McGrath Flashcards
What is the argument against moral realism that McGrath is responding to?
1a. REALISM REQUIRES CONVERGENCE: If moral realism is true, then there will be no moral disagreement in ideal conditions
2a. We are not currently justified in believing that there will be no moral disagreement in ideal conditions.
- Ideal conditions: individuals are perfectly rational and fully informed. Not perfect, but reasonably rational.
3a. A closure principle: if [we know that] “If P then Q” is true, and we are not justified in believing Q, then we are not justified in believing P.
4a. Thus, we are not justified in believing that moral realism is true.
Summary:
- Moral realists claim that realism requires convergence
-But, we have no true evidence for believing that there will be moral convergence, even in ideal conditions
-if we are not justified in believing that realism requires convergence is true, then we are not justified in believing realism
-so, we are not justified in believing moral realism is true
What is moral realism?
There are mind-independent facts about morality that are either true or false.
What is a closure principle?
If you are justified in believing P, you’re justified in believing P, then Q, and you’re justified in believing Q.
Consequently, if you know if P, then Q, and you are not justified in believing Q, then you are not justified in believing P.
McGrath’s argument
- If in some domain realism is true and regarding facts in that domain, there is:
- insufficient evidence or
-misleading evidence or
-it is difficult to put the evidence together or
-reasonable people can have totally different starting points for reasoning
Then, there will be disagreement in that domain, even under ideal conditions. - Some or all of the above are true in the moral domain even if realism is true (even in ideal conditions, all of the following above will happen/exist in the moral domain)
- Thus, realism requires convergence is false.
Summary:
- If realism, then disagreement even under ideal conditions (all of these things that occur even in ideal conditions act as undercutting defeaters)
- Even if realism is true, there will be disagreement that occurs (as all of the factors occur even under ideal conditions, and all of the factors lead to)
-So, Realism requires convergence is false (which undercuts the original argument for realism requires convergence)
When, why, and how, according to McGrath, would agreement about moral judgments provide additional justification for moral beliefs? What is an example of this?
Agreement about moral judgments provide additional justification so long as we are not in bad conditions.
Bad conditions include: Insufficent evidence, misleading evidence, difficult to understand evidence, or reasonable people have completly differrent starting points)
EX: If you morally believe that J-walking is seriously wrong, and that no one should do it, and everyone else around you believes that J-walking is wrong and no one should do it, and no one is in a bad condition (i.e., there is no insiffucient, misleading, or confusing evidence, and every reasonable perosn has the same starting point), then you more justified in believing the moral judgment that j-walking is wrong.
When, why, and how, according to McGrath, would disagreement about moral judgments act as a defeat?
Disagreement about a moral judgment would act as a defeat if: there are bad conditions, or if there are perfectly good conditions but there is still disagreement.
EX: Suppose you believe that J-walking is wrong. However, there’s a lot of insufficent evidence on the matter, it’s highly misleading, and really confusing whether or not j-walking is wrong. The person next to you does not believe that j-walking is wrong, and is also experiencing all of these bad conditions. You discuss with the person on the street corner whether or not j-walking is wrong, and they disagree with your thought that it is wrong. This disagreement would act as a defeater to your belief, especially because you already know that there are a lot of bad conditions at play.
What would other authors say about McGrath’s argument? What would McGrath say about other arguments?