Week 10-Internet Sex Offences

Question 1

What is Technology-assisted CSA? (Hamilton et al., 2017)

Answer 1

Different forms of offending in young peoples’ own words:
1. Offline CSA shared with and viewed by others via technology
2. Peer CSA committed via technology or offline shared with others in the victim’s peer group
3. Offline CSA commissioned via technology
4. Offline sexual blackmail
5. Technology assisted sexual blackmail
6. Technology assisted grooming
7. Sexual activity bought from a young person via technology
8. Sexual images created consensually but shared non-consensually

Question 2

What crimes have been legislated?

Answer 2

• Inciting a child to engage in sexual activity (Section 10 Sexual Offences Act, 2003)
• Engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child (Section 11 Sexual Offences Act, 2003)
• Causing or inciting child prostitution or
  pornography (Section 48 Sexual Offences Act, 2003)
• Arranging or facilitating the commission of a child sex offence (Section 14 Sexual Offences Act, 2003)
• Meeting a child under the legal age of 16 following sexual grooming (Section 15 Sexual Offences Act, 2003)
• Sexual communication with a child (Section 67 Serious Crime Act 2015)

Question 3

What is the role of the internet: Has the internet helped contribute to the ISO
problem?

Answer 3

-It has facilitated ISOs by providing new ways of committing offences.

• The internet provides an affordable,
  anonymous and accessible means through which people can explore deviant
  sexual interests.
• Anonymity contributes to an ‘online
  disinhibition’ effect (Suler, 2004)
• It can facilitate an interest in children
  through access to indecent images,
  access to children and it provides a
  supportive environment for some
  offenders (Durkin, 1997, Beech, Elliot, Birgden & Findlater, 2008).

Question 4

What is the scope of the problem:
IIOC

Answer 4

• Interpol (2008) database contained over
  520.000 IIOC. UK ChildBase 807.525
  unique still images in 2009 (Quayle &
  Jones, 2011)
• Difficult to estimate number of adults
  interested in accessing/producing images:
  – Take/distribute: 12.993 offences;
  Possession: 1.398 offences.
  – (Home Office, 2010-2011)
• Estimated 50,000 individuals involved in
  IIOC offences in the UK (CEOP, 2013)

Question 6

What’s Technology-assisted Child Sexual Abuse? (CSA) (Hamilton et al., 2017)

Answer 6

Different forms of offending in young peoples’ own words
1. Offline (In world) CSA shared with and viewed by others via technology
2. Peer CSA committed via technology or offline shared with others in the victim’s peer group
3. Offline CSA commissioned via technology
4. Offline sexual blackmail
5. Technology assisted sexual blackmail
6. Technology assisted grooming
7. Sexual activity bought from a young person via technology
8. Sexual images created consensually but shared non-consensually

Question 7

What are current Legislations making CSA illegal?

Answer 7

• Inciting a child to engage in sexual activity (Section 10 Sexual Offences Act, 2003)
• Engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child (Section 11 Sexual Offences Act, 2003)
• Causing or inciting child prostitution or
  pornography (Section 48 Sexual Offences Act, 2003)
• Arranging or facilitating the commission of a child sex offence (Section 14 Sexual Offences Act, 2003)
• Meeting a child under the legal age of 16 following sexual grooming (Section 15 Sexual Offences Act, 2003)
• Sexual communication with a child (Section 67 Serious Crime Act 2015)

This list is not exhaustive

Question 8

What is the role of the internet: Has the internet helped contribute to the ISO
problem?

Answer 8

-It has facilitated ISOs by providing new ways of committing offences.

• The internet provides an affordable,
  anonymous and accessible means
  through which people can explore deviant
  sexual interests.
• Anonymity contributes to an ‘online
  disinhibition’ effect (Suler, 2004)
• It can facilitate an interest in children
  through access to indecent images,
  access to children and it provides a
  supportive environment for some
  offenders (Durkin, 1997, Beech, Elliot,
  Birgden & Findlater, 2008) (some would argue that the internet creates more sex offenders as they may initially never have this interest rather an addiction to porn).
• For some, internet sex offending fulfills some form of social deficits meaning they become more withdrawn (a vicious cycle). Additionally these offenders can seek each other out online and provides advice on how to avoid being caught

Question 9

What is the scale of the problem: Indecent Images Of Children (IIOC)

Answer 9

• Interpol (2008) database contained over
  520.000 IIOC. UK ChildBase 807.525
  unique still images in 2009 (Quayle &
  Jones, 2011)
• Difficult to estimate number of adults
  interested in accessing/producing images:
  – Take/distribute: 12.993 offences;
  Possession: 1.398 offences.
  – (Home Office, 2010-2011)
• Estimated 50,000 individuals involved in
  IIOC offences in the UK (CEOP, 2013)

Question 10

What is the scale of the problem: Grooming

Answer 10

• Sexual offences, including those against
  children, are massively under-recorded
  (ONS, 2015).
• One UK study reported that 2.1% of police
  cases in the UK each year relate to online
  grooming (Gallagher, Fraser, Christmann
  & Hodgson, 2006).
• Of a total of 2,391 reports received by the
  public, 64% related to grooming, making it
  the most reported activity to CEOP (CEOP, 2010) (i.e., more people experience grooming than anticipated)

Question 11

What is the Overall Scope of the Problem?

Answer 11

• Around 12% of children aged 11-16 years old have received sexual messages online in the past 12 months (Livingstone et al, 2010; 2011)
• Most common victims of online grooming (and subsequent offline offending) are adolescent females aged 13-17 years (e.g. Katz, 2013; Wolak, Finkelhor & Mitchell, 2004) but increasingly younger ages of children are being effected as younger ages access technology (Barnardo’s, 2011).
• Links to vulnerability (i.e., risk factors) – mental health, previous victimisation, social deprivation, in care, learning difficulties (e.g. Jonsson et al, 2019, Euser et al, 2013) – though have to also consider all children are at risk (i.e., there is no defining characteristic of who becomes a victim)
• Of 400 counselling sessions in relation to
  grooming, 82% of victims did not consider
  themselves a victim of CSE (Child Line, 2012) (part of this is the belief that they are in a relationship and have had sex with them several times - so may not want to cooperate with police investigation)

Simple calculation: 453,450 children in
ENGLAND alone

• Giles & Alison (2021) estimate there are
  between 2,365-5,991 males with paedophila and 12,218-30,952 males with hebephilia who are likely contact offenders.
• Combined socio-economic burden from
  these persons could amount to £236-£597
  million (incident costs) increasing to £2.9-
  £7.3 billion (lifetime costs)
• Total economic burden of national pool of
  IIOC offenders (N=50,000; CEOP,2013)=£113 million- £5.6 billion

Question 12

What is the Overall Scope of the Problem? (Giles et al., 2024; Hamilton et al., 2017)

Answer 12

• Worrying picture beginning to emerge that
  online only abuse just as harmful to
  victims than offline abuse.
• Technology provides additional routes to
  access young people to abuse, and to
  manipulate and silence them (i.e., it is very pervasive as these offenders can harass or message these individuals as many times they want any time in the day)
• Additional elements for young people to
  contend with; control, permanence,
  blackmail (The worst threat with blackmail is that any image of them will be shared; so many hide from fear that it has been released), revictimisation and self blame.
• Some professionals noted that victims are
  more often ‘blamed’, seen as participated
  in the abuse or do not see it as abuse when it is offline (i.e., that they had a choice and a say in saying no to this)

Question 13

What are the Research Approaches in IIOC?

Answer 13

• Wide range of academic papers examining
  characteristics of offenders such as
  sociodemographic characteristics, criminal records, personality, motivation and cognitions, life experiences, access to children and use of technology (c.f. Long et al, 2016)
• How groups differ (IIOC only, contact only, dual offenders; e.g. Babchishin et al, 2014)
• As a diagnostic tool for paedophilia (See Seto, 2018)
• Content of images (Tejeiro et al, 2020)
• Offender views (Winder and Gough, 2010)

Limitations:
-How do you really know which group an individual belongs to?
-Detected versus undetected offenders? (+ those who have been caught may not have been caught for other offences)
-Cannot access indecent images for
research purposes + research is quite limited (so how do we know what we know about offenders is 100% accurate?)

Question 14

What is ‘Online Grooming’?

Answer 14

‘……….a series of explicit or implicit goal-
directed behaviours that together share the
intention of preparing a target individual,
where his or her compliance and/or
submission is advantageous and/or
necessary for the specific purpose of
achieving an unlawful or exploitative goal’
(Elliott, 2015).

Question 15

What is involved in the grooming process from the offender’s perspective?

Answer 15

• Offenders deliberately enter chat rooms geared towards children, they review online profiles and postings by children to identify potential victims (Malesky, 2007).
• Quayle et al. (2014) rapid skill acquisition for online groomers in terms of selecting technologies and learning how to target and approach children. They engage in several interactions simultaneously.
• Victim choice: - accessibility, opportunity and vulnerability (O’Connell, 2003)
• Victim choice:- try to choose those who mention sex or are sexually curious, vulnerable or ‘appear submissive’, and young sounding screen name e.g. Jenny13 (Malesky, 2007; Quayle et al, 2014). They don’t always tend to have a type and open their net wide for anyone willing to communicate back
• They will communicate with victims in a variety of ways (Wolak et al, 2004) 15

Question 16

Often cited typology: What are contact driven offenders like (Whittle et al., 2013)?

Answer 16

• Contact driven offenders (CDOs) have every intention of engaging in offline sexual behaviours with an adolescent.

– Short online interaction times; 70% spend less than a week talking to their victims online, whilst 50% tried to arrange a meeting within a day of first contact.

– Briggs et al’s (2011), online conversation is used to simply find sexually active teens, determine the victim’s willingness to engage in sex, keep the contact a secret, and lastly to explain the sexual activities that would occur

Question 17

Often cited typology: What are fantasy driven offenders like (Whittle et al., 2013)?

Answer 17

Fantasy driven offenders (FDOs) on the other hand, engage in much longer conversations with their victims:
- average being 32.9 days, with a maximum of 180 days (Briggs et al., 2011)

• Suggests that they are motivated by the act of grooming itself.
• See the internet as a medium through which to engage in cybersex in order to facilitate masturbation.
• The FDOs communication with victims is mainly focused on the description of their sexual behaviours and an attempt to coerce their victim into engaging in similar activities.

Question 18

What are types of Grooming behaviours? (From the Perverted Justice Website)

Answer 18

• Deception: Offenders may pose as teenagers or manipulate other aspects of their identify such as age, name physical appearance and interests. However many children are aware of conversing with an adult or someone considerably older.
• Rapport building: An offender may exhibit traits of friendliness and trustworthiness (positivity). They may synchronise their behaviour and communication style to that of the child (co-ordination). They may learn about the offender’s interest’s beliefs and circumstances (mutuality)
• Act as mentor: For example, they may offer advice such as choosing what to wear, relationship difficulties with parents, partners and peers, schooling and mental health.
• Claim they have a special bond, unique or exclusive relationship. The strategies serve to develop an offender’s control and isolate a child from those that would otherwise provide protection. They may also help offenders to justify or defend their relationships to themselves and to authorities.
• Risk assessment: Most research highlights an offender’s attempts to assess risk, for example, by asking who is at home, or in the room with the child, enquiring about the location, schedule and that of their parents. These strategies prevent detection and also help to assess the levels of trust and vulnerability.
• Incentives: These include money and gifts, such as concert tickets, day trips, cell phones.
• Explicit about sexual intentions: Whilst some offenders do attempt to build trust by developing a friendship and rapport it is clear that many offenders are openly explicit about their sexual intentions, and that these intentions are introduced earlier than might be expected.
• Exchanging sexually explicit material: This may take various forms including dirty talking, sending sexual photos, and links to pornographic. Subsequently, the offender has leverage to blackmail the victim
• Treats ongoing activities as secrets: This creates a barrier and hinders a child to confide in others.
• Blackmail, threats and coercion: Such as threatening the young person to disseminate sexually explicit material of them, disclose sexually explicit acts they had engaged in to their parents and/or friends, as well as go to their home to hurt them.

Question 19

What are Research Approaches to Grooming?

Answer 19

• Grooming strategies and the grooming process (e.g. Elliot, 2015) and models of communication (e.g. Williams et al, 2013, Webster et al, 2012)
• Offender typologies (preferential offenders versus situational offenders, Lanning, 2012; fantasy drive vs contact driven, Briggs et al, 2011; hypersexualised, see Webster et al, 2012).
• Internet behaviours and communications do not necessarily differentiate between these groups (Broome et al., 2018)

Limitations:
-Use of perverted justice website and other vigilante groups/decoys
-Ethical issues in examining child language in sexual changes (in the sense we don’t want to embarass them for something that was initially private: hence why research is limited)

Question 20

What are protection options from grooming?

Answer 20

• Technical options (e.g. parental controls)
• Prevention and psycho-education in schools
• Third-party monitoring (e-safe, Internet watch foundation, THORN)
• Legal options
  – Internet Watch Foundation (can report to where they will disseminate this to the police)
  – CEOP
  – Police forces
  – ROCUs (covert surveillance)

Question 21

What’s the Kent Internet Risk Assessment
Tool (KIRAT: Long et al, 2016)

Answer 21

• Arrest prioritisation tool for Indecent
  Image of Children Offenders (Long et al., 2016)
• KIRAT used nationally in the UK and
  rolled out across 24 European countries, as well as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Israel
• Assisted in two of the largest national police operations in British history in 2014 and 2015

Question 22

What is the TOG Toolkit (Giles & Rhodes, 2017)?

Answer 22

The purpose of the app is to allow front line officers to follow the acronym as a step by step guide to investigating the initial stages of an online grooming case.

Question 23

What did Giles et al. (2021) find?

Answer 23

• Economic Evaluation of Rapport Based
  Investigative Interviewing
• Rapport-based from suspects that can help strengthen cases and/or safeguard victims (as a barrier is that offenders typically respond with no comment)
• These outcomes can be modelled and monetised
• We estimate the potential cost saving from training the national pool of Investigative Interviewers in Rapport Based approaches

Question 24

What are Detection and Enforcement
challenges?

Answer 24

• Victim awareness and reporting
• Location and access to crime scene: Could be anywhere in the world
• Identification of offenders(s): Individuals vs organised groups
• Local responsibilities: who’s job is it? (if the offender and victim differ in location massively)
• Evidential requirements (offender may tell the victim to delete the evidence)
• Building and maintaining rapport with groomed victims
• Offenders delete evidence
• Third-party links (RIPA) (e.g., requesting evidence from Facebook but this has since become encrypted making this harder)
• Global co-operation
• Differences in legal frameworks internationally (some view it as worse others see it as normal)

Question 25

In the final analysis what risks
do ISO’s pose?

Answer 25

• Risks cannot be overestimated; not just for victims of offline but also online only sexual offences.
• Failure to commit resource to prevention and intervention could cost billions in terms of harm experienced by victims (physical and emotional)
• Is there a “treatment gap” in terms of online victims?

Children, in general, are harmed by internet sexual offending (Giles & Alison, 2021):
– Police could be stretched beyond their investigative capabilities
– Desensitisation to IIOC images, widespread availability promotes trivialisation of content
– Online individuals continue to gain social cohesion
– Children may be able to access IIOC easily