[W2] - Readings Flashcards
From Positivism to Popper’s Fallibilism and Kuhn’s Paradigms
What should a hypothesis be? (relative over absolute degrees of falsifiability)
A Hypothesis Should Be:
- Falsifiable.
- The more falsifiable, the better.
- Should not yet be falsified.
- Should be more falsifiable than the hypothesis for which it is offered as a replacement.
This emphasizes comparison.
What does the sophisticated falsificationist account of science emphasize/focus on?
It emphasizes the growth of science.
It focuses the relative merits of competing theories as opposed to the merits of a single theory.
It gives a dynamic picture of science rather than the static account of the naivest falsificationists.
A sophisticated falsificationist maintains that theories can be falsified and rejected (to be replaced by better theories) - while denying that theories can ever be established as true or probably true.
The fact that science is fallible is not a
disadvantage, as the falsificationist settles for progress rather than truth.
What is an Ad Hoc modification?
A modification in a theory, such as the addition of an extra claim or a change in some existing postulate/presumption, that has no testable consequences that were not ALREADY testable consequences of the unmodified theory.
It adds no new testable consequences.
Why would a falsificationist object to ad hoc modifications?
A falsificationist would reject ad hoc modifications – as such modified hypotheses are typically less falsifiable than the original version (e.g., “all bread nourishes” - “all bread nourishes, except that one harmful batch of bread made in Normandy”)
They typically exist to protect a theory from a threatening falsification - and lead to no new tests (to use Popper’s words, they are not independently testable)
What is a falsification?
The failure of a theory to stand up to observational and experimental tests.
Popper believed that the falsification of bold, highly falsifiable conjectures marked the most significant advances in science. He was mistaken.
What does mark significant scientific advances?
The confirmation of bold conjectures and/or the falsification of cautious conjectures.
The confirmation of bold conjectures will be informative, and constitute an important contribution to scientific knowledge, because they mark the discovery of something that was previously unheard of or considered unlikely (determining whether something is bold is historically relative - it depends on the background
knowledge/scientific theories that were well accepted in the time in which it was proposed)
The falsification of cautious conjectures is informative because it establishes that what was regarded as unproblematically true is in fact false.
The Inductivist vs Falsificationist perspectives on Confirmation
The significance of confirming instances according to the extreme inductivist is determined solely by the logical relationship between the observations that are confirmed and the theory they support. In other words, historical context is deemed irrelevant.
A confirming instance is one that gives inductive support to a theory, and the greater their number, the greater the support for the theory and the probability of its truth.
By contrast, in the falsificationist account, the significance of confirmations depends very much on their historical context. A confirmation will be deemed more significant if it is estimated that it is unlikely to occur in the light of the background knowledge of the time. For falsificationists, confirmations that are foregone conclusions are insignificant (i.e., observing Neptune now as opposed to for the first time)
What are the Advantages of Falsificationism over Inductivism?
- Some facts (especially experimental results) are theory-dependent and fallible.
This undermines the inductivist position that science should have an unproblematic and factual foundation- while the falsificationist recognizes that facts/theories are fallible. - The inductivist has trouble specifying the criteria for a good inductive inference.
Therefore, they have difficulty answering questions concerning the circumstances under which facts can be said to give significant support to theories. - The falsificationist states that facts give significant support to theories when they constitute severe tests of that theory. The confirmations of novel predictions are important members of this category. This helps to explain why repetitions do not result in a significant increase in the empirical support for a theory (which an extreme inductivist has difficulty accommodating).
While the inductivist has problems explaining how knowledge of the unobservable can be derived from observable facts, the falsificationist believes that claims about the unobservable can be severely tested (and hence supported) by exploring their novel consequences. - The falsificationist insists that science does not involve induction (bypassing the intuitionist’s difficulty in defining an inductive inference). Deduction is used to reveal the consequences of theories so that they can be tested! But no claims are made as to whether the survival of tests shows a theory to be true (or probably true). At best, the results of such tests show a theory to be an improvement on its predecessor.
Why is falsification not always as simple as it seems?
Because, when observation and
experiment provide evidence that conflicts with the predictions of some law or theory, it may be the evidence (e.g., research methods) that is at fault rather than the law or theory!
Additionally, a
realistic scientific theory involves many universal statements rather than just one. Specific boundary conditions or instruments for use may also be stated. Therefore, when a prediction turns out to be wrong, it is difficult to know
which of the many premises was at fault.
The historical evidence for the inadequacy of falsificationism
If scientists strictly adhered to the guidelines of falsificationism then some now great scientific theories would have been rejected in their early stages; on the basis of an observation inconsistent with them (i.e., newton’s gravitational theory, bohr’s theory of the atom, kinetic theory, Copernican Revolution)
The Copernican Revolution as a case study of scientific development without falsificationism
The Copernican Revolution introduced the idea of an earth that moves and orbits the sun (not stationary as in the Aristotelian universe).
New concepts
of force and inertia did not come about as a result of careful observation and experiment. Nor did
they come about through the falsification of bold conjectures and the continual replacement of
one bold conjecture by another.
Early formulations of this theory, involved imperfectly formulated novel conceptions, and were persevered with and developed in spite of apparent falsifications!
It was only after a new system of physics had been devised, a process that involved the labor of
scientists over several centuries, that the new theory could be successfully matched with the results of observation and experiment in a detailed way.
Galileo Galilei was one big defendant of the Copernican Revolution: his improvements to the
telescope, astronomical observations, and support for Copernicanism were all integral.
Problems with the falsificationist’s perspective on demarcation
- The criterion for “science” are too easily satisfied.
- The criterion for science are also satisfied
by many knowledge claims Popper would wish to classify as “non-science”.
How did Popper respond to criticisms of the falsificiationist approach to demarcation?
Emphasized the need for dogmatism on an individual level, highlighting the need for a critical thinking component in science (“If we give in to criticism too easily, we shall
never find out where the real power of our theories lies”)
What can be learned from the history of falsification?
- Theory must not only be falsifiable, but it also must not be falsified
- However, it is often necessary to retain theories in spite of apparent falsification
- History demonstrates that the evolution and progress of major sciences exhibit a structure that is not fully captured by either the inductivist and falsificationist accounts. Science should proceed from an understanding of the many theoretical frameworks in which scientific activity
takes place.
Can observations be theory-dependent?
Yes. The meaning of concepts often depends on the structure of the
theory in which they occur.
Who was the first major challenger of the inductivist and falsificationist accounts of science?
Thomas Kuhn - in his book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (1962)
Through his focus on the history of scientific progress, Kuhn realized that neither of these traditional accounts resembled the historical evidence.
His resulting theory emphasized the revolutionary nature of scientific progress - where a revolution involves the ABANDONMENT of one theoretical structure, and its REPLACEMENT by another (incompatible) one. He also valued the sociological characteristics of scientific communities.
Kuhn’s Cycle of the Progression of Science, and paradigms
[PNCR - NN, NC - P]
Pre-science → Normal science → Crisis → Revolution → New normal science → New crisis → Pre-science
Pre- Science: Disorganized and diverse activity that precedes the formation of a science - which
eventually becomes structured and directed when a single paradigm becomes adhered to by a
scientific community. Characterized by total disagreement and constant debate over the fundamentals.
Paradigm: Made up of general theoretical assumptions and laws and
the techniques for their application that the members of a particular scientific community adopt.
Normal Science: Workers within a paradigm practice “normal science” - in which they articulate and develop the paradigm into improve the match
between it and nature/attempt to account for and accommodate the behavior of some aspect of the real world as revealed through experimentation. We presuppose that paradigm provides the means for the solution within
it, so failure to solve → failure of the scientist.
Crisis: You will always encounter difficulties/ anomalies within a paradigm. However, when difficulties and falsifications get
out of hand (i.e., strike at the fundamentals/present a social issue) a crisis state develops - and deepens with the emergence of a rival paradigm and no compelling demonstration of the superiority of one over the other.
Revolution: The abandonment of one paradigm and adoption of a new one - the resolution of the crisis - not all science is cumulative!
Precisely defining the characteristics of a paradigm
- will have explicitly stated fundamental laws and theoretical assumptions
● will include standard ways of applying the fundamental laws to a variety of situations
● instrumentations and instrumental techniques
● some general, metapshysical principles that guide work within a paradigm
● will contain some very general methodological prescriptions
● will be sufficiently imprecise and open-ended (normal science involves detailed attempts
to articulate paradigms to improve its match with nature → a paradigm will always be
imprecise enough to let this work be done)
● Kuhn: more to a paradigm than we can note down; all paradigms have anomalies - he rejects certain brands of falsificationism
The function of normal science and revolutions
The Function of Normal Science: Opportunity to DEVELOP DETAILS of theory → necessary for
scientists to be uncritical of the paradigm so that this detailed work can be done.
Function of Revolutions: Prevents science from becoming TRAPPED in a single paradigm.
Kuhn and Relativism
Kuhn was accused of having put forward a ‘relativist’ view of scientific progress (as his account of progress relying on whether a paradigm is better than one it challenges does not
have a definitive, neutral answer, but depends on the values of the individual, group or culture that makes this judgment)
Kuhn rejected this perspective, and sought to distance himself from relativism.
Kuhn likened scientific revolutions to gestalt switches, to religious conversions and to political revolutions.
On the one hand, Kuhn is aware of the fact that a scientific revolution
extends over a considerable period of time involving much work.
On the other hand, Kuhn’s comparisons between paradigm changes and gestalt switches/religious conversions suggests that the change takes place ‘all at once’. [confusion between objective and subjective knowledge perhaps?]
Distinguishing between Subjective and Objective Knowledge
Subjective Knowledge: What people might believe as a consequence of their individual perceptual experiences.
Objective Knowledge: The observation statements that might be taken to support a belief. These are publicly testable and debatable in a way that the former are not.
Knowledge can be constructed as objective by talking about the objective properties of
statements.
Why is homeopathy relevant to discussions around demarcation (i.e., distinguishing science from pseudoscience)
Homeopathy is typically taken as “one of the clearest
examples of pseudoscience by both scientists and philosophers of science” - but for a long time there was no discussion that established this systematically.
Indeed, historical demarcation criteria do not seem to adequately explain this:
* Falsifiability (Popper): homeopathy has been falsified many times.
* Criterion of problem-solving (Kuhn): bit wonky
Mukerji and Ernst - and their application of bullshitology
Applying bullshitology means using examples to show how disciples of a certain perspective defend it with bullshit instead of proper scientific research.
Additionally, it means showing that the way a certain group are arguing their perspective shows a
carelessness regarding important epistemic standards and perhaps even an outright indifference
to the truth.
What is homeopathy, who developed it, and what are its two primary tenets?
Homoeopathy is a school of medicine, first developed by German physician Hahnemann (died 1843).
Its first guiding tenet - The Law of Similars - Like cures Like.
A physician should, to cure an illness, choose a remedy made from a substance that, in a healthy subject,
creates symptoms similar to the ones to be treated.
The Doctrine of Potentisation/Dynamisation - Any substance used must be serially diluted, usually in a water/alcohol mixture, and then shaken at each step of serial
dilution.
Homeopaths believe that shaking transfers energy or information onto the substance.
High potencies, which dilute the mother tincture beyond D24 (or C12), likely contain no
molecules of the original substance.
Three Variations of Homeopathy
- Classical Homeopathy (Hahnemann’s version) - prescriptions of remedies are highly individualized. Collecting the individual’s medical history is an extensive, time-consuming process— and the
homeopath considers the patient’s situation well beyond her bodily symptoms. Hence, two patients with identical conditions will not necessarily receive the same remedy. - Clinical Homeopathy -
The patient’s condition determines the remedy.
Two patients with identical conditions WOULD be prescribed the same
homeopathic medicine (Hahnemann would have disagreed with this - but even moreso with the third, more widespread, version) - Homeopathic Self-Medication - A patient, who is not trained in homeopathic
principles, determines for themselves which remedy to use.
Homeopathy and RCTs
Homoeopathy’s empirical prediction is that highly diluted homeopathic remedies will perform significantly better than placebos in rigorous tests. biases.
This could be tested with confirmatory studies -
double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled trials (RCTs).
Things to note about RCTs:
● Risk of bias (e.g., when no adequate randomisation or blinding)
● Even RCTs can yield false-positive findings
● Scientists are sometimes tempted to use hypothesising after the results are known
or HARKing
● It is essential to consider the entire evidence and evaluate each study
regarding methodological quality and indications of data snooping. This is done with systematic reviews and meta-analyses. Note that research outlets may be
more likely to accept studies with positive results, which will result in a bias in the publication
record.
Problems for homeopathy with RCTS:
● Implausibility: its core claim is that dilutions beyond the Avogadro limit, which probably
contain not even a single molecule of the active ingredient, can have therapeutic effects.
This does not make sense.
● Insufficiency of acceptable evidence: confirmatory studies tend to be methodologically
weak and at high risk of bias, and systematic reviews and meta-analyses conclude that the
available evidence is insufficient.
Define pseudoscience.
Pseudoscience is a non-science that PRETENDS to be a real science (i.e., art is a non-science but not pseudoscientific - because artists don’t pretend to be
scientists)
Pseudoscience versus Parascience
Parascience does not claim to abide by the rules of science;
it could claim, instead, to possess a superior way of knowing that is preferable to science.
Therefore you could also call them anti-scientists - e.g., Traditional Chinese Medicine.
Some homeopaths should be classed as parascientists rather than pseudoscientists (when they attack science). This paper focuses on homeopaths who think of themselves as scientists though.
Pseudoscience versus Protoscience
Protoscientists seek to practice science but have not been
able, because of a lack of time or resources, to establish their scientific credentials. Example: the
Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI).
One cannot yet classify such efforts as science or not - only time will tell. For homeopathy, we believe time has already told.
Pseudoscience versus Bad Science
If a researcher attempts to stay true to the basic tenets of
science but fails, they are a bad scientist, not a
pseudoscientist.
There is likely a continuous spectrum ranging from good science to
not-so-good science to bad science to awful science to pseudoscience. As Kitcher puts it,
“[w]here bad science becomes egregious enough, pseudoscience begins”.
As an example,
consider this notion that Weitzenhoffer coined: “Debating creationists on the topic of
evolution is rather like trying to play chess with a pigeon.” The bad scientist plays by the
rules of science but, like the lousy chess players, fails, while the pseudoscientist, like
the pigeon, plays an entirely different game.
Pseudoscience versus Science Fraud
Ladyman argues that “pseudoscience is,” in a first approximation, “to science fraud as
bullshit is to lies”.
While an honest scientist faithfully follows the rules
and procedures of her science and truthfully reports her data, a science fraudster, like a liar,
proceeds dishonestly. She deliberately departs from established scientific procedures or
falsifies her data. She does this in order to arrive at the desired conclusion about which she seeks
to defraud the recipient of her work.
The pseudoscientist, however, behaves like a bullshitter. She does not necessarily seek to deceive on a specific fact. Instead, she betrays a complete “indifference to how things really are,” which Frankfurt takes to be “the essence of bullshit”.
Pseudoscience as bullshit
Ladyman observed, an apparent disanalogy between the ordinary bullshitter and the pseudoscientist - “bullshitters usually know what they are doing, whereas many pseudoscientists are
apparently genuinely seeking truth”.
Ladyman argues, though, that pseudoscientists who think of themselves as truth-seekers, are also
bullshitters - of an even more profound kind. In the case of truth-seeking
pseudoscientists, they go so far as to bullshit
themselves. Unlike the scientist, who strives to arrive at the most
reliable knowledge on a topic, the pseudoscientist simply does not do what it takes to ensure that what
she says is true.
The two types of bullshitting pseudoscientists
*Ordinary Bullshit: Some bullshit us and know it.
*Epistemically Careless Bullshit: Some just don’t give a shit and may not even realize what it is they are doing.
We do not care to which category a pseudoscientist belongs, only that - with a “symptomatic
approach” (Boudry) - we look out for tell-tale signs of either outright indifference to the truth or epistemic carelessness. If these violations occur systematically
and become “egregious enough,” the label “pseudoscience” should be warranted.
Science is all about debate - and by engaging in a debate with pseudoscientists we can see what it is they actually use to defend their assertions.
The authors’ conclusion on homeopathy as a pseudoscience
Since the most
well-known and influential demarcation criteria, such as Popper’s falsifiability criterion and
Kuhn’s problem-solving criterion, cannot account for homeopathy - the authors have tried to fill
this research gap using a novel bullshitology-based approach to the demarcation problem.
With this approach, we have argued that homeopathy should be regarded as pseudoscience
because its proponents claim scientific standing for it and produce argumentative bullshit to
defend it, thus violating important epistemic standards central to science.
