Other Criminal Competencies

Question 1

Colorado v. Connelly (1986)

Answer 1

To find a confession involuntary, there needs to be coercive police activity (coercive police activity is required for a confession to be stricken)

Question 2

Crane v. Kentucky (1986)

Answer 2

SCOTUS held that the defendant’s Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial were violated when the trial judge excluded testimony regarding the physical and psychological circumstances (being interrogated for hours) of a confession, based on the fact that a pretrial hearing had already been held on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.

How a confession is derived, such as the issue of voluntariness, is a matter of legality and was appropriately addressed during the pretrial hearing. In Crane, the Supreme Court held that the issue of the physical and psychological circumstances under which a confession was derived is relevant to the factual issue of innocence or guilt and must be allowed as a defense at trial in the presence of a jury.

Question 3

Fare V. Michael C. (1979)

Answer 3

(1) Juvenile requests for probation officer presence during an interrogation does NOT trigger Miranda
(2) “Totality of the circumstances” standard in considering waiver of Miranda (knowingly and voluntarily) applies to juveniles

Question 4

G.J.I. v. State (1989)

Answer 4

Application of adult competency/due process protections DO NOT apply to juveniles

Question 5

In re Gault (1967)

Answer 5

Juvenile defendants face a loss of liberty when they are denied the same due process rights as adults charged with a crime

Question 6

Whalem v. U.S. (1965)

Answer 6

(1) Competency hearings are not required if both parties stipulate to the findings of competency evaluations,

(2) A court can impose an insanity defense onto a defendant against their desires
- overturned by Marble

Question 7

North Carolina v. Alford (1970)

Answer 7

(1) 1) A defendant may make a guilty plea without acknowledging guilt. The courts may accept whatever plea a defendant chooses to enter, as long as the defendant is competently represented by counsel; the plea is voluntarily and intelligently chosen; and “the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt. (Christina’s summary)
(2) The fear of the death penalty, in and of itself, is not adequately coercive to invalidate a guilty plea within the meaning of the 5th Amendment (Loandra’s card)

Question 8

Faretta v. California (1975)

Answer 8

(1) 6th Amendment guarantees criminal defendants a right to self-representation.
(2) A person is not incompetent to waive the right to an attorney merely because they are unable to understand technical legal matters (hearsay rules, rules governing selection of jury).

Question 9

Indiana v. Edwards (2008)*

Answer 9

(1) Standard outlined in Dusky applied to those w/counsel.
(2) Standard for CST was not the standard to determine competency for defendants to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.
(3) US Constitution permits states to insist upon representation by counsel for those incompetent to conduct that trial proceedings by themselves but CST under Dusky.
(4) The trial judge must determine that the waiver is “voluntary” and “knowing.”

Overall, a defendant who is competent to stand trial can still be found incompetent to represent himself at trial. Mental illness can vary over time, so competent in one moment may not mean competent in the next; to allow a defendant to proceed when he/she lacks capacity to do so results in an embarrassing spectacle and undercuts due process.

Question 10

Godinez v. Moran (1993)*

Answer 10

1) The competency standard is the same across the board. That is, competency to stand trial (per Dusky) is the same to for competency for pleading guilty or waiving right to counsel.
2) Added the capacity to right to remain silent, right to jury trial, right to confront one’s accuser, and right to trial counsel.

Question 11

Miranda v. Arizona (1966)*

Answer 11

Due to inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation, a suspect must be “clearly informed of his rights and must waive them” (e.g., right to consult with a lawyer and to have a lawyer with them during interrogation so they are not compelled to be witnesses against themselves.

The case is the SCOTUS basis for most 5th amendment issues

Statements must be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.

Question 12

Berghuis v. Thompson (2010)

Answer 12

SCOTUS:
1) A suspect’s silence during interrogation doesn’t invoke/trigger his right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona. The invocation of that right must be unambiguous, and silence is insufficient.

2) Voluntarily and knowingly responding to police interrogation after remaining silent constitutes a waiver of the right to remain silent, provided that a Miranda warning was given and the suspect understood it.

Mnemonic: Remaining silent is ‘bogus,’ and doesn’t count as invoking Miranda

Question 13

Brown v. Mississippi (1936)

Answer 13

SCOTUS: A defendant’s confession that is extracted by police violence cannot be entered as evidence and violates the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.

Question 14

Dickerson v. US (2000)

Answer 14

SCOTUS:
1) The requirement for Miranda warnings is constitutionally-mandated, and thus, it cannot be superseded by federal statute

2) The mandate of Miranda v. AZ that a criminal suspect be advised of certain constitutional rights governs the admissibility at trial of the suspect’s statements, not the requirement of 18 USC 3501 that such statements simply be voluntarily given.

Mnemonic: Congress can’t be a dick, and legislatively attempt to throw a constitutional coup against Miranda.

Question 15

Escobedo v. Illinois (1964)

Answer 15

SCOTUS:
If a suspect has been refused (his right to) counsel, his statements to police are excluded.

Escobedo asked for a lawyer several times while being interrogated for hours. SCOTUS said the police violated his 6th amendment rights.

Mnemonic: Is-co(unsel)-(in) bed, can he be woken up to help me?

Question 16

Fellers v. US (2004)

Answer 16

SCOTUS:

1) Miranda warnings must immediately be given when a person is formally arrested
2) The appeals court needed to determine if statements repeated after the Miranda warning was given was the “fruit” of pre-Miranda, and thus unconstitutional

Be a good feller/fella, and mirandize someone asap.

Question 17

G.J.I. v. State (1989)

Answer 17

In 1989, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals — in a case involving juvenile “G.J.I.” — held that Oklahoma’s competency statute was not applicable to juvenile proceedings, saying that it was “neither appropriate nor necessary” that a child understand a case against him or her since the system was allegedly focused on treatment, not punishment.

Mnemonic: GJI = Gloss (over) juvie incompetence

Question 18

J.D.B v. North Carolina (2011)

Answer 18

Should courts consider the age of a juvenile suspect in deciding whether he or she is in custody for Miranda purposes? Yes.

“It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave. Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a child’s age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis,” Sotomayor wrote for the majority.

Mnemonic: JDB = juvie date (of) birth