Threat Assessment Flashcards
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District (1969)
Does a prohibition against the wearing of armbands in public school, as a form of symbolic protest, violate the students’ freedom of speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment? Yes.
SCOTUS held that the armbands represented pure speech that is entirely separate from the actions or conduct of those participating in it. The Court also held that the students did not lose their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech when they stepped onto school property. In order to justify the suppression of speech, the school officials must be able to prove that the conduct in question would “materially and substantially interfere” with the operation of the school. In this case, the school district’s actions evidently stemmed from a fear of possible disruption rather than any actual interference.
NJ v. T.L.O. (1985)
The Court held that while the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to public school officials, they may conduct reasonable warrantless searches of students under their authority notwithstanding the probable cause standard that would normally apply to searches under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the search of T.L.O.’s purse was reasonable under the circumstances, and that the exclusionary rule of the 4th didn’t apply here.
Schenck v. United States (1919)
Did Schenck’s conviction under the Espionage Act for criticizing the draft violate his First Amendment right to freedom of speech? The Court held that the Espionage Act did not violate the First Amendment and was an appropriate exercise of Congress’ wartime authority. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes concluded that courts owed greater deference to the government during wartime, even when constitutional rights were at stake. Articulating for the first time the “clear and present danger test,” Holmes concluded that the First Amendment does not protect speech that approaches creating a clear and present danger of a significant evil that Congress has power to prevent. Holmes reasoned that the widespread dissemination of the leaflets was sufficiently likely to disrupt the conscription process. Famously, he compared the leaflets to falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theatre, which is not permitted under the First Amendment.
Watts v. United States (1969)
An 18yo attended a protest against police brutality, and made threat against President LBJ. A federal statute makes it a crime to “knowingly and willfully” threaten the life of the President. SCOTUS said he didn’t make a real threat. Watts’ statement was “political hyperbole”. The Court noted, “The language of the political arena… is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact.” Thus, considering the “context, and regarding the expressly conditional nature of the statement and the reaction of the listeners,” the Court ruled that Watts’ statement was not a true threat.
Bethel School District No 403 v. Fraser (1986)
The First Amendment does not prevent a school district from disciplining a high school student for giving a lewd speech at a high school assembly. Chief Justice Burger distinguished between political speech which the Court previously had protected in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) and the supposed sexual content of Fraser’s message at the assembly. Burger concluded that the First Amendment did not prohibit schools from prohibiting vulgar and lewd speech since such discourse was inconsistent with the “fundamental values of public school education.”
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988)
the Court held that the First Amendment did not require schools to affirmatively promote particular types of student speech. The Court held that schools must be able to set high standards for student speech disseminated under their auspices, and that schools retained the right to refuse to sponsor speech that was “inconsistent with ‘the shared values of a civilized social order.’” Educators did not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as their actions were “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” The actions of principal Reynolds, the Court held, met this test.
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)
Did Ohio’s criminal syndicalism law, prohibiting public speech that advocates various illegal activities (crime, violence), violate Brandenburg’s right to free speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
The Court’s Per Curiam opinion held that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg’s right to free speech. The Court used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be prohibited if it is “directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and (2) it is “likely to incite or produce such action.” The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution.
