Violence Risk Assessment and Quasi Criminal Commitment

Question 1

Lipari v. Sears Roebuck (1980)

Answer 1

Psychiatrists’ duty to protect third parties DOES extend to foreseeable, but unidentified, third parties.

The victims need not be readily identifiable as was the case in Tarasoff, but instead belong to a “class of persons” who could be “reasonably foreseen” to be harmed by the dangerous patient.
NOTE: No other state court has extended the duty as far as this Federal Nebraska court…

Question 2

Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of California (1976) *

Answer 2

There IS a therapist duty to protect third parties from dangerous patients.

A psychologist has a duty to “exercise reasonable care” in protecting the potential victim, including – but not necessarily – directly warning the potential victim.

Question 3

Brady v. Hopper (1983)

Answer 3

A psychiatrist’s duty to warn DOES NOT extend to liability, should the patient cause injuries to another.

Question 4

Jablonski v. U.S. (1983)

Answer 4

Psychiatrists ARE required to protect a foreseeable victim in the absence of a specific threat.

Question 5

Hedlund v. Superior Court of Orange County (1983)

Answer 5

Extended duty to warn (Tarasoff) to “foreseeable” others that may be unnamed/unthreatened

Question 6

Barefoot v. Estelle (1983)

Answer 6

Psychiatrists CAN testify about future dangerouness of defendants in capital cases

Question 7

Kansas v. Hendricks (1997)*

Answer 7

The procedure for civil commitment established by Kansas SVP Act does NOT violate principles of due process, double-jeopardy, or ex post facto

Procedure is civil, rather than criminal; “definition of ‘mental abnormality” does not violated due process

Question 8

Kansas v. Crane (2002)*

Answer 8

An “absolute lack of control” of one’s bx is not required for SVP commitment

Question 9

Coble v. Texas (2010)

Answer 9

SCOTUS denied cert to review:
(1) Whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals improperly extended Barefoot v. Estelle by reading that case as categorically foreclosing any claim that the admission of unreliable expert testimony in a particular case violates the federal Constitution; and (2) whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals undercut Jurek v. Texas by abandoning the consideration of future dangerousness and retroactively replacing it with a dangerous-character test.

Question 10

United States v. Comstock (2010)

Answer 10

The Supreme Court held that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress authority sufficient to enact the Adam Walsh Protection and Safety Act (a law that could confine a person solely because of “sexual dangerousness”). SCOTUS pointed to five considerations that compelled its holding. (1) the Necessary and Proper Clause grants broad authority. (2) The Court recognized that Congress has long delivered mental health care to federal prisoners. (3) Congress had good reason to pass the statute as it has the power to protect nearby communities from the danger prisoners may pose. (4) The Tenth Amendment does not reserve a zone of authority to the states in this context. (5) The Court recognized that the statute was narrow in scope and did not confer on Congress a general police power, which is reserved to the states.