Week 4 papers Flashcards

1
Q

What is absolute information and what is relative information?

Eyring et al. (2021): Less Information, More Comparison, and Better Performance: Evidence from a Field Experiment

A

Absolute performance is a number you get, such as customer satisfaction is a 7.

Relative is in comparison with others, such as top 10%

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2
Q

What reasons are there to expect relative is better than absolute?

Eyring et al. (2021): Less Information, More Comparison, and Better Performance: Evidence from a Field Experiment

A
  • Peer-performance comparison: you compare yourself to others, people do not want to underperform to others.
  • Absolute doesn’t contain much information by itself (is a 5 good or bad?). Relative provides more context as absolute doesn’t have a benchmark. With relative a benchmark is included because you have a natural point to compare to.
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3
Q

What reason is there to expect relative leads to better performance than relative + absolute?

Eyring et al. (2021): Less Information, More Comparison, and Better Performance: Evidence from a Field Experiment

A

Because relative+absolute (1) can lead to information overload (too many KPIs) and (2) because focus might shift from relative to absolute if both are shown (decreasing peer-comparison)

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4
Q

In what setting is absolute information very important?

Eyring et al. (2021): Less Information, More Comparison, and Better Performance: Evidence from a Field Experiment

A

A setting where you want standardization, cost reduction and efficiency. In this case you explicitly want to measure on absolute amounts.

So absolute is very important if you want to standardize, such as premium shopping experience, starbucks or mc donalds.

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5
Q

What is the relevance of SOX with regard to financial reporting practices?

Cohen et al. (2008): Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management (EM) in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods

A

Investors use the FS and the FS must be trustworthy. Goal of SOX is to increase the faith in FS. Managers periodically report to shareholders, but if this is not faithful then investors can’t make decisions and this breaks the capital market.

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6
Q

What are the 2 important differences between real EM and accrual-based EM?

Cohen et al. (2008): Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management (EM) in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods

A

Real EM is harder to detect, but more expensive

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7
Q

What is real EM and what is accrual-based EM?

Cohen et al. (2008): Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management (EM) in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods

A

accrual-based EM is done through the accounting system, and does not influence the underlying business
Real EM is done through the business, by making different business decisions.

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8
Q

Why is real EM more expensive and why would it be a substitution after SOX?

Cohen et al. (2008): Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management (EM) in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods

A

Real is more expensive because you change business decisions, which can lower firm value (delay investments), while accrual-based only changes the accounting data.

Firm don’t want to be caught again for EM, so they choose real EM and less accrual-based EM.

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9
Q

What are the 3 types of real EM?

Cohen et al. (2008): Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management (EM) in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods

A
  1. Delay investments, reduce discretionary spending
  2. Boost sales with discounts: start contracts earlier, more lenient credit terms, costly to firm
  3. Overproduction: spread part of MOH over more products to reduce COGS. Also costly for firm because of costs for working capital
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10
Q

What does the difference in real vs accrual-based EM show before vs after SOX?

Cohen et al. (2008): Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management (EM) in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods

A

Before SOX accrual-based EM increased and real decreased. After SOX accrual-based decreased and real increased. Firms still require EM, but make more use of Real EM. They are used as substitutes, if you use more real, you use less accrual-based.

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11
Q

What is the effect of a Big 4 audit firm on EM?

Cohen et al. (2008): Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management (EM) in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods

A

If a firm has Big 4 as auditor they use less accrual-based EM. Reason is that they are more effective at stopping accrual-based EM. This is not the case for real EM. The focus of the auditor is on accounting information, so real EM is outside of the scope of the auditor.

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12
Q

What is the effect of options granted on EM?

Cohen et al. (2008): Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management (EM) in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods

A

Managers receive options at the money. If you receive options you want a lower share price. If managers receive options they are more inclined to use income decreasing EM. They can lower the strike price of the options by lowering the stock price.

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13
Q

What are the 2 main responsibilities of CFOs?

Kroos et al. (2018): Voluntary Clawback Adoption and the Use of Financial Measures in CFO Bonus Plans

A

Fiduciary responsibilities: responsible for correct preparation and integrity of FS. Also quality of internal controls.
Decision making responsibilities: cost reduction, budgeting & forecasting, financing, M&A

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14
Q

What problem exists with accounting earnings based bonuses for CFOs?

Kroos et al. (2018): Voluntary Clawback Adoption and the Use of Financial Measures in CFO Bonus Plans

A

This will not properly motivate him for his fiduciary responsibilities. The CFO is responsible for the financial reporting quality, you reward him based on numbers he can influence and is responsible for himself. For his decision responsibility it is fine.

A problem exists. Bonus on accounting earnings decreased his gatekeeper responsibilities. But no bonus decreases his decision-making responsibilities. So using the bonus yes or no increases the costs of one or the other.

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15
Q

What are clawbacks and do they solve the problem?

Kroos et al. (2018): Voluntary Clawback Adoption and the Use of Financial Measures in CFO Bonus Plans

A

Clawbacks allow the firm to reclaim all previous compensation. There is a trigger event in the contract, this could be a misstatement, fraud or misconduct.

Clawbacks solve the problem. CFOs are less inclined to manipulate accounting numbers because the costs are larger. You can give more bonuses based on accounting earnings to properly motivate their decision responsibilities.

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16
Q

What happens when firms implement a clawback?

Kroos et al. (2018): Voluntary Clawback Adoption and the Use of Financial Measures in CFO Bonus Plans

A

If firms implement a clawback, they issue more bonuses based on accounting earnings.

17
Q

What 4 proxies can measure susceptibility to misreporting?

Kroos et al. (2018): Voluntary Clawback Adoption and the Use of Financial Measures in CFO Bonus Plans

A

Internal control weaknesses: if problems existed in the past, system is more sensitive to manipulation.
Magnitude of accruals: if abnormal accruals are higher, more sensitive to manipulation.
Relative CEO power: more powerful CEO means that CFO is more sensitive to manipulation.
Relative audit committee power: if stronger committee, less sensitive to manipulation

18
Q

What is the effect of susceptibility to misreporting on clawbacks and CFO bonuses based on earnings?

Kroos et al. (2018): Voluntary Clawback Adoption and the Use of Financial Measures in CFO Bonus Plans

A

After clawbacks are implemented, accounting PM are used more to motivate decision making responsibilities, but this effect is stronger for firms that are not susceptible to misreporting.

19
Q

What are the 3 determinants that affect how successful managers are in adjusting targets downwards?

Bol et al. (2010): Supervisor Discretion in Target Setting: An empirical Investigation

A

Turbulent environment: more competition, dynamic market, store-specific risk
Hierarchical difference: conflict avoidance, difference in status between 2 managers
Unfairness perception: How challenging is your peer group.

Increased noise –> lower targets
Challenging peer group (fairness) –> lower targets
Status difference smaller –> lower targets

20
Q

What is the determining factor for explicit use of RPE? And what is this?

Gong et al. (2011): Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts

A

Common risk is the determining factor of RPE usage. Firms influenced by external factors also shared by others are more inclined to use RPE in the bonus of CEOs.

Common risk is based on similar industry with same external factors, similar size in SP1500, similar returns through stock movements.

21
Q

What are the 2 explanations of who firms choose for RPE comparison?

Gong et al. (2011): Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts

A
  1. Common risk exposure (efficient contracting)
  2. Self serving bias: CEO uses influence to not be compared to industry leader. Proof is that not often compared to industry leader