Unit 6: Turnout Flashcards

1
Q

What key strong assumption to we weaken in this unit?

A

That all eligible to vote will choose to vote

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Why, especially in developing countries, may voters vote/not vote?

A

May vote if coerced/paid to do so

May not turn up to a vote (common in developed countries too)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

How do voting rules for citizens vary between countries? Percentage of each, and an example of each?

A

Some countries it is a right tf VOLUNTARY (87%)
Others it is a duty (eg. Australia) (13%) (greater turnout in these countries) (some countries have more severe penalties than others)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

What is avg. voter turnout in UK? How has it changed over last 60yrs?

A

Fallen in last 60yrs, now 65-70%

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Point arguing in favour of voting being compulsory, and a point against this?

A

For: Would increase turnout; evidence shows that minority groups tend to be under-represented in elections, and tf according to MVT -> change in policy if they chose to vote

Against: Studies of countries who have small fines for non-voters show that compulsory voting does NOT affect policy

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Why could it be the case that studies of countries who have small fines for non-voters show that compulsory voting does NOT affect policy? (2) What does this suggest about non-voters?

A

Either:
a) those who abstain have no preference tf vote randomly
or b) equal proportions of each political preference do not vote

This may imply that people don’t vote because they forget to register/are on holiday etc.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Explain, using a simple model, why voters vote? (C-B)

A

Voter i votes if benefit from outcome, B(i), is greater than cost of voting, C(i)
- Benefit of voting only affects voter IF they can affect the outcome, tf must multiply this by the probability of being pivotal, p(i)
- Costs of voting include: info., transport and opportunity costs
Decision rule: vote if p(i).B(i)>C(i)
Therefore, voters are more likely to abstain when p(i) is very small (ie. when the number of voters in the election is larger)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Explain the Paradox of voting with an example? How does this explain why people may sell their vote/abstain?

A

eg. 1mil voters; 2 outcomes, 1 or 0. Each active voter votes for either with probability 1/2. Tf ‘my’ vote only matters if the votes are exactly tied, because then I am the pivotal voter! If votes are 0-499,998 or 500,002-1mil, my vote won’t affect the result tf can sell it/not vote and receive the benefits/costs of the elected policy regardless!

The prob. of being the pivotal voter in this vote is VERY LOW, even putting in 50:50 odds on each individual vote, because there are so many people (p(i)=1/1200 here) This is the paradox of voting!

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

What did Downs (1957) conclude from the paradox of voting?

A

Because the probability of being the pivotal voter is so low, a rational voter will abstain

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

What does evidence show regarding vote numbers? What would we infer from this? (2) IF true, what does this therefore mean?

A

Evidence shows MUCH HIGHER TURNOUTS
If p(i)B(i)>C(i) all should vote, and vice versa.
Therefore, supposing that p(i)B(i) is less than C(i), this implies that:
a) voters are irrational (do not max utility)
b) ignorant (do not have/cannot process all information

If these are true, suggests that democracy is based on irrational/ignorant decision makers!

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Note:

A

These results indicate that it is more likely that voters are rational, and these very simple voting models have failed to accurately describe reality

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

Explain what Dellavigna et al.’s (2017) Turnout Experiment did, and what they found? (2) What did they conclude from this?

A
  • Field experiment in US, going door-to-door
    Key results:
    1) Non-voters feel shameful, voters do not experience this additional ‘cost’
    2) Non-voters lie and pretend they voted; voters tell the truth

-> consistent with hypothesis that non-voters want to be seen as voters!

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

What did Battaglini et al. (2010) find?

A

Swing Voter Lab Experiment:

Found informed voters chose correctly and uninformed ones chose to abstain!

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Given the paradox of voting, why aren’t more people willing to sell their vote?

A

Decision rule: if aP(Pivotal) is less than m (money), voter will generally sell vote (see notes)
Interpretation: if I care a lot about the policy, I will not sell my vote

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Why is it unsurprising people do sell their votes? What is the issue with vote buying in practice?

A

Since p(pivotal) is very small; issue in practice is that the actual ballot is secret tf can’t know if seller of vote has stuck to agreement!

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Why is unsurprising people are willing to pay for votes?

A

By accumulating lots of votes, the probability that these votes are collectively pivotal (ie. the chance that one of them is the median) increases

17
Q

What is a solution often used by vote buyers to ensure that people whose votes they buy do actually vote for them?

A

They identify non-voters who would probably vote for them, and pay them to show up!

18
Q

2 other methods used to bias elections?

A

1) Violence applied to decrease turnout

2) Specific violence discriminating supporters from opponents