TRANSPO Flashcards
Article 1755.
A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756.
In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
Art. 1759.
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Art. 1763.
A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Art. 1757.
The responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers as required in Articles 1733 and 1755 cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise.
Art. 1758.
When a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the common carrier’s liability for negligence is valid, but not for wilful acts or gross negligence.
The reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of the common carrier’s liability.
Art. 1760.
The common carrier’s responsibility prescribed in the preceding article cannot be eliminated or limited by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on the tickets or otherwise.
Art. 1754.
The provisions of Articles 1733 to 1753 shall apply to the passenger’s baggage which is not in his personal custody or in that of his employee. As to other baggage, the rules in Articles 1998 and 2000 to 2003 concerning the responsibility of hotel-keepers shall be applicable.
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in Articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1753. The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration.
X, an 80-year old epileptic, boarded the S/S Tamaraw in Manila going to Mindoro. To
disembark, the passengers have to walk thru a gang plank. While negotiating the gang plank, X
slipped and fell into the waters. X was saved from drowning, brought to a hospital but after a
month died from pneumonia. Except for X, all the passengers were able to walk thru the gang
plank. What is the liability of the owner of the S/S Tamaraw?
ANSWER: The owner of S/S Tamaraw is liable for the death of X in failing to exercise extraordinary
diligence in the safety of passengers.
Article 1755 of the New Civil Code provides that “[a] common carrier is bound to carry
the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.” In this case, the
carrier did not take the necessary precautions in ensuring the safety of passengers boarding
and disembarking from the vessel.
Article 1756 of the same code also provides that unless the contrary is shown, a
common carrier is presumed to have been negligent in cases of death or injury to its
passengers. Since X has not completely disembarked yet, the obligation of the shipowner to
exercise utmost diligence still then subsisted and he can still be held liable.
Thus, the owner of S/S Tamaraw is liable for the death of X.
Peter So hailed a taxicab owned and operated by Jimmy Cheng and driven by Hermie
Cortez. Peter asked Cortez to take him to his office in Malate. On the way to Malate, the taxicab
collided with a passenger jeepney, as a result of which Peter was injured, i.e., he fractured his
left leg. Peter sued Jimmy for damages, based upon a contract of carriage, and Peter won.
Jimmy wanted to challenge the decision before the Supreme Court on the ground that the trial
court erred in not making an express finding as to whether or not Jimmy was responsible for the
collision and, hence, civilly liable to Peter. He went to see you for advice. What will you tell him?
Explain your answer.
ANSWER: I will tell Jimmy not to challenge the decision of the court finding him liable for damages.
Article 1755 of the New Civil Code provides that a common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with due regard for all circumstances. Furthermore, Article 1756 of the
same Code provides that in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observe extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
In this case, the court need not have to make an express finding that Jimmy was
responsible for the collision because Article 1756 of the NCC makes an express presumption
that in case a passenger was injured, the common carrier is presumed to be at fault or was
negligent. It is upon Jimmy to Cheng to prove that the collision is a fortuitous event and that it
exercised extraordinary diligence.
Therefore, Jimmy Cheng‟s contention of the trial court‟s failure to make an express
finding of his responsibility in the collision as a ground for an appeal will not stand.
Vivian Martin was booked by PAL, which acted as ticketing agent of Far East Airlines, for
a round trip flight on the latter‟s aircraft, from Manila-Hongkong- Manila. The ticket was cut by
an employee of PAL. The ticket showed that Vivian was scheduled to leave Manila at 5:30p.m.
on 05 January 2002 aboard Far East‟s Flight F007. Vivian arrived at the NAIA an hour before
the time scheduled in her ticket, but was told that Far East‟s Flight 007 had left at 12:10p.m. It
turned out that the ticket was inadvertently cut and wrongly worded. PAL employees manning
the airport‟s ground services nevertheless scheduled her to fly two hours later aboard their
plane. She agreed and arrived in Hongkong safely. The aircraft used by Far East Airlines
developed engine trouble, and did not make it to Hongkong but returned to Manila. Vivian sued
both airlines, PAL and Far East, for damages because of her having unable to take the Far East
flight. Could either or both airlines be held liable to Vivian? Why?
ANSWER: Only Far East Airlines can be held liable to Vivian, on the ground of breach of contract of
carriage. She cannot sue PAL because PAL is not a party to the contract.
According to the case of Ramos v. China Southern Airlines Co. (G.R. No. 213418,
September 21, 2016), when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular
flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to
expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If that does not happen, then the carrier
opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Moreover, in an action based on a
breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not need to prove that the common
carrier was at fault or negligent. All she has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance due to the carrier‟s fault.
In the case at bar, Vivian was not able to reach her destination because her ticket was
inadvertently cut and wrongly worded by a PAL employee, and that the aircraft used by Far East
Airlines developed an engine trouble. Because Vivian was not able to fly and reached her
destination, a breach of contract of carriage arises and she can file an action based on a breach
of contract of carriage without the need to prove that Far East Airlines was at fault or negligent.
Therefore, Vivian can sue Far East Airlines for damages due to breach of contract of carriage.
One of the passenger buses owned by Continental Transit Corporation (CTC), plying its
usual route, figured in a collision with another bus owned by Universal Transport, Inc. (UTI).
Among those injured inside the CTC bus were: Romeo, a stow away; Samuel, a pickpocket then
in the act of robbing his seatmate when the collision occurred; Teresita, the bus driver‟s
mistress who usually accompanied the driver on his trips for free; and Uriel, holder of a free
riding pass he won in a raffle held by CTC.
A. Will a suit for breach of contract of carriage filed by Romeo, Samuel, Teresita, and Uriel
against CTC prosper? Explain.
B. Do Romeo, Samuel, Teresita, and Uriel have a cause of action for damages against
UTI? Explain.
ANSWER:
A. As to Romeo, Samuel, and Teresita, no, the suit for breach of contract of carriage will
not prosper. However, as to Uriel, yes, such suit will prosper.
According to Art. 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence for the safety of passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case. A passenger is one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of
contract, express or implied, with the carrier as to the payment of fare or that which is accepted
as an equivalent thereof. Furthermore, in the same case, the following were held to be not
considered as passengers and are entitled to ordinary diligence only:
1. One who has not yet boarded any part of a vehicle regardless of whether or not
he has purchased a ticket;
2. One who remains on a carrier for an unreasonable length of time after he has
been afforded every safe opportunity to alight;
3. One who has boarded by fraud, stealth, or deceit;
4. One who attempts to board a moving vehicle, although he has a ticket, unless
the attempt be with the knowledge and consent of the carrier;
5. One who has boarded a wrong vehicle, has been properly informed of such fact,
and on alighting, is injured by the carrier; or
6. One who rides any part of the vehicle which is unsuitable or dangerous or which
he knows is not designed or intended for passengers. (Vda de. Nueca v. Manila
Railroad Co., C.A. No. 31731-R, January 30, 1968)
Romeo cannot sue for breach of contract of carriage as he was stowaway who secured
passage by fraud and was not a passenger. Likewise, Samuel and Teresita cannot sue for
breach of contract of carriage. The element of payment of fare or an equivalent that is accepted
by the public conveyance was absent. Samuel did not board the bus to be transported but to
commit robbery. On the other hand, Teresita did not board the bus to be transported but to
accompany the driver while he was performing his work. Finally, Uriel can sue for breach of
contract for he was a passenger although he was being transported gratuitously, because he
won a free riding pass in a raffle held by CTC, which is an equivalent of fare for carriage.
Hence, only the suit for breach of contract of Uriel will prosper.
B. Yes, Romeo, Samuel, Teresita and Uriel may sue UTI on the basis of quasi-delict.
Under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, when there is fault or negligence, one by his act or
omission causes damage to another, without pre-existing contractual relation between the party
at fault and the one suing, shall be obliged to pay for the damage done.
In the present case, Romeo, Samuel, Teresita, and Uriel may allege that the collision
was due to the negligence of driver of UTI.
Hence, their cause of action is based on quasi-delict.
Topic: Extraordinary Diligence; Duration of Liability; Passengers (2011)
P rode a Sentinel Liner bus going to Baguio from Manila. At a stop-over in Tarlac, the
bus driver, the conductor, and the passengers disembarked for lunch. P decided, however, to
remain in the bus, the door of which was not locked. At this point, V, a vendor, sneaked into the
bus and offered P some refreshments. When P rudely declined, V attacked him, resulting in P
suffering from bruises and contusions. Does he have cause to sue Sentinel Liner?
A. Yes, since the carrier’s crew did nothing to protect a passenger who remained in the
bus during the stop-over.
B. No, since the carrier’s crew could not have foreseen the attack.
C. Yes, since the bus is liable for anything that goes wrong in the course of a trip.
D. No, since the attack on P took place when the bus was at a stop-over.
ANSWER:
A. Yes, since the carrier’s crew did nothing to protect a passenger who remained in the
bus during the stop-over.
Article 1755 of the New Civil Code (NCC) provides that a common carrier is bound to
carry the passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Also, Article
1735 of NCC provides that in case of loss of effects of death or injuries to passengers, the
common carrier is presumed to be at fault or have acted negligently unless it can prove that it
had observed extraordinary diligence in the vigilance thereof. The court need not make an
express finding of fault or negligence of common carriers, the law imposes to common carriers
strict liability, as long as it is shown that there exists a contract between the passenger and the
common carrier and that the loss, deterioration, injury, or death took place during the existence
of contract.
In addition, the carrier is bound to exercise utmost diligence with respect to passengers
the moment the person who purchases the ticket presents himself at the proper place and in a
proper manner to be transported. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until
the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier‟s conveyance
or has had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier‟s premises.
In this case, the common carrier is bound to exercise an extraordinary diligence towards
P since he is considered a passenger at the time he suffered bruises and contusions from V.
The crew of the carrier must have secured the necessary precautions and safety of its
passengers especially when the contract of carriage is not yet deemed terminated/completed
since they were only on a stop-over.
Therefore, the carrier is liable for breach of contract of carriage for the failure of the
carrier‟s crew to exercise extraordinary diligence over its passenger during the existence of
contract.
Topic: General Principles; Extraordinary Diligence of Common Carriers; Contributory
Negligence (2012)
X, while driving his Toyota Altis, tried to cross the railway tract of PNR along Blumetritt
Avenida Ext., Manila. The train as it approached Blumentritt Avenida Ext., applied its horn as a
warning to all the vehicles that might be crossing the railway tract, but there was really nobody
manning the crossing. X was listening to his iPod touch, hence, he did not hear the sound of the
horn of the train and so his car was hit by the train. As a result of the accident, X suffered some
injuries and his car was totally destroyed as a result of the impact. Is PNR liable?
a) PNR is not liable because X should have known that he was crossing a place
designated as crossing for train, and therefore should have been more careful.
b) PNR is liable because Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising
a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to person and property at railroad
crossings which means a flagman or a watchman should have been posted to
warn the public at all times.
c) PNR is not liable because it blew its horn when it was about to cross the railway
along Blumentritt Avenida Ext.
d) PNR is not liable because X was negligent, for listening to his iPod touch while
driving.
ANSWER: b) PNR is liable because Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a
reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to person and property at railroad crossings which
means a flagman or a watchman should have been posted to warn the public at all times.
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
Based on the statement of facts PNR is liable. As held in the case of PNR v. IAC (G.R.
No. 70547 January 22, 1993). A railroad is not required to have a gate (crossing bar) or a flagman, or to maintain
signals at every intersection; only at such places reasonably necessary; what is considered
reasonably necessary will depend on the amount of travel upon the road, the frequency with
which trains pass over it and the view which could be obtained of trains as they approach the
crossing, and other conditions.
Here, since Avenida is a busy road PNR should have placed a gate (crossing bar) or a
flagman, or to maintain signals at every intersection.
However, the amount of damages will be equitably reduced due to the negligence of X.
Article 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of
obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances.
X should have exercised the necessary diligence required in traversing the PNR track,
he is negligent because he was playing music at a loud volume to the extent that X failed to
hear the horn of the approaching train.
Hence, the amount of damages to be paid by PNR will be equitably reduced due to the
contributory negligence of X.
In conclusion Option B is the correct answer.
Topic: General Principles; Extraordinary Diligence of Common Carriers; Liability for Acts
of Employees (2012)
The AAA Bus Company picks up passengers along EDSA. X, the conductor, while on
board the bus, drew his gun and randomly shot the passengers inside. As a result, Y, a
passenger, was shot and died instantly. Is AAA Bus Company liable?
a) The bus company is not liable for as long as the bus company can show that
when they hired X, they did the right selection process.
b) The bus company cannot be held liable because what X did is not part of his
responsibility.
c) The bus company is liable because common carriers are liable for the negligence
or willful act of its employees even though they acted beyond the scope of their
responsibility.
d) The bus company is not liable because there is no way that the bus company
can anticipate the act of X.
ANSWER:
c) The bus company is liable because common carriers are liable for the negligence or
willful act of its employees even though they acted beyond the scope of their responsibility.
According to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code, common carriers are liable for the death of or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the former’s employees, although
such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders
of the common carriers. This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
their employees.
Here, although employee X acted beyond his authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carrier, the bus company is still liable by express mandate of the law.
In conclusion Option C is the correct answer.
