UNEMPLOYMENT (1) Flashcards

1
Q

Unemployment in neoclassical model

A

Wages always adjust to ensure labour market clears = NO involuntary unemployment. all unemployment is voluntary.

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2
Q

Supply of labour in neoclassical

A

Can be fixed labour supply or upwards sloping.

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3
Q

Neoclassical model is good at explaining

A

LR trends in participation - change between employment and out of LF.

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4
Q

2 ways neoclassical model can explain gender specific change in LF participation

A
  1. Higher demand for women’s labour due to tech change/sectoral change (also explains reduction in gender wage gap)
  2. Higher female supply due to change in gender norms and tech change in home production.
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5
Q

Weakness of neoclassical model

A

Doesn’t explain changes in unemployment since no unemployment in the model.

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6
Q

How does introducing wage rigidity change the neoclassical model?

A

Wages don’t adjust following shock –> involuntary unemployment.

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7
Q

4 reasons for wage rigidity.

A
  1. LR contracts agreed in advance
  2. Min wage
  3. Unions and collective bargaining
  4. Efficiency wages/
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8
Q

2 limitations of wage rigidity model

A
  1. Why is urate > 0 even in booms - unrealistic to assume w > w* at all times.
  2. Is it realistic for LR contracts to be mutually inefficient (Barro critique) - in interest of workers and firms to cut wages in a recession.
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9
Q

Search frictions =

A

Workers and firms cannot find each other immediately.

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10
Q

What type of unemployment do search frictions generate?

A

Involuntary since workers are searching for a job but can’t find one.

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11
Q

One-sided search model focuses on…

A

The search effort behaviour of workers.

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12
Q

2 things we do NOT model in 1 sided model

A
  1. firm’s search behaviour

2. Workers’ decision to be out of LF - we only model involuntary U.

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13
Q

Fractions unemployed and employed

A

U = unemployed

1 - U = employed

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14
Q

Separation rate =

A

S = the fraction of employed workers who lose their job every period = exogenous,

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15
Q

p =

A

Probability of receiving a job offer.

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16
Q

An unemployed worker with a job offer will compare…

A
  1. The value of becoming employed Ve(W)

2. The value of staying unemployed Vu

17
Q

What does Ve(W) depend on? (2)

A
  • Increasing and concave function of offered wage

- Decreasing in separation rate

18
Q

what does Vu depends on? (3)

A

Independent of wage
Increasing in b
Increasing in probability of getting another job offer next period.

19
Q

What do we assume about workers search efforts?

A

That once they accept a job, they stop searching even for a better one.

20
Q

Workers will accept an offer if…

A
w > reservation wage
So Ve(W) > Vu
21
Q

H(W) =

Graph looks like

A

The fraction of workers receiving a job offer greater than W. decreasing in W. Graph is non-linear but decreasing.

22
Q

Flow of workers from employed to unemployed

A

S(1 - U)

23
Q

Flow of workers from unemployed to employed =

A

UpH(W*)

24
Q

How do we find LR unemployment?

A

In the LR urate is stationary:
S(1 - U) = UpH(W*)
Solve for U once have functional form for H.

25
Q

If we increase b, what happens to LR unemployment?

A

higher b = higher reservation wage = fall in H(W*) = this pivots down = urate rises

26
Q

Trade-off with b

A
  1. providing insurance

2. providing incentives