Connecting Vavoa, Street, McGrath, and Decruz to everyone else we've read so far

Question 1

What would Alston say about DeCruz’s argument on convergence and divergence in religious beliefs?

Answer 1

• Connects with Chauvinism argument, in the chauvinism argument there’s some worrisome feature F.
• Some may believe that divergence is a worrisome feature, and you would think that if god is real there would be convergence
• But, DeCruz believes that divergence is not a worrisome feature for the belief of the existence of God because it proves independence. Independence is crucial for convergence to exist, because it demonstrates that it exists reliably rather than through systematic biases.
• So, the worrisome feature of “divergence” is not a worrisome feature because it’s a necessary feature of convergence.

Question 2

What would Huemer say about DeCruz’s argument on convergence and divergence in religious beliefs?

Answer 2

• Diveregence because there is a difference in our seemings
• convergence because there is a similarity in our seemings

Question 3

What would the externalists say about DeCruz’s argument?

Answer 3

The externalists believe in the importance of a reliable process (that is, if you have a belief formed by a prima facie reliable process then you have prima facie justificitaton for believing it)

DeCruz demonstrates that the way we go about our belief in God is a reliable process. Divergence helps to demonstrate this. Divergence demonstrates independence and explains why there would be no systematic biases. This, combined with convergence on the overall idea of God, create a reliable process for acquiring our belief that there is justification for God’s existence.

Question 4

What would McGrath say about DeCruz’s argument?

Answer 4

DeCruz believes:
-that common consent about God and disagreement about the details = some evidence for the existence of God.
-Conjunct jury theorem (the idea of independence)
-God
-Convergence and divergence

McGrath:
-moral disagreement is not a problem for moral realism.
-Even in ideal conditions, people will disagree and this is not evidence against moral realism.
-Morality
-agreement and disagreement
-realism does not require convergence

Both:
- disagreement is not a problem
- agreement could indicate systeamtic bias
-copmplete convergence/consent is not a necessary condition for the truth.

Question 5

What would Street say about DeCruz’s argument?

Answer 5

Street and DeCruz would likely disagree in some ways and agree in few ways.

Their differences:
-DeCruz discusses God, whereas Street discusses moral
-DeCruz shows that we have independence which ultimately demonstrates that we have some justification for God’s existence (we have some justification for a belief)
-Street demonstrates that we lack independent reason to trust evolution’s influence on our value intuitions, so this lack of independence leads to a lack of justification for moral/value realism (we don’t have justification for a belief)

Similarities:
-Street says we have to have an independent reason for believing how value intuitions may be correctly influenced by evolution—DeCruz agrees with the importance of independence (we must show independence with convergence via divergence)

Question 6

What would Vavova say about DeCruz’s argument?

Answer 6

Vavova and DeCruz agree in some ways and disagree in others.

They disagree:

-Vavova focuses her argument on moral beliefs whereas DeCruz focuses on beliefs regarding the existence of God
- They disagree about the importance of independence. DeCruz claims it’s necessary for us to have a level of independence for belief about God. Vavova says independence for forming beliefs about moral beliefs is necessary because then we would commit to skepticism

The agree:
-they are both not general skeptics
-they belief that god exists, and they believe that moral belief exists (we know Vavova believes some moral beliefs must exist because the debunkers rely on some beliefs about morality to demonstrate how moral beliefs may be unreliable)

Question 7

What would Alston say about McGrath’s argument?

Answer 7

Alston would discuss with McGrath how McGrath’s argument is similar to the Chauvinism argument:

• There may be some worrisome feature about McGrath’s argument that come about (that is, that Realsim DOES NOT Require Convergence seems suspicious for the realist), but, as McGrath explains, this isn’t a worrisome feature because it is what is expected when understanding moral realism — Disagreement will still persist even under ideal conditions because there are so many “bad conditions” that are bound to occur when talking about something as complex as morality.

Question 8

What would Huemer say about McGrath’s argument?

Answer 8

• both are related because mcgrath is saying moral disagreement is not a problem for moral realism and huemer says seemings may be a defeater.

Question 9

What would McGrath say about Huemer’s argument?

Answer 9

idk

Question 10

What would the externalists say about McGrath’s argument?

Answer 10

The externalists would likely be a little bit suspicious of McGrath’s arguement. They may even say that if all of these bad conditions occur, it doesn’t seem like we have a relaible process for determining moral realism, so we may not be able to say that moral realism is true. They may say that if realism requires convergence is true this provides more justification for the belief because they believe that if your belief comes from a reliable process then you have prima facie justification for belieivng it. Having this much disagreement to overcome doesn’t seem like a reliable process (at least according to the externalists)

Question 11

What would McGrath say about the externalists argument?

Answer 11

McGrath would likely say that the externalist argument isn’t taking into account heavily confusing arguments. For example, we may never really agree or know whether realism is true or what it means to be a good person. Therefor, it’s unclear if we could ever truly have a reliable process for these things. But this doesn’t make them anyless true, as it’s what’s expected from something as complex as these topics (just like the chauvanism argument says about “worrisome” features of religious experience).

Question 12

What would DeCruz say about McGrath’s argument?

Answer 12

DeCruz would agree with McGrath in saying that disagreement isn’t always a problem, especially for complex topics (like the existence of God or morality). They would probably just disagree about what the details of this disagreement entail. For DeCruz, this disagreement (or divergence) is necessary to demonstrate independence and show that we don’t have systematic biases. For McGrath, this disagreement seems necessary because it seeems like if realism is true, insufficent, misleading, or confusing evidence is bound to persist.

Question 13

What would Street say about McGrath’s argument?

Answer 13

Street rejects the idea of realism, specifically by rejecting the idea that evolution can act as evidence to trust realism. McGrath says that we can still have realism, and that we just don’t need convergence in realism for realism to be true. Street believes that evolution shaped our evalulative beliefs whether or not these beliefs were true. She says that if these happen to be true, it would just be a massive coincidence, and the chance that there might be a massive coincidence cannot be enough to say that our evaluative beliefs are true. So, for Street, evolution acts as an undercutting defeater for moral realsim. On the other hand, McGrath is simply rebutting the idea that realism requires convergence by saying that this is false. She says that this has to be false because if realism occurs there will be numerous factors (i.e., misleading, confusing, and insufficent evidence) that will cause disagreement to occur even in ideal conditions, and this disagreement cannot be enough to claim that moral realism isn’t true, but rather it is enough to claim that realsim requires convergence is false.

Question 14

What would Vavova say about McGrath’s argument?

Answer 14

Vavova would probably agree a bit more with McGrath than Street would. Vavova believes that in order to show reason not to believe our moral beliefs, we must give a sufficent enough reason (and currently, the debunkers do not have a sufficent reason unless they want to commit to general skepticism (which they don’t)). So, Vavova says that we do have prima facie justification for believing our moral beliefs. McGrath also agrees that we have prima facie justification for believing our moral beliefs, she just comes to this conclusion differently by saying that if realism is true, “bad conditions” will persist and that this disagreemtn will occur even under ideal conditions, but this isn’t enough to say that realism isn’t true but just to say that realism requires convergence is false.

Question 15

What would Alston say about Street’s argument?

Answer 15

Alston would likely disagree with Street’s argument under his chauvinism argument. He would probably agree with Vavova in saying that the fact that we don’t know whether or not our value intuitions are true is not a factor to not believe in them (just as there are some worrisome factors about religious experience) because moral intuitions are supposed to be understood independently.

Alston would also argue under the double standard argument that if we cannot understand moral intuitions independently then we also can’t be expected to have justified beliefs regarding perception (as these were also formed independently)

Question 16

What would Huemer say about Street’s argument? Specifically, is Street’s argument a problem for moral knowledge given phenomenal conservatism?

Answer 16

Street would deny Humer’s idea of phenomonal conservatism (that we can have prima facie justification if those beliefs seem true based on our seemings)

Question 17

What would the externalists say about Street’s argument? Specifically, is Street’s argument a probelm for moral knowledge given process reliabilism?

Answer 17

The externalist would say that Street’s argument for moral knowledge is not a reliable process, which is why she demonstrates that we cannot have value realism because our process for acquiring information about evolution is not a relaible process (we have value intutions because they are adapative whether or not they are true). So, any truth about how we came about evaluative intuitions are just a coincidence, and coincidence isn’t a reliable process. Street would deny that our seemings are created with a prima facie justified under PC because evoluton warps our seemings of moral knowledge.

Question 18

What would McGrath say about Street’s argument? How does Street’s argument relate to convergence, divergence, or to contigency?

Answer 18

McGrath would disagree with Street in some ways because Street claims that evolution is an undercutting defeater for moral realism whereas McGrath claims that moral realism may be true but it doesn’t require convergence. They would likely both agree that we currently do have some level of convergence abut some moral beleifs (i.e., you should care for your offspring) but they would also agree that these are highly difficult subjects (for McGrath, the difficulty is to be expected and therefore not a defeater, whereas for Street this difficulty demonstrates why we should be skeptical about our moral beliefs).

Street would likely say that we currently have convergence of moral beliefs because of the way that evolution has shaped our beliefs thus far. However, Street would not say that this convergence acts as justification. Street would instead claim that our current argument for moral realism via evolution is lacking independence, something that may be created via divergence but currnetly is not.

Question 19

What would Vavova say about Street’s argument?

Answer 19

Vavova would disagree with Streets argument, specifically disagreeing with the idea that we chose our value intuitions whether or not they were true. This connects to Vavova’s whole argument, in which Vavova argues that if we can’t trust our value intuitions because we believe them independently of other beliefs, then we couldn’t even trust something like perceptual beliefs (because these we believe independently of other things) which would result in generalized skepticism — which Steet does not want to commit to.

Question 20

What would Decruz say about Street’s argument?

Answer 20

DeCruz and Street would both agree on the importance of Independence. They just go about this in different ways – DeCruz says it’s important to have independence to demonstrate a lack of systematic biases. Street says that we need independence to prove that moral reliabilsim is reliable. They both agree that independence would show justification. DeCruz says that religious belief does have independence, which demonstrates that we have justifciation for religious belief. Street says that moral realism does not have independence (specifically when we are trying to figure it out via evolution), so evolution acts as an undercutting feature for moral reliabilsm.

Question 21

What would Alston say about Vavova’s argument?

Answer 21

Alston’s Double Standard argument and Vavova:
- Double standard argument says: Religious experience has some worrisome feature F, but sense experience also has this worrisome feature, and we still rely on sense experience, so it can’t be a worrisome feature for religious experience
- in Vavova’s argument, Vavova claims that Street believes that evolution cannot be reliable because it relies on an independent reason.
- But, Vavova cliams that we rely on plenty of things with independent reasons (like our sense experiences), so the fact that evolution relies on independent reason cannot be a problem.

Alston’s Chauvinism argument and Vavova:
- Vavova is making the Chauvinism argument all over again
- The Chauvinism argument says that you can only call religious experinece into question if it tells you that it is bad to be experiencing a worrisome feature of religious expxerience. In other words: you must take religious belief seriously, unless you find grounds that say you shouldn’t take religious belief seriously
- Vavova pretty much says the same thing but with moral belief: you must take moral belief seriously unless you find grounds that you shouldn’t (which, as she’s demonstrated in her argument, has not been done so far). Evolution is not grounds to not take moral belief seriously unless you want to be commited to general skepticism
- Vavova is fine with critizing moral beliefs, it just has to be on grounds that say it is ok to critize moral beliefs.

Question 22

What would Huemer say about Vavova’s argument?

Answer 22

Huemer and Vavova would likely agree with the importance of phenomal conservatism.
- Huemer’s idea of phenomenal conservatism goes as follows: if it seems to S that P, then S has at least prima facie justification for believing P.
- This idea is very similar to Vavova’s ideas regarding moral belief. If it seems to us that moral belief is true, then we have justification for believing it unless some defeater overcomes this justification. Huemer agrees that if it seems to us that it is true, we have prima facie justification for believing it’s truth unless it is overcome by a defeater
- As Vavova says in P7: “Currenlty, our beliefs about morality make it look like evoljtion gave us reliable moral faculties” – in other words, it seems to us that our current beliefs about morality gave us reliable moral faculties,

Question 23

What would McGrath say about Vavova’s argument? Do McGrath and Vavova disagree? If so, to what extent, and if not, why not? If they are just talking about unrelated things, how would they disagree?

Answer 23

McGrath and Vavova disagree in some ways and agree in others.

They agree that:
- both are in favor of moral realism
- both are defenders of moral realism
- both make rebutting arguments against moral realism (McGrath Rebutts by saying that disagreement is not a problem for moral realism because it’s inevitable because moral realism will never have completly ideal conditions— things can be really really complicated and still be true) (Vavova is rebutting by responding to people who say that evolution is a problem for moral realism by saying that it’s not a problem for moral realism)

They disagree that:
- in the level of complexity surrounding moral realism. It seems that Vavoa believes that we should trust moral realism independently (it doesn’t need to depend on anything else), whereas McGrath says we can trust moral realism even though there are so many factors that it could depend on (bad conditions) there is still truth amongst the complexity.

Question 23

What would the externalist say about Vavova’s argument?

Answer 23

The externalist would ask if Vavova has a reliable process for her justifciation of believing moral belief.

The externalist may argue vavova does have a reliable process by saying that:
- Vavova demonstrates a reliable process by showing that beause we independently rely on some of our beliefs (like perception), we should be able to independently rely on some beliefs about morality

However, the externalist may also argue that Vavova does not have a reliable process by saying:
- we have an independent reason for justified perceptual beliefs because it is simply what we see/hear. Are our moral beliefs this simple? Can evolution really demonstrate that these moral beliefs are created in a justified way? And Vavova would likely say that that yes, it does currently look like naturual selection gave us reliable moral faculties so they can be trustecd independntly (BUT CAN THEY BC WOULDNT THEY THEN BE TRUSTED VIA NATURAL SELECTION?)

Question 24

What would Street say about Vavoa’s argument?

Answer 24

Street would likely disagree with Vavova’s argument, afterall, Vavova’s entire argument is pretty much dedicated to explaining why Street’s conclusion that evolution defeats the justification for moral beliefs.

Street specifically disagrees with P7 of Vavova’s argument, because Street does not agree that evolution gave us relaible moral faculties.