Mid Term 2

Question 1

Outline Agrippa’s trilemma

Answer 1

One of three options appears to have to be right, but each have problems

(1) Our beliefs are unsupported
(2) Our beliefs are supported by an infinite chain of justification
(3) Our beliefs are supported by a circular chain of justification

1. Either A or B or C
2. Not A
3. Not B
4. Not C
5. Not (A or (B or C))
6. Thus, contradiction

Question 2

Infinitism

Answer 2

That an infinite chain of justification can justify a belief

Unclear how an infinite chain could “support” a belief anymore than an infinite foundation for a house

Question 3

Coherentism

Answer 3

Circular chain of beliefs could justify a belief
- augmented by the claim that a small circle can’t justify, but a sufficiently large circle could do justificatory work
- partly based on the thought that people do justify their beliefs in this way

Question 4

Foundationalism

Answer 4

Holds that some foundational beliefs are unjustified (responds to option 1 in Agrippa’s trilemma) - i.e. that some beliefs must be unsupported

Question 5

Classical foundationalism

Answer 5

Dominant form of foundationalism, holds that foundational beliefs are self-justifying (require no additional beliefs for their support)

Question 6

What did Descartes argue (which corresponds to foundationalism)

Answer 6

That all knowledge was based on a few self-evident propositions that are immune to any kind of doubt whatsoever

Question 7

Weakness of coherentism

Answer 7

Even if [people do justify their beliefs in a circular manner], it doesn’t follow that we are right to form them in this way (people are just not careful enough in actual practice)

Question 8

Weakness of foundationalism

Answer 8

Challenge of identifying which beliefs are self-justifying (foundational)

There must be some strict constraints on foundational beliefs, but if too strict then the class of foundational beliefs is so narrow that it can’t justify many beliefs that most would think are justified

Question 9

Why might the distinction between rationality and irrationality be important within the theory of knowledge and knowing?

Answer 9

It is only rational beliefs that are candidates for knowledge, with irrational beliefs by their nature not being instances of knowledge (Pritchard)

Another reason to be interested in rationality from the perspective of the theory of knowledge is that rationality seems connected to justification

Question 10

Epistemic rationality

Answer 10

A form of rationality which is aimed at true belief

Question 11

Practical rationality

Answer 11

A form of rationality aimed at how to achieve goals aside true belief; such as increasing personal or communal well-being, justice, health, profit, etc

Question 12

Discuss the idea: If the goal of epistemic rationality is true belief, then the goal should be to maximize true belief (Pritchard)

Answer 12

First, if what this means is forming as many true beliefs as possible, then it would suggest that one should form beliefs by memorizing a telephone book, or the names and majors of every student on campus, or counting blades of grass (but this seems irrational)

Second, it seems like an efficient way to maximize true belief would be to believe almost anything (irrational)

Question 13

Discuss the idea: One way [to address the issues associated with epistemic rationality maximizing true beliefs] may be to change the conception of epistemic rationality to require minimizing falsehoods rather than maximizing true belie

Answer 13

One problem would be that the way to ensure you have the fewest false beliefs would be to withhold from believing much of anything (also irrational)

Question 14

What is a key notion in making assessments about epistemic rationality

Answer 14

Responsibility
- praise (when a person satisfies their epistemic responsibilities)
- blame (when they fail them)

Question 15

Deontic epistemic rationality

Answer 15

It holds that an agent is epistemically rational just so long as the agent does not violate any epistemic norm in coming to form that belief by her own lights. That is, an agent can be rational and employ the wrong epistemic norms, just so long as she is not to blame for her employing the wrong norms (Prithcard)

Question 16

Non-deontic epistemic rationality

Answer 16

A stronger non-deontic conception of epistemic rationality requires that an agent employ the correct epistemic norms - An agent has to use the correct epistemic norms (that are likely to lead to true beliefs) to be epistemically rational

Question 17

Problems with non-deontic epistemic rationality

Answer 17

One problem is that it seems to break the ties between rationality and responsibility

Question 18

Epistemic internalism

Answer 18

There is a close connection between epistemic standing and what the agent can be held responsible for
The agent has control over whether they are epistemically rational

Question 19

Epistemic externalism

Answer 19

One can responsibly form their beliefs and yet because one is using the wrong epistemic norms they are not epistemically rational
The agent doesn’t have control over whether they are epistemically rational (one may, due to no fault of their own, have been taught the wrong epistemic norms)

Question 20

Drawback of internalist deontic conception of rationality

Answer 20

It draws a large separation between justified belief and knowledge (someone following wrong epistemic norms may end up with a correct judgment about the essay in addition to having a justified belief)

Question 21

Drawback of externalist deontic conception of rationality

Answer 21

We really do evaluate epistemic rationality based on whether a person’s belief forming methods are the kind of thing for which people can be blamed or praised

Question 22

Summary of externalist vs internalist theory of epistemic rationality

Answer 22

The internalist theory seems to throw a large wedge between justified beliefs and knowledge. But it respects the idea that epistemic rationality is closely tied to responsibility—what the agent can be praised and blamed for links up with whether they are epistemically rational

The externalist theory of epistemic rationality makes knowledge and justification closely tied, but loses the idea that responsibility and epistemic rationality are closely connected

Question 23

Basis of reliabilism

Answer 23

Knowledge involves some kind of success or achievement - cognitive achievement

Whatever account of knowledge epistemology provides, it should accommodate the intuition that knowledge is an achievement, an instance of cognitive success.

This entails that when one knows what one believes truly, one has not acquired the true belief through luck

You cannot acquire knowledge through a method that gets you truth only through luck, it appears that some element of reliability in method is required

Question 24

Reliabilism

Answer 24

Reliabilism holds that knowledge must be true belief gained in a reliable way, where ‘reliable’ means the method is likely to get you true beliefs (Pritchard)

Question 25

Initial problem with reliabilism

Answer 25

If this thesis is merely understood as reliability plus a belief that is true, then it faces some serious issues - namely can have Gettier style counterexamples to RTB

Question 26

Non-argued component of reliabilism view

Answer 26

It does seem like employing processes that tends toward truth more than falsity is an important component of respecting the idea that knowledge is an achievement

Question 27

One way of adjusting RTB

Answer 27

One way that the view has been modified has been to demand that knowledge is true belief gained by the operation of a reliable epistemic virtue and faculty

Question 28

Epistemic virtue

Answer 28

A character trait (a feature of some person that disposes the person to behave in certain ways) which makes you better suited to gaining the truth

So, an epistemic character trait is a feature that a person has that disposes them to act in certain ways in their truth-seeking behaviour

Question 29

Examples of epistemic virtues

Answer 29

• non-dismissive consideration of arguments
• charitable interpretation of opposing arguments
  awareness of one’s own presuppositions and potential for being mistaken
• consultation of expert knowledge reliability of source material knowledge of what one is talking about rather than merely repeating others’ opinions
• open-mindedness
• intellectual
• discernment
• curiosity
• parsimony
• creativity

Question 30

How is a cognitive faculty distinguished from an epistemic virtue?

Answer 30

Faculties are usually innate and automatic, whereas epistemic virtues are acquired, or at least can be and are deliberately executed
- faculties do not require reflection of the agent

Question 31

Reliabilist version of virtue epistemology (RVE)

Answer 31

What is important when we talk about reliability is not the reliability of the process by which beliefs are formed, but rather the agent’s reliability (Pritchard)
- it is a theory of knowledge that understands knowledge in terms of epistemic virtues and faculties

Question 32

One concern of any variant of reliabilism

Answer 32

It permits very easy to acquire knowledge

Question 33

How can one stay within the virtue epistemic framework but adopt an internalist epistemology

Answer 33

Require that knowledge issues only through epistemic virtues