Voting And Media Behaviour Flashcards
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
1: Decline of Class-based voting and the rise of partisan dealignment
It could be argued that social class is still a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK, as class-based political alignment continues to influence party support, especially among economically vulnerable groups (past)
-1970s around 2/3 of the electorate voted in line of their social class, and around 90% supported either Labour or Conservatives
-labour was seen as the party of the industrial working class and trade unions, advocating for welfare expansion and workers’ rights
-conservatives represented property owners, business interests and the middle class
-traditional model of class voting, grounded in the socio-economic divide between the working class and middle/upper classes, was once the dominant explanation for uk working patterns
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
1: decline of class-based voting and the rise of partisan dealignment
Although these clear divides have weakened, recent elections have indicated that class-based considerations have not disappeared.
-2017 general election, Labour received 44% of working-class votes, while the conservatives received 47% of middle-class votes- lingering class effect on party choice
-labour’s 2017 manifesto promising nationalisation of public services, abolishing tuition fees and increasing income tax on higher earners. This resonates with low-income and precariously employed groups.
-class based appeals, especially during times of economic uncertainty and austerity, continue to shape how voters respond to policy agendas.
-the conservatives have a tradition of favouring low taxes and reduced welfare support. Wealthier people less reliant on the state
-labour favour policies that redistribute wealth or provide greater support (higher taxes on wealthier people and higher spending on the welfare state.
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
1: the decline of class-based voting and the rise of partisan dealignment
Distinct and analytical facts
-ideological positions have material consequences for different social groups and continue to shape how people vote
-in 2017, Labour proposed raising the income tax on those earning over £80,000 and increasing corporation tax to fund investment in health, education and nationalised utilities. These pledges gained particular traction among young and working-class voters affected by austerity and insecure work employment.
-labour won a majority of voters earning under £30,000 a year while conservatives leg among those earning over £50,000
-not shaped via occupation but through people’s relationship to the economy and state.
-a voter with a mortgage, secure employment and private healthcare access may be more inclined to support party that promises low taxes and market freedom.
-economic foundations remain closely tied to class and continue to inform many voters’ political decisions.
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
1: the decline of class-based voting and the rise of partisan dealignment
However a more convincing argument is that class has significantly declined in importance as a determinant of voting behaviour primarily due to partisan dealignment, social mobility and the rise of new political cleavages
-since 1970s, there has been noted an erosion of class-based party loyalty, with an increasing number of voters becoming politically disengaged or switching parties between elections. This is evidenced by the sharp drop in strong party identification and the rise of the so-called “floating voter”.
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
1: the decline of class-based voting and the rise of partisan dealignment
2019- “the red wall” phenomenon
-the 2019 general election marked a profound turning point in this trend. The conservatives made substantial gains in Labour’s traditional heartlands- “the red wall”- seats that had been Labour strongholds for decades. Bishop Auckland
-conservatives outperformed labour among working-class voters (48% and 33%)
-these shifts were not driven by social class structure, but by broader factors such as Brexit, leadership perception and cultural values.
-many working-class voters in post-industrial areas voted conservative, not because of class betrayal, but because they no longer felt that Labour was adept to solve the Brexit issue and resonate with the entrenched slogan of the Conservative Party’s Slogan “Get Brexit Done” ( a controversy arose over Jeremy Corbyn unable to deliver an answer about Labour’s policy on brexit)
-the electorate had more trust in leadership and stance on Brexit of conservatives (moderately disciplined and competent forefront)
-Corbyn went into 2019 elections with an identical senior campaign team, same approach to manifesto and strategic approach to divert focus from Brexit to his own radical domestic policies
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
1: The decline of class-based voting and a rise of partisan dealignment
Moreover, class boundaries themselves have become increasingly blurred due to changes in the economy, education expansion and housing patterns.
-the growth of the service sector, decline of manufacture and the rise of “new working-class” roles in retail and care have complicated traditional class categories
-social mobility has allowed many to shift their material circumstances without the necessarily altering their political beliefs
-individuals may no longer vote according to their objective class position, but rather in line with their cultural values, identity or stance on specific issues particularly immigration and social justice.
-no longer a primary or most predictive factor in British voting behaviour
-value-based/ issue (in 2015, UKIP attracted a large former working-class labour voters, particularly in northern England (anti-eurosceptic stance)
-labour lost over 4 million working-class votes between 2005 and 2019, with many shifting to the conservatives or to leave-supporting parties
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
1:the decline of class-based voting and rise of partisan dealignment
Analysis and evaluation for why it is that a more convincing argument is that class has significantly declined in importance due to the rise of partisan dealignment
The clear weakening of traditional party loyalties, especially those based on class identity
-in post-war period, political allegiance was closely tied to occupational class
-2/3 of manual workers voted labour in 196, while over 2/3 of non manual workers supported Conservatives
-yet in 2010 this divide had narrowed significantly with only 40% of working-class voters supporting labour, reflecting the erosion of class-based loyalty
-dealignment also evident in the rise of political volatility and floating voters where a significant decline in long-term party identification since in 1970s
-voters are more likely to switch allegiance from one election to the next, prioritising leaderships, policies, specific issues like Brexit or immigration over class-based loyalty
-the willingness of voters to support parties like the Reform UK, depending on the political moment.
-these shifts demonstrate that class, while not irrelevant, no longer operates as the dominant axis of political alignment in the UK
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
2: the impact of geography on voting behaviour
It could be argued that social class continues to shape voting behaviour indirectly through geography, since regional economic inequality in the UK often mirrors class divisions.
-historically areas with concentrated working-class populations- such as the industrial North of England, south wales and parts of scotland have provided a reliable base of support for Labour
-these regions were built around coal, steel, and manufacturing industries and were historically linked with trade unions and collectivist values
-not just regional loyalty, but class identity as well
-constituencies such as Doncaster North, Wansbeck, and Easington, for example, have traditionally been labour strongholds, and the the voting behaviour of their residents reflected their shared working-class identity and economic interest in welfare and redistribution
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
2: the impact of geography on voting behaviour
A more convincing argument is that geography has become increasingly a independent and decisive factor in voting behaviour, particularly as regional cultural identity, political alienation, and attitudes towards globalisation have begun to outweigh traditional class loyalties
-2016 EU referendum, where a clear geographic split emerged: remain support dominated in London, Scotland and university towns, while leave won across much of England and Wales, particularly in post-industrial and rural areas
-reflected contrasting worldviews between liberal, outward-looking urban centres and more socially conservative, economically marginalised towns
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
2: the impact of geography on voting behaviour
Made visible in the 2019 general election when the conservatives achieved a significant breakthrough in Labour’s so-called “Red-Wall” a collection of historically labour-voting seats across the North and Midlands
-shifted dramatically, driven by voters who identified more strongly with Boris Johnson’s promise to “Get Brexit Done” than with Labour’s ambiguous position on the issue
-less influenced by traditional class identity and more by a sense of regional neglect, frustration with london-centric politics, cultural concerns over immigration and national sovereignty.
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
2: geography and its impact on voting behaviour
This divide mirrors the broader urban-rural split that now defines UK politics. Cities like Labour, Manchester and Liverpool remain labour strongholds, driven by younger, more diverse and university educated populations
Rural and semi-rural constituencies- such as North Shropshire, West Dorset and South West Norfolk- overwhelmingly vote conservative, reflecting more traditionalist, socially conservative and pro-Brexit attitudes
-2016 Brexit Referendum indicated clear geographic cleavages
-a striking example of geography overriding class is Scotland, where Labour’s historic dominance collapsed after the 2014 independence referendum
-the SNP now holds a majority of scottish seats, driven by nationalist sentiment and dissatisfaction with Westminster rather than traditional class alignment. This highlights how territorial identity and regional consciousness have reshaped political allegiances
-class and geography have diverged
-geographical context increasingly encapsulates cultural, political and economic differences, making place-based identity a more powerful determinant of voting behaviour than class alone
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
3: the impact of age and education on voting behaviour
It could be argued that social class still plays a role in shaping voting behaviour through its close connection to education levels and long-term economic security.
-individuals from working-class background are statistically less likely to attend university and more likely to be employed in precarious or low-wage sectors, and more dependent on public services- all factors that might incline them to vote for parties like Labour, which advocate for wealth redistribution and a stronger welfare state.
-in 2022, only 26% of students from working-class families attended university, compared to 58% from professional-class families
-reinforces the idea that educational disparity and class inequalities are interlinked
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
3: the impact of age and education on voting behaviour
Facts and analysis
-labour’s 2017 and 2019 manifestos which promised free university tuition, increased public spending and re-nationalisation of key industries, had clear appeal to voters affected by austerity and job insecurity, particularly in economically deprived areas.
-many of whom still identified with a traditional working-class outlook
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
3: age and education and its impact on voting behaviour
A more convincing argument is that education and age have overtaken social class as the most powerful and consistent predictors of voting behaviour
-2019 general election saw a dramatic generational divide: labour secured 56% of the 18-24 vote, while the conservatives won 67% of voters aged 70+
-age has become a proxy for values and life experience, with younger voters typically favouring progressive policies on climate, social justice and equality
-older voters tend to support tradition, national sovereignty and economic stability- values more closely aligned with the conservative party
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
3: age and education and its impact on voting behaviour
Education also mirrors this divide. Education has replaced occupational class as the main axis of political division. Voters with degrees even those in low-paid or precarious work, tend to vote Labour and Green based on cultural attitudes rather than class position
-in 2019 labour won the majority of university-educated voters, while conservatives gained support from those with no formal qualifications
-43% of graduates voted for labour while 58% of voters with GCSEs or lower voted for conservatives
-the split was made evident in the 2016 Brexit Referendum where 70% of graduates voted Remain and a majority of non-graduates voted Leave.
-these patterns reflect deeper value-based cleavages rather than material class interests
-graduates are more likely to support socially liberal, outward-looking policies, and favour cooperation with international institutions like tge EU
-non-graduates tend to hold more socially conservative views and place greater emphasis on national identity, immigration control and law and order
1:evaluate the view that social class is no longer a significant factor in determining voting behaviour in the UK
3: age and education and its impact on voting behaviour
Facts and analysis of voters with degrees and with no degrees and the voting patterns they entail
-a young, university-educated cafe worker earning £22,000 may vote labour, while a 50 year-old plumber with no degree, despite similar earnings may vote conservative due to pro-brexit and socially conservative views
-in this way education and age has fractured the traditional working class, creating divergent political identities within the same economic group
-class remains relevant in shaping access to education and resources, it is education and age and the values it tends to instil that now more directly shapes voting behaviour
-emerges as defining political cleavage in the uk, cutting across traditional class boundaries and reshaping the political landscape around cultural, not just economic and class divides.
2: evaluate the view that the media has too much influence over voting behaviour in the UK
1: Media Bias and Newspaper Endorsements
It could be argued that newspapers have historically played an outsized role in shaping electoral outcomes in the UK through their clear partisan allegiances and the strategic timing of their endorsement
-the Sun’s infamous headline on the day of the 1992, a vicious attack on Labour leader Neil Kinnock- warning that a Labour government would be a national disaster- was followed by a conservative victory and the now-infamous line “it’s the sun wot won it”
-during the 2015, 2017, 2019 general elections, the majority of UK national newspapers exhibited pro-conservative bias
-2019, Boris Johnson received considerably more positive coverage than Jeremy Corbyn, whose campaign was heavily undermined by repeated stories focusing on antisemitism in the Labour Party, national security and alleged personal untrustworthiness
-publications like the Daily Mail and the Telegraoh featured headlines such as “Apologists for Terror” and “Corbyn’s catastrophe”, contributing to broader narrative that delegitimised Labour’s leadership in the eyes of undecided or swing voters
2: evaluate the view that the media has too much influence over voting behaviour in the UK
1: Media Bias and Newspaper Endorsements
More facts and analytical points
Endorsements from newspapers still carry weight in political culture
-in 2019, 8/10 of the UK’s highest-circulating newspapers endorsed the Conservative Party, reinforcing a one-sided media environment that critics argue distorts democratic fairness
-aggressive and ideologically charged and aimed at swaying public opinion, particularly among readers who are not deeply politically engaged
-a significant percentage of voters were unaware of the actual policies of the parties they supported, suggesting that media narratives-especially headlines and editorial lines- may substitute for deeper political understanding among large segments of the electorate
-stories broken by the Daily Mail or the telegraph often dominate news cycles and shape the tone of national conversation
-less politically engaged or more economically insecure voters particularly may be more susceptible to emotive, identity-based messaging
2: evaluate the view that the media has too much influence over voting behaviour in the UK
1: Media Bias and Newspaper Endorsements
However the extent of this influence may be overstated in today’s diversified media environment. Print readership has declined drastically in the past two decades
There influence is present, but not overpowering, and certainly not sufficient to dictate the outcome of elections in a complex and diversified information ecosystem
-the sun, which dominated the media landscape with over 3.5 million daily readers in the early 2000s, had fallen below 1million by 2020/
-the Daily Mail and the Guardian have experienced major drops in circulation, reducing the scope of direct influence
-in 2023, only 26% of adults now rely on newspapers with social media 45% and television 60%.
-media effects theory suggests that individuals are nit passive recipients of media messages
-psychological theories such as selective exposure, confirmation bias and cognitive dissonance imply that people are more likely to seek out and trust news sources that confirm their existing beliefs- meaning newspapers often reinforce rather than shape political opinion.
-in this sense their influence is more about solidifying tribal loyalties than converting voters
-it could be argued that while media bias in print remains highly visible, its actual power over changing electoral behaviour is constrained by falling readership, greater audience agency and the diversification of information sources
-fact-checking claims and accessing a wider range of viewpoints- the idea that a single editorial line can dominate public opinion is outdated
-while newspapers can amplify party messages, they are just one of many competing sources of information in an increasingly pluralistic media environment
2: evaluate the view that the media has too much influence over voting behaviour in the UK
2: television debates and broadcasting regulations
It could be argued that televised debates and broadcast media have a strong influence on voter behaviour by shaping how leaders are perceived in real time. Televised debates, especially when they occur close to election day, can sway undecided voters and shift momentum in the polls
-in 2010, Nick Clegg’s unexpectedly strong performance in the first debate led to a surge in support for the Liberal Democrats, prompting media headlines about a potential three-party race. The lib dems surged in polls to 29% after the debate. Shows how a strong debate performance can quickly alter public perception and disrupt the expected two party dominance
-jeremy Corbyn’s confident appearance in the 2017 debates contrasted sharply with theresa may’s refusal to participate, improving his leadership ratings and helping labour close the polling gap (heavily replayed in news broadcasts and on social media magnifying their impact)
-debates can increase political engagement and improve voter understanding- particularly among younger or undecided voters
2: evaluate the view that the media has too much influence over voting behaviour in the UK
2: television debates and broadcasting regulations
However, the electoral impact of debates tend to be short-lived and often symbolic rather than decisive. While debates can influence impressions of leadership, they do not necessarily change party allegiance
-despite Clegg’s success in the debates, the liberal Democrats ended up losing seats in 2010. They lost 5 seats, suggesting limited conversion of popularity into actual votes
-in a political system where party loyalty, class identity and long-term issues such as brexit play decisive roles, one-off televised performances rarely alter the broader electoral picture
-while television debates attract attention, they are limited in their ability bto shape final voting outcomes, particularly in an era of increasing political polarisation and media diversification
2: evaluate the view that the media has too much influence over voting behaviour in the UK
2: television debates and broadcast regulations
A more convincing argument is that the influence of televised media is deliberately kept in check through robust regulation.
-Ofcom enforces strict impartiality rules, ensuring that broadcasters like the BBC, ITV and Channel 4 provide balanced and equitable coverage of political parties, particularly during election periods
-leaders from UKIP, SNP, Greens all appeared. Demonstrates TV’s role in enhancing voter choice and democratic inclusion rather than pushing a single agenda (neutrality, reducing the risk of none-sided influence)
-traditional broadcast television is losing relevance among younger voters, with Ofcom reporting a sharp decline in live TV viewership in favour of on-demand and digital platforms
-media acts more as a public service rather than a tool of manipulation
-its influence is moderated by both legal frameworks and generational shifts making it an informative rather than overpowering force in UK elections
2: evaluate the view that the media has too much influence over voting behaviour in the UK
3: social media, political engagement, and misinformation
It could be argued that social media exerts an overwhelming influence and largely unchecked influence on voting behaviour due to its unregulated nature, algorithm-driven content and ability to spread misinformation at speed and scale
-during both the 2016 Brexit Referendum and the 2019 general election, social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter were used to disseminate misleading or false information. Charged pro-brexit ads and micro-target users with emotionally charged ads (psychologically control and manipulation)
-Conservative party faced widespread criticism in 2019 for rebranding its twitter account to “factcheckUK” during a televised debate, misleading the public into believing it was an independent fact-checking service
-the scandal revealed how data harvested from millions of users was used to micro-target individuals with highly personalised ads based on psychological profiling- often without consent or awareness
-algorithms on platforms tend to promote content that provokes strong emotional reactions, increasing the visibility of extreme or divisive content
-warning of online political campaigning to be opaque largely unregulated to foreign interference and manipulation
2: evaluate the view that the media has too much influence over voting behaviour in the UK
3: social media, political engagement, and misinformation
However, while these risks are real, the extent to which they actually change voting behaviour is limited. Most users are exposed to a mix of views and while echo chambers exist, they are not as sealed off as once feared
Increasingly more aware of misinformation and actively engage in fact-checking or critical discussion online
-while social media contains threats to democratic discourse, its impact on voting behaviour may be less about manipulation and more about reinforcing existing beliefs or political engagements
-does not exert disproportionate influence on voting outcomes and may even promote greater engagement and inclusion
-democratised political communication giving voice to underrepresented groups and allowing direct interaction between politicians and voters
-labour’s 2017 digital campaign leveraged memes, viral videos and hashtags like forthemany to energise young voters and counter negative mainstream mefia coverage
-young voters are more likely to engage in political debate and turnout when exposed to political content online
-social media has also enabled accountability with users quickly calling out inconsistencies or false claims by politicians often before mainstream media has reacted
-regulatory frameworks are gradually catching up and are able to to label political ads, remove harmful content and are subject to scrutiny from parliamentary committees and watchdog groups