Boer War - Conventional War Flashcards
Strength of Boers
-The Boers had purchased many German Mauser rifles, the Boers had a gun culture and were thus a better shot, they also all rode on horseback meaning they could move swiftly
-The Boer forces outmanoeuvred and outgunned the slower British forces, the Boers struck with speed, confidence, and the use of surprise
-Boers also used trenches which served as excellent cover
British Army Strength
-Little possibility of surprise, Boers knew they were coming, British army dependent on rail lines for transportation of supplies, Boers set up defensive position in path of British army
-Lack of knowledge of South Africa e.g. inadequate scouting, inaccurate maps with key parts missing, Major-General Hart’s African guide fleeing in the Battle of Colenso
-A British army had been beaten by the Boers in the 1st Boer War (1880-1881), but most of the leadership did not learn from these lessons
British Army reliance on railways
Under Buller - Buller’s initial mistakes at the start of the war
-While numerically superior with a corps of almost 50,000 men, Buller decided to split army into 3 separate forces:
-Lord Methuen to advance to Kimberley and break siege of the town
-Lieutenant General William Gatacre to secure the cape Midland area against guerrilla Boers
-Buller lead bulk of army core to relieve army at Ladysmith
Under Buller - General Gatacre’s failings
-Battle of Stormberg 10th December 1899
-While Gatracre’s force where the smallest he was also facing the lightest opposition
-He failed in a plan to surprise the Boers with a dawn attack by marching into position in complete darkness over rough terrain guided by crude maps and local guides
-The column got lost and Gatacre realised he has lead his men into the heart of the Boer lines who poured fire into the confused British troops
-Gatacre was forced to order a general retreat and in the confusion 600 soldier left behind becoming POWs
Under Buller - Lord Methuen’s failings
-Battle of Magersfontein 11 December 1899
-The Boers had fallen back to Magersfontein, where they had constructed trenches in front of the hills which were carefully camouflaged, and completely avoided British reconnaissance - The position also gave the Boers an excellent field of fire over the plain
-On the 10th of Dec British artillery carried out a 2 hour bombardment of the top of the hill but this simply alerted Boers of a British attack
-Brtish forces advanced in the dark in close formation across open ground, but when dawn broke they were completely vulnerable to the repeating rifle fire of the Boers
-Force suffered almost 950 men killed and wounded
Under Buller - Black Week
10-17 December 1899
The three British defeats at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso
Under Buller - Battle of Colenso
15 December 1899
Made in attempt drive towards, and relieve, the siege of Ladysmith
Under Buller - Buller’s failings in the planning stage - Battle of Colenso
-Between Buller and Ladysmith was an entrenched Boer army of unknown strength commanded by Botha
-In a telegraph to the Secretary of State for War on the 12th of December, a frontal assault was ruled out, but Buller immediately changed his mind
-Buller signalled to the forces in Ladysmith that he was planning to attack on the 17th December but then changed the attack to the 15th December without telling the forces in Ladysmith meaning they would not sally out at the needed time
-Buller ordered his brigade commanders to advance across a broad open plain towards the enemy at dawn but he didn’t really know where the Boers were
Under Buller - Opposition or lack there of to Buller’s plan - Battle of Colenso
-Major-General Lyttelton later complained about the lack of reconnaissance, the lack of a certain place to ford the river, the lack of artillery preparation, and the lack of proper targets for the artillery
-At the time, however, no one raised any objections to the C-in-C’s plan. But this could have been because Buller’s military reputation was so secure that commander likely didn’t have the courage to question him
Under Buller - Lack of scouting or mapping - Battle of Colenso
-The British maps were inaccurate
-Hart’s brigade was ordered to cross the river at a fording place but in reality there was two meaning he did not know where he was going
-Hildyard’s brigade was ordered to march to a bridge but in reality there was two, with no obvious answer between the two
Under Buller - Failings of Colonel Long - Battle of Colenso
-During the battle, Long moved 16 guns down the railway line to advance the guns as quickly as possible
-Buller had warned about not risking artillery pieces by advancing them at the start of the battle
-When they started to get closer, Long suddenly ordered his guns to gallop forward, leaving his covering infantry behind and ignoring the calls to slow down
-He set up his guns half a mile from the river with the covering infantry lagging around a mile behind
-The gun crews had no cover and all the Boer rifles were focused on them, eventually Long was forced leave the guns and run to shelter
-If these guns were lost for good then it would be a huge stain on the honour of Britain
Under Buller - Failings of Major-General Hart - Battle of Colenso
-The very traditional Hart preferred to advance his troops shoulder to shoulder as if on the Napoleonic parade ground, which was suicidal against the accurate fire of Boer rifles
-The officers on Hart’s left flank could clearly see the trenches packed with Boers but when they warned him of this danger he made it clear he would ignore them unless they attacked in force
-Hart advanced his troops in close formation across open ground he refused to allow his subordinates (who were trying to take the initiative) from deploying into a more open formation even after Botha hit the men with rifle and artillery fire from 3 sides
-Hart’s Irish Brigade suffered around 500 casualties out of 4000 men total
Under Buller - Buller’s excessive focus on the abandoned guns - Battle of Colenso
-Buller decided to postpone the main attack until Long’s guns could be recovered and then rode to where the gun crews were sheltered and took over personal command where he was least useful as a commander
-The C-in-C concentrated on this single task despite there being 8,000 men that had still not been committed to the battle
-He obsessively tried to retrieve the guns but with the mounting cost in men, he called off the attempt as suicidal .Potentially, if he had waited until nightfall, the guns may have recovered with far fewer casualties
-Buller decided to abandon the battle at almost midday and later claimed his men were exhausted, and if the Boers attacked then the British would come off worse. However, it is highly unlikely the Boers would’ve left their defences to attack a numerically superior British force
-Buller had lost 10 guns and over 1,000 men in total, while the Boers had suffered less than 40
Under Buller - Buller’s last attempt
-Battle of Spion Kop 23-24 January 1900
-Due to the arrival of 30,000 reinforcements, Buller made a second attempt to force a path to Ladysmith
-Almost 2,000 infantry under Major-General Woodgate climbed the kop and drove off the small Boer force on the summit
-At sunrise, troops on summit were under rifle and artillery fire from the other heights which were arrayed in a crescent looming over Spion Kop
-Ended with the British withdrawing from the top of the kop
-Cost another 1300 casualties and 200 POWs vs 200 Boer casualties
