welfare mix Flashcards
1
Q
vertical equality
A
more favourable treatment of those with lower incomes than those with higher ones in order to avoid or reduce the depth of poverty or reduce inequalities in resources more generally.
2
Q
horizontal equality
A
compensatory treatment of those with similar incomes but greater needs of one kind or another (such as larger families or needs related to disability status).
3
Q
Life-cycle redistribution
A
allowing for cash and in-kind provision at times in people’s lives, particularly childhood and old age, when incomes from market activities are low, with net contributions made when market resources are higher.
4
Q
insurance in welfare
A
protection against loss of income in events such as unemployment, ill health, or greater than average life expectancy, and provision of services if needs for health or other care occur
5
Q
state can intervene without it being public provision
A
o Using public financing to meet a need for distributional reasons does not necessarily imply that state agencies should be the provider. Similarly, ensuring that children’s needs are met after divorce, for example, can be met through a public decision to enforce a private transfer without there being any necessary state provision or finance.
6
Q
typical pros of private provision
A
- Choice + competition
- State – is one size fits all the best way ? small organisations do better at fiiting in with local needs
- Voluntary and informal sectors give a chance to realise social citizenship- might promote local bonds and help you realise participatory ideal – doing things for each other. Not just realising rights through the state.
7
Q
the state and life cycle redistributions
A
- much of social security is concerned with life-cycle redistribution, with the majority of spending going on pensions and other benefits for the elderly. While some of this can be achieved through private savings or pension systems, the state remains dominant, reflecting both high costs of private retirement provision for those on low incomes, and the complexity and incentive problems created by attempts to limit its role through means-testing.
8
Q
a time and place for private provision?
A
- Private insurance market failures, that can justify a strong role for the state on efficiency grounds, are more important in some areas than others—particularly future health or social care needs affected by long-term uncertainties that are hard to quantify, such as the likelihood and cost of someone’s care needs for dementia 30 years after the point in their lives when earnings are highest, for instance.
9
Q
left and right on role of the state
A
- The left tends to favour a larger role for the state, while the right leans towards commercial, voluntary, and informal solutions, advocating for a welfare society over a welfare state
10
Q
- Social Division of Welfare (SDW)
A
- Statutory/state
-> most obvious and visible
-> ‘public’
->Titmuss argued to be most progressive- Occupational
-> “the ‘fringe benefits’ of employment such as subsidised pensions, health insurance, mortgages, and company cars”7
-> less obvious
-> ‘substantial’ scale - eg. Employer contributions to social protection receipts 7% of GDP in UK 2000; statutory provision only 3.8% (Farnsworth, 2004) - Fiscal
-> “the benefits delivered through the taxation system such as tax reliefs and later on private pensions and health insurance”
-> ‘very long but largely neglected history’
-> ‘upside down benefits’
-> can be regress (tax expenditures) or progressive (tx credits)
-> relief of non-state pensions is biggest fiscal expenditure in UK
-> controversial - has been considered ‘outside’ of the welfare state (Sinfield, 2016); or ‘second institutional ayer’ (Stebbing and Spies-Butcher, 2010)
- Occupational
11
Q
good v bad of public v private financing
A
when public is more distributively egalitarian. Questions of quality and efficiency are more debated. In terms of accountability debated- public financed eg healthcare in NHS is hidden – people don’t hold government to account for this so private financing alleviates issues of accountability.
12
Q
good v bad of public v private provision- health outcomes
A
some evidence that for-profit have worse outcomes eg private elderly care correlates to higher levels of death when they take over from state providers. Dependent on sector eg cataracts publicly provided is poorer and also facing cut crunches. In long-term care eg social and elderly care, for-profit tends to be worse. Some sectors work better when nationalised than others eg telecommunications v water
13
Q
good v bad of public v private control
A
also murky. Choice may increase satisfaction and some responsiveness and some private providers have innovated new ways. But also questions of accountability and can lead to segregation (church running schools) or ‘cramming and parking’
14
Q
Powell on criteria for privatisation
A
No ‘commonly accepted’ criteria for privatisation.
15
Q
Crouch on criteria for privatisation
A
- Crouch (2003: 15) argues that privatisation occurs when ownership of a previous public resource is transferred to private firms, while under contracting out ownership remains with the public sector.
- In his view, Labour reforms in health involve partnerships and sub-contracting rather than privatisation
16
Q
Young on criteria for privatisation
A
- Young (1986) presents a wide concept of privatisation, arguing that policies contain one or more of the following elements: current balance (size, scope, role); balance in the longer term by creating opportunities for the private sector to grow (e.g., by changing regulations); private resources to solve government problems (e.g., use of business practices); and increased market pressures to bear on the use of assets staying inside the public sector (e.g., internal and external competition).
17
Q
Young and complexity of privatisation in the UK
A
Young argues that seven different forms of privatisation are identifiable in Conservative policy since 1979 (although he gives few NHS examples):
o (a) selling off public assets
o (b) relaxing state monopolies
* (c) contracting
* (d) private provision of services
* (e) investment projects
* (f) extending private sector practices into the public sector
* (g) reduced subsidies and increased charges
18
Q
example of complexity of privatisation In the UK
A
- Even private schools have some tax benefits which mean they are at least somewhat intermingled with the state.
19
Q
Bozeman on privatisation
A
- Publicness Perspectives: Bozeman (1987: 17) and argues that political control is the essence of publicness: ‘all organizations are public because political authority affects some of the behavior and processes of all organizations’.
20
Q
Powell’s mixed economy of welfare - 4 main components
A
o State: Public service provision, addressing market failures.
o Market: Efficient alternative to state provision.
o Voluntary: Includes philanthropic and mutual elements, supported by the left.
o Informal: Involves family, friends, and neighbours, favoured by the right but criticized by feminists
21
Q
Powell mixed economy of welfare - dimensions
A
o 1-dimensional: Focuses on a single issue or sources of welfare.
o 2-dimensional: Examines provision and finance.
o 3-dimensional: Considers provision, finance, and regulation.
In a pure public sector, a public actor makes choices about where spending goes and how much is spent, the opposite for private
22
Q
Powell and universalism
A
: Powell argues for universal access to social welfare benefits and protections, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status, or other factors. Universalistic policies ensure that all members of society are entitled to essential services and supports, reducing the risk of stigma, exclusion, and discrimination
23
Q
Powell and culture in welfare
A
Powell emphasizes the importance of cultural competence in welfare provision, ensuring that services are responsive to the cultural, linguistic, and contextual needs of diverse populations. This may involve providing culturally relevant programming, language access services, and community-based outreach efforts to engage underserved communities.
24
Q
Powell’s institutional changes
A
structural changes to social policies and institutions to address systemic barriers and inequalities. This may include reforms to address disparities in access to education, employment, housing, healthcare, and other social determinants of well-being, as well as efforts to dismantle discriminatory practices and institutional racism.
importance of participatory governance and community engagement- By involving affected communities in decision-making processes, policymakers can ensure that policies are responsive to the needs and priorities of those they are intended to serve.
25
Wheels of welfare- scholars behind it
Buchardt + Hill
26
wheels of welfare dimensions to analyse welfare provision
1. Provision- is the provider of the service a public- or private sector body?
2. Finance - does the public sector pay for the service directly through tax-financed public spending or indirectly through tax reliefs?
3. Decision - can individuals choose for themselves the amount of service used or whether the provider is public or private, or is this decided for them by the state?
27
wheels of welfare pure public
o Pure public= tax-financed, provided by a publicly owned and run organisation, and with little or no choice on the part of the beneficiary about how much or from whom to receive the service. Emergency treatment in an NHS hospital is an example.
28
wheels of welfare pure private
Pure private= activity undertaken by individuals at their own initiative and purchased in the free market, such as private medical insurance
29
size of pure public in the UK
* In the UK for education, health care, and income maintenance, the 'pure public’ still represented more than half of total activity in 2007-8, but for personal care it was two-fifths and for housing less than a tenth.
o The share of the "pure public" sector (fully funded and controlled by the government) decreased slightly, falling from 50.3% to 48.2%. Despite this decline, the real value of the "pure public" sector still grew by 50%,
30
size of Private provision of publicly financed and publicly controlled services
'contracting out' and its equivalents—was around a fifth of total activity within education and health care, and a third for personal care, but much less important for housing and almost absent for income maintenance.
31
size of publicly financed but privately controlled and provided services
were more than a tenth of all income maintenance activity—representing the value of tax advantages of private pension contributions- but small in the other areas.
o Public finance for private provision and decision declined, influenced by the abolition of mortgage interest relief for owner-occupiers and the decreased importance of "contracting out" of the state second pension
32
size of pure private
* The 'pure private' sector, while growing, was a fifth or less of activity in four of the areas, but was dominant—three-quarters of the total- in housing.
o private spending on private education increased, while health care saw rapid growth in private medicine and over-the-counter medicines. Housing saw a significant rise, mainly due to increased owner-occupiers' imputed rents.
33
relative decline of our public and relative growth of pure private
* one prominent feature has been the steady fall in the share in the ‘pure public’ sector from 52 per cent in 1979-80, to 50 percent in 1995-6, and again to 48 per cent in 2007-8. Meanwhile the 'pure private' sector grew from 24 to 27 %
34
public provision but private finance in the UK
* Public provision but private finance - declined due to the transfer of housing to housing associations, resulting in less rent paid by tenants. + The sector of public provision but private finance and decision remained small, with some offsetting factors such as the end of "pay beds" in NHS hospitals and growth in other health services provided to the private sector.
35
Hill- the effect of housing on welfare expenditure
* the decline in the role of the public sector was somewhat less marked once housing is excluded. Indeed, over the Conservative period between the first two dates, it was only in terms of its role as a provider that the public sector declined, with no fall in the share of public finance, a rise in the proportion under public control, and a slight rise in the share of the pure public sector. In these terms, the 'privatization' of the Conservative years can be seen as being concentrated on the state's role within housing.
36
from 2007 by early coalition - rise in public spending
* total public spending rose by more than had been planned in nominal terms and by 11% in real terms … the real increase in health spending was exactly as planned and that in education slightly lower. It was the 13% real increase in social security and tax credits that contributed most to the overshoot in total spending above plans. Given the fall in GDP, however all three elements contributes to the rise in spending as a share of GDP
37
difference in real spending on services 2010-11/2014-15
difference in real spending set to be £43 billion lower, yet with health spending £2 billion higher and state pensions £6 billion higher- non pensions social security and tax credits intended to fall by £12 bill and education by £10 b
38
increased privatisation of healthcare under Coalition
increased by APQ
o publicly funded, independently provided healthcare (including GPs and dentists) now accounts for 25% of total health spending, compared to 22% in 2007/08. Within this, however, NHS purchase of non-NHS- provided healthcare grew by 65% in real terms between 2007/08 and 2013/14. ‘Pure private’ spending on healthcare has also continued to increase in real terms (by 9% between 2007/08 and 2013/14),
39
income maintenance- public spending under coalition
o Pure public (benefits and tax credits) and pure private (private insurance against loss, private pensions etc.) make up 55% and 20% of total spending respectively.
o Spending on the basic State Pension (pure public) makes up just over one- third of total pensions spending (34%).
* Policies in relation to income maintenance other than pensions under the coalition have been dominated by cuts in benefit levels in real terms and restrictions on benefit eligibility, accompanied by the rhetoric of austerity, however in reality these changed have had a net zero effect on public finances
40
voluntary sector role in social welfare
o Voluntary sector- eg In 2013/14, food banks provided an estimated 20 million meals in the UK, a total value of perhaps £40 million. This is small fraction of total spending on income maintenance (1/100th of a percentage), but nevertheless significant in its impact on recipients and on public debate.
41
Education spending under coalition
o the share of total education spending that is public finance and public provision has fallen only slightly, from 61% to 60%.(2013/14)
o There has been a 76% increase in out-of-pocket spending on education – including on further and higher education – in real terms between 2007/08 and 2013/14. This segment now accounts for one-fifth (22%) of all education spending.
42
Hill on overall changes to welfare state under coalition
more than meets the eye- The selective nature of the cuts will mean that the structure of public spending on the welfare state will have changed, even if its overall scale in relation to national income returns to what it had been before the crisis. Healthcare and pensions are becoming more important, but non-pension social security, housing and non-school education less important.
43
social care spending under coalition
* Social care - Public spending began to fall in the late 2000s, despite increasing demand from the growth in the older and disabled population. A significant part of this was spending in the ‘pure public’ segment, which fell by nearly a quarter in real terms between 2007/08 and 2013/14. At the end of the period it accounted for just 26% of overall (public and private) expenditure. Meanwhile, contracted-out care (independently provided services commissioned and paid for by the local authority) grew in real value, and increased its share of overall spending, and at 35% is now the largest segment in this figure.
44
housing expenditure
* The proportion of total current spending on housing in the ‘pure private’ segment was 82% in 2013/14, similar to the proportion (81%) in 2007/08.
45
decline in voluntary sector provision under coalition
been affected by cuts to grant income from central and local government – down from £3.1 billion in 2009/10 to £2.2 billion in 2012/13. But, rates and mean hours of volunteering have been steady.
46
Evers- the 3rd sector of the welfare mix
otherwise made up of the market the state and the informal private household sphere
nuanced understanding of the third sector as an intermediary area within a mixed welfare system.
the importance of third sector organizations in balancing and integrating various social, economic, and political dimensions in modern societies.
47
Evers on which welfare policies are optimal
emphasizes the shift towards policies of 'welfare pluralism,' which prioritize synergistic mixes of resources and rationales over simple substitution processes between different sectors of provision. This approach seeks to make planned use of non-state resources to ensure welfare and well-being while managing the costs of public welfare.
48
evers- role of third sector organisations
the intermediary role played by third sector organizations, which not only interact with states and markets but also with the informal sphere, including families, social networks, and community building. These organizations act as connectors rather than setting clear boundaries around a sector.
A distinct pluralist approach in social policy should respect the specific rationales of different realms, acknowledge the polyvalent role of third sector organizations, and be concerned with securing the foundations of these organizations.
49
Need for the third sector
* Evers discusses the tension and interdependence between different social spheres, such as the state, the market, and the informal sector, within the third sector. This interrelation influences the landscape of third sector organizations and exposes their public space to constant tensions.
50
demographic challenge to welfare production and provision
* UK declining fertility rate, fluctuating but low mortality rate and shift from UK as a country of emigration to a country of inward immigration.
* The UK today can be described as an aged society, where the proportion of older people (aged 65 and over) increasingly represents a greater part of the total population.
* as life-cycle patterns change and lengths of lives expand, we would expect to see income maintenance and health and personal care change - likely increase personal pension contributions, preventative healthcare etc.
51
challenges to welfare - economic context
* Economic growth underpins the development and sustainability of social policy, but equally social policy is crucial to the achievement of economic growth.
* Problems arise for the sustainability of social policy when there is a mismatch between the raising of tax revenues, the levels of spending promised by governments, and the extent to which a gap between these is closed through government borrowing.
* Social policy played a key role in mitigating the social and economic effects of the 2008 financial crisis, but it is also threatened with reductions in spending and debt.
* as incomes rise, one would expect to see a general move towards services with the characteristics of 'luxuries': health care and education, in particular, are services that appear to be more important in more affluent societies
52
economic context of the UK
* Since 2008, we have been witnessing what political economist David McNally has described as a global slump (2009, 2010). Triggered in 2007 by a wave of defaults on 'subprime' mortgages in the United States, the financial crisis has precipitated a slump in the so-called real economy
* While economic growth averaged 5.4 per cent per year between 1997 and the first quarter of 2008, since then output has grown by just 1.6 per cent per year on average. (2014)
again with cost of living crisis
53
unemployment in the UK
* The data on unemployment reveal a similar picture: after 2007/8, the unemployment rate jumped three percentage points, from around 5 per cent of the labour force to roughly 8 per cent.
now 4.2%
54
food price increases
The annual rate of UK food and non-alcoholic beverage prices inflation increased to 19.1% in the 12 months to March 2023
the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which had a major impact on the global supply of grains and fertilizers, and on European energy prices
labour shortages, which left some crops unharvested
droughts and cold snaps in Europe and North Africa, which led to higher imported food prices
55
median income in the UK
Median income for the poorest fifth of people decreased by 3.8% between FYE 2021 and FYE 2022 (Figure 3). This follows a 2.0% reduction between FYE 2020 and FYE 2021.
Median disposable income increased by 1.6% to £66,000 for the richest fifth of people
56
youth unemployment in Britain
* the Confederation of British Industry, frequently complains about the 'unemployability' of Britain's youth, from its 2004 warning against 'slang' and 'poor language skills' to its finding in 2012 that 71 per cent of employers 'believe schools and colleges should be prioritising development of employability.
57
Ethnic minorities and welfare
* Minority groups will constitute a larger proportion of the future population of western countries. Their current welfare therefore has long-run consequences.
* Social policy can impact ethnic minorities directly through immigration and race relations policies and indirectly through, for example, social security, housing and employment policies.
58
Social spending under Thatcher/ Major
* Despite the Thatcher government's intention in the 1980s to reduce state involvement, pressures from an aging population and increasing demands for services like healthcare and education led to an expansion of social spending. While total public spending was controlled, social spending's share increased from 50% of all public spending in 1978-79 to 60% in 1996-97.
59
spending on different sectors under Thatcher
Within this total housing spending fell--including housing-related benefits it had been over 4 per cent of GDP in 1974, but was half this by 1995. Over the same period, to 1995, public spending on the NHS rose from 3.8 to 5.7 per cent of GDP, and social security spending, dominated by state pensions, from 8.2 to 11.4 per cent of GDP.
60
Marketisation of welfare
Brennan + others use the term marketisation to refer to government measures that authorise, support or enforce the introduction of markets, the creation of relationships between buyers and sellers and the use of market mechanisms to allocate care
61
Market provision and promise of choice
Brennan + others- * Market provision promises empowerment through the exercise of choice and more efficient provision; higher quality services delivered for lower cost to the consumer, and ultimately to the taxpayer if services are funded wholly or partially by the state.
62
conditions needed for marketisation to = empowerment
Brennan + others
certain conditions must be met: information about the price and quality of competing suppliers must be freely available to consumers; the costs of changing supplier must be low; and suppliers must operate in a competitive market.
63
prevention of transparency in marketisation of care
Brennan + others
* Making use of market information requires skills that are not equally distributed: an increased focus on choice favours those with more resources and education, who have considerable advantages in navigating the system.
64
choice for empowerment in marketisation of care
Brennan + others
* Further, for quality control through the market to work, consumers must be able easily to switch poor quality providers for higher quality ones – but continuity of care is important for both childcare and elder care – so exit is costly.
65
satisfaction with markets of care UK
Brennan + others
* Data on user satisfaction shows lower scores among elderly users than younger disabled people for both ‘improvements in mental well-being’ and ‘getting the support they need’ from using personal budgets – UK.
66
choice in social care in Australia
Brennan + others
since the mid-1980s, the exercise of choice by older people and their carers has been limited by supply-side constraints on service provision and block-funding arrangements under competitive tendering and contracting.
o In childcare, the rapid growth of for-profit providers in Australia, and especially the dominance of a single company, reduced the capacity of many families to choose a service of their preferred type. the diverse non-profit childcare sector that predated marketisation gave way to a smaller number of commercial providers.
67
choice of care in Sweden
Brennan + others
* Sweden - full coverage of childcare - can be argued that parents have been empowered as they have got a greater scope for choosing between childcare centres with different auspices, but there is no empirical evidence that parents value such choice.
o Most parents choose a childcare centre close to the home irrespective of provider or profile
68
costs and marketisation of care
Brennan + others
* Little empirical data with respect to eldercare in the three countries support the hopes for cost containment expressed by market enthusiasts.
o In Sweden after the first years of competitive tendering, costs do not seem to have fallen.
69
Quality and marketisation of care
Brennan +others
* Evidence about quality in childcare also shows that non-profit services are generally of higher quality than those offered by for-profit providers.
70
quality of care in UK and marketisation
o An evaluation of the UK Neighbourhood Nurseries Initiative, reported that ‘maintained’ nurseries (that is, those funded by local authorities and not run for profit) had the highest level of quality.
71
quality of care in Australia and marketisation
* An Australian study that measured childcare quality partly by the willingness of staff to place their own child in a service of a similar standard, suggested that quality is highest in non-profit services and lowest in those provided by large corporate providers, with independent for-profits in the middle, but closer to non-profits.
72
Personal healthcare budgets in the UK - benefits
o The work of Jenny Morris and others has suggested that, of these groups of carers, the most satisfactory as far as disabled people are concerned are personal assistants, employed directly by care users. Such personal assistants, it is argued, are far preferable to traditional social service personnel who are often rule-bound, subscribe to the medical model of disability, and patronise their “clients”.
73
community care bill - room for choice
o Breadth of community care bill 1996- Many people will want to use direct payments to employ or contract with their own personal assistants to provide the services they need. Others may want to buy their care from an agency rather than take on the responsibility of becoming an employer. Still others may decide to employ their own staff for some tasks, and purchase other services from an agency.
74
personal health budgets- issues of vulnerability
o Although direct payments will be “monitored” by local authorities to ensure they are being spent properly in care services, there is nothing in the Consultative Paper that suggests that the market itself will be carefully policed. Hence, informal and illegal contractual arrangements, where the workers have no employment rights of any kind, are likely to develop- both purchasers and providers are poor and/or vulnerable to exploitation.
75
Burchardt on availability of choice in care
* disabled people are more likely to experience constrained autonomy in all respects, while being from a low socio-economic group and/or lacking educational qualifications is a risk factor across several components.
76
Buchardt - how to improve choice agenda
(1) adopting a more sophisticated concept of ‘choice’ such as the conceptualization of ‘choice as autonomy’ outlined here;
(2) developing a better understanding of existing inequalities in autonomy, such as we begin to explore in our empirical results; and
(3) tackling these inequalities through, for example, the removal of obstacles to active decision-making by providing effective support and advocacy, especially for disabled people, and addressing the major structural barriers – poverty, ill health and geographical inequality – which place significant restrictions on the autonomy of those who are already disadvantaged.
77
Buchardt- issue of focus on choice in care as it stands
* Overall, instrumental motivations for promoting choice have dominated policy-making leading to the concentration on services rather than outcomes as the locus for choice: we are invited to choose between hospitals, schools, care agencies and pension providers, but all such services are a means to an end rather than ends in themselves.
* The degree of control we may or may not be able to exercise over the outcomes that we actually value – our health, education, daily life and security in old age – is mostly overlooked or ignored by this approach.
78
Unequal distribution of autonomy - disabled people
Buchardt
o The most striking association is that with disability: disabled people are significantly less likely to be ‘able to do the things that are important’ to them.
o Disabled people are more likely to experience constrained autonomy in all six respects: lack of self-direction, fatalism, pressure from others, ill health, lack of money and constraints as a result of where they live.
o Among disabled people, those in a low socio-economic group and/or lacking educational qualifications are at significantly greater risk of fatalism, and of experiencing constraints due to ill health than those in a higher socio-economic group with qualifications.
79
unequal distribution of autonomy- low socio-economic background
o For the population as a whole, being in a low socio-economic group and/or lacking educational qualifications is a risk factor for fatalism, and constraints on autonomy due to lack of money and ill health.
80
Autonomy as multi-dimensional
Buchardt
autonomy is inherently multidimensional- An adequate concept must encompass the internal (mental) and external (situational) aspects of autonomy, and the interaction between them.
Thus to focus solely on the act of choosing, the dominant approach in the ‘choice’ policy agenda, risks missing much that is important in constraining the broader idea of ‘choice as autonomy’.
Simply ensuring that options are on the table is not going to be sufficient to ensure that everyone can make an active decision.
81
what individuals need to exercise choice
Buchardt
Prior to the point of choosing, it is also important that person has been able to form, and reflect on, an idea about what he or she wants – based on a rich understanding of what might be possible.
82
Key Message of welfare under coalition in election
* A key message from the leader of the Conservative Party in the 2010 UK general election was that the financial crisis in public expenditure meant that there were new and stronger reasons for the voluntary or Third Sector, rather than the state, to deliver change and provide services to the community.
83
Big society
* The Big Society made its first appearance in David Cameron's Hugo Young Lecture in November 2009 and became a key part of his party's election campaign a few months later… regime. According to the ideology of the Big Society, not only was Britain 'broken' and mired by moral decline, it was also burdened by the albatross of ‘big government' – devolving power from the state so communities could be more involved in the organisation and delivery of previously public services.
* The discourse of a Big Society thus sought to mobilise citizens' affective capacities for empathy and concern for their fellows in order to take on health care, child care and elder care, to run local libraries and deal with unemployment, to tackle poverty and inequality, and, generally, to increase overall well-being in the context of further welfare state retrenchment and privatisation
84
Big society as a departure form Thatcher
* Under Thatcher had been ‘there is no such thing as society’
* According to the Big Society's exponents, violence, greed and atomisation were the result of 30 years of neoliberalism that rewarded selfish behaviour at the expense of a sense of community, with the result, they argued, that there was now widespread alienation and disenfranchisement.
85
big society as a response to social distress
* in the face of multiple crises and an austerity regime evidently reliant on households and communities to pick up the state's tab for bailing out the banks, the socially regressive nature of the 'Big Society' was obvious. 'Broken Britain' served as a rhetorical device with which to identify and decry a moral crisis exemplified by the pro liferation of anxiety-fuelled figures deemed responsible for the situation - 'feral youth', 'benefit scroungers', 'greedy bankers' and 'tax dodgers'
86
Big society -role of the state
* In the new Big Society model, it is envisaged that where the state steps back, a mixture of private and voluntary sector organisations will step forward in its place. As we shall see in the next section, the state is itself active in engineering this profound economic and social, restructuring of economy and society
market failure and unequal access require government intervention in the form of subsidies for disadvantaged individuals and communities, however this kind of assistance is supposed to take a very specific form orientated towards financialisation, namely as financial support to enable those who are disadvantaged to participate in the market.
87
three tiers of big society policy
. First, at the level of individual services, there will be an emphasis on performance-related provision, continuous improvement, transparency and accountability.
Second, through the Localism Act (discussed below), neighbourhoods and local communities will be enabled to bid for, buy assets and run services, as well as take advantage of the implementation of community budgets
Third, the government's role will shift from a provider of services to a commissioner (at most), conditional upon the creation of a diverse range of independent providers, as well as a facilitator of investment (by private investors) in such services premised upon payment by results.
88
autonomy of organisations in big society
* The White Paper makes clear the government's desire to foster the development of autonomous organisations, operating on a level playing field, in which the logic of competition to offer the best service operates a disciplinary device. Large contracts are to be divided up, such that individual elements can be serviced by different enterprises, with the long-term goal of financial self-sufficiency. Public sector staff are promised greater autonomy and independence through employee ownerships schemes across the entire sector.
89
localism act
2011
sets out a number of policy changes intended to facilitate the implementation of the framework set out in the Open Public Services White Paper- number of 'community rights namely the right ‘to buy’, ‘to build’ and ‘to challenge’… these processes put communities at the helm of the further prioritisation process, while at the same time relying on the notions of mutual and social enterprises with an ethical as opposed to purely profit-orientated motivation.
90
public services act
2012
government must take into consideration something called ‘social value’ in the tendering process that service providers undergo. Organisations must demonstrate the social value they produce and an organisations capacity to produce social value should be a central determining factor in the procurement of services – Social value denotes the positive non-financial impacts and outcomes of programmes, organisations and interventions.
90
economic gain of organisations under big society
The newly established bank for social investment, Big Society Capital, states that social investors 'will often accept lower financial returns to generate greater social impact'; however, they do nevertheless have the 'expectation of some financial return', as 'social investment is repayable, often with interest
91
employee led public sector mutuals
set out by big society
, 85 had been established, delivering over £1 billion of services
92
who argues for role of voluntary sector in welfare
Danson and Whittam
93
role of VCS in big society
* Alternative to private provision with new role of state as ‘enabler not producer’: Many policy documents can be observed to promote the VCS due to ‘market failure’, for example in providing goods and services in parts of the economy where it would not be profitable for private sector businesses to operate.
"we will identify proven social programmes, franchise them to social entrepreneurs with a track record of success and fund them directly from existing state budgets to deliver public services"
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SNP on big society
from 2007 argued for similar state role
o Before 2007, this was complemented by large-scale housing stock transfer from council control to newly created top–down housing associations; by geographically based LECs (local enterprise companies) within the regional development agencies (RDAs) of Scottish Enterprise and Highlands & Islands Enterprise; and through community planning partnerships
Scotland now rejecting it - public sector domination with third sector support
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How to make VCS initiatives effective
* Much of this thinking can be traced back to the work of Porter (1998) where he argues that isolated initiatives have compromised inner-city regeneration initiatives and ‘have treated the inner city as an island isolated from the surrounding economy and subject to its own unique laws of competition’. The solution, therefore, is to (re-)connect the inner city to the competitive market economy through private sector businesses; Porter emphasises the role of small business enterprises, which can succeed due to ‘the competitive advantage of the inner city’.
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pros of VCS initiatives
Danson and whittam
As well as this urban focus, and the long-established role of the VCS in addressing the endemic problems of the inner city, such organisations have been promoted and seen as essential to the social and economic development of more rural and remote communities. While a degree of romanticism underlies some of this support and literature), it is undoubtedly the case that social capital is equally often integral to the sustainable development of fragile areas and this is nurtured and contained within the VCS locally.
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class issue with VCS
* The evidence demonstrates, however, that volunteering tends to have a strong class bias with higher income and socio-economic groups more likely to be engaged in both informal and formal activity, to reproduce other inequalities in opportunity and outcome and so to promote deeper divisions rather than to act to address them. It is known that non-volunteers are especially concentrated amongst the socially excluded, those on low incomes and benefits, the economically inactive and unemployed, residents of poorer neighbourhoods and members of unstable families.
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VCS and non competition as an issue
* VCS organisations rely on state funding as a major source of income. Much of this support arises from the winning of contracts from the state to deliver goods and services previously provided by the state. This in essence becomes a ‘contestable market’ approach, which involves competition for the market as opposed to competition in the market. Once the contract has been won by the individual social enterprise, they become a monopoly provider.
many smaller local organisations may be unlikely to secure such contracts and hence be put out of business. Once a contract is secured, the larger organisation can further enhance its position, by utilising the increased resource it has achieved through securing the contract, to further increase its scale and scope of activities and hence make it even more difficult for small local VCS bodies to compete
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welfare policy of 1991 government in Sweden
advocating for choice revolution
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share of private provision in Swedish welfare
* During the 1990s, the public welfare service sector opened up to competing private actors. As a result, the share of private provision grew, both within the health-care and primary education systems as well as within social service provision.
* the share of private providers is still relatively low (ranging between 5 and 15per cent),
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overall effect of welfare privatisation in Sweden
their existence has given rise to more socially stratified service-consumption patterns and a tendency among the well-to-do to leave the public sector for private alternatives.
undermine previous Swedish notions of a “people’s home” – universal coverage
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why has privatisation increased in Swedish welfare
* The critical public debate about the organization of the welfare services sector during the 1980s also reflected the growing problems of local governments in delivering services as their own financial situations deteriorated. As a result of attempts to ration services and reduce costs, waiting lists for health care and other social services (particularly childcare) grew, resulting in public discontent.
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the market in Swedish welfare
* virtually all publications from the ministry of finance came to advocate the introduction of various types of so-called “quasi-markets” in the social services sector. In a quasi-market, the provision of services is separated from direct political control, and the role of government is reduced to that of “purchasing” services on behalf of the public from a variety of competing “providers” on a contract basis. In the late 1980s, quasi-markets as a means to renew the welfare services sector came to be openly endorsed by the Social Democratic government.
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Swedish health - policy which increased privatisation
* Health 1990s- decentralization of regulatory power to the county councils, which made it legally possible for them to experiment with new organizational forms of service provision and to contract out regular health services to non-public actors. Public service providers were thus made organizationally independent and were funded on the basis of performance, rather than budgets.
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increase in health privatisation in Sweden
In 2000 some 85 per cent of the counties had private providers and this group accounted for over 25 per cent of all patient visits
* The share of privately employed health-care staff increased from 4.8 per cent in 1993 to 7.2 per cent in 2000. The greatest proportion of private providers is to be found in the bigger cities, where their share of total provision is about 15 per cent
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Private health insurance growth in Sweden
* the number of private health insurance holders grew during the same period from 23,000 in 1990 to 115,000 in 2000- While private health insurance is still rare in Sweden, it is significant that a market has been established for this type of insurance.
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Policies which have changed education in Sweden
* In 1988 the system was decentralized, as regulatory powers were transferred from the central state to the municipalities and the schools themselves
* introduction of a voucher system in 1992- established a system whereby privately operated schools could compete for students with public schools on an equal financial basis. It entitled all private schools approved by the National Agency of Education, including the confessional and commercially operated, to full public funding to be calculated on the basis of the number of enlisted students-
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Sweden private education growth
* The introduction of educational vouchers drastically improved conditions for private schools in Sweden and resulted in a rapid expansion of the non- public school sector. In 1991, there were a little over 60 non-public schools in the country; by 2000 their numbers had reached 475 and were steadily increasing
* In 2002 the share of students who attended private schools had grown from virtually nil (see above) to 5 per cent in primary schools and 6 per cent in secondary schools
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inequality and privatisation of education in Sweden
* As in the health-care sector, private providers tend to be over- represented in high-income areas.
* Some segregation issues - children of parents with high incomes and more education are over-represented among those who transfer to private schools and public schools of better reputation. Ethnic segregation, likewise, is furthered both by the establishment of privately operated (but publicly funded) schools catering to immigrants (on the basis of religion or language) as well as the observed tendency of parents of Swedish origin living in ethnically mixed areas to prefer schools with a low percentage of immigrant children
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elder care policy changes in Sweden
* In the 1990s, a majority of the municipalities left the previous system of direct administrative control over service provision and introduced a purchaser/ provider system. This implies that, while decisions about eligibility and the amount of care granted remain with the local authorities, the actual care services are provided by independent organizations
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size of private provision in elder care in Sweden
* In 2002, 92 of the 288 municipalities used private contractors.
* The share of private contracting as part of total elder-care costs quadrupled in the first half of the 1990s
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childcare policies in Sweden
* Universalist still - during the 1990s, as the municipalities were placed under a legal obligation to provide this service for all parents, including the unemployed.
the childcare sector had already been deregulated and municipalities given wider discretion to organize service provision as they saw fit
* the government introduced a (national) maximum fee for childcare services in 2002, regardless of provider
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share of private childcare in Sweden
* Between 1990 and 1999, the share of children in private (although publicly funded) care facilities rose from 5 per cent to 15 per cent
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issue with private sector childcare in Sweden
* Children of the highly educated were clearly over-represented within the non-public sector, whereas children of immigrant families were under-represented
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Issue with public sector provision in Sweden
* In the public sphere - public resources became more restricted in this area during the 1990s. This was most clearly evident from the increase in average child-group size, by 20 per cent in pre-schools and 65 per cent in leisure-time centres. Questions over quality
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Potential of self perpetuating state privatisation
- Creates its own political supporters+ some stand to gain materially from it + will be disproportionately resourceful and influential. Privatising creates entirely new political actors.
- privatization may be accelerated by the dynamics set in motion by consumer choice- is likely to create ever-increasing demands for more exclusive and culturally “distinct” service alternatives
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private provision of welfare leads to private financing
- privatization of the provision of welfare services may result in increased pressure for the privatization of their financing as well. If a commercial market for high-quality private social services develops, the better-off might be inclined to pay for these services privately rather than wait for public authorities to “purchase” them on their behalf. This will, by definition, undermine political attempts to maintain a universal, egalitarian welfare services sector
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issue with Powell's MEW
ignores choice- wheels of welfare typology
regulation is hard to measure - no obvious common metric
voluntary sector is not a separate sector (Evers)- hybrid between the other 3 mies in the welfare mix
