Type Identity Theory

Question 1

Type Identity Theory AO1

Answer 1

Physicalist theory - aesthetic of painting won’t change without physical changes, depend upon physical.
Claims that mental properties are physical properties.
Different from correlation, e.g heart correlated with kidneys, mental properties are identical with physical properties.
A thought is exactly the same as neurons firing.
A reductive theory of mind, a ontological reduction.
May not seem the same, but as investigate reality through science, many things don’t turn out the way they seem (water = H20).

Question 2

Smart - if correlated, why identical?

Answer 2

If neuroscience shows that mental states are correlated with what happens in the brain, why go on to say they are identical?
Smarts argues it is due to Ockham’s razor, if there is no overwhelming arguments in favour of Dualism, then we should reject the idea of mental properties.
It is not a claim about language or concepts, but about reality. Is not the claim that the concept pain means certain neurons firing. Is not offering definitions, not analytically true. The concepts of pain and neurons remains distinct, but they both refer to same thing in the world. Two concepts, one property.

Question 3

Argument 1 against Type Identity Theory

Answer 3

Putman - Problem of multiple Realisability:
Mental properties are not identical to physicals ones because the same mental property can be related to or supervene on a different physical property.
E.g. brain states that relate to pain may be different between, humans, dogs and aliens. Very implausible prediction for aliens to have the same physical states when they evolved separately from us.
They have the same mental state of pain but have different physical properties.
Different ways of realising pain.

Question 4

Counter to argument from multiple realisability

Answer 4

Could respond by saying that to talk about ‘human pain’ is a different property from ‘dog pain’, or ‘human thoughts’ and ‘alien thoughts’.

Question 5

Argument from multiple realisability (argu1) - Eval.

Answer 5

Doesn’t seem plausible.
Pain is pain because of how it feels, a thought is a thought because of what is thought - regardless of the agent experiencing it.
A human, dog and alien all share something in common, which we identify as the mental property pain, even thought we have different physical properties.
So, mental properties cannot be identical to physical ones.

Question 6

Arguments against type identity theory

Answer 6

Multiple Realisability
Indivisibility Argument
Conceivability Argument
Knowledge Argument
Philosophical Zombies