1. Evaluate the View That Class Remains the Biggest Factor

Question 1

P1: Agree Class v Age

Answer 1

1. n the 1970s, the majority of the working class (often identified as C2 and DE in social class categories) voted for the Labour Party, 56% of voters in working-class areas supported Labour, reflecting the party’s strong ties to the working class.
2. In contrast, the upper and middle classes largely supported the Conservative Party. By the 1970s, the Conservative Party received over 50% of votes from the middle classes, especially in areas with higher proportions of non-manual workers.
3. Class-based voting patterns remain evident in some areas. In the 2019 General Election, cities like Liverpool (60.7% Labour) and Manchester (59.7% Labour) maintained strong Labour representation despite the party’s overall poor national performance. In the 2024 election, voters from lower social classes (C2 and DE) were more likely to support the Reform Party, with 32% of C2 voters and 28% of DE voters backing the party, compared to only 16% of AB voters.

Question 2

P1: Class v Age Disagree

Answer 2

1. In 2019, 42% of AB category (managerial) voters supported the Conservative Party, a significant drop from 78% in 1964. Meanwhile, only 34% of DE category (semi-skilled, unskilled, unemployed, or pensioners) voters supported Labour, compared to 64% in 1964.
2. In 2017, YouGov identified age as the “new dividing line” in British politics.In the 2024 election, 18% of 18-24-year-olds voted Green, 41% voted Labour, 9% voted Reform, and 8% voted Conservative. In contrast, only 3% of over-60s voted Green, with 24% voting Labour, 16% voting Reform, and 40% voting Conservative.
3. Turnout is higher among older voters, benefiting the Conservative Party. In 2017, turnout among the 65+ age group was about 25 percentage points higher than among 18-24-year-olds

Question 3

P2: Disagree Class v Education

Answer 3

1. In the 2019 election, 43% of degree holders voted for Labour, 17% for the Lib Dems, and 29% for the Conservatives. In contrast, the Conservative Party secured 58% of the vote among those with GCSE-level education or lower (YouGov). Similarly, in the 2016 EU referendum, 75% of those without qualifications voted for Brexit, while 75% of university graduates voted against it.
2. In the 2024 election, high-education voters leaned towards Labour or the Lib Dems, while those with lower levels of education were more likely to support Reform or the Conservatives. A key explanation for this trend is the values associated with education. Lower-educated voters tend to have more authoritarian values, aligning with the Conservative Party, whereas those with higher education are more likely to embrace libertarian values, favoring Labour or the Liberal Democrats

Question 4

P2: Agree Class v Education

Answer 4

1. The educational divide could be seen as a new class divide, as those with lower education levels tend to earn less than those with higher qualifications. In the 2024 election, Reform received higher vote shares from both working-class voters and those with lower educational attainment. However, the influence of this educational divide may be short-term, largely driven by Brexit. As Brexit becomes less central in politics, this divide may decrease in importance in future elections.

Question 5

P3: Class v Region Disagree

Answer 5

1. Region was once a key determinant of voting behavior, with Labour dominating in the North, parts of Wales, and Scotland, while the Conservative Party controlled the South East and East Midlands. However, from 1997 onwards, regional divisions became less pronounced. Tony Blair’s 1997 victory saw Labour gain middle-class seats, including in the South East and East Midlands. In 2010, the SNP disrupted Labour’s hold in Scotland, and in 2019, the Conservatives made significant gains by breaking parts of Labour’s “Red Wall” in the North, flipping majorities of over 20,000 votes.
2. The 2024 election marked a return to the importance of region in voting behavior. Labour regained dominance in Scotland and the North, while the Conservatives were largely wiped out in these areas, securing just 4 out of 131 seats in the North and Wales, down from 56 in 2019. In Scotland, Labour reclaimed its position as the largest party, winning 37 of 57 seats, dismantling the SNP’s dominance.

Question 6

P3: Class v Region Agree

Answer 6

1. The Tories’ loss of traditional Labour heartlands in the North in 2024 may not signify a return of regional importance but rather reflects their poor performance across the board, including in their own strongholds. The Conservatives lost significant seats not only in the North but also in their traditional areas in the South East, South West, West Midlands, and East of England. In the South East, the Tories won 74 of 91 seats in 2019, but only 30 in 2024, with Labour winning 36 and the Lib Dems 24.
2. Regionally, the divide can be seen as reflecting class, with the North historically favoring Labour due to its working-class concentration, and the South East leaning Conservative due to its middle and upper-class demographics. Today, the regional divide aligns more with the age/education divide, as cities like London have higher proportions of younger, more educated voters who support Labour. Conversely, rural constituencies, which are more likely to vote Conservative or Lib Dem, tend to have older voters with lower educational attainment.