Epistemic monism, pluralism, relativism

Question 1

Argument for plausibility of epistemic pluralism

Answer 1

1) People either have implicit, pre-theoretic, concepts about what counts as knowledge which are influenced by their social position or not.

2) Either all concepts of what counts as knowledge are right, or some can be wrong.

3) If it is more plausible that everyone has implicit, pre-theoretic, concepts about what counts as knowledge which are influenced by their social position, and that some concepts of what counts as knowledge can be wrong, then epistemic pluralism is the most plausible approach.

4) It is more plausible that everyone has implicit, pre-theoretic, concepts about what counts as knowledge which are influenced by their social position, than not.

5) Some concepts of what counts as knowledge can be wrong.

6) Thus, epistemic pluralism is the most plausible approach.

Question 2

Concepts

Answer 2

• Epistemic pluralism holds that there are many different, potentially incompatible, yet equally correct “ways of knowing”, allowing for different conceptions of knowledge and knowledge systems but also that there are some constraints on acceptable theories of knowledge.
• Epistemic pluralism bridges the gap between the extremes of epistemic monism and epistemic relativism.
• Epistemic monism asserts that there is a single correct theory of knowledge/knowing that all cultures should adopt, whereas epistemic relativism asserts that knowledge is entirely relative to a context, culture, individual, etc.
• Epistemic monism conforms to an entirely normative approach (aiming to answer definitively “what should count as knowledge”) whereas epistemic relativism commits only to the descriptive approach (aiming to answer “how is knowledge used, applied, etc.”) without discrediting or disallowing any theories of knowledge.

Question 3

Defence of the factual strength of my argument

Answer 3

• By the law of excluded middle, my first premise must be true as either we are able to objectively evaluate/reflect on knowledge, or not. Similarly, my second premise is true by the same reasoning as the first.
• My third premise is true via the definition of epistemic pluralism, and the logic that if the key concept of an approach is proven true then the approach itself should be accepted as true (or at least the most plausible, as I have stated in my argument).
• I believe my fourth premise to be true based on the idea that since our reality is so heavily influenced by a variety of subjective experiences, it seems much more plausible that our concepts of knowledge are influence by said subjective experiences than not. Furthermore, I would argue that our understanding of our reality (knowledge included) begins forming before our learning of critical thinking techniques which help reason objectively (or as objectively as possible). Thus, it is much more plausible that since our understanding of reality begins to be shaped in a subjective manner prior to learning how to reason, or evaluate, objectively, that our ultimate concepts of knowledge will be influenced in some capacity by our implicit notions of knowledge (which would be influenced by many aspects of our subjective life, including social position).
• I believe my fifth premise should be accepted as true on the basis that there could exist certain knowledge systems based in entirely inappropriate epistemic norms which a theory must protect against. If an epistemic theory has no safeguards to discredit knowledge systems rooted in hate, prejudice, illogical justification, or any other faulty concepts, then the theory will be too open to attack.

Question 4

Counterargument

Answer 4

• One could argue that although navigating our subjective reality begins before learning measures that allow for objective evaluation, once learning critical thinking techniques that allow for objective evaluation one may consider knowledge objectively. That is, that one could evaluate what counts as knowledge without being influenced by any implicit, pre-theoretic, concepts about what counts as knowledge which are influenced by their social position so long as they apply proper critical thinking measures learned over time.
• I would argue that even in these conditions it is still much more plausible that implicit concepts about knowledge one gains subjectively play a part in their evaluation of knowledge since it is unquestionably more difficult to recognize, evaluate, and appropriately handle our implicit notions than it is to reason objectively (even if the ideal critical thinking measures to protect against subjective reasoning are taught and understood).
• On the basis of what is more plausible, it will always be more likely that implicit concepts stemming from subjective experience (including social position) will play a part than the chances someone is able to reason absolutely objectively.