Walter and Anderson's argument

Question 1

Argument for the cogency of their argument

Answer 1

1) If W and A’s argument is factually and logically strong, then their argument is cogent.
2) W and A’s argument is factually and logically strong.
3) Thus, W and A’s argument is cogent.

Question 2

Concepts

Answer 2

• T and W argue that TWP aims to answer the normative question “what should count as knowledge?”, and as such preemptively assumes that there exists a single correct theory of knowledge/knowing which should be adopted by all cultures – this is called epistemic monism.
• T and W argue for an epistemic pluralism approach to balance descriptive and normative approaches, by acknowledging there are many different, potentially incompatible, yet equally correct “ways of knowing”, allowing for different conceptions of knowledge and knowledge systems, but also that there are some constraints on acceptable theories of knowledge.
• A fully descriptive approach (epistemic relativism) only aims to answer how knowledge is used, applied, and evaluated in different societies, cultures, and fields without discrediting any knowledge systems.

Question 3

Defence of the factual strength of my argument

Answer 3

• It is noted that W and A’s argument can be put into a standard form argument that is logically strong, thus my premise that their argument is factually and logically strong is true if W and A’s premises are factually strong.
• . W and A argue that everyone (including TWPers) have implicit pre-theoretic concepts about what counts as knowledge/knowing, and that these notions are shaped, in part, by social position. They continue that the implicit ideas about what count as knowledge/knowing then influence the answer to the normative question; ‘what should count as knowledge?’.
• I believe that the premises of W and A’s argument are true based on the idea that since our reality is so heavily influenced by a variety of subjective experiences, it seems extremely probable that our concepts of knowledge are influenced by said subjective experiences (including social position) than not. Furthermore, I would argue that our understanding of our reality (knowledge included) begins forming before our learning of critical thinking techniques which may help reason objectively (or as objectively as possible). Thus, it is much more plausible that since our understanding of reality begins to be shaped in a subjective manner prior to learning how to reason, or evaluate, objectively, that our ultimate concepts of knowledge will be influenced in some capacity by our implicit notions of knowledge (which have in turn been influenced by many aspects of our subjective life, including social position).

Question 4

Counterargument

Answer 4

• One could argue that although navigating our subjective reality begins before learning measures that allow for objective evaluation, once learning critical thinking techniques that allow for objective evaluation one may consider knowledge objectively. That is, that one could evaluate what counts as knowledge without being influenced by any implicit, pre-theoretic, concepts about what counts as knowledge which are influenced by their social position so long as they apply proper critical thinking measures learned over time.
• I would argue that even in these conditions it is still much more plausible that implicit concepts about knowledge one gains subjectively play a part in their evaluation of knowledge since it is unquestionably more difficult to recognize, evaluate, and appropriately handle our implicit notions than it is to reason objectively (even if the ideal critical thinking measures to protect against subjective reasoning are taught and understood).
• On the basis of what is more plausible, it will always be more likely that implicit concepts stemming from subjective experience (including social position) will play a part than the chances someone is able to reason absolutely objectively.