Domestic Politics and International Cooperation: Interest Groups Flashcards
Putnam’s Model
-Offers a conceptual framework “for understanding how diplomacy and domestic politics interact”
Two-stage model
Level 1. The negotiators bargain and reach a tentative agreement
Level 2. The agreement is ratified through a process that includes separate discussions with domestic constituents
Win-sets
-The set of all possible Level 1 agreements that would gain the support of constituents at level 2
Argument
1. Larger win-sets make level 1 agreements more likely
2. The larger the perceived win-set, the more they can be “pushed around” by level 1 negotiators
3. The effect of decreasing one’s win-set too far may mean there are no feasible agreements
What Affects the Size of Win-sets
- Distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among level 2 constituents
–> Lower cost of no agreement means smaller win-set - Level 2 institutions, ratification procedures affect the size of the win-set
–> if a super-majority is required the win-set will be smaller - Negotiator strategies
–> a negotiator may exploit side payments to expand the win-set
Trade Cooperation and Interest Groups
Two key interest groups
1. Exporters
2. Import-competing industries
Governments have two goals
1. Maximizing general welfare
2. Keeping the power –> support of some interest groups
Domino Theory Steps
-Status quo: import-competing industries rule –> protectionism
-A preferential trade agreement (PTA) is created from which country A is excluded
-Country A faces trade and investment diversion
-Diversion generates “pressures for inclusion”
-Exporters lobby their government to join PTA
Domino Theory Implications
-A single incidence of trade liberalization may trigger the formation of several PTAs
-Countries that were previously happy as non-members react to the trade diversion created by PTAs and thus chose to join one themselves
Interdependent Cooperation
-The decision to join an international agreement for country A is a function of the decision of other countries to join international agreements
-The larger the losses from trade diversion of a country, the larger the win-set of entering a PTA
-International agreements diffuse over time due to political pressures (from exporters)
Smoot-Hawley
-Became law on June 17, 1930
-Highest rate of tariff rates at 40.14%
-Triggered retaliation (tit-for-tat)
-Decreased trade and deepened the depression
Agriculture
-Unsheltered border states compete with imports, interior states were sheltered
Industry
-Heavy industry had a competitive advantage, light homogeneous goods faced import competition
-Coalition created by light industry and unsheltered agriculture
-There was a small win-set for the US due to interest groups and side payments unavailable due to economic recession
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA)
-Transfers power of setting tariffs from Congress to the President
-Bilateral negotiations for reciprocal reductions
-Tariff reductions up to 50%
-Continued most-favored-nation (MFN) practice
BGW
-when democrats came to power they implemented liberalization, then republicans would reverse it
-RTAA was implemented to that the responsibility would fall more on executive power, so that congress wouldn’t have to be involved
-this was never reversed and then liberalization stopped being a topic of discussion, it was just assumed
Hickox
-counters BGW theory by saying it was more complicated than just interest groups for democrats and republicans, external factors also important
-WWII had a major impact on how US exported to other countries (had more abilities because not hard hit by war)
Why was the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) Passed?
Giving power to the President:
-Broader district –> preference for more liberation
Simple majority to ratify agreements
Satisfying Congress with reciprocity
-Reciprocity created export opportunities
-Broadened range of acceptable tariff cuts
-Exporters become advocates of liberalization
-Larger win-set
-RTAA nurtured export-oriented industry
