Terms Flashcards

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1
Q

f

Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) 19 Eq 462

terms - freedom of contract

A

Sir George Jessel MR, 465, ‘… men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting… their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to consider—that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract.’

= The CA decided that the contract should be upheld.

The company sued Sampson (one of its shareholders) for breaking a patent contract, where Sampson had given ‘all future patent rights’ for a printing machine, to the company. Sampson argued it should be void as it lasted too long. The company won in the Court of Appeal.

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2
Q

Dick Bentley Productions Ltd v Harold Smith (Motors) Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 623

terms in oral / unsigned agreements

A

Denning LJ, because Harold Smith Motors Ltd was a professional seller the statement of the mileage became a term. (The reverse of Oscar.)

‘Here we have a dealer, Mr. Smith, who was in a position to know, or at least to find out, the history of the car.’

= Again, the rules are applied against the party with more power – with expert knowledge.

DBP Ltd bought a Bentley from HSM which was thought to have done 20,000 miles, but in fact had done 100,000 miles.

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3
Q

L’Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394

terms (signed agreement) - GR

A

Maugham LJ held that she was bound. Two ways to escape would be (1) m/r or (2)a plea of non est factum (not my deed)

= Now the decision would differ: UCTA 1977 s 6(2)(a)

Two of the defendants’ representatives visited the plaintiff and asked her to buy an automatic slot machine for cigarettes. The plaintiff was the owner of a café in Llandudno. She agreed to buy the machine and signed a ‘Sales Agreement’ produced by one of the defendants’ representatives with an exclusion of liability clause. However, the machine was defective.

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4
Q

Bassano v Toft [2014] EWHC 377 QB, [45].

terms (signed agreement) - electronic signature

see also Law Comm, Electronic Commerce (2001) para. 3.37

A

Electronic, online forms, where clicking or tapping ‘X’ or ‘I accept’ in a box is said to count as signing

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5
Q

Curtis v Chemical Cleaning [1951] 1 KB 805.

terms (signed agreement) - exceptions (m/r)

A

Misrep. ( overrinding oral assurance) made exclusion inoperative.

misrepresentation that a document excluded liability for damage to a satin dress’ sequins: but it excluded all liab. Dress stained

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6
Q

Grogan v Robin Meredith Plant Hire [1996] CLC 1127

terms (signed agreement) - exception ( not a contractual document)

A

Exclusion ineffective: only an ‘administrative’ document.

= Terms in a signed document are not contractually binding unless the signatory knew the document contains contract terms, or a reasonable person would expect it to contain contract terms.

The defendant was a plant hire company. They approached a civil engineering company called Triact for work. The parties agreed orally that Triact would hire some of the defendant’s employees for a fee.

After those employees had worked for two weeks, Triact’s site manager signed a time sheet which the defendant drew up. At the bottom of the sheet was a set of contract terms. This included a term requiring Triact to indemnify the defendant against any liability incurred in the course of the hire (the indemnity clause). The site manager did not read the terms.

The claimant was injured by one of Triact’s machines. They sued both Triact and the defendant for damages. The defendant was judged liable for 2/3rds of the compensation, while Triact was liable for the remaining 1/3rd. The defendant sought to enforce the clause requiring Triact to indemnify them for their 2/3rds liability. They argued that the clause had been incorporated into the contract when Triact’s site manager signed the time sheet.

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7
Q

Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher [2011] UKSC 41

terms (signed agreements) - exception (employment contracts)

see also Uber Technologies Inc v Heller, 2020 SCC 16, [65]-[72] and [149] (canadian case)

A

Lord Clarke [35] held, to interpret whether what people have signed is the ‘true agreement’, the parties’ ‘relative bargaining power must be taken into account’, a ‘purposive approach’. This does not affect ‘commercial contracts’, [21]
⇒ Employers and their advisers cannot draft their way out of employment status if that does not accord with the reality of the relationship:

B, a car cleaner signed he ‘hereby confirms that he is a self-employed independent contractor’. To get the minimum wage and paid holidays, the Working Time Regulations 1998 and National Minimum Wage Act 1998 required he is a ‘worker’ or an ‘employee’. B claimed he was in fact an employee, despite the signed ‘contract’.

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8
Q

City and Westminster Properties (1934) Ltd v Mudd [1959] Ch 129

signed agreements - entire agreement clauses - collateral contracts

A

= Harman J held this ‘collateral’ contract overrode the written lease

a court can say there’s a ‘collateral’ contract, imposing obligations alongside a main written contract
despite the GR (‘the parole evidence’ rule = a written contract is presumed this is the whole deal unless the parties intended to be bound by oral terms)

written lease said M could only use property for business, but he was orally assured he could live there. He did.

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9
Q

Parker v South Eastern Railway (1877) 2 CPD 416

terms - incorporation by notice

see also Richardson, Spence and Co Ltd v Rowntree [1894] AC 217: R falls of the ship and the ticket fell off ship. Ticken given to her had an exclusion sclause but was folded and smudged. Not Incorporated

A

The jury was directed to consider whether P had read or was aware of the special condition upon which the bag was deposited. It answered this question in the negative and accordingly judgment was entered for P. On appeal by the defendant, the Court of Appeal held that the jury had been misdirected. The real question was whether thedefendant had done what was reasonably sufficient to give P notice of the condition. A new trial was ordered.

=> Mellish LJ, ‘The railway company must, however, take mankind as they find them, and if what they do is sufficient to inform people in general that the ticket contains conditions, I think that a particular plaintiff ought not to be in a better position than other persons on account of his exceptional ignorance or stupidity or carelessness.’

P deposited a bag in the defendant’s station cloakroom. He received a paper ticket which said on its face ‘See back’ and on the back were a number of printed conditions, including a condition excluding liability for any bag with a higher value than £10. P admitted that he knew there was writing on the ticket but stated that he had not read it and did not know or believe that the writing contained conditions. The bag was lost and P claimed £24 10sfor its value.

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10
Q

Thompson v London, Midland and Scottish Railway [1930] 1 KB 41

terms - incorportion by notice (by reference)

A

the terms were incorporated

T fell off the train when it stopped in dark past the platform. Ticket said conditions were found in the timetable, which could be bought at the station.

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11
Q

Chapleton v Barry UDC [1940] 1 KB 532

incorporation by notice

A

Slesser LJ : the ticket was not a contractual document => NoT INCORPORATED

C got a deckchair at a (pebble) beach, South Wales. He paid for the chair and got a ticket which said that the ‘council will not be liable for any accident’. The chair collapsed.

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12
Q

Olley v Malborough Court:

incorporation by notice - timing of the notice

A

Not incorporated - brought to the attention after the agreement was made

O left her fur coat in her room at the hotel and her room key at the reception. A tied stole the coat. A notice behind the bedroom door excluded liability.

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13
Q

Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1970] EWCA Civ 2

incorporation by notice - timing of the notice - red hand rule

but see ( decided before + between businesses)Spurling v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461

The defendant used the services of a warehouse to store goods on a regular basis. Each time he delivered goods to the warehouse he was asked to sign an invoice which contained an exclusion clause. This invoice came after the contract had been agreed. On one occasion he stored some barrels of orange juice and again signed the invoice. When he went to pick them up, however, some of the barrels were empty and one contained dirty water. Consequently he refused to pay for the storage. The claimant warehouse owners brought an action for the agreed price of storage relying on the exclusion clause to demonstrate that they were not liable for the damage to the goods. The defendant argued the clause had not been incorporated into the contract as he signed the document after the contract was made.

Held: The clause was incorporated through previous dealings. The defendant would have been aware of the term from the previous contracts and therefore it did form part of the contract. The claimant was entitled to payment and the defendant had no right to claim compensation for the damage to the orange juice.

A

The machine itself constituted the offer. The acceptance was by putting the money into the machine. The ticket was dispensed after the acceptance took place and therefore the clause was not incorporated into the contract.

The claimant was injured in a car park partly due to the defendant’s negligence. The claimant was given a ticket on entering the car park after putting money into a machine. The ticket stated the contract of parking was subject to terms and conditions which were displayed on the inside of the car park. One of the terms excluded liability for personal injuries arising through negligence. The question for the court was whether the term was incorporated into the contract ie had the defendant brought it to the attention of the claimant before or at the time the contract was made. This question depended upon where the offer and acceptance took place in relation to the machine.

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14
Q

Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1987] EWCA Civ 6

see also O’Brien v MGN Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1279
OB and were told that they had won 50,000. This was all a mistake. This was all a mistake. Rule 5, printed in papers on some days, not others, said that if too many prizes given, there would be a prize draw. Readers’ complained when their claims for £50k were refused.

Hale LJ : the notice in incorporated in the contract. Notice was not really adequate but the term was not onerous.

A

condition had not been so incorporated
Dillon LJ

> [I]f one condition in a set of printed conditions is particularly onerous or unusual, the party seeking to enforce it must show that that particular condition was fairly brought to the attention of the other party.

=> the more onerous the terms, the more notice is needed

I delivers 47 photo transparencies contained in a bag, not opened, condition 2 siad 5£ per day was charged for each. S did not return them for a month. Not an exclusion clause so no help from the UCTA 1977.

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15
Q

Mc Cutcheon v David MacBrayne Ltd [1964] UKHL 4

incorporated through trade - course of dealings ( consistent)

A

The terms weren’t incorporated because The claimant had used the car ferry on a few occasions previously. Sometimes he had been asked to sign a document containing an exclusion clause sometimes he had not been asked to sign a form ⇒ Lack of consistency (Lord Reid)

Mr McCutcheon, the appellant, asked his brother-in-law, Mr McSporran, to arrange for his car to be shipped from Islay to the mainland. Mr McSporran took the car to the respondents’ office in Port Askaig where he was quoted a price for a return journey for the car. He paid the fare and was given a receipt. He delivered the car into the possession of the respondents. The vessel sank on the journey as a result of the negligence of the respondents’ employees and the car was a total loss. The appellant brought an action in negligence against the respondents, who sought to rely on the terms of an exclusion clause contained in their conditions of carriage.

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16
Q

Hollier v Rambler Motors (AMC) Ltd [1971] EWCA Civ 12 (regular)

incorportaed through trade - course of dealings (regular)

A

that the term was not incorporated. Salmon LJ held that the course of dealing was not regular and consistent enough. (⇒ contrast with Henry Kendall v William Lillico where chicken feed defects excluded in nite. Buyers had bought 3 or 4 times a year for 3 years. Term incorporated: dealing was regular and consistent enough - also note that they were professionals )

Mr Walter Hollier had his car repaired at RM’s garage 3 or 4 times in last 5 years. Each time, he signed a note saying the ‘company is not responsible for damage caused by fire to customers’ cars on the premises.’

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17
Q

*British Crane Hire Corporation Ltd v Ipswich Plant Hire Ltd [1973] EWCA Civ 6

incorporated through trade - general trade practice

A

The Court of Appeal held that the defendants were liable to meet this cost on the basis that the plaintiffs’ terms contained a clause which required the defendants to indemnify them against such losses and such a term was, as the defendants knew, in standard use in the trade (a course of dealing cannot be established here) ⇒ therefore bound by them

The defendants hired a crane from the plaintiffs. Both parties were in the business of hiring out heavy earth-moving equipment. Given the urgency of the situation, the agreement was reached over the telephone. Agreement was reached on the price but nothing was said about the general conditions of hire. The plaintiffs did send their conditions of hire to the defendants but before the defendants signed it the crane sank into the marshy ground on which the defendants were working (although the accident occurred without negligence on the part of the defendants). The plaintiffs sought to recover from the defendants the cost of recovering the crane from the marshy ground. The defendants denied that they were liable to meet this cost.

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18
Q

Investors Comp Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1997] UKHL 28

construction

A

Therefore, the House of Lords held, what they really meant was to assign all claims except for: ‘Any claim sounding in rescission (whether for undue influence or otherwise)’ (i.e. move the ‘whether’ and the bracket). => they wanted to assign the claims for damages

Lord Hoffmann listed five principles:

(1) what the reasonable person with all background knowledge would think is the meaning
(2) the relevant ‘matrix of fact’ is anything that could affect the language’s meaning
(3) but exclude prior negotiations (to avoid cost unless to ascertain the knowledge of the parties Ocean bulk or rectification)
(4) it is not the literal meaning of a sentence, but the contextual meaning that is preferred
(5) there is a presumption that people do not make linguistic mistakes

= in short, construe words according to what a reasonable person would understand in the context at hand, but exclude evidence of prior negotiation.

lICS Ltd was set up by the Securities and Investment Board (now the FCA) to compensate people who had been sold dodgy investments (‘Home Income Plans’) by banks and building societies (like West Bromwich BS).

lCustomers got compensation and assigned their legal claims to ICS. ICS sued WB for them. But the assignment contract said …

s 3(b) ‘Any claim (whether sounding in rescission for undue influence or otherwise) that you have or may have against the West Bromwich Building Society…’ was excluded from the assignment (i.e. not transferred by investors to ICS).

=> you are not assigning anything AT ALL, mistake in drafting.

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19
Q

Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24

construction - interpretation (purpose)

see also Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, where there are two or more possible interpretations, choose the one that promotes the ‘commercial purpose’.

A

Supreme Court held no: this was not covered by an interpretation that was ‘consistent with business common sense’ = the term of the contract as construed from a business standpoint would not contemplate that indemnity

Capita (buyer) entered into an agreement with Wood (seller) to purchase an insurance company
The agreement contained an indemnity clause under which the seller promised to pay to the buyer an amount equal to any compensation resulting from claims from customers or complaints by customers to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)
Shortly after the sale, the buyer discovered that the company misled customers, informed the FCA and agreed to a compensation scheme with the FCA, unprompted by any customer complaint
The Court of Appeal held in favour of the seller on the ground that the indemnity excluded compensation not paid pursuant to claims or complaints

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20
Q

Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38

construction - interpretation- contractual context

A

=> Lord Hoffmann holds ‘no’. The meaning could be established by asking whether it made commercial sense. In fact, common sense suggested that P’s contention for £897k was correct, because otherwise the deal could not have been profitable. There was no amount of ‘red ink’ that could not be used to correct verbiage to match the contract’s (commercial) purpose.

=If the context and background of a contract indicate that something has gone wrong with the language of a contract, the courts are not obliged to attribute to the parties a meaning they plainly did not have. If both the mistake and the true intended meaning would be apparent to a reasonable person aware of all admissible background knowledge, the court may correct the mistake in the process of interpretation. This being the case, there is no need to rectify the contract.

P, a developer, would build on C’s land and sell properties, giving C: ‘23.4% of the price achieved for each Residential Unit in excess of the Minimum Guaranteed Residential Unit Value less the Costs and Incentives.’ C argued it was £4.4m owing and P said it was only £897k owing. Pre-contractual negotiations suggested it was indeed £897k. Were they to be admissible?

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21
Q

Canada Steamship Lines Ltd v R [1952] UKPC 1

construction - interpretation - contra proferentem (exemption clauses)

A

=> Lord Morton, held no. It was to be interpreted to not cover negligence, and exclude only liability under strict duties. (Despite the wide words.) If there’s no express exclusion of negligence, and there’s some other alternative, the exclusion applies to that.

= only covers the strict duty, not beyond

CSL stored goods in the Crown’s shed on the wharf of Montreal harbour. An employee, while repairing with an oxy-acetylene torch, accidentally started a fire and burnt down the shed. The Crown had a strict duty to keep the shed in repair (Civil Code art 1614). Also, clause 7 said ‘the lessee shall not have any claim… for… damage… to… goods… being… in the said shed.’ Did this clause cover negligence?

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22
Q

Ailsa Craig Fishing Ltd v Malvern Fishing Co Ltd [1981] UKHL 12

construction - interpretation - contra proferentem - limitation clauses

A

contra proferendum doesn’t apply in ‘full rigour’ to limitation clauses.
= the limitation clause did apply

A security company (D) had contracted to provide security and supervision in Ailsa Craig (C)’s fishing boats
A limitation clause in the contract limited D’s negligence liability to £1000
A boat belonging to C was sunk when it crashed while anchored against another boat belonging to Malvern
C sued D for negligence

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23
Q

HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] UKHL 6

construction - interpretation - exemption clause

A

there can never be an exclusion of liability for fraud (public policy ground)

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24
Q

Photo Productions Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827

construction - interpretation - fundamental breach- exemption clauses

A

HL held that, even though the breach was ‘fundamental’ (ie S was meant to guard building, but instead burnt it down), the exclusion clause covered the breach.

Lord Denning’s fundamental breach doctrine (= contract was breached and terminated for a reason that was ‘fundamental’ then no exclusion clause was effective. ) was rejected

Photo Productions (C) engaged Securicor (D) to provide security in its factory
D’s employee started a fire to keep warm and burnt D’s factory down
C sued D in negligence for the damage
D sought to rely on an exemption clause in their contract: ‘under no circumstances shall the company be responsible for any injurious act or default of any employee of the company unless such act or default could have been and avoided by exercise of due diligence’

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25
Q

Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1976] QB 319

standard implied terms - terms implied in law

A

Lord Denning MR, in CA, held there was a duty to on landlords to do reasonable repairs. A term could be implied whenever it was reasonable, based on ‘stacks of’ cases. But the duty was not breached on the facts: tenants should’ve done more to keep the common parts clean themselves.=> pointing towards more judicial intervention

Lord Wilberforce held terms could only be implied when it was ‘necessary’ (but did not say necessary for what purpose). Here such a term was necessary, but it was not breached. On the facts, the tenants should have cared more for maintenance themselves.

The ‘Piggeries’, a set of old Liverpool council flats, were vandalised and dirty. Tenants refused to pay rent in protest. The council tried to evict the tenants. The tenants counter-claimed breach of an implied term to keep block in repair.

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26
Q

Shell UK Ltd v Lostock Garage Ltd [1976] WLR 1187

implied terms - terms implied by law

A

Lord Denning MR => non-discrimination term was not common enough to be a term implied in law; there was also no implied term in fact on the (old) intent test.

Lostock claimed Shell breached an implied duty to it, as a franchisee, to not discriminate against Lostock when selling petrol under an exclusive supply agreement. Lostock was losing money because the price from Shell was too high. It switched supplier. Shell sued.

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27
Q

Johnstone v Bloomsbury HA [1991] 2 All ER 293

.

standard implied terms - implied in law

A

They all said that under the UCTA 1977 s 2(1) but differed on implied term approach

    • Stuart-Smith LJ held the implied term – duty to give a safe system of work – overrode the express term of working hour discretion.
    • Browne-Wilkinson LJ held the express term had to be exercised in light of the implied term, so it could not be abused: so B in breach.
    • Leggatt LJ held express terms override implied

Dr Johnstone’s contract at UCL hospital said he should work 40 hours, and could have to do overtime of an extra 48 hours on average – sometimes over 100 hours p/w (of 168 total). => Terrible working conditions ‘He suffers from stress and depression…’

Breach of implied terms => safe system of work?

28
Q

Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board [1992] 1 AC 294

standard implied terms - implied in law

A

Lord Bridge: term implied based on ‘necessity’, in this case to know what one’s rights at work are.

=> Cf. Malik v BCCI [1997] UKHL 23, good faith/ mutual trust and confidence = implied term in employment

Dr S and others claimed the SHSSB hadn’t properly informed them about pension rights (‘superannuation’) meaning they hadn’t claimed pension benefits they would’ve been entitled to. Breach of implied term to give pension information?

29
Q

The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64

individual implied terms - terms implied in fact

lcf The Reborn [2009] EWCA Civ 531, similar facts, but the opposite result.

A

Bowen LJ, the court should place liability ‘to give such business efficacy as must have been intended’. Wharf owner liable. The place of liability ‘must have been in the contemplation of both parties’.

The Moorcock, unloading cargo at a Thames wharf, hit rocks and was damaged. Ship owner sued wharf business, arguing they should be liable because they must have known of risk. Contract said nothing.

30
Q

Shirlaw v Southern Foundries Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206

individual implied terms - terms implied in facts

A

= CA and HL held it was a breach of contract to remove Shirlaw before 10 years. But HL held no implied right to remain on the board (i.e. damages awarded, but no specific performance)

‘Officious bystander’ metaphor in the CA
MacKinnon LJ, “Prima facie that which in any contract is left to be implied and need not be expressed is something so obvious that it goes without saying; so that, if, while the parties were making their bargain, an officious bystander were to suggest some express provision for it in their agreement, they would testily suppress him with a common ‘Oh, of course!’”’

Shirlaw had a 10-year contract as managing director with Southern Foundries Ltd. It was taken over by new shareholders. They changed the company’s constitution and dismissed Shirlaw from the board. Shirlaw claimed this breached an implied term that he would remain on the board. Was there such a term?

31
Q

Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman [2000] UKHL 39 (current law)

individual implied terms - terms implied in fact

A

House of Lords held, the directors’ discretion could only be exercised in light of the policyholders’ reasonable expectations: an implied term.

=> Lord Steyn, ‘It is only an individualised term of the second kind which can arguably arise in the present case. Such a term may be imputed to parties: it is not critically dependent on proof of an actual intention of the parties. The process “is one of construction of the agreement as a whole in its commercial setting”: Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 191, 212E, per Lord Hoffmann. This principle is sparingly and cautiously used and may never be employed to imply a term in conflict with the express terms of the text. The legal test for the implication of such a term is a standard of strict necessity.’

Equitable Life AS’s directors purported, under art 65, to use ‘their discretion’ reduce the extra premiums of its ‘Guaranteed Annuity Rate’ life insurance policyholders. The directors used the money to prop up ‘Current Annuity Rate’ policyholders. Those rates fluctuated with the markets, and the markets had fallen. The ‘GAR’ holders claimed this was illegitimate precisely because their income was meant to be guaranteed.

32
Q

Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10

individual implied terms - terms implied in fact

A

= The declaration was granted, directors could be removed : The overriding purpose of the Articles’ machinery for appointing and removing directors was to ensure that the board reflected the appropriate balance of interests between the various kinds of shareholders despite art 90(E) requiring holding special + C shares.
[18], ‘… the implication of the term is not an addition to the instrument. It only spells out what the instrument means.’
= Implication is treated as part of the interpretation process, the test being whether the reasonable person would imply a term

=> The AG claimed shareholders could remove Belize Telecom Ltd’s directors, even though the company’s constitution, article 90(E) said a special share and class C shares had to be held at same time to do so.
Articles of association of Belize Telecom stipulated that shareholders that held a certain share percentage could appoint a fixed number of directors
D purchased a share percentage that entitled it to appoint two directors to the board but subsequently went into liquidation
The articles provided that directors could only be removed on grounds such as lunacy and bankruptcy
C sought a declaration that the articles include an implied term that directors can be removed when the shareholder with the required shareholding to support his appointment ceased to exist

33
Q

M&S plc v BNP Paribas Securities Ltd [2015] UKSC 72

individual implied terms -terms implied in fact

A

=> UKSC held no term was to be implied requiring repayments: not ‘necessary’.

Rationale:

=> Lord Neuberger suggested Belize should not be taken to suggest that different things happen between interpreting and implying terms.

[23] a term can be implied if ‘(i) the reasonable reader is treated as reading the contract at the time it was made and (ii) he would consider the term to be so obvious as to go without saying or to be necessary for business efficacy… it would be wrong to treat Lord Steyn’s statement in Equitable Life … that a term will be implied if it is “essential to give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties” as diluting the test of necessity. That is clear from what Lord Steyn said earlier on the same page, namely that “[t]he legal test for the implication of … a term is … strict necessity”, which he described as a “stringent test”.)’

=> Lord Clarke [76] ‘I accept that both (i) construing the words which the parties have used in their contract and (ii) implying terms into the contract, involve determining the scope and meaning of the contract… both processes are part of construction of the contract in a broad sense.’

M&S claimed it should be reimbursed by its landlord, BNP, when it terminated early a lease of a Paddington property. No term in the lease said what would happen if the right to terminate was exercised when rent had already been paid for a period.

34
Q

Barton v Morris [2023] UKSC 3

individual implied terms - terms implied in fact

A

Lady Rose (Briggs, Stephens agreeing) held:
* there was no express term.
* a term implied in fact would contradict the express term
* a term implied in law from SGSA 1982 s 15 was displaced by the contract, and it was also unilateral, so not applicable
* no claim in unjust enrichment to get around the contract.

=> Lord Burrows, Lord Leggatt dissent, would have applied section 15 by analogy. B should have got a reasonable sum, £435,000, implied in law.

=> Lord Burrows also says unjust enrichment would create the same claim.

Foxpace Ltd (represented by Morris) agreed to pay Barton £1.2m if he found a buyer for a property, Nash House, paying over £6.5m. He found Western UK Ltd to buy it for £6.55m but then it HS2 work meant the price was dropped to £6m. F paid B nothing. Was he entitled to anything?

35
Q

Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905

good faith

A

Lord Mansfield held the insurance was void as C did not disclose danger. ‘Good faith forbids either party by concealing what he privately knows, to draw the other into a bargain from his ignorance of that fact, and his believing the contrary.’

Carter, Governor of Fort Marlborough, Indonesia, bought insurance from Boehm, without disclosing that the fort could not withstand attack from the French. French attacked. Boehm claimed the policy was void for non-disclosure.

36
Q

Transco plc v O’Brien [2002] EWCA Civ 379

good faith in employement law

A

An employer had acted in breach of the implied duty of trust and confidence by offering an enhanced redundancy package to all of its employees with the exception of the applicant; the fact that the employer had believed that the applicant was not a permanent employee had not been a proper ground for denying him the enhanced package.

not the most important to know

37
Q

Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd [2013] EWHC 111

implied duty good faith - in (certain) commercial contracts

A

Leggatt J doubted that English law had reached the stage where it is ready to recognise a requirement of good faith as a duty implied by law, even as a default rule, into all commercial contracts. Nevertheless, there was no difficulty, following the established methodology of English law for the implication of terms in fact, in implying such a duty in any ordinary commercial contract based on the presumed intention of the parties.

Leggatt J held this breached an individualised implied term of good faith in this agreement: it was a ‘relational’ long term contract where such a foundation of honesty was necessary to fulfil reasonable expectations.

nb: this was not a standardised implied term.

Leggatt J,

121, holds that in standard English views there is no general principle of good faith – rejected for pre-contractual negotiations in Walford v Miles by the HL

124-130, but this does appear to be ‘swimming against the tide’, as the US, EU law, most civil law countries, Canada, NSW (in Australia), and probably NZ and Scotland do recognise such a duty.

Leggatt J suggests that GF exists = basic honesty, and you can always opt out. This would make “good faith” differ, weaker than, eg Canada or Germany.

YS was ITC’s exclusive distributor of Manchester United fragrances in Middle East, Africa, Asia & Australia. ITC told YS that retail prices were put up to $65 when in fact they were not.

38
Q

Bhasin v Hrynew (2014) SCC 71

good faith

canadian case

A

Canadian SC holds good faith is not just an implied term – good faith is an ‘organising principle’ for all contractual relations. CAF’s failure to give adequate notice about CAF’s merger plans before a decision was made and to be candid during the relationship was a breach.

Cromwell J:

33.“… it is time to take two incremental steps… The first step is to acknowledge that good faith contractual performance is a general organizing principle of the common law of contract which underpins and informs the various rules in which the common law, in various situations and types of relationships, recognizes obligations of good faith contractual performance. The second is to recognize, as a further manifestation of this organizing principle of good faith, that there is a common law duty which applies to all contracts to act honestly in the performance of contractual obligations.” = extends the scope of honesty

  1. “… this should not be thought of as an implied term, but a general doctrine of contract law that imposes as a contractual duty a minimum standard of honest contractual performance. It operates irrespective of the intentions of the parties and is to this extent analogous to equitable doctrines which impose limits on the freedom of contract, such as the doctrine of unconscionability.”

CAF Corp hired Bhasin as an ‘enrolment director’ for 3 years – a self-employed franchise job. Another enrolment director, Hrynew, was trying to merge their businesses: B didn’t want to. Through CAF, H managed to be appointed to review regulatory compliance and require the merger. B claimed breach of good faith.

39
Q

Bates v Post Office (No 3) [2019] EWHC 606 (QB) 550

good faith in ‘relational contracts’

but Green Close v Natwest = if good faith would cut down a clear obligation in the contract then GF won’t be implied

A

Fraser J held there was a breach.

  1. In a ‘relational contract’ (over a long time, high degree of cooperation, etc) there is a duty of good faith.
  2. Good faith ‘does not mean honesty… It includes honesty, but there is more to it than that.’ 711. ‘parties must refrain from conduct which in the relevant context would be regarded as commercially unacceptable by reasonable and honest people.’

sub-postmasters were accused of fraud and privately prosecuted (some were even convicted), when it was in fact the Horizon computer system fault (accounting calculations were wrong and showed inaccurate losses). They were told they were the only ones with accounting problems, when they were not.

40
Q

Brooke Homes (Bicester) Ltd v Portfolio Property Partners Ltd [2021] EWHC 3015

meaning of good faith

nb: Candey Ltd v Bosheh [2022] EWCA Civ 1103, rejects any duty of good faith from a client .to a solicitor (breached by settling a case so that solicitor got no costs). It would have been a ‘startling concept’. Not so obvious that it goes without saying.

=> So, good faith can be a term implied in fact, but not a general term: courts reluctant in commercial deals to change much

A

Mr Hugh Sims QC, [101]-[105] good faith should be

(i) honesty
(ii) reasonable standards of fair dealing
(iii) fidelity to a common purpose
(iv) act consistently with justified expectations of the parties.

NB: should it apply to all contracts

The defendant group of companies (P) had put together a development site through a series of option agreements. It identified the claimant (B) as a potential developer of the site.

An agreement referred to as ‘Heads of Agreement’ was entered into in 2015 between P and B. The Heads of Agreement required the parties to use “all reasonable endeavours” to enter into a final binding agreement which captured the terms of the Heads of Agreement acting in good faith towards each other. The Heads of Agreement anticipated that the parties would enter into a conditional contract for the sale and development of part of the land.

When no formal conditional contract had been entered into by 2018 B claimed that P was in breach of the Heads of Agreement.

41
Q

Times Travel (UK) Ltd v Pakistan International Airlines Corp [2021] UKSC 40

unfair terms

A

[26] and [44], Lord Hodge,
‘The courts have taken the position that it is for Parliament and not the judiciary to regulate inequality of bargaining power where a person is trading in a manner which is not otherwise contrary to law… there is no doctrine of inequality of bargaining power and no general principle of good faith in contracting in English law…. A powerful commercial party, such as a monopoly supplier… can impose onerous terms… as a condition for entering into a transaction with another party.’

42
Q

George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803

unfair terms UCTA 1977

S55(4) SGA 1979 had provided that any term purporting to restrict liability under ss 13, 14 or 15 SGA 1979 is not enforceable to the extent that it is shown that it would not be fair or reasonable to allow reliance on the term
It is now replaced by S6(2)(a) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
However, the part of the judgment on reasonableness is still relevant to statutory interpretation of the reasonableness test in UCTA 1977

A

But the limitation was unreasonable primarily because the seller (dealing with many customers) was in a better position to guard against and insure the risk of seed failure than any single farmer (now under UCTA 1977 s 11).

=> Lord Bridge, on the reasonableness test:

‘the court must entertain a whole range of considerations, put them in the scales on one side or the other, and decide at the end of the day on which side the balance comes down. There will sometimes be room for a legitimate difference of judicial opinion as to what the answer should be, where it will be impossible to say that one view is demonstrably wrong and the other demonstrably right…. when asked to review such a decision on appeal, the appellate court should treat the original decision with the utmost respect and refrain from interference with it unless satisfied that it proceeded upon some erroneous principle or was plainly and obviously wrong.’

GMC bought cabbage seeds from FLS. Clauses 1 and 2 limited damages for defects to the price (£201.60). Cabbage crops failed, £61,513 in lost production.
Lord Denning MR, dissenting on reasoning, held the limitation clause did encompass defective cabbages, but was unfair under (what is now found in) UCTA 1977 s 6 and Sch 2. Oliver LJ and Kerr LJ held the things sold were not even cabbages. Limitation clause not effective.

43
Q

Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] UKHL 1

unfair contract terms - UCTA 1977

A

HL holds, yes. By s 13(1) the attempt to preclude the duty has no consequence. It was caught by s 2(2). It was unreasonable under s 11 because ESB was better placed to get insurance than S.

Lord Griffiths,
‘Everyone knows that all prudent, professional men carry insurance, and the availability and cost of insurance must be a relevant factor when considering which of two parties should be required to bear the risk of a loss. We are dealing in this case with a loss which will be limited to the value of a modest house and against which it can be expected that the surveyor will be insured. Bearing the loss will be unlikely to cause significant hardship if it has to be borne by the surveyor but it is, on the other hand, quite possible that it will be a financial catastrophe for the purchaser who may be left with a valueless house and no money to buy another.’

Mrs Smith buys a new house, with a loan from a building society. The building society hires Eric S Bush to do a survey: no essential house repairs needed. ESB does not contract with S, but its report disclaims accuracy of report to anyone. After S bought, the chimney collapsed and destroyed the roof. ESB liable under UCTA 1977 s 2(2) and s 13?

44
Q

Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1984] EWCA Civ 5

ufair contract terms - UCTA - exclusion clause

A

Slade LJ, condition 8 in effect was an exclusion clause, even though it was in the form of shifting responsibility onto PP for whatever H did wrong: caught by s 13 ans 2. Was it reasonable under s 11 and sch 2? No: unreasonable because HPH was better placed than PP to get insurance for such short hire jobs.

Other possible reasons =>The Court of Appeal held that the term acted as an exclusion clause and was unreasonable because:
1. the contract was entered into at short notice
2. The claimant was given little opportunity to familiarise himself with the term
3. The claimant was forced into a take it or leave it situation as had no choice but to accept the driver.
4. There was little opportunity to arrange own insurance cover
5. The claimant had no choice in the selection of driver or to assess their qualifications or suitability to do the job.

Hamsted Plant Hire Co Ltd hired out a JCB excavator and a driver (Mr Hyland) to Philips Product Ltd. Condition 8 said Mr H would be considered PP’s employee. Mr H crashed into a building owned by PP.

45
Q

Thompson v T Lohan (Plant Hire) Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 649

unfair contract terms - UCTA 1977 - exlusion clause

A

CA: Fox LJ, the point of s 2(1) was to protect the victim. Because condition 8 (passing liability to JWH) operates between two businesses, and the victim was compensated either way, condition 8 was not considered an exemption: Mr H was JWH’s employee. (Why not say it is an exemption, but reasonable?)

TLPH Ltd hired out a JCB excavator and driver (Mr Hill) to JW Hurdiss Ltd. Condition 8 said H would be considered JWH’s employee. Mr Hill ran over and killed Mr Thompson. Mrs Thompson sued TLPH Ltd and won compensation. TLPH then sought to get the money back from JWH. Who must pay?

46
Q

Timeload Ltd v British T elecom plc [1995] EMLR 459

unfair contract terms - UCTA s 3

A

Sir Thomas Bingham MR held unfair, because it was rendering something different from what was reasonably expected (ie stable service).

the plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants, BT, from terminating the contract between them under clause 18 of the contract which provided that BT had the right ‘at any time’ to terminate the contract between the parties on the giving of one month’s notice. The reason why the plaintiffs wanted an injunction to prevent termination was that they wanted to keep their telephone number and termination of the contract would have deprived them of their ability to do so. The plaintiffs sought to challenge the validity of clause 18 under section 3 of the Act.

47
Q

Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd [1992] EWCA Civ 6

unfair contract terms - UCTA s 13

A

CA held s 13(1)(b) meant that condition 12.4 was in effect an exclusion and was caught by ss 3 or 7. And it was unreasonable.

SG sold HM an overhead conveyer system, and HM was to pay instalments. SG’s condition 12.4 excluded HM’s right to set off payments for goods being defective. System defective: HM refused to pay last instalment. SG sued and relied on condition 12.4.

48
Q

St Albans City & District Council v International Computers Ltd [1996] EWCA Civ 1296

unfair contract terms - limitation clause - UCTA - reasonableness test

A

Scott Baker J held the limit was unreasonable under ss 3 and 11, and Sch 2. IC had more resources and more bargaining power – even though St Albans was a government entity

Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government wished to tax people for being an adult citizen (the ‘community charge’ or ‘poll tax’). Before riots forced it to be scrapped, councils like St Albans bought computer systems to run it. St Albans’ system from IC failed, and it lost £1.3m. IC’s standard terms limited liability to £100k.

49
Q

Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317

unfair contract terms - reasonableness test

A

the clause was reasonable
Chadwick LJ held (overturning judge) ‘In circumstances in which parties of equal bargaining power negotiate a price for the supply of product under an agreement which provides for the person on whom the risk of loss will fall, it seems to me that the court should be very cautious before reaching the conclusion that the agreement which they have reached is not a fair and reasonable one.’

= two-medium or two small: exclusion clause more likely to be reasonable

= if inequality/disparity of bargaining power – more likely to be unreasonable

S (a software supplier) sold W (a computer retailer) a computer system that failed. The contract stated consequential losses were excluded. Claim?

50
Q

First Tower Trustees Ltd v CDS (Superstores International) Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 1396

unfair contract terms - exclusion clause - UCTA

A

Lewison LJ held that the misrepresentation could not be excluded. FTT would have been liable but for the exclusion, and the exclusion was not reasonable. FTT better placed to get insurance.

CDS claimed that FTT’s clause 5.8 in its lease agreement was unfair: this excluded liability for misrepresentations. FTT said there was no environmental problems in the warehouse, but was in fact aware it was infested with asbestos.

=> MA 1967 s 3 and UCTA 1977 s 11?

51
Q

Marks & Spencer plc v. BNP Paribas Securities [2015] UKSC 72

terms implied in law - tenancy

A

=> UKSC held no term was to be implied requiring repayments: not ‘necessary’.

M&S claimed it should be reimbursed by its landlord, BNP, when it terminated early a lease of a Paddington property. No term in the lease said what would happen if the right to terminate was exercised when rent had already been paid for a period.

52
Q

R & B Customs Brokers Co Ltd v United Dominions Trust Ltd [1987] EWCA Civ 3

dealing as a consumer - UCTA s 12

see also Feldarol Foundry plc v Hermes Leasing (London) Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 747

A

held: the claused would have been held to be reasonable
dismissing the appeal, that no sufficient degree of regularity has been shown by DCo. such as would show that the activity was an integral part of PCo.’sbusiness and PCo. had been dealing as a consumer within theUnfair Contract Terms Act 1977 s.12(1). Accordingly, by virtue of s.6(2), the implied term of fitness for purpose could not be excluded

R&B was a shipping broker and a freight forwarding agent, but merely a two-person company. It bought a second-hand car from United Dominions Trust, as a company car driver by Mr Bell, the managing director. The car roof leaked, a breach of section 14(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. An exemption clause in the contract for the car provided that the implied conditions about fitness for purpose were excluded. R&B argued that this was contrary to UCTA 1977 section 6, and United Dominions contended that R&B could not avail themselves of the Act because as a business they could not count as a consumer.

53
Q

Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc and Others [2009] UKSC 6

General principles of unfair terms in consumer contracts

Regulation 6(2)(b) states that the assessment of the fairness of a term in a contract “shall not relate . . .
to the adequacy of the price or remuneration, as against the goods or services supplied in exchange”.
In other words, the “value for money” equation is excluded.
The Court of Appeal held that this exclusion applied only to the “core terms” of the contract and not to ancillary terms such as the charges for unauthorised overdrafts. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the charges for unauthorised overdrafts fell within this exclusion. They were part of the price
paid by the customer for the banking services provided.

A

Court of Appeal held unanimously under s 64 (ex reg 6(2)) the terms could not be assessed.

Held at the UKSC (under the now s 64 CRA)

(1) the terms could not be assessed for fairness, as it was all part of a ‘package’ of charges making the bank’s price or remuneration

(2) it should not be referred to the CJEU, either because it was acte clair (despite a unanimous CA under Sir Clarke MR) and because a national court would decide the appeal’s result anyway.

When a bank customer uses an unplanned overdraft and then makes a payment request (whether by standing order, direct debit or using an ATM or debit card), banks generally make the payment as requested, and then charge fees (which may include “paid item” charges and unauthorised overdraft fees) which accrue on a daily basis whilst the unauthorised overdraft continues. The Office of Fair Trading (‘OFT’), acting on behalf of consumers, challenged these fees under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (‘UTCCR’), which implements European Union Unfair Contract Terms Directive.

54
Q

ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67

unfair term - CRA 2015 - s 62

A

UKSC held:

Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption, giving first judgment held the notice was not unfair as it would have been agreed to. People ‘did accept it.’

Lord Mance: a consumer would have asked for a graded charge, but it was not unfair: at 209-213.

Lord Hodge, ‘some doubt’ but persuaded.

Lord Clarke says very little.

Lord Toulson, dissents. A reasonable consumer would not have agreed, at 314.

  1. ‘Lord Neuberger and Lord Sumption in para 107 have substituted their judgment of reasonableness of the clause for the question whether the supplier could reasonably have assumed that the customer would have agreed with the term…. at the very least that the point is not acte clair.’

Treats the test under s 62(4) as cumulative

(joined with Cavendish Square BV v Makdessi on penalty clauses) : 2 hour max. Stay / 4 hours max for fitness centre members. Non-compliance = fine

55
Q

Director of Fair Trading v First national bank plc [2001] UKHL 52

unfair terms

Significance

(1) The HL recognised that exceptions to the fairness test (s 64) should be construed narrowly in light of the Directive’s purpose.

(2) But why did the court not defer to the DGFT on its view of what was fair (s 62)? Who is better placed to decide?

(3) Lord Bingham at [17] regarded ‘good faith’ and ‘significant imbalance’ as cumulative requirements. But why? Doesn’t that make consumer claims harder?

A

Held: HL held (1) the term was not a core term -within s 64 (as it is now)- as it did not concern the primary price of the bank’s services. So it could be assessed for fairness. But (2) it was fair (now s 62) to substitute ordinary interest rates.

Lord Bingham, [12] ‘there is an important “distinction between the term or terms which express the substance of the bargain and ‘incidental’ (if important) terms which surround them… [Chitty]… The object of the regulations and the directive is to protect consumers against the inclusion of unfair and prejudicial terms in standard-form contracts into which they enter, and that object would plainly be frustrated if [section 64] were so broadly interpreted as to cover any terms other than those falling squarely within it…. “

Facts: DGFT claimed FNB’s term, which raised interest rates after a borrower’s default, was unfair. If a borrower defaulted on a loan, they could get a court judgment for a ‘repayment plan’ under the Consumer Credit Act 1974. A statutory interest rate would apply under the County Court (Interest on Judgment Debts) Order 1991. FNB’s terms replaced this statutory rate with its own higher market interest rates. Was it a core term? Fair?

56
Q

Bankers Insurance Co Ltd v South [2004] Ll Rep IR 1,
OFT v Ashbourne Management Services Ltd [2011] EWHC 1237,

unfiar terms

A
  • Buckley J in the High Court held that an insurance policy exemption for covering motor boat accidents was fair.
  • gyms had minimum subscription periods of 12 to 36 months. If people sought to terminate early, they would be classed as ‘defaulters’ and gyms threatened passing details to a credit reference agency. Kitchin J held that it was unfair. *

lower court cases - unfair terms

57
Q

Feldarol Foundry plc v Hermes Leasing (London) Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 747

dealing as a consumer - UCTA s 12

A

The words “deals as a consumer” in the 1977 Act are consistent with the wider meaning which the court gave to the words “seller in the course of a business” in the[Sale of Goods Act 1979] The fact that F was a public company andR&Binvolved a one man private company was insufficient to distinguish the case on the facts,Stevenson v Rogersapplied andR&Bfollowed. A declaration made by B in the agreement that the car was to be used for business purposes was also irrelevant, as it was not directed to the capacity in which F was dealing.

facts: H, a finance company, appealed against a decision that F, a company, had hire purchased a Lamborghini Diablo as a consumer, with the result that H could not rely on exclusion clauses in the agreement and that the car was not of satisfactory quality. B, the driver of the car, complained of various defects soon after taking delivery of it and returned it to the dealer with the intention that the dealer would obtain a replacement. B made the first payment due under the agreement in order to “roll over” the agreement to the replacement vehicle. H argued that (1) F, being a company, was not capable of dealing as a consumer for the purposes of the UCTA 1977 F had not rejected the car but had affirmed the contract by paying the first instalment.

58
Q

Last Bus Ltd v DawsonGroup Bus and Coach Ltd [2023] EWCA Civ 1297

UCTA 1977 s 6

A

The CA overturns the High Court

B hires five coaches through DG. DG’s standard terms exclude liability for satisfactory quality. The coaches are not good, and LB sues. Is the exclusion clause effective under UCTA 1977 s 6 (and SG(IT)A 1973 s 10, corresponding to SGA 1979 s 14)? Also keep in mind UCTA 1977 s 3 (standard terms, contract breach).

Andrew Baker J held the parties’ bargaining power was equal, so no claim, and no trial. But as fact he also found that there were no alternatives on the market.

59
Q

Wilson v Secretary of Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2003] UKHL 40

contracts and human rights

A

HL held there was no violation of Prot 1, art 1. Parliament had a good justification for CCA 1974 policy, solving a ‘perennial problem’ of consumer protection.

First County Trust Ltd, a loan company, argued the Consumer Credit Act 1974 s 127(3) violated ECHR Prot 1, art 1. CCA 1974 required lenders to state all terms in one document or forfeit claims. FCT charged Mrs W a document fee of £250 of top of interest (94.78%) on a £5k loan, when she pledged her BMW. So, not one document. This failure meant FCT lost all its loan money, £5k. Human right?

60
Q

Uber BV v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5

contracts and human rights

A

Supreme Court upheld finding that Uber drivers are workers.

Lord Leggatt, [68] ‘inequality of bargaining power is not generally treated as a reason for disapplying ordinary principles of contract law, except in so far as Parliament has made the relative bargaining power of the parties a relevant factor under legislation…’
[77]-[78] but the purpose of statutory rights in remedying unequal bargaining power had to be regarded in determining the scope of who is a worker (recalling Autoclenz Ltd v Belcher).

Uber drivers claimed the minimum wage and paid holidays – to do this they had to be employees or ‘workers’. Employment Tribunal said, Uber is an ‘excellent illustration… of “armies of lawyers” contriving documents in their clients’ interests which simply misrepresent the true rights and obligations on both sides’.

61
Q

Uber Technologies v Heller, 2020 SCC 16 : Canadian Case

contracts and human rights ECHR

A

Supreme Court of Canada held (7 to 2) the arbitration term is not enforceable – it is ‘unconscionable’ based on the parties ‘unequal bargaining power’ [65]-[72].

  1. ‘An inequality of bargaining power exists when one party cannot adequately protect their interests in the contracting process…’
  2. ‘Differences in wealth, knowledge, or experience may be relevant, but inequality encompasses more than just those attributes…’ e.g. ‘a wide variety of transactional weaknesses.’

Brown J dissents on reasoning, saying the arbitration clause can be held invalid on public policy alone.

Côté J dissents on outcome, saying the contract is valid

Mr Heller ‘signed’ or clicked to accept agreement to become a driver, [183] and the agreement said for any dispute, the parties had to undergo arbitration in the Netherlands. (Mr Heller is in Canada.)

H and others claim the right to a CA$14 (about £8) minimum wage, overtime and vacation pay. He needs to be an ‘employee’ of Uber to do this. Uber asserts H is self-employed, and has no rights, and says that anyway the claim should go to Dutch arbitration under the contract.

62
Q

Last Bus Ltd v DawsonGroup Bus and Coach Ltd [2023] EWCA Civ 1297

A

held: The Court of Appeal held that UCTA is not limited in application to consumer contracts, and applies with full force (subject to the exceptions in Schedule 1) to commercial contracts where one party is dealing on the other’s standard terms (Section 3) or where the contract is one of hire purchase (Section 6(1A)(b)). The Court held that the clause wasprima facieunenforceable, and the first instance judge was wrong to conclude that it was enforceable

FACTS: transaction where the Claimant had purchased Mercedes Benz coaches that were financed by Dawsongroup in a series of hire purchase agreements that included an exclusion clause that excluded the statutory term as to fitness implied by Section 10(2) Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973. The case concerned the extent to which the exclusion clause satisfied the requirement of reasonableness under section 6(1A)(b) and section 11 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (” UCTA “)

63
Q

Tudor Grange Holdings Ltd v Citibank NA [1992] Ch 53

UCTA s 10 - unfair terms

A

Held:
Section 10 did not apply to a contract to settle disputes concerning performance of an earlier contract
Release was binding of Tudor Grang
= s 10 doesn’t apply to genuine compromises of existing claims

Tudor Grange bought action against Citibank
Citibank argued to have it struck out based on TG’s agreement to a deed of release which prevented the action
TG claimed it was unenforceable under s10 of UCTA 1977- right to complain of breaches of duty of care

64
Q

Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya (2013) C-415/11

A

In relation to whether the term ‘causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of the consumer’ the CJEU said that the national court had to examine ‘to what extent, the contract places the consumer in a legal situation less favourable than that provided for by the national law in force.’ [para 68]In relation to whether a significant imbalance arises ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith’ the CJEU said that the question for the national court is whether ‘the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer would have agreed to such a term in individual contract negotiations.’ [para 6]

65
Q

who has the burden / onus of proof to show that the term is reasonable?

A

the party who is trying to rely on it