WW1 - War on Land Flashcards
Wars leading up to WW1
-Britain had not fought a European war since the Crimean War of 1853-56
-The 2nd Boer War differed from other colonial wars as the British had suffered setbacks from a force using modern kit, teaching the British a valuable lesson
Crappy tech at start of war
-Both sides were limited by poor communication and lack of intelligence which resulted in poor decision making and lost opportunities
-Hardly any aerial recon at first, apart from a few balloons and recon planes, generals relied on cavalry patrols for recon
-Bicycles, horses, carrier pigeons, flashing lights, and flags were used to communicate
-In 1914, armies still relied heavily on horses, the British transported as much horse-feed as ammunition, 5 million tons
Failure of the war of movement
-The plan required the 1st German Army (furthest north) to cover a minimum of 15 miles per day for the first 3 weeks, which was too fast even for German organisation
-The troops pushed far ahead of their railway-supply system and the further they advanced the worse it got, field kitchens couldn’t keep up; men and animals went hungry
-Starved of supplies, and sometimes distracted by less vital targets, the German advance faltered
Beginning of the war of attrition
-The war of movement became a war of attrition and defensive entrenchment
-The Germans swung away from Paris in September 1914, allowing the Entente to launch a flank counter-attack at the Battle of the Marne
-Next, both armies attempted to outflank each other in a series of battles in a ‘race to sea’ from the 17th of September to the 19th of October
-The ‘race’ ended in stalemate and the British held the key Belgian town of Ypres after the 1st Battle of Ypres (19 October – 22 November 1914)
-Trench warfare allowed little freedom for initiative and it was merely whoever held out the longest who would win
Sir John French as Commander-in-Chief of the BEF
-1914-1915
-He became so depressed at the prospect of defeat following the Mons campaign that his chief concern became the welfare of his troops, at the detriment of his French allies. It required an emergency visit from Kitchener, the Secretary of War, in September 1914 to stiffen French’s resolve to carry on.
-Once the war of manoeuvre ended with the First Battle of Ypres, French’s mood switched to one of over-optimism, until, by Autumn 1915, he was once again reluctant to co-operate with the French and had to be urged into action.
-In the campaigning which followed the Race to the Sea, his incompetence again became evident. Coupled with poor judgement and a number of scandals in the press he was compelled to resign and was replaced in December 1915 by one of his Corps commanders, General Douglas Haig.
Sir John French - Battle of Loos
-25th September-14th October 1915 - Designed as a combined French-British offensive against Germany key points, with the British target being Loos
Failure of preliminary attacks:
-A continuous preliminary bombardment, which showered 250,000 shells on to the German defences over four days, had little real effect as rounds
-Before sending in the infantry on the morning of 25 September 1915, the British released 150 tons of chlorine gas from 5,000 cylinders placed on the front line to make up for the ineffective artillery barrage - However a change in the direction of the wind at several points along the front blew the gas back into the British trenches, causing seven deaths and injuring 2,600 soldiers who had to be withdrawn from the front line.
Failure in the main assault:
-General French fielded six divisions despite his troops being exhausted from the fighting in the spring
-Successes were not capitalised on due to a lack of reinforcements as they were not properly managed by French who underestimated how poor the roads were
-Around 50,000 British casualties, compared to around 25,000 German casualties
-Led to the removal of General French as commander-in-chief, being replaced by Douglas Haig on 19th December 1915
Sir John French - Battle of Loos - Reasoning & Overview
-25th September - 14th October 1915
-Designed as a combined French-British offensive against Germany key points, with the British target being Loos
-It was the largest British offensive of 1915, and saw the first use of gas by the British against the German lines.
-It was also one of the first battles to see battalions from the newly formed ‘Kitchener’s Army’
-Very little land was gained, and the attack was eventually called off on the 14th October 1915.
-The British casualties were roughly twice the amount of the Germans
Sir John French - Battle of Loos - Start of the Battle
-A continuous preliminary bombardment, which showered 250,000 shells on to the German defences over four days, had little real effect.
-Before sending in the infantry on the morning of 25 September 1915, the British released 150 tons of chlorine gas from 5,243 cylinders placed on the front line to make up for the ineffective artillery barrage.
-However a change in the direction of the wind at several points along the front blew the gas back into the British trenches, causing seven deaths and injuring 2,600 soldiers who had to be withdrawn from the front line.
Sir John French - Battle of Loos - Problems
-General French fielded six divisions despite his troops being exhausted from the fighting in the spring
-The British army continued to suffer from a poor supply of shells for its artillery
-Successes were not capitalised on due to a lack of reinforcements as they were not properly managed by French who underestimated how poor the roads were
Sir John French - Battle of Loos - Results
-Around 50,000 British casualties, compared to around 25,000 German casualties
-Led to the removal of General French as commander-in-chief, being replaced by Douglas Haig on 19th December 1915
-Errors of Loos were repeated on the first day of the Battle of the Somme
Haig as Commander-in-chief of the BEF
-Took over from French, December 1915-1918
-Directed offensives, oversaw supplies and dealt with both his French allies and government (including Lloyd George who was the PM from 1916 and who was a critic)
-Led the Army through the bloodiest battles e.g. Somme (1916), Paaschendaele (1917) and Hundred Days’ Offensive and has been described as unimaginative and insensitive - However he was also responsive to new ideas such as tanks
-A conference in November 1915 agreed on joint British-French offensives in 1916, but the French were drawn into a long struggle at Verdun
-His army had 56 infantry divisions in June 1916 compared to 4 in 1914 and he sought to relieve pressure on the French with a major assault, in the form of the Battle of the Somme 1916
Haig - The Somme
-July-November 1916 - The French-British offensive on River Somme began in June 1916 to relieve this pressure at Verdun; experiences at Loos convinced Haig gains could be made, with enough artillery
Failure of preliminary attacks:
-Attacks failed at Somme because: Germans were too well entrenched and the British didn’t know this, British had insufficient big guns and one in three shells fired did not explode, German troops survived barrage and were still full of fight
Inexperience of leaders:
-It was the first great test of the citizen forces of the Kitchener Army, where the lack of experienced officers and NCO’s meant that the tactical clumsiness and poor level of training of these formations contrasted with the BEF of 1914 or the German Army of mid-1916
-The inexperience due to rapid expansion can be seen in the experience of the 23 divisional commanders/major-generals at the Somme, only 3 had commanded as much as a brigade before the war
-Of the 18 corps commanders in 1916, only 2 had commanded divisions before the war, and yet they were now entrusted with 60,000 men
Assault continuing despite high casualties:
-Haig expected 40,000 casualties in three days, whereas the British had almost 60,000 casualties on the first day (however, the day was unique in the bloodshed and 1/8th of the total losses of the 142 day battle were on day 1)
-Total casualties in the battle was to over 400,000 British and Empire, 200,000 French, almost 500,000 German
-The ‘Butcher’s bill’ was tragically high but lessons were learned
Haig - The Somme - Date and Reasoning
-July-November 1916
-The French-British offensive on River Somme began in June 1916 to relieve this pressure at Verdun; experiences at Loos convinced Haig gains could be made, with enough artillery
Haig - The Somme - Outcome
-Attacks failed at Somme because: Germans were too well entrenched and the British didn’t know this, British had insufficient big guns and one in three shells fired did not explode, German troops survived barrage and were still full of fight
-Those who survived emerged battle-hardened, with experience of the new warfare of ‘fire and move’ doctrine using light machine guns, the creeping artillery barrage, first sight of tanks and better use of aircraft
Haig - The Somme - Casualties
-Haig expected 40,000 casualties in three days, whereas the British had almost 60,000 casualties on the first day of whom 20,000 were killed (however, the day was unique in the bloodshed and 1/8th of the total losses of the 142 day battle were on day 1 )
-Total casualties in the battle was to over 400,000 British and Empire, 200,000 French, almost 500,000 German
-The ‘Butcher’s bill’ was tragically high but lessons were learned
Haig - The Somme - Active front theory
Haig continued to mix attrition and offensive in his attempt to achieve the elusive breakthrough
He believed trench warfare might make soldiers passive and inactive between offensives, so to maintain attacking spirit and an attacking front, he ordered frequent smaller raids on the German line
Haig - The Somme - Inexperience of the lower level army
-It was the first great test of the citizen forces of the Kitchener Army, where the lack of experienced officers and NCO’s meant that the tactical clumsiness and poor level of training of these formations contrasted with the BEF of 1914 or the German Army of mid-1916
-The British units used 3/4x as many officers in action that their opponents and therefore lost 3/4x as many officers, thus preventing the growth of an experienced officer core, while the Germans took care to preserve their officers as an asset
-The loss of regimental officers was largely due to the inexperience of the other ranks as the officers ended up being forced to do jobs that sergeants and corporals should have been doing, when these sergeants and corporals then had to fill the shoes of dead or wounded officers, the errors compounded
Haig - The Somme - Inexperience of the generalship
-Inexperience also stretched up into the generalship with the closet contact with the front line being a brigadier. In August 1914 the 6 infantry divisions contained 18 brigadiers , this meant that the 56 infantry divisions of the 1916 BEF required 168 brigadiers, which were hastily promoted from all arms
-The inexperience due to rapid expansion can be seen with the growth of the major-generals who commanded the base units of the division, 56 major-generals were needed for the infantry, 5 for the cavalry, more for the staff, more for the other theatres. This was a lot to ask for an army that begun with just 6
-Of the 23 divisional commanders/major-generals at the Somme, only 3 had commanded as much as a brigade before the war
-Above the divisional commanders were the commanders of army corps/lieutenant-generals, there were 3 at the start of the war in 1914 which grew to 18 in 1916
-Of the 18 corps commanders in 1916, only 2 had commanded divisions before the war, and yet they were now entrusted with 60,000 men
