Why do States Join International Agreements?

Question 1

Fearon’s Model

Answer 1

Two-Stage Model
-Bargaining stage
–> States bargain to choose between two enforceable agreements

-Enforcement stage
–>States implement and enforce that agreement

Question 2

Bargaining Stage

Answer 2

-Two sides holding out against making agreement, until one side folds and gives other better deal
-Holding out incurs costs
-As “shadow of the future” grows, the stakes rise, making negotiations longer
-Where cooperation is finite, state hold out shorter
-States with lower costs of non-cooperation hold out longer

Question 3

Role of International Institutions

Answer 3

Bargaining Stage
1. Set focal points and establish precedents
2. Structure bargaining process
3. raising the cost of failure (failure hurts the regime and other states)

Enforcement Stage
1. Includes enforcement mechanisms
2. Repeated cooperation
3. Monitoring

Question 4

Enforcement Phase

Answer 4

Non-effective monitoring and enforcement
1. Non-serious bargaining
2. Non-bargaining at all

Effective monitoring and enforcement
1. Long bargaining process

Question 5

Issues with the “Shadow of the Future”

Answer 5

-Where short, agreements tend not to be enforceable
-Where long, expect costly non-cooperation-

Question 6

Issue Linkage

Answer 6

-A tool to ease the bargaining process
-Country A cares about X not Y
-Country B cares about Y not X
-Linking X and Y makes it easier to reach a deal
-The only way for country 1 to achieve X is to make concessions on Y

Question 7

Advantage of Issue Linkage

Answer 7

-Encourages wider participation and potential gains
-Protectionist Interests face higher costs to mobilize because of other powerful groups in favor of liberalization