answer 3

role of authority is to serve governed, by enabling them to act better on reasons that already apply to them

Question 4

What undermines tacit consent?

Answer 4

1. We have no choice but to enjoy benefits (many public goods = non-excludable)
2. No genuine alternative (costs of leaving country too high)

Question 5

Principle of fair play

Answer 5

those who benefit from others’ cooperative efforts have obligation to pay fair share (wrong to free ride)

Question 6

Benefit foisting objection

Answer 6

NOZICK

can’t force benefits on others and then demand payment/obligation

Question 7

Claim of voluntarist fair play

Answer 7

Distinction between actively accepting and merely receiving benefits

Question 8

Problem w/voluntarist fair play?

Answer 8

how can citizens actively accept benefits of non-excludable goods provided by state?

Question 9

Conditions for Klosko’s fair play?

Answer 9

Fair play obligations arise if receive goods which meet following conditions because it would be deeply objectionable to free-ride

1. Benefits > costs
2. ‘Presumptively beneficial’ good (i.e. every individual can reasonably be expected to want good, whatever their values/conception of good)
3. Fair scheme (e.g. fair distribution of benefits and burdens)

Question 10

Rawls - natural duty of justice

Answer 10

1. Support and comply w/just institutions that exist + apply to us
2. Create + support institutions that protect basic rights/justly govern distribution of benefits and burdens of social cooperation

Question 11

Particularity objection to natural duty of justice claims

Answer 11

Particularity objection

1. why obligated to our particular state?
2. Which institutions apply to us?
3. Why not duty to create these institutions across globally?

Question 12

A posteriori anarchism

Answer 12

legitimate authority possible, but no existing states justify conditions for it

Question 13

A priori anarchism

Answer 13

no state could ever be legitimate

Question 14

Stiltz – why do he argue we are required to obey democratic laws?

Answer 14

natural duty not to unilaterally impose will on others

Question 15

Simmons - universal weakness of natural duty theories

Answer 15

1. Imply that duties not dependent on relationships to particular institution
2. Therefore universal only obliged to obey law of ‘own’ government (not all governments globally that meet criteria)

Question 16

Response to Simmons’ particularity objection to natural duty theories. Reply to this?

Answer 16

1. Not obliged to obey law where not obeying wouldn’t threaten other just institutions (e.g. France’s democratic, just institutions) and wouldn’t impose our will on others/violate a right
2. Other states could easily make us obliged to obey their laws (E.g. if France granted me citizenship against my will, would that give me an obligation to obey French laws too?)

Question 17

Wolff’s argument for a priori anarchism

Answer 17

Primary obligation of autonomy – “refusal to be ruled”

1. Political obligations imply we’ve surrendered our right to choose to an authority, neglecting our obligation to be autonomous agents
2. Only exception = direct democracy with unanimous decisions, although wouldn’t really constitute political obligation
3. Political obligations can’t exist

Question 18

Why does Wolff argue for the primary obligation of autonomy (refusal to be ruled)?

Answer 18

1. Humans have capacity to choose/be free + responsibility to use capacity (and hence be autonomous agents)
2. Have primary obligation because it’s necessary for moral action

Question 19

Obligations vs duties

Answer 19

1. Obligations must be voluntarily undertaken
   (a) E.g. obligation to keep promise/fulfil contract arises only when done something to generate obligation
   (b) e.g. made promise, signed contract
2. Duties need not be
   (a) E.g. moral duties fall on us regardless of voluntary commitments

Question 20

Parekh - distinction between legal obligation and political obligation

Answer 20

1. Obligation to obey law = legal obligation
2. Political obligation broader (someone who owes political obligation owes polity more than obedience to its law, but also duty also to take positive steps to secure safety + advance interests of country)

Question 21

Response to Wolff’s a priori anarchist argument

Answer 21

1. Implausible that autonomy overrides all other values

2. Not clear Wolff can reject political authority w/o also rejecting promises and contracts as constraints on autonomy

Question 22

Estlund - normative consent

Answer 22

1. Most agree consent void if wrong to consent to authority (e.g. consent to become slave generates no obligation)
2. Symmetrically, draw same conclusion where would wrong not to consent to another’s authority
3. i.e. failure to consent where wrong not to do so = void
4. If state performs morally necessary tasks (and hence citizens ought to consent to obey laws), then failure to consent effectively void (still have political obligations)

Question 23

3 interpretations of ‘legitimate political authority’

Answer 23

1. Justified coercion
2. Capacity to impose duties
3. Right to rule

Question 24

Dworkin - conditions for communities to generate associative political obligations

Answer 24

1. Communities satisfying 4 conditions generate obligations:
   (a) Each member sees themselves as having special obligations to other members
   (b) Obligations seen as owed to each other personally
   (c) Obligations flow from concern for well-being of each of members
   (d) Obligations flow from equal concern for all members

Question 25

Descriptive vs normative legitimacy

Answer 25

1. Descriptive legitimacy - people’s beliefs about political authority and obligations
2. Normative legitimacy - some benchmark of acceptability or justification of political power/authority

Question 26

3 conceptual accounts of legitimate political authority

Answer 26

1. Justified coercion
2. Capacity to impose duties
3. Right to rule

Question 27

What is a political obligation?

Answer 27

1. Each under general obligation of obedience to legal norms of society in which they live
2. If citizens have such obligation, then state imposes obligations on us through legislative acts (i.e. it has authority)

Question 28

What does Rawls argue about fair play obligation arguments?

Answer 28

1. Fair play can generate obligations only when “one has voluntarily accepted” its benefits
2. Lots of state-provided good non-excludable and so can’t avoid enjoying benefits

Question 29

Does Rawls think we still have political obligations when laws not fully just?

Answer 29

Still have political obligations as long as institutions and law reasonably just

Question 30

Challenges to a posteriori anarchist argument

Answer 30

1. Objection – hypocrisy
   (i) (Philosophical) anarchists claim legitimate state and political obligations don’t exist, yet don’t do anything about it + may still see value in institutions
2. Objection – denying political obligation
   (i) Intuition – we do have political obligations
   (ii) Anarchism denies this

Question 31

Rawls’ definition of normative political legitimacy?

Answer 31

justification of coercive political power

Question 32

Example Estlund uses to demonstrate normative consent argument?

Answer 32

1. Plane crash, but strong chance to save many people w/well-coordinated effort
2. Steward takes control and gives commands to coordinate rescue
3. Plan will be successful, but requires cooperation of everyone
4. Steward not giving any immoral commands
5. Conclusion
   (i) Clearly immoral for someone in position to help not to agree to steward’s commands
   (ii) non-consent here nullified due to immorality of not consenting

Question 33

Problems with associative membership political obligation theories?

Answer 33

1. Problem w/family analogy – not persuasive because members of political community lack close and intimate relationships
2. Conflates sense of obligation w/obligation itself – I may feel more obliged to save my brother, but that doesn’t mean I actually am obliged (i.e. feeling of obligation doesn’t provide independent moral justification)