Unit 6: Turnout: Dhillon and Paralta (2002) Flashcards
Aim of Dhillon and Paralta (2002)?
To explain voter turnout
What do Dhillon and Paralta (2002) assume?
That voters only care about the outcome (policy) of their vote tf their decision to vote depends on their ‘vote value’ (v. small in a large election, implies voters should abstain!)
(1) What 3 papers do Dhillon and Paralta discuss ITO ‘correcting’ the objective function?
1) Downs (1957): ‘expressive benefit’ of voting, manifested in D; comes from LT value of a working democracy (possible consequences of failed democracy are huge, so voter incurs ST cost to avoid large LT cost)
2) Fiorina (1976): ‘expressive features’ of voting; voters get utility from party loyalties: benefit from voting for party, and cost for voting against party
3) Scheussler (2000): voting allows individuals to ‘reaffirm to themselves and others, who they are and what they believe in’ (eg. character/personality)
Tf voter turnout explained by additional utility derived from an overall expressive benefit
(1) Dhillon and Paralta (2002) Decision rule?
Voters vote if expressive benefit > cost of voting (still doesn’t quite explain high voter turnout!)
(2) What did Dhillon and Paralta (2002) look at next to try explain the puzzle? What was the idea behind it? What do papers suggest? (2) What does this correction find?
Revised rationality expectations: are voters actually rational?
Idea: voters may miscalculate the probability of being pivotal/learn from previous elections
Sieg and Schulz (1995): replace full rationality of voter by model of adaptive learning
Other studies suggest voters may be unduly influenced by: outcome of last election/turnout in last election/polls
Still doesn’t predict very high turnout observed…
(3) What was the third model correction Dhillon and Paralta (2002) used to try explain high voter turnout?Explain. What other group-based theory was considered?
Altruistic voter:
Idea: elections divide people into groups tf motivated by ethical considerations. Voters viewed as utilitarians who think of social welfare rather than the individual benefits from voting, and hence are altruistic; the Altruistic voter receives utility from being an active supporter of her group, and HELPING others
IF all follow this mentality -> greatest probability of winning!
Sacher and Nalebuff (1999): suggests voters are passive; when election is looking close, party leaders contact them and they will vote -> tf would suggest higher turnout when elections are close
(3) Problem with the altruistic voter model correction?
It doesn’t agree with (well-documented!) free rider behaviour!
(4) What was the fourth correction Dhillon and Paralta (2002) used to try to explain the puzzle?
Instead of trying to make benefits seem greater than costs, used INFORMATION-BASED EXPLANATIONS:
Supposed that if voting was costless, people still wouldn’t necessarily vote, so why…?
Idea: some don’t know what/how to choose due to information problems, therefore uninformed voters abstain to allow the more informed ones decide (strategic delegation to those who know more!) (talk about Battaglini et al.’s (2010) experiment)
(4) What happens to voter power in this model?
As more abstain, the power of each vote rises!
(4) What is ‘Swing voters curse’? Why does it fit this model well?
Less informed voters prefer to abstain rather than vote!
Because it is rational and holds even if voting is costless!
Describe an example demonstrating swing voters curse? What does this show?
See notes page 2 side 1 (v important can explain!)
Shows overall it is better for uninformed voters to abstain rather than risk swinging the vote!
Conclusion on Dhillon and Paralta (2002) paper?
Many papers agree on some form of expressive benefit; overall reason for voter turnout is a whole range of factors including economic, psychological,and philosophical. Also highly likely the assumption of true rationality cannot be used to describe voters.
