Attribution

Question 1

Attribution - Heider & Simmel Video Demo (1944):

A:
B:
C: The video displays silent shapes moving and interacting. Viewers typically interpret these movements as depicting a narrative: a big triangle acting as a bully with a temper, and a small triangle and small circle being bullied and teaming up. Despite being merely shapes, people attribute gender, personality, relationships, drama, intentions, and motivations to them. Notably, individuals with autism often see these shapes purely as movements without any ascribed motivations or personalities.

Answer 1

C: The video displays silent shapes moving and interacting. Viewers typically interpret these movements as depicting a narrative: a big triangle acting as a bully with a temper, and a small triangle and small circle being bullied and teaming up. Despite being merely shapes, people attribute gender, personality, relationships, drama, intentions, and motivations to them. Notably, individuals with autism often see these shapes purely as movements without any ascribed motivations or personalities.

Question 2

Inferring (invisible) mental states:

A: An IKEA ad makes the audience feel bad for a replaced lamp, highlighting our tendency to ascribe emotions to inanimate objects. This reflects our automatic inference of mental states, which we also do for humans. We’re built to infer invisible mental states, constantly making and being overly confident in our inferences about others’ thoughts and intentions. It demonstrates that while we naturally describe movements in terms of intentions, desires, and emotional states, these states are not actually visible; we merely believe we can see them.
B:
C:

Answer 2

A: An IKEA ad makes the audience feel bad for a replaced lamp, highlighting our tendency to ascribe emotions to inanimate objects. This reflects our automatic inference of mental states, which we also do for humans. We’re built to infer invisible mental states, constantly making and being overly confident in our inferences about others’ thoughts and intentions. It demonstrates that while we naturally describe movements in terms of intentions, desires, and emotional states, these states are not actually visible; we merely believe we can see them.

Question 3

Invisible States & Traits: What is reasonable to infer?

A:
B:
C: It’s reasonable to start by inferring traits to predict states, intentions, and behaviors, moving from broad to narrow. For example, an angry person (trait) is likely to be in an angry (state), and thus more likely to want to respond in a hostile fashion (intention) and more likely to be hostile (behavior). However, in everyday life, we typically start with observed behavior and infer backwards to traits.

Answer 3

C: It’s reasonable to start by inferring traits to predict states, intentions, and behaviors, moving from broad to narrow. For example, an angry person (trait) is likely to be in an angry (state), and thus more likely to want to respond in a hostile fashion (intention) and more likely to be hostile (behavior). However, in everyday life, we typically start with observed behavior and infer backwards to traits.

Question 4

Invisible States & Traits: What do we actually infer? (incorrectly)

A:
B: We infer states and traits backwards: Behavior → Intention → State → Trait. This is known as “affirming the consequent,” which is a logical fallacy. For example, if it rains, the game is canceled, but if the game is canceled, it doesn’t necessarily mean it’s raining; there could be other reasons.
C:

Answer 4

B: We infer states and traits backwards: Behavior → Intention → State → Trait. This is known as “affirming the consequent,” which is a logical fallacy. For example, if it rains, the game is canceled, but if the game is canceled, it doesn’t necessarily mean it’s raining; there could be other reasons.

Question 5

How do we make attributions?

A:
B: We attribute behavior to either dispositional factors (traits) or situational factors. For example, a golf ball rolls because it is round (dispositional) or because someone hit it (situational). Both factors usually work together, but we tend to focus on one and ignore the other. This applies to everyday behaviors, like why Joe kicked Fido. Joe might have a bad temper (dispositional) or Fido might have bitten him first (situational). Often, we consider just one explanation, though both can be valid.
C:

Answer 5

B: We attribute behavior to either dispositional factors (traits) or situational factors. For example, a golf ball rolls because it is round (dispositional) or because someone hit it (situational). Both factors usually work together, but we tend to focus on one and ignore the other. This applies to everyday behaviors, like why Joe kicked Fido. Joe might have a bad temper (dispositional) or Fido might have bitten him first (situational). Often, we consider just one explanation, though both can be valid.

Question 6

When making attributions how do we decide whether to focus on dispositional or situational factors?

A: To determine whether Joe’s behavior is dispositional or situational, we examine his actions across different situations over time. How does Joe behave at a birthday party, when attacked, at a restaurant, or if he loses his job? By comparing his behavior in various contexts, we can assess if Joe generally has a bad temper or if his actions are situation-specific. This approach is similar to Hal Kelley’s Covariation Model.
B:
C:

Answer 6

A: To determine whether Joe’s behavior is dispositional or situational, we examine his actions across different situations over time. How does Joe behave at a birthday party, when attacked, at a restaurant, or if he loses his job? By comparing his behavior in various contexts, we can assess if Joe generally has a bad temper or if his actions are situation-specific. This approach is similar to Hal Kelley’s Covariation Model.

Question 7

Hal Kelley’s (1967) Covariation Model:

A: This model explains how we make attributions by examining how behavior covaries with situations. To understand why Joe kicked Fido, we consider three factors: distinctiveness, consensus, and consistency. Distinctiveness assesses how unusual/uncommon Joe’s behavior is across different situations; if Joe is mean to many people, it suggests a bad temper. Consensus looks at how others behave in the same situation; if everyone is mean to Fido, it indicates Fido may provoke people. Consistency examines whether Joe always kicks Fido; if not, something temporary, like a bad day at work, may have provoked Joe. These three factors help us understand the reasons behind Joe’s behavior.
B:
C:

Answer 7

A: This model explains how we make attributions by examining how behavior covaries with situations. To understand why Joe kicked Fido, we consider three factors: distinctiveness, consensus, and consistency. Distinctiveness assesses how unusual/uncommon Joe’s behavior is across different situations; if Joe is mean to many people, it suggests a bad temper. Consensus looks at how others behave in the same situation; if everyone is mean to Fido, it indicates Fido may provoke people. Consistency examines whether Joe always kicks Fido; if not, something temporary, like a bad day at work, may have provoked Joe. These three factors help us understand the reasons behind Joe’s behavior.

Question 8

What leads to a dispositional attribution?

A:
B:
C: A dispositional attribution is made when there is low distinctiveness (it’s not unusual or uncommon for them), low consensus (not everyone behaves the same way in the same situation), and high consistency. This means the behavior is consistent across different situations, people, and time.

Answer 8

C: A dispositional attribution is made when there is low distinctiveness (it’s not unusual or uncommon for them), low consensus (not everyone behaves the same way in the same situation), and high consistency. This means the behavior is consistent across different situations, people, and time.

Question 9

Limitations of Covariation Analysis:

A:
B: It’s a perspective model of what we should be doing, not what we actually do. It assumes we observe behavior over time and across various situations, but in reality, we often don’t have the time or opportunity to do so. We rarely see people in different contexts unless they are close friends or family. Typically, we see one behavior and make assumptions based on that single instance. While the model suggests a thorough process for making attributions, in everyday life, we jump to conclusions based on limited information.
C:

Answer 9

B: It’s a perspective model of what we should be doing, not what we actually do. It assumes we observe behavior over time and across various situations, but in reality, we often don’t have the time or opportunity to do so. We rarely see people in different contexts unless they are close friends or family. Typically, we see one behavior and make assumptions based on that single instance. While the model suggests a thorough process for making attributions, in everyday life, we jump to conclusions based on limited information.

Question 10

Correspondent Inference Theory - Ned Jones (1965):

A: This attribution theory aligns more with what we actually do, focusing on single behaviors since we often lack the information required for the Covariation Model. The formula is: Behavior (B) = Dispositions (D) + Situational Factors (S). The more situational factors account for the behavior, the less we should attribute it to disposition (D = B - S). Jones suggests using social norms to determine if behavior is dispositional or situational. Since we understand how situations typically affect people, we don’t need to observe them extensively. For instance, in a library where quietness is the norm, someone being loud reveals a lot about their disposition. If behavior aligns with social norms (B = S), no dispositional inference is needed. However, if behavior exceeds situational expectations (B > S), it indicates a dispositional trait. For example, Mark punching Bill might seem highly hostile until we learn Bill provoked him by revealing an affair with Mark’s wife, shifting the attribution to the situation rather than Mark’s disposition.
B:
C:

Answer 10

A: This attribution theory aligns more with what we actually do, focusing on single behaviors since we often lack the information required for the Covariation Model. The formula is: Behavior (B) = Dispositions (D) + Situational Factors (S). The more situational factors account for the behavior, the less we should attribute it to disposition (D = B - S). Jones suggests using social norms to determine if behavior is dispositional or situational. Since we understand how situations typically affect people, we don’t need to observe them extensively. For instance, in a library where quietness is the norm, someone being loud reveals a lot about their disposition. If behavior aligns with social norms (B = S), no dispositional inference is needed. However, if behavior exceeds situational expectations (B > S), it indicates a dispositional trait. For example, Mark punching Bill might seem highly hostile until we learn Bill provoked him by revealing an affair with Mark’s wife, shifting the attribution to the situation rather than Mark’s disposition.

Question 11

The Castro Study (Classic) Jones & Harris (1967):

A:
B:
C: This study tested the Correspondent Inference Theory by having subjects read essays for or against Castro, written by students who either chose their stance or were required by an authority figure. Subjects rated how pro-Castro they believed the writers were to measure their dispositional attitudes. Predictions were that freely chosen essays would reflect true attitudes, while required essays should not. However, results showed that subjects still rated writers with no choice as more pro-Castro than expected, indicating they didn’t fully account for situational constraints. This demonstrates the Correspondence Bias or Fundamental Attribution Error, where people tend to make dispositional attributions despite clear situational influences.

Answer 11

C: This study tested the Correspondent Inference Theory by having subjects read essays for or against Castro, written by students who either chose their stance or were required by an authority figure. Subjects rated how pro-Castro they believed the writers were to measure their dispositional attitudes. Predictions were that freely chosen essays would reflect true attitudes, while required essays should not. However, results showed that subjects still rated writers with no choice as more pro-Castro than expected, indicating they didn’t fully account for situational constraints. This demonstrates the Correspondence Bias or Fundamental Attribution Error, where people tend to make dispositional attributions despite clear situational influences.

Question 12

The Correspondence Bias (Jones & Harris, 1967) A.K.A Fundamental Attribution Error
(Ross, 1977):

A:
B:
C: This bias is the tendency to make dispositional attributions from observed behavior, even when situational influences explain the behavior. For example, we see a hostile action and infer a hostile personality, ignoring situational factors. The power of the situation is often invisible to us; we see the behavior but not the context. This bias supports Hypothesis 2: “we don’t know why people do what they do.” We struggle to account for situational influences that are not immediately apparent, making it hard to separate an actor from the role they play.

Answer 12

C: This bias is the tendency to make dispositional attributions from observed behavior, even when situational influences explain the behavior. For example, we see a hostile action and infer a hostile personality, ignoring situational factors. The power of the situation is often invisible to us; we see the behavior but not the context. This bias supports Hypothesis 2: “we don’t know why people do what they do.” We struggle to account for situational influences that are not immediately apparent, making it hard to separate an actor from the role they play.

Question 13

Why do we commit the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) - Gilbert & Malone, 1995?

A:
B:
C: #1: Overlooking Situational Constraints, #2: Inaccurate Theories of Situational Influence, #3 Salience, #4: Incomplete Corrections of Automatic Dispositional Inferences

Answer 13

C: #1: Overlooking Situational Constraints, #2: Inaccurate Theories of Situational Influence, #3 Salience, #4: Incomplete Corrections of Automatic Dispositional Inferences

Question 14

1. Overlooking Situational Constraints:

A:
B:
C: Situations are often invisible because they exist in the mind of the actor or are related to the roles they take on. We can also be the situation for others, causing them to act differently around us compared to others. These subjective construals, such as previous threats, are not visible to outside observers, making it easy to overlook situational influences.

Answer 14

C: Situations are often invisible because they exist in the mind of the actor or are related to the roles they take on. We can also be the situation for others, causing them to act differently around us compared to others. These subjective construals, such as previous threats, are not visible to outside observers, making it easy to overlook situational influences.

Question 15

2. Inaccurate Theories of Situational Influence (Sherman, 1980):

A:
B: This concept aligns with Corollary 2a: we are unaware of the power of situations. Even when aware of situational factors, we tend to underestimate their influence. Studies showed that subjects predicted they would not comply with writing a counterattitudinal essay or singing a song over the phone, but they were much more compliant than expected. This occurs because we cannot see the power of authority, an invisible factor that significantly influences behavior. We are poor at predicting the extent to which situations will impact us.
C:

Answer 15

B: This concept aligns with Corollary 2a: we are unaware of the power of situations. Even when aware of situational factors, we tend to underestimate their influence. Studies showed that subjects predicted they would not comply with writing a counterattitudinal essay or singing a song over the phone, but they were much more compliant than expected. This occurs because we cannot see the power of authority, an invisible factor that significantly influences behavior. We are poor at predicting the extent to which situations will impact us.

Question 16

3. Salience:

A:
B: Salience refers to what grabs your attention; for example, in a room where everyone is wearing white, the person in red stands out. We tend not to commit the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) for ourselves because we are more aware of situational influences on our behavior than our own actions. For others, we see only the behavior and judge based on that, often overlooking situational factors. This is called the Actor-Observer Effect. For example, I’m speeding because I’m late for work, but you’re speeding because you’re a bad driver. Salient things are attention-getting, and we use situational explanations for ourselves but focus on behavior for others because the situation is often invisible.
C:

Answer 16

B: Salience refers to what grabs your attention; for example, in a room where everyone is wearing white, the person in red stands out. We tend not to commit the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) for ourselves because we are more aware of situational influences on our behavior than our own actions. For others, we see only the behavior and judge based on that, often overlooking situational factors. This is called the Actor-Observer Effect. For example, I’m speeding because I’m late for work, but you’re speeding because you’re a bad driver. Salient things are attention-getting, and we use situational explanations for ourselves but focus on behavior for others because the situation is often invisible.

Question 17

Actor-Observer Effect (Salience):

A: A cognitive bias where people attribute causes for behaviors differently based on whether they are the actor or an observer. When observing someone else’s behavior (observer perspective), we tend to attribute their actions to their personality or dispositional factors rather than situational influences. For example, if someone else is speeding, we might think, “They are a reckless driver.” However, when explaining our own behavior (actor perspective), we are more likely to attribute it to situational factors rather than our personality. For instance, if we are speeding, we might think, “I’m in a hurry because I’m late for work.
B:
C:

Answer 17

A: A cognitive bias where people attribute causes for behaviors differently based on whether they are the actor or an observer. When observing someone else’s behavior (observer perspective), we tend to attribute their actions to their personality or dispositional factors rather than situational influences. For example, if someone else is speeding, we might think, “They are a reckless driver.” However, when explaining our own behavior (actor perspective), we are more likely to attribute it to situational factors rather than our personality. For instance, if we are speeding, we might think, “I’m in a hurry because I’m late for work.

Question 18

Consequence of Differential Attributions for self & other (Vorauer & Ratner, 1996) - Salience Example:

A:
B: Participants were asked to imagine meeting someone equally attractive at a party, having a conversation, and then parting ways without asking for a date. When explaining why they didn’t follow up, participants commonly cited fear of rejection. However, when asked why the other person didn’t follow up, participants assumed it was because the other person wasn’t interested. This discrepancy, where individuals believe others have different reasons than their own, is known as pluralistic ignorance. It highlights how fear of rejection prevents people from expressing interest, while they assume the lack of follow-up from others means disinterest.
C:

Answer 18

B: Participants were asked to imagine meeting someone equally attractive at a party, having a conversation, and then parting ways without asking for a date. When explaining why they didn’t follow up, participants commonly cited fear of rejection. However, when asked why the other person didn’t follow up, participants assumed it was because the other person wasn’t interested. This discrepancy, where individuals believe others have different reasons than their own, is known as pluralistic ignorance. It highlights how fear of rejection prevents people from expressing interest, while they assume the lack of follow-up from others means disinterest.

Question 19

4. Incomplete Corrections of Automatic Dispositional Inferences (Dan Gilbert, 1989):

A: aligns with Corollary 3b, suggesting we often overlook biases in our judgments because they occur automatically. According to the Sequential Operations Model, our judgment process involves three steps: automatic behavioral characterization, automatic initial dispositional attribution, and controlled situational correction. The first two steps happen regardless of situational constraints, as they are associative processes. The third step, situational correction, requires effort and motivation, making it less likely to occur under cognitive load. For example, seeing someone throw a punch leads to an automatic inference of a hostile person, but recognizing it’s a staged act requires deliberate correction, which happens only if we are motivated and not distracted.
B:
C:

Answer 19

A: aligns with Corollary 3b, suggesting we often overlook biases in our judgments because they occur automatically. According to the Sequential Operations Model, our judgment process involves three steps: automatic behavioral characterization, automatic initial dispositional attribution, and controlled situational correction. The first two steps happen regardless of situational constraints, as they are associative processes. The third step, situational correction, requires effort and motivation, making it less likely to occur under cognitive load. For example, seeing someone throw a punch leads to an automatic inference of a hostile person, but recognizing it’s a staged act requires deliberate correction, which happens only if we are motivated and not distracted.

Question 20

STUDY: Incomplete Corrections (Gilbert, Pelham & Krull, 1988):

A:
B:
C: Tests the Sequential Operations Model. Participants watched a silent video of a woman behaving anxiously during an interview. They were asked, “How anxious is this woman in everyday life?” with the context of either anxiety-provoking or calming topics. Participants were either made cognitively busy (by remembering the list of topics) or not. Findings showed that in the cognitively busy condition, participants judged the woman as anxious regardless of the topic, demonstrating automatic dispositional inferences under cognitive load. In the non-busy condition, participants adjusted their judgments based on the context, but still didn’t fully correct for situational factors. This indicates that while situational corrections occur without cognitive load, strong dispositional attributions persist, anchored by the initial behavior observed.

Answer 20

C: Tests the Sequential Operations Model. Participants watched a silent video of a woman behaving anxiously during an interview. They were asked, “How anxious is this woman in everyday life?” with the context of either anxiety-provoking or calming topics. Participants were either made cognitively busy (by remembering the list of topics) or not. Findings showed that in the cognitively busy condition, participants judged the woman as anxious regardless of the topic, demonstrating automatic dispositional inferences under cognitive load. In the non-busy condition, participants adjusted their judgments based on the context, but still didn’t fully correct for situational factors. This indicates that while situational corrections occur without cognitive load, strong dispositional attributions persist, anchored by the initial behavior observed.

Question 21

Do we see this same bias in other cultures?

A: Yes
B: No

Answer 21

A: Yes

East Asians claim to value sensitivity to situational factors more than European Americans (Norenzayan et al., 2002). However, when tested under cognitive load, both East Asians and European Americans make similar dispositional attributions (Lieberman et al., 2005). This suggests that despite cultural differences in expressed values, cognitive load leads to the same attributional patterns across cultures.

Question 22

Circumscribed Accuracy (Swann, 1984):

A:
B:
C: Explains why the world doesn’t suffer from widespread misattributions. We often see people in consistent situations, such as assuming a waiter is obedient because they serves us. This misattribution is usually harmless because we typically see waiters in their work context. Problems arise when we misapply these assumptions outside familiar contexts, like expecting the same obedience from a waiter in a grocery store. Additionally, we sometimes are the situation for others, influencing their behavior around us. For example, a lion and a giraffe describe a man by the water hole differently; the lion sees him as always screaming, while the giraffe sees him as always calm. This illustrates Circumscribed Accuracy—we tend to see people in the same situation. People also choose situations that align with their personalities, reinforcing consistent behavior. However, this consistency is less reliable in experimental settings.

Answer 22

C: Explains why the world doesn’t suffer from widespread misattributions. We often see people in consistent situations, such as assuming a waiter is obedient because they serves us. This misattribution is usually harmless because we typically see waiters in their work context. Problems arise when we misapply these assumptions outside familiar contexts, like expecting the same obedience from a waiter in a grocery store. Additionally, we sometimes are the situation for others, influencing their behavior around us. For example, a lion and a giraffe describe a man by the water hole differently; the lion sees him as always screaming, while the giraffe sees him as always calm. This illustrates Circumscribed Accuracy—we tend to see people in the same situation. People also choose situations that align with their personalities, reinforcing consistent behavior. However, this consistency is less reliable in experimental settings.

Question 23

Which of the following scenarios illustrates insufficient justification?

A. Alice is paid $50 to write a positive review of a boring book and later admits she still finds the book boring.

B. Bob is paid $1 to write a positive review of a boring book and later convinces himself that the book was somewhat interesting.

C. Carol receives a high grade after studying hard for a difficult exam and believes her success is due to her effort.

D. Dave chooses to volunteer at a charity event because he genuinely enjoys helping others.

Answer 23

B. Bob is paid $1 to write a positive review of a boring book and later convinces himself that the book was somewhat interesting.

Question 24

Which of the following scenarios illustrates the Sequential Operations Model?

A. Frank assumes his friend is lazy because he didn’t do his homework, without considering that his friend was sick.

B. Grace notices that her colleague always dresses well and concludes that her colleague must be very organized.

C. Henry believes that everyone in his class is intelligent because they all scored high on a test.

D. Emily sees a man yelling at a cashier and initially thinks he is a rude person, but later realizes he was frustrated because of a mistake in his order.

Answer 24

D. Emily sees a man yelling at a cashier and initially thinks he is a rude person, but later realizes he was frustrated because of a mistake in his order.

Question 25

Which of the following scenarios illustrates cognitive dissonance?

A. Jane believes smoking is unhealthy but continues to smoke, so she convinces herself that it helps reduce her stress.

B. Kevin studies hard and receives a high grade, believing his success is due to his effort.

C. Laura volunteers at a shelter because she enjoys helping others and feels good about her actions.

D. Mike buys an expensive gadget and feels satisfied because he believes it’s the best on the market.

Answer 25

A. Jane believes smoking is unhealthy but continues to smoke, so she convinces herself that it helps reduce her stress.

Question 26

Which of the following scenarios illustrates self-verification theory?

A. Tom, who dislikes public speaking, avoids situations where he has to speak in front of others.

B. Sarah, who views herself as a good student, seeks feedback from teachers who also see her as hardworking and intelligent.

C. Olivia donates to charity because she believes in helping those in need.

D. Peter changes his study habits after receiving poor grades to improve his performance.

Answer 26

B. Sarah, who views herself as a good student, seeks feedback from teachers who also see her as hardworking and intelligent.

Question 27

Which of the following scenarios illustrates circumscribed accuracy?

A. Alex always sees his coworker, Sam, being very polite and assumes Sam is a polite person, not realizing Sam behaves differently outside of work.

B. Beth changes her opinion about a movie after reading several positive reviews online.

C. Charlie believes his friend is hardworking because he consistently sees him studying in the library.

D. Dana notices that her friend becomes anxious before exams and assumes this is the only time she feels stressed.

Answer 27

A. Alex always sees his coworker, Sam, being very polite and assumes Sam is a polite person, not realizing Sam behaves differently outside of work.

Question 28

Which of the following scenarios illustrates the concept of attribution?

A. Grace changes her opinion about a restaurant after trying a different dish.

B. Henry thinks his neighbor is unfriendly because he rarely sees him outside.

C. Frank assumes his friend is a good person because he volunteers at a local shelter.

D. Emily believes her coworker is late because he is lazy, not considering that he might have been stuck in traffic.

Answer 28

D. Emily believes her coworker is late because he is lazy, not considering that he might have been stuck in traffic.

Question 29

Which of the following scenarios illustrates the Covariation Model?

A. Frank assumes that everyone who volunteers at the shelter is kind-hearted, without considering other factors.

B. Henry believes his friend is outgoing because he is always talkative at parties, ignoring his behavior in other situations.

C. Emily notices that her friend, Sarah, is always cheerful when she is at work, but not as cheerful when she is at home. She concludes that Sarah’s job makes her happy.

D. Grace sees her classmate studying hard and assumes she must be a dedicated student, regardless of the context.

Answer 29

C. Emily notices that her friend, Sarah, is always cheerful when she is at work, but not as cheerful when she is at home. She concludes that Sarah’s job makes her happy.

Question 30

Which of the following scenarios illustrates the Fundamental Attribution Error (Correspondence Bias)?

A. Emily sees her friend, who is usually calm, acting anxiously and assumes it’s because of an upcoming exam.

B. Frank notices his coworker is late to work and assumes it’s because they are irresponsible, without considering that they might have been stuck in traffic.

C. Grace believes that eating healthy foods will improve her fitness. She notices someone who is fit and assumes they eat healthy foods.

D. Henry sees a person littering and thinks they must be careless, even though there might not be a trash can nearby.

Answer 30

B. Frank notices his coworker is late to work and assumes it’s because they are irresponsible, without considering that they might have been stuck in traffic.