Property Dualism

Question 1

Property Dualism AO1

Answer 1

There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties.
One substance: physical, Two properties: mental + physical.
Physical substances posses mental properties, but mental do not depend.
Defends dualism for phenomenal properties of consciousness (pain).
These properties cannot be reduced to physical, behavioural or functional proporties, irreducible.
Rejects physicalism, phyics misses something fundamental.
Can accept correlation between physical + mental, but are distinct.

Question 2

Argument for Property Dualism: Knowledge Argumen

Answer 2

Mary is a scientist who has lived all her life in a black and white room. However, she is specialised in the science of vision and knows every physical fact about - the properties of light, biology of the eye, etc. She is let out of the room and comes to see red for the first time, does she learn something new?

It seem just obvious that she will. Learn what it is to see the colour red. So, it is possible to know all the physical facts and yet not know qualia.

Question 3

Knowledge Argument - Counter

Answer 3

Mary does gain new knowledge, but it is ability knowledge. She gains the ability to know how to imagine or recognise red, not a proposition.

Question 4

Knowledhe Argument - Eval.

Answer 4

Considering truth of proposition.

Seeing red and knowing how to imagine red are two different things.
Not necessary to know what it is like to see red - no ability to imagine, can still look at something red.

Not sufficient - imagination alone, doesn’t know what it is to see colour.
So, imaging red is neither sufficient nro necessary for knowing what it is to see red.
So, mary gains more than simply knowing how to imagine red.

Question 5

Argument for Property Dualism: Chalmers Zombie Argument

Answer 5

Idea of existence of philosophical zombie has no obvious contradiction, therefore their existence in a possible world is metaphysically possible.
In this possible world, it is physically identical as the actual world but it would contain no phenomenal properties of consciouness.
If consciousness was identical with physical properties (and physicalism true), it would not be possible for a creature to have same physical properties but no consciousness (Leibniz’s Law).
Since, is metasaphysicaly possible, consciouness cannot be identcal to physical properties.

Question 6

Leibniz’s Law

Answer 6

Leibniz’s principle of the indiscernibility of identicals.
If A is identical to B (A=B), than you can’t have A without B - they are the same thing.

Question 7

Types of claims

Answer 7

Both start from epistemic claim, then infers a ontological claim.

Question 8

Zombie Argument - Counter 1

Answer 8

A zombie world is not conceivable.
Not thinking clearly (triangle 3 sides compare), confused.
If physicalism is true, physical duplicate = functional duplicate.
Phenomenal properties can be analysed in terms of physical ans functional properties, no qualia.
Currently underdeveloped but will eventually prove a zombie will have the same consciousness as you have.

Question 9

Zombie Argument - Counter 1 - Eval.

Answer 9

Depends upon a complete analysis of consciousness - no concurrent proof.
Impossible to analyse how something feels or what it is like to experience.
No evidence not more clear than existence of qualia.