Vavova Flashcards
What is Vavova’s argument?
- General Skepticism is false
-Street agrees with this - If showing that we don’t have any independent reason to trust beliefs on a certain subject undercuts the justification ofr those beliefs, then general skepticism would be true.
-But Street doesn’t believe that general skepticism would be true (contradiction between P1 and P2) - Thus, we do not undercut the justification for moral beliefs by pointing out that we don’t have any reason to trsut our moral beliefs that is independent of our moral beliefs.
-by moral standards, naturual selection looks pretty good - Thus, if debunkers can undercut the justification of moral beliefs, they have to give evidence that moral beliefs are unreliable
- in order to give evidence that moral beliefs are unreliable, debunkers need to rely on some beliefs about morality
- Thus, we cannot undercut the justification of moral beliefs without relying on beliefs about morality
- Our beliefs about morality make it look like evolution gave us reliabile moral faculties.
-This is where Vavova and Street disagree - Thus, we cannot undercut the justification of our moral beliefs using evolution.
Why does Vavova think that moral debunking arguments must rely on what we think we know about morality?
Because if we argue that morality must have an independent reasont o believe it, then we would have to commit to skepticism for everything (and Street does not want to commit to overall skpeticism)
Why does Vavova reject NO GOOD?
No Good principle: you shouldn’t believe something unless you have good reason to
Vavova rejects this principle because then we wouldn’t be able to trust some of our most simple, perceptual beliefs
This principle makes skepticism true
Why doesn’t Vavova reject GOOD?
If you have good reason to think your belief is mistaken, then you have good reason not to believe your belief. It has a significant enough defeat.
Can be reframed in terms of justification, defeat, prima facie justification, etc. Reframe this in the terms that we have learned.
How does Vavova’s argument relate to foundationalism?
Foundationalsm relies on non-inferential justification. In other words, it depends on the idea that the thing you believe is just your experience
Vavova believes that we must understand our simple beliefs through a foundationalist lens (so that we don’t commit to skepticism)
Vavova says that if we have to question the formulation of our moral beliefs, then we must also question our simple beliefs, which wouldn’t be good because then we would be skeptical about everything. So, likewise to simple/pereptual beliefs, we must understand moral beliefs through foundationalism.
Do Vavova’s arguments show that we cannot reject moral realism in any way? Why or why not?
If I give you a hypothetical debunking argument, be able to explain what Vavova might say about it.
Could one try to make an evolutionary debunking argument against religious knowledge? If so, would something like Vavova’s response work against it? Why or why not?