Vitiating elements Flashcards
dysi
Barton v Armstrong [1976] A.C. 104
duress to the person
This case concerns physical duress/duress to the person and does not apply to economic duress, under which the threat must be a ‘but for’ cause and a significant cause:
To establish duress of the person, a threat need not be the primary or ‘but for’ cause of the threatened party entering into contract, it only needs to be a cause
in favour of the appelant
Barton (C) had agreed in a deed to buy out Armstrong (D)’s interest in a company. C sought a declaration that the deed was void for duress, alleging that D threatened to murder him.
First instance : The judge denied the claim as he found that the primary reason for C to contract was commercial necessity
Appeal: Lord Cross : Though C might have entered into the agreement even if D had made not threats, the threats have in fact contributed to his decision
Skeate v Beale (1840) 11 Ad & E 983
duress to goods
Held: Duress to goods will not suffice to render a contract voidable
In favour of the claimant
A landlord was owed money by a tenant. He seized goods owned by the tenant and threatened to sell them immediately unless the tenant entered an agreement for repayment of the sums owned. The tenant agreed to the repayment terms but then sought to have the agreement set aside for duress.
The Siboen and The Sibotre [1976] 1 Lloyds Rep 293
duress to goods
The contract couuld be set aside and following the judgement of Kerr J, the court seemed to have begun a sort of doctrine of economic duress
The plaintiffs (i.e. claimants) hired a couple of ships from the defendants, who then made a threat saying they would go bankrupt if the defendants did not renegotiate. The plaintiffs knew the shipping industry wasn’t doing so well so exploited this and the defendants reluctantly agreed. The defendants then changed there mind because of the improper pressure, but the plaintiffs sued for breach of contract
Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] A.C. 614
economic duress
Commercial pressure, such as a threat to abandon a transaction, does not equate economic duress.
this case defined the category of economic duress.
“Duress, whatever form it takes, is a coercion of the will so as to vitiate consent”. (Lord Scarman, 635) In a contractual situation, mere commercial pressure will not be sufficient.
The pressures “must be such that the victim must have entered the contract against his will, must have had no alternative course open to him and must have been confronted with coercive acts by the party exerting the pressure.” [at 636] . . . “It must be shown that the payment made or the contract entered into was not a voluntary act on his part.” [636]
Atlas Express v Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 641.
economic duress
the contract was voidable for ED
Kafco Ltd. had a contract to supply Woolworths with baskets. They had a ‘trading agreement’ with Atlas Express for at least six months to undertake the deliveries. Atlas Express realised it had underestimated the size of cartons to be carried, so it was costing more to deliver. Kafco would not vary the price. On 18 November 1986,[1] Atlas sent an empty truck to Kafco, with a letter saying if a higher charge was not agreed to, the truck would leave empty. Kafco would go broke without the contract, so they “felt compelled to sign”.[1] Later, Kafco refused to pay, and argued there was economic duress, and also no new consideration.[2]
Kafco also successfully argued that Atlas had given no consideration for its promise to pay more money on the basis that Atlas was merely performing an existing contractual duty
DSND Subsea v Petroleum Geo-Services (2000) [2000] B.L.R. 530
ecocomic duress
Dyson, J.:
‘The ingredients of actionable duress are that there must be pressure,
(a) whose practical effect is that there is compulsion on, or a lack of practical choice for, the victim,
(b) which is illegitimate, and
(c) which is a significant cause inducing the claimant to enter into the contract . . .’ (need not be the only cause)
=> the contract becomes voidable for duress
set out the test for duress
DSND (C) was carrying out construction work as a subcontractor for PGS (D) on oil rigs
Due to a change in the work to be done, C suspended its work pending the signing of a contractual variation to ensure that insurance included the new type of work based on a genuine concern with the risk involved
Under financial pressure, D entered into the contractual variation
D sought to escape from the contractual variation on the ground that it had been induced to enter by duress
CTN Cash & Carry v Gallaher [1994] 4 All E.R. 714
economic duress (lawful act duress)
The Court of Appeal held that the transaction was valid. The court would not set it aside for economic duress. Relevant factors included:
The defendant believed in good faith that the claimant owed them the money.
The fact that the defendant was under no legal obligation to offer access to credit services;
The mere fact that the defendant was in a dominant position was insufficient on its own to turn legitimate pressure into illegitimate pressure.
This Case is Authority For…
The mere fact that the defendant used lawful means to exert pressure does not necessarily preclude the defence of economic duress.
Whether the defendant is acting in good faith in exercising the pressure is a critical factor in determining whether it is legitimate or not.
The claimant operated a ‘cash and carry’ business. The defendant was their supplier. The defendant had absolute discretion in granting the claimant access to credit facilities. They threatened to cut off the claimant’s line of credit unless they were paid a sum of money. The defendant honestly, but incorrectly, believed that they were owed the money.
If the claimant refused to pay, this would seriously jeopardise their business since the defendant effectively had a monopoly on the market. The claimant paid the sum, but later sought to have the transaction set aside for economic duress.
Times Travel (UK) Ltd v Pakistan International Airlines Corpn [2021] UKSC 40
economic duress (lawful act duress)
Held : Appeal dismissed : economic duress requires a threat (or pressure exerted) by the defendant that is illegitimate + that illegitimate threat (or pressure) caused the claimant to enter into the contract + no alternative
as there is no duty of good faith in english law ⇒ rare to establish a lawful act duress in a commercial setting == An illegitimate pressure in a commercial transaction required behaviour with ‘reprehensible characteristics’ in order to set aside the transaction on the basis of economic duress.
‘bad faith’ does not suffice
Times Travel UK (‘Times Travel’) are a travel agent. At the time of this case, their business depended almost entirely on selling flight tickets on commission for the respondent airline. The respondents were the only airline to offer direct flights to Pakistan. When some of the airline’s other agents were bringing a claim for back commission, the airline pressured Times Travel not to take part in this action. They reduced Times Travel’s allocation of tickets from 300 to 60 per fortnight and gave notice that they were terminating their contract. Whilst Pakistan Airlines were within their legal rights to do these things, such actions would effectively end the agent’s business. Therefore, Times Travel were in much the weaker bargaining position. The airline offered them a new contract, on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis: per Lord Hodge, at para.58. This new contract included an onerous waiver, which released the airline from any obligation to pay Times Travel back commission, the largest of which was a claim of £1.215m: Richards LJ [2020] Ch 98, para.26. Times Travel’s representatives wanted to take away the contract in order to consider it, but the airline refused. After entering into the new contract, Times Travel sought to set it aside for economic duress and claim the back commission.
Halpern v Halpern [2007] EWCA Civ 291
duress (recision)
Held — The common law remedy of rescission on the ground of duress required an ability to give counter-restitution. Thus, a party could not avoid a contract procured by duress in circumstances where he could not offer the other party substantial restitutio in integrum. Rescission at common law on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentation required an ability to give counter-restitution. The logic of rescission was that parties were put back into the position they would have been had there been no contract. That logic required an ability to give counter-restitution. There was no reason why the nature of the remedy of rescission or the circumstances in which it was available should differ depending upon whether the ground of rescission was fraud or duress
An inheritance dispute involving the claimants and the defendants was compromised by an agreement. One of the clauses of the compromise agreement required that all documents relating to the agreement be destroyed. The claimants subsequently brought proceedings against the defendants claiming damages for breach of the compromise agreement. They applied for summary judgment, and were successful in striking out certain parts of the defences. One of the remaining pleaded defences was that the compromise agreement had been procured by duress. The judge noted that the destruction of the documents relating to the agreement had benefited the defendants and prejudiced the claimants. He noted that the destruction could not be undone and that pecuniary relief could not put the claimants in as good a position as they would have been in if the agreement could have been rescinded and matters restored to the position before the agreement had been made. He therefore ordered the hearing of a preliminary issue as to whether a party could avoid a contract procured by duress in circumstances where he could not offer the other party restitutio in integrum.
Heilbut, Symons & Co v Buckleton [1913] AC 30
m/r (representation or warranty)
Whether a representation becomes a term of the contract (or forms a collateral contract) depends on whether the parties objectively intended it to be so. It cannot be presumed that a person intends to be contractually bound by every representation of fact.
. Factors which were important in this case to the finding that the statement was a mere representation included:
- The fact that the classification of the company did not objectively appear important to the claimant;
- That the defendant’s response to the claimant’s question about the prospects of the company was merely expressing an opinion (‘a firm of their standing would not be bringing it out if they did not believe it to be all right’);
- The natural meaning of the words used did not express or imply any contractual warranty; and
- The fact that the claimant was the first to mis-label the company as a rubber company: the defendant merely failed to correct him and never adopted that label as their own.
Held in favour of the defendant
The claimant asked the defendant (a firm of rubber merchants) whether they were bringing out a rubber company. The defendant replied that they were. The claimant asked about the prospects of the company. The defendant responded that they were bringing it out. The claimant thought that this was good enough for him. On the basis of this, the claimant bought 5000 shares in the new company from the defendant.
The shares later fell in value. The claimant sued the defendant for breach of warranty or fraudulent misrepresentation. He argued that the new company was not a rubber company, whereas the defendant had represented that it was. The jury held that there was no fraudulent misrepresentation. However, they went on to hold that the defendant had given a warranty which they had breached. The defendant appealed.
Oscar Chess Ltd v Williams [1957] 1 WLR 370
misrepresentation or warranty
C’s claim was rejected
The statement that the car was a 1948 model was not intended to be a term
Lord Denning: “It is sometimes supposed that the tribunal must look into the minds of the parties to see what they themselves intended. That is a mistake. . . . “The question of whether a warranty was intended depends on the conduct of the parties, on their words and behaviour, rather than their thoughts. If an intelligent bystander would reasonably infer that a warranty was intended that will suffice.”
The seller (D) represented a car sold to a motor dealer (C) as a 1948 model as it was stated so in the car’s registration book
The car was actually a 1939 model, thus the price was inflated
When C found out that the car was a 1939 model, C brought a claim for breach of contract, claiming that it was a term of the sale agreement that the car was of the 1948 model
Dimmock v Hallet (1866) LR 2 Ch App 21
Misrepresentation (false statement)
= the misrepresentation must be false
= The Court of Appeal held that although the statement about the land being “fertile and improvable” was merely a “flourishing description” and did not entitle the buyer to rescind, telling only a half truth about the tenants constituted good grounds for m/r
An 934-acre (3.78 km2) estate was about to be auctioned off to discharge a debt to a mortgage. The estate included three parcels of land called “Bull Hassocks Farm”, “Creyke’s Hundreds” and “Misson Springs”. The advertisement for the auction described the Bull Hassocks Farm as having “fertile and improvable land”, and described in the particulars that each parcel was let out to paying tenants (the first two to Mr R Hickson and Misson Springs to a Mr F Wigglesworth). However, it was not mentioned that the tenants had, by the time of the auction, already given notice to quit the property. The eventual buyer, Mr Dimmock, sought rescission of the contract for misrepresentation
Conlon v Simms [2006] EWCA Civ 1749
misrepresentation (non-disclosure)
In some case non-disclosure can ammount to m/r : in the context of negotiations for a partnership, a party to those negotiations was under a duty to make a disclosure of matters affecting (or likely to affect) his status as a partner, and that failure to make such disclosure gave rise in law to a claim for damages.
***
the principle of caveat emptor did not apply to the making of a partnership agreemen
Context of partership agreements between sollicitors
With v O’Flanagan [1936] Ch 575; [1936] 1 All ER 727.
misrepresentation (silence, change of circumstances)
keeping silent about a statement which is true when made but subsequently becomes false can be a misrepresentation => continuing duty until formation of contract.
Now formalised in the m/r Act 1967 s 2(1)
The claimant bought a medical practice from the defendant. During negotiations, the defendant told the claimant that the profits for the business were £2000 per year. This was true at the time. However, by the time of contracting circumstances had changed. The profits were substantially lower. The defendant failed to tell the claimant this. When the claimant found out, they sued for rescission of the contract.
Bisset v Wilkinson [1927] AC 177
misrepresentation : statement of fact
The m/r must be one of fact not of opinion
Wilkinson agreed to purchase land from Bisset for the purpose of sheep farming. Wilkinson took possession of the land but soon after experienced difficulties and did not make the interest payments when they fell due. When Bisset brought an action to recover the overdue interest payments Wilkinson sought to have the agreement rescinded, alleging that Bisset had misrepresented that the land ‘had a carrying capacity of 2000 sheep if only one team were employed in the agricultural work of the land’. The Court set the agreement aside. Bisset appealed arguing that it was a statement of fact not opinion.
As both parties were aware, the appellant had not and, so far as appears, no other person had at any time carried on sheep-farming upon the unit of land in question. That land as a distinct holding had never constituted a sheep-farm + Never ascertained the capacity since the defendants are inexperienced ⇒ statement ofopinion
Esso Petroleum Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801
misrepresention : statement of fact (exception )
When A is in the business of making forecast = actionable m/r
=> The Court of Appeal held that there was no action for misrepresentation as the statement was an estimate of future sales rather than a statement of fact. However, the claimant was entitled to damages based on either negligent misstatement at common law or breach of warranty of a collateral contract.
trying to sell a franchise to operate an esso petrol filling station: spot never been used before for petrol filling. They give an estimate (overestimation) of how much they’ll sell
Smith v Land and House Property Corp (1884) 28 Ch D 7
misrepresention : statement of fact (exception : unique knowledge )
Statements of opinion can be statements of fact if they fall within the knowledge of the representor but not the representee => when clear imbalance of knowledge
***
Bowen LJ: “if the facts are not equally well known to both sides, then a statement of opinion by one who knows the facts best involves very often a statement of a material fact, for he impliedly states that he knows facts which justify his opinion.”
The claimant put up their hotel for sale. The particulars of sale described the property as being let to a ‘most desirable tenant’ for a rent of £400 over a 7.5 year term.
Pankhania v Hackney London Borough Council [2002] EWHC 2441
misreprepresentation (statement of law)
False Statements of law are false statements of fact that are actionable for misrepresentation.
=> The statement that the occupier was a licensee was an actionable misrepresentation
Damages under s. 2(1) Misrepresentation Act 1967 were awarded to C
applying the House of Lords’ decision in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council (1999) to contract law : HLBC owned land to park cars. It’s a statement of fact on whether you can park a car on land but whether you’re allowed to park the car is a question of law.
When the purchaser asks the council what are the rights of the persons who park on this land. The council answered: they have a license but in fact they had a lease.
When it transpired that the purchaser was bound by the lease, he complained but the council claimed that statement of law wasn’t actionable
Wales v Wadham [1977] 1 WLR 199
misreprepresentation (fact not intention)
= only statement of intention = not actionable as m/r
divorce case. Mr. Wales has to make a settlement (=contract). Mrs. Wales has religious beliefs so she will not marry again (=statement of intention) then he must make provisions for her for the rest of her life. Mr Wales finally married Mr Wadham and Mr. Wales argues with m/r in contractual terms to get his money back.
Edgington v Fitzmaurice [1885] 29 Ch D 459
m/r (statement of intention - exception)
C was entitled to damages for the tort of deceit
The prospectus constituted a fraudulent misrepresentation
Bowen LJ: “There must be a mis-statement of an existing fact; but the state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man’s mind at a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else. A misrepresentation as to the state of a man’s mind is, therefore, a mis-statement of fact.”
misstatement of intention
Directors of a company (Ds) released a fraudulent prospectus for a bond issue, which stated that the proceeds would be used to building alterations and business expansion when the true purpose was to pay off company debt
C purchased the bonds partly under the the mistaken impression that he would be granted security and it was admitted that he would have purchased had he thought otherwise
When the company went into liquidation, C sued under the tort of deceit for damages
Limit No2 Ltd v Axa Versicherung AG [2008] EWCA Civ 1231
m/r must be one of fact, not intention
= if a statement of intention is a representation of existing facts => exception to the fact rule
Commercial Banking Co of Sydney v RH Brown and Co [1972] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 360
misrepresentation (addressed at the party misled)
Principle : the misrepresentation must be addressed at the party misled
=> Decision: The court held the bank liable in the circumstances.
Reason: The statement was made by CBCS with the intention that it should be acted on by the plaintiff’s bank or by that bank’s customers who were concerned with obtaining the information. not a requirement that the representation was made directly to P, where D does intend reliance by P. It can be made by a third party as long as it was intended to get to P.
Facts: RH Brown, a woolgrower, wanted to find out if a purchaser of wool was in good financial standing. RH Brown asked their bankers to find out. Their bankers contacted the purchaser’s bank, the Commercial Banking Co of Sydney (CBCS), and made the relevant inquiry. In reply, CBCS represented that the purchasers were “safe for their trading engagements generally”. This was not in fact true, and the manager of the CBCS did not honestly believe it to be true. Having relied on the incorrect information that had been given, and having suffered loss as a result, RH Brown sued CBCS in deceit.
Issue: Was the CBCS liable to RH Brown for a representation made indirectly to RH Brown?
Peek v Gurney [1873] L.R. 6 HL 377
m/r ( intended to induce party into contract + directed at the party)
the misrepresentation must intend to induce the contract / intended to be acted upon
in that case : House of Lords said this was not intended to be read by third parties
Gurney put out a prospectus about certain shares that were being sold, but
the prospectus was only available to certain people
Peek came across this and decided he wanted to buy some of the shares.
Peek was not specific people it was intended for – Peek was a random third
party
=> As a third party could he enforce an action?
JEB Fasteners v Marks, Bloom and Co [1983] 1 All ER 583
misrepresentation (induces the contract)
if the statement does not induce the contract, then it is not an actionable m/r. in this case: however statement does not induce the contract so not an actionable m/r.
accountant negligently prepared the account of the company to prospective purchasers. The latter did not consider them in their decision because it seemed incoherent =
Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1
m/r (party induced into contract)
The Court of Appeal held in favour of the defendant. The claimant had made a material misrepresentation, so it was to be assumed that the defendant relied on it. The mere fact that the defendant had the means to discover the truth and failed to do so did not rebut this presumption. The defendant was therefore entitled to have the contract rescinded.
To rebut this assumption, the party must show that the defendant actually knew of facts which made the statement untrue, or that his words or conduct made clear that he did not rely on the statement.
A solicitor purchased into the partnership in the solicitors’ firm. He was told the partnership had an income of £300 per year and was given the opportunity to look at the accounts. He declined the offer to check the accounts and took them at their word. In fact the income was only £200 per year.
Horsfall v Thomas (1862) 1 H & C 90
m/r (material : induce party into contract)
party unaware of the mis-statement -_m/r
=> D was not deemed to be induced to enter into the contract by C’s fraudulent misrepresentation
The claimant (C) delivered a defective gun to the defendant (D) which D would have rejected it had he examined the gun and discovered the defect
C having sued D for the cost cost of the gun, D argued in defence that he was induced to accept the bill by the fraud of C
Atwood v Small (1838) 6 Cl & F 232
m/r (material : induce party into contract)
the party relied on their own judgement so recision denied
=> A misrepresentation is not actionable where its accuracy is independently verified by the representee, even if the verification did not discover the misrepresentation.
D sold mines and steelworks to C.
Prior to the sale, D made representations about the capabilities of the property and C agreed to purchase subject to verifying those statements.
C’s agents verified that they were true, but they were later revealed to be false.
C sought rescission of the contract.
Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831
misreprensentation must be material
Valuers owe potential mortgagors a duty of care to take reasonable steps to avoid causing economic loss, if they know or ought to have known that the mortgagor will rely on their report without seeking independent verification. T
no misrepresentee’s duty to check info but if checking is reasonable yes
In the first case, the claimant applied to a building society for a mortgage to purchase a house. The building society instructed the defendant surveyors to carry out an inspection and valuation of the property. The defendant’s employee noticed that the chimney breasts were removed. However, he failed to check whether this left the chimney with adequate support. Their report stated that the property did not need any essential repairs. The chimney later collapsed.
The mortgage application form contained a clause disclaiming both the building society and the defendant’s liability for the accuracy of the valuation report. The building society advised the claimant that the report was not a structural survey and that she should seek independent advice.
In the second case, the claimant applied for a mortgage from the first defendant, a local council. The first defendant provided a report on the state of the property, undertaken by the second defendant. It failed to note several structural problems which made the property unsaleable. The application form stated that the valuation was confidential and that the first defendant accepted no responsibility for the value or condition of the house based on the inspection report. They advised the claimant to get their own survey.
Both claimants relied on the reports without seeking further inspections or advice. Both paid a fee to have the reports made. The claimants sued the defendants in negligence. The defendants relied on the disclaimer in the valuation report as excluding their liability. The claimants responded that the disclaimer did not exclude their liability. In the alternative, they argued that the disclaimer was void for unreasonableness under s.2 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.
SK Shipping Europe Ltd v Capital VLCC 3 Corp (C Challenger) [2022] EWCA Civ 231
misrepresentation must be material
M/R must actually induce the contract: ‘real and substantial’ ROLE for ENTERING INTO THE CONTRACT
Males LJ sets out the legal test :
“The relevant enquiry is whether the claimant would have entered into the contract if the representation had not been made at all, not whether it would have done so if it had been told the true position” [61]
The Court of Appeal upheld the Commercial Court’s decision and dismissed the appeal.
The Court of Appeal emphasized that in general, mere offer of contractual terms will not amount to any representation in the absence of words of representation. In the present case, the offer of guarantee in the charterparty should not of itself be held to involve an implied representation as to current or recent performance of the Vessel.
Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) ltd [1969] 2 Q.B. 158
Fraudulent m/r and damages
C is entitled to damages for not only the difference between the purchase and sale price, but also the liabilities he has incurred in running the business (all actual damage directly flowing from entering into the transaction induced by fraud, whether foreseeable or not)
C had been D’s fraud to buy an ironmonger’s business for £9500
C later discovered the fraud and sued D for deceit but remained in business in the meantime
After three years, he sold the business for £3,700 but incurred debts in running the business
Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] AC 465
negligent m/r + duty of care principle
” When a party seeking information or advice from another – possessing a special skill – and trusts him to exercise due care, and that party knew or ought to have known that the first party was relying on his skill and judgment, then a duty of care will be implied.”
D is not liable to C in negligence
Although a duty of care can be owed for negligent misstatement, the disclaimer excluded any duty of care
Duty of care for negligent misstatement arises where there is an assumption of responsibility, and loss is recoverable despite being pure economic loss
C, an advertising agency, sought information on the creditworthiness of a potential client (E) from the client’s bank D
D confirming the credit worthiness of E headed with the disclaimer “for your private use and without responsibility on the part of this bank or its officials”
C entered into contracts with and lost $17,000 when E went into liquidation
C sued D for negligence
Whittington v Seal Hayne (1900) 82 LT 49
innocent m/r - indemnity
prior to 1967 no dammages for innocent m/r
Only rent and cost of repairs were to be restituted to C as indemnity for the misrepresentation.
The loss of poultry, loss of profits and medical expenses were consequential losses that were not recoverable.
=> Indemnity for rescission only covers expenses that were obligated by the contract and benefited the other party.
C entered into a lease of a farm by D’s innocent misrepresentation that the premises were sanitary and in good repair.
However, the water was poisoned due to the state of the premises and led to the death of C’s poultry.
C sought rescission of the contract.
Issue arose as to which of the following expenses or losses incurred by C were recoverable under restitution from D:
rent paid,
cost of repairs carried out in compliance with a local authority order, and/or
loss of poultry, loss of profits and medical expenses.
Playboy Club London Ltd v Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SpA [2018] UKSC 43
negligent m/r + duty of care principle
However, the bank was not held liable because when the playboy club called, they did not say who they were.
= a gambler wants credit at the Playboy club. The club called the person’s bank ( under a fake identity) who said that it was ok. The bank had not taken care in ascertaining his finances.
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 A.C. 145
negligent m/r + assumption of responsibilty principle
The HoL : in Hedley byrne v Heller but rather the basis is assumption of responsibility rather than duty of care. In practice, the two may work out to the same
“if a person assumes responsibility to another in respect of certain services, there is no reason why he should not be liable in damages for that other in respect of economic loss which flows from the negligent performance of those services.” [[1994] 3 W.L.R. 761 at 776]
=> D’s were liable in negligence to Cs as they owed them a duty of care
Cs, investors (known as “names”) in Lloyds Insurance Syndicates brought actions against Ds, the managing agents (underwriters) of the syndicates, for substantial losses
Howard Marine and Dredging Co v Ogden & Sons Ltd [1978] 2 WLR 514; [1978] QB 574; [1978] 2 All ER 355
statutory m/r ( reasonableness)
The court says no reasonable grounds = you should have relied on the documents of the vessel => high standard.
Deadweight capacity of the ship. The seller relies on memory of Lloyds list, however the list is false (though it’s a reputable source of information).
Al-Hasawi v Nottingham Forest FC Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 2242.
statutory m/r
=>high treshold to prove that reasonable reason to believe the representatio to be true
in that case they successfully proved it
Spice Girls Ltd v Aprilia World Service BV [2002] EWCA Civ 15, [2002] E.M.L.R. 27
misrepresentation by conduct
Court of Appeal held = m/r made by conduct (the defendant thought that they were signing a contract with the whole group when one one of their member was about to leave and the claimant knew it)
On 9 March 1998, Halliwell informed the other members of the Spice Girls of her intention to withdraw from the group, yet the group signed an agreement with AWS on 24 March and again on 30 April, and participated in a commercial photo shoot on 4 May in Milan, eventually concluding a contract with AWS on 6 May 1998.
