Mid Term 2 Flashcards
(33 cards)
Outline Agrippa’s trilemma
One of three options appears to have to be right, but each have problems
(1) Our beliefs are unsupported
(2) Our beliefs are supported by an infinite chain of justification
(3) Our beliefs are supported by a circular chain of justification
- Either A or B or C
- Not A
- Not B
- Not C
- Not (A or (B or C))
- Thus, contradiction
Infinitism
That an infinite chain of justification can justify a belief
Unclear how an infinite chain could “support” a belief anymore than an infinite foundation for a house
Coherentism
Circular chain of beliefs could justify a belief
- augmented by the claim that a small circle can’t justify, but a sufficiently large circle could do justificatory work
- partly based on the thought that people do justify their beliefs in this way
Foundationalism
Holds that some foundational beliefs are unjustified (responds to option 1 in Agrippa’s trilemma) - i.e. that some beliefs must be unsupported
Classical foundationalism
Dominant form of foundationalism, holds that foundational beliefs are self-justifying (require no additional beliefs for their support)
What did Descartes argue (which corresponds to foundationalism)
That all knowledge was based on a few self-evident propositions that are immune to any kind of doubt whatsoever
Weakness of coherentism
Even if [people do justify their beliefs in a circular manner], it doesn’t follow that we are right to form them in this way (people are just not careful enough in actual practice)
Weakness of foundationalism
Challenge of identifying which beliefs are self-justifying (foundational)
There must be some strict constraints on foundational beliefs, but if too strict then the class of foundational beliefs is so narrow that it can’t justify many beliefs that most would think are justified
Why might the distinction between rationality and irrationality be important within the theory of knowledge and knowing?
It is only rational beliefs that are candidates for knowledge, with irrational beliefs by their nature not being instances of knowledge (Pritchard)
Another reason to be interested in rationality from the perspective of the theory of knowledge is that rationality seems connected to justification
Epistemic rationality
A form of rationality which is aimed at true belief
Practical rationality
A form of rationality aimed at how to achieve goals aside true belief; such as increasing personal or communal well-being, justice, health, profit, etc
Discuss the idea: If the goal of epistemic rationality is true belief, then the goal should be to maximize true belief (Pritchard)
First, if what this means is forming as many true beliefs as possible, then it would suggest that one should form beliefs by memorizing a telephone book, or the names and majors of every student on campus, or counting blades of grass (but this seems irrational)
Second, it seems like an efficient way to maximize true belief would be to believe almost anything (irrational)
Discuss the idea: One way [to address the issues associated with epistemic rationality maximizing true beliefs] may be to change the conception of epistemic rationality to require minimizing falsehoods rather than maximizing true belie
One problem would be that the way to ensure you have the fewest false beliefs would be to withhold from believing much of anything (also irrational)
What is a key notion in making assessments about epistemic rationality
Responsibility
- praise (when a person satisfies their epistemic responsibilities)
- blame (when they fail them)
Deontic epistemic rationality
It holds that an agent is epistemically rational just so long as the agent does not violate any epistemic norm in coming to form that belief by her own lights. That is, an agent can be rational and employ the wrong epistemic norms, just so long as she is not to blame for her employing the wrong norms (Prithcard)
Non-deontic epistemic rationality
A stronger non-deontic conception of epistemic rationality requires that an agent employ the correct epistemic norms - An agent has to use the correct epistemic norms (that are likely to lead to true beliefs) to be epistemically rational
Problems with non-deontic epistemic rationality
One problem is that it seems to break the ties between rationality and responsibility
Epistemic internalism
There is a close connection between epistemic standing and what the agent can be held responsible for
The agent has control over whether they are epistemically rational
Epistemic externalism
One can responsibly form their beliefs and yet because one is using the wrong epistemic norms they are not epistemically rational
The agent doesn’t have control over whether they are epistemically rational (one may, due to no fault of their own, have been taught the wrong epistemic norms)
Drawback of internalist deontic conception of rationality
It draws a large separation between justified belief and knowledge (someone following wrong epistemic norms may end up with a correct judgment about the essay in addition to having a justified belief)
Drawback of externalist deontic conception of rationality
We really do evaluate epistemic rationality based on whether a person’s belief forming methods are the kind of thing for which people can be blamed or praised
Summary of externalist vs internalist theory of epistemic rationality
The internalist theory seems to throw a large wedge between justified beliefs and knowledge. But it respects the idea that epistemic rationality is closely tied to responsibility—what the agent can be praised and blamed for links up with whether they are epistemically rational
The externalist theory of epistemic rationality makes knowledge and justification closely tied, but loses the idea that responsibility and epistemic rationality are closely connected
Basis of reliabilism
Knowledge involves some kind of success or achievement - cognitive achievement
Whatever account of knowledge epistemology provides, it should accommodate the intuition that knowledge is an achievement, an instance of cognitive success.
This entails that when one knows what one believes truly, one has not acquired the true belief through luck
You cannot acquire knowledge through a method that gets you truth only through luck, it appears that some element of reliability in method is required
Reliabilism
Reliabilism holds that knowledge must be true belief gained in a reliable way, where ‘reliable’ means the method is likely to get you true beliefs (Pritchard)
