Voting And Media Behaviour Flashcards
1: Decline of Class-based voting and the rise of partisan dealignment
It could be argued that social class is still a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK, as class-based political alignment continues to influence party support, especially among economically vulnerable groups (past)
-1970s around 2/3 of the electorate voted in line of their social class, and around 90% supported either Labour or Conservatives
-labour was seen as the party of the industrial working class and trade unions, advocating for welfare expansion and workers’ rights
-conservatives represented property owners, business interests and the middle class
-traditional model of class voting, grounded in the socio-economic divide between the working class and middle/upper classes, was once the dominant explanation for uk working patterns
1: decline of class-based voting and the rise of partisan dealignment
Although these clear divides have weakened, recent elections have indicated that class-based considerations have not disappeared.
-2017 general election, Labour received 44% of working-class votes, while the conservatives received 47% of middle-class votes- lingering class effect on party choice
-labour’s 2017 manifesto promising nationalisation of public services, abolishing tuition fees and increasing income tax on higher earners. This resonates with low-income and precariously employed groups.
-class based appeals, especially during times of economic uncertainty and austerity, continue to shape how voters respond to policy agendas.
-the conservatives have a tradition of favouring low taxes and reduced welfare support. Wealthier people less reliant on the state
-labour favour policies that redistribute wealth or provide greater support (higher taxes on wealthier people and higher spending on the welfare state.
1: the decline of class-based voting and the rise of partisan dealignment
Distinct and analytical facts
-ideological positions have material consequences for different social groups and continue to shape how people vote
-in 2017, Labour proposed raising the income tax on those earning over £80,000 and increasing corporation tax to fund investment in health, education and nationalised utilities. These pledges gained particular traction among young and working-class voters affected by austerity and insecure work employment.
-labour won a majority of voters earning under £30,000 a year while conservatives leg among those earning over £50,000
-not shaped via occupation but through people’s relationship to the economy and state.
-a voter with a mortgage, secure employment and private healthcare access may be more inclined to support party that promises low taxes and market freedom.
-economic foundations remain closely tied to class and continue to inform many voters’ political decisions.
1: the decline of class-based voting and the rise of partisan dealignment
However a more convincing argument is that class has significantly declined in importance as a determinant of voting behaviour primarily due to partisan dealignment, social mobility and the rise of new political cleavages
-since 1970s, there has been noted an erosion of class-based party loyalty, with an increasing number of voters becoming politically disengaged or switching parties between elections. This is evidenced by the sharp drop in strong party identification and the rise of the so-called “floating voter”.
1: the decline of class-based voting and the rise of partisan dealignment
2019- “the red wall” phenomenon
-the 2019 general election marked a profound turning point in this trend. The conservatives made substantial gains in Labour’s traditional heartlands- “the red wall”- seats that had been Labour strongholds for decades. Bishop Auckland
-conservatives outperformed labour among working-class voters (48% and 33%)
-these shifts were not driven by social class structure, but by broader factors such as Brexit, leadership perception and cultural values.
-many working-class voters in post-industrial areas voted conservative, not because of class betrayal, but because they no longer felt that Labour was adept to solve the Brexit issue and resonate with the entrenched slogan of the Conservative Party’s Slogan “Get Brexit Done” ( a controversy arose over Jeremy Corbyn unable to deliver an answer about Labour’s policy on brexit)
-the electorate had more trust in leadership and stance on Brexit of conservatives (moderately disciplined and competent forefront)
-Corbyn went into 2019 elections with an identical senior campaign team, same approach to manifesto and strategic approach to divert focus from Brexit to his own radical domestic policies
1: The decline of class-based voting and a rise of partisan dealignment
Moreover, class boundaries themselves have become increasingly blurred due to changes in the economy, education expansion and housing patterns.
-the growth of the service sector, decline of manufacture and the rise of “new working-class” roles in retail and care have complicated traditional class categories
-social mobility has allowed many to shift their material circumstances without the necessarily altering their political beliefs
-individuals may no longer vote according to their objective class position, but rather in line with their cultural values, identity or stance on specific issues particularly immigration and social justice.
-no longer a primary or most predictive factor in British voting behaviour
-value-based/ issue (in 2015, UKIP attracted a large former working-class labour voters, particularly in northern England (anti-eurosceptic stance)
-labour lost over 4 million working-class votes between 2005 and 2019, with many shifting to the conservatives or to leave-supporting parties
1:the decline of class-based voting and rise of partisan dealignment
Analysis and evaluation for why it is that a more convincing argument is that class has significantly declined in importance due to the rise of partisan dealignment
The clear weakening of traditional party loyalties, especially those based on class identity
-in post-war period, political allegiance was closely tied to occupational class
-2/3 of manual workers voted labour in 196, while over 2/3 of non manual workers supported Conservatives
-yet in 2010 this divide had narrowed significantly with only 40% of working-class voters supporting labour, reflecting the erosion of class-based loyalty
-dealignment also evident in the rise of political volatility and floating voters where a significant decline in long-term party identification since in 1970s
-voters are more likely to switch allegiance from one election to the next, prioritising leaderships, policies, specific issues like Brexit or immigration over class-based loyalty
-the willingness of voters to support parties like the Reform UK, depending on the political moment.
-these shifts demonstrate that class, while not irrelevant, no longer operates as the dominant axis of political alignment in the UK
2: the impact of geography on voting behaviour
It could be argued that social class continues to shape voting behaviour indirectly through geography, since regional economic inequality in the UK often mirrors class divisions.
-historically areas with concentrated working-class populations- such as the industrial North of England, south wales and parts of scotland have provided a reliable base of support for Labour
-these regions were built around coal, steel, and manufacturing industries and were historically linked with trade unions and collectivist values
-not just regional loyalty, but class identity as well
-constituencies such as Doncaster North, Wansbeck, and Easington, for example, have traditionally been labour strongholds, and the the voting behaviour of their residents reflected their shared working-class identity and economic interest in welfare and redistribution
2: the impact of geography on voting behaviour
A more convincing argument is that geography has become increasingly a independent and decisive factor in voting behaviour, particularly as regional cultural identity, political alienation, and attitudes towards globalisation have begun to outweigh traditional class loyalties
-2016 EU referendum, where a clear geographic split emerged: remain support dominated in London, Scotland and university towns, while leave won across much of England and Wales, particularly in post-industrial and rural areas
-reflected contrasting worldviews between liberal, outward-looking urban centres and more socially conservative, economically marginalised towns
2: the impact of geography on voting behaviour
Made visible in the 2019 general election when the conservatives achieved a significant breakthrough in Labour’s so-called “Red-Wall” a collection of historically labour-voting seats across the North and Midlands
-shifted dramatically, driven by voters who identified more strongly with Boris Johnson’s promise to “Get Brexit Done” than with Labour’s ambiguous position on the issue
-less influenced by traditional class identity and more by a sense of regional neglect, frustration with london-centric politics, cultural concerns over immigration and national sovereignty.
2: geography and its impact on voting behaviour
This divide mirrors the broader urban-rural split that now defines UK politics. Cities like Labour, Manchester and Liverpool remain labour strongholds, driven by younger, more diverse and university educated populations
Rural and semi-rural constituencies- such as North Shropshire, West Dorset and South West Norfolk- overwhelmingly vote conservative, reflecting more traditionalist, socially conservative and pro-Brexit attitudes
-2016 Brexit Referendum indicated clear geographic cleavages
-a striking example of geography overriding class is Scotland, where Labour’s historic dominance collapsed after the 2014 independence referendum
-the SNP now holds a majority of scottish seats, driven by nationalist sentiment and dissatisfaction with Westminster rather than traditional class alignment. This highlights how territorial identity and regional consciousness have reshaped political allegiances
-class and geography have diverged
-geographical context increasingly encapsulates cultural, political and economic differences, making place-based identity a more powerful determinant of voting behaviour than class alone
3: the impact of age and education on voting behaviour
It could be argued that social class still plays a role in shaping voting behaviour through its close connection to education levels and long-term economic security.
-individuals from working-class background are statistically less likely to attend university and more likely to be employed in precarious or low-wage sectors, and more dependent on public services- all factors that might incline them to vote for parties like Labour, which advocate for wealth redistribution and a stronger welfare state.
-in 2022, only 26% of students from working-class families attended university, compared to 58% from professional-class families
-reinforces the idea that educational disparity and class inequalities are interlinked
3: the impact of age and education on voting behaviour
Facts and analysis
-labour’s 2017 and 2019 manifestos which promised free university tuition, increased public spending and re-nationalisation of key industries, had clear appeal to voters affected by austerity and job insecurity, particularly in economically deprived areas.
-many of whom still identified with a traditional working-class outlook
3: age and education and its impact on voting behaviour
A more convincing argument is that education and age have overtaken social class as the most powerful and consistent predictors of voting behaviour
-2019 general election saw a dramatic generational divide: labour secured 56% of the 18-24 vote, while the conservatives won 67% of voters aged 70+
-age has become a proxy for values and life experience, with younger voters typically favouring progressive policies on climate, social justice and equality
-older voters tend to support tradition, national sovereignty and economic stability- values more closely aligned with the conservative party
3: age and education and its impact on voting behaviour
Education also mirrors this divide. Education has replaced occupational class as the main axis of political division. Voters with degrees even those in low-paid or precarious work, tend to vote Labour and Green based on cultural attitudes rather than class position
-in 2019 labour won the majority of university-educated voters, while conservatives gained support from those with no formal qualifications
-43% of graduates voted for labour while 58% of voters with GCSEs or lower voted for conservatives
-the split was made evident in the 2016 Brexit Referendum where 70% of graduates voted Remain and a majority of non-graduates voted Leave.
-these patterns reflect deeper value-based cleavages rather than material class interests
-graduates are more likely to support socially liberal, outward-looking policies, and favour cooperation with international institutions like tge EU
-non-graduates tend to hold more socially conservative views and place greater emphasis on national identity, immigration control and law and order
3: age and education and its impact on voting behaviour
Facts and analysis of voters with degrees and with no degrees and the voting patterns they entail
-a young, university-educated cafe worker earning £22,000 may vote labour, while a 50 year-old plumber with no degree, despite similar earnings may vote conservative due to pro-brexit and socially conservative views
-in this way education and age has fractured the traditional working class, creating divergent political identities within the same economic group
-class remains relevant in shaping access to education and resources, it is education and age and the values it tends to instil that now more directly shapes voting behaviour
-emerges as defining political cleavage in the uk, cutting across traditional class boundaries and reshaping the political landscape around cultural, not just economic and class divides.
