Domestic Politics and International Cooperation: Institutions Flashcards
Selectorate
The group of people who have a say in selecting the leader
-Those who are not part of the selectorate
–> Eg. Children, women in some states
Winning Coalition
The subset of the selectorate whose support the leader needs to stay in power
Types of Political Systems
Democracy –> large selectorate, large winning coalition
Autocracies –> large selectorate, small winning coalition
Monarchies –> small selectorate, small winning coalition
Methods for Staying in Power
Two tools at the leader’s disposal
1. Private goods –> benefiting one or small group of individuals (eg. land or monopoly rights)
2. Public goods –> benefit everyone and are non-excludable (eg. good policy or infrastructure)
Private Goods
-When leaders have a small winning coalition they would prefer to use private goods
-Public goods benefit more people than necessary and to a lesser extent
-By using private goods the leader can spend less to satisfy their supporters more fully and they can have the remaining resources for their own use
Public Goods
-When a leader has a large winning coalition they prefer to use public goods
-Providing each member of the large winning coalition enough private goods to satisfy them would be too expensive, public goods are more efficient
-These leaders can use some semi-private goods (like government contracts) but most benefits are from targeted public goods (like infrastructure projects)
Replacing an Autocratic Leader
-Deposing an autocratic leader requires at least one member of the winning coalition to defect to a challenger
-Member will defect if challenger can credibly promise them more benefits than current leader
Risk of Exclusion In an Autocratic Regime
-Since the selectorate is large, the member of the winning coalition may worry that even if they defect challenger would be able to gather enough support to form a new winning coalition without the defector, thus excluding them from the new winning coalition
-As the ratio of selectorate to winning coalition gets smaller the leader can offer less to the winning coalition and still retain their loyalty due to the increased risk of exclusion
Cost of Exclusion in Different Regimes
-The size of the winning coalition also affects the cost of future exclusion
-When the winning coalition is large, hence rewards are predominantly public, supporters have little to fear from exclusion
-But in a regime with a small winning coalition the rewards would be mostly private, thus the cost of exclusion would be very high
Democracy and Trade Cooperation
-A transition from autocracy to democracy, leads to a 7% fall in tariffs
-Public welfare is usually enhanced through trade, so seen as a public good
-If a leader specific punishment is imposed, citizens will want to improve their welfare so they will replace their leader, if the cost is low
-Since the cost to replace the leader in a democracy is low, leaders have incentives to maintain cooperation so that they are not replaced
-Public welfare is key to political success for leaders of large winning coalition systems
Leader Specific Punishment
-States refuse to cooperate with states that previously cheated them
-Cooperation is possible by changing behavior to match past actions (tit-for-tit)
-Leader specific punishment rely on threat of reciprocal punishment to enforce cooperation
-These strategies target the leader that implemented the policies, rather than the state
-So when the leader is replaced cooperation is restored
Autocracies and Trade Cooperation
-Since trade enhances public welfare it is usually seen as a public good, so autocratic leaders don’t really have an incentive to increase it
-Even if citizens would like to replace the leader the cost of replacing the leader in autocratic systems is high
-So even if leader specific punishments are imposed on an autocratic leader who deviates, due to the high loyalty of a small winning coalition, the leader will not be replaced
-Autocratic leaders do not have incentives to cooperate
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Free Trade
-Developing countries are usually rich in labour and poor in capital
-In LDCs a protectionist trade policy would only benefit the few individuals who are well endowed in the relatively scarce factor (capital) and penalize everyone else (labour force)
-But since autocracies don’t care about the opinions of citizens, they will benefit their winning coalition (most likely the capital owners)
Democratization and Free Trade
-When democratization occurs, electoral competition may modify the strategies of political elites
-As a regime becomes more democratic, trade liberalization may become appealing tool to gain electoral support
-Lower tariffs increase the incomes of workers in exporting firms, and decreases the price of imported goods
-In democratic regimes free trade is the best policy for electoral success
