CRIM2 Flashcards

Question

Q: May a public officer charged under Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law'' also be simultaneously or successively charged with direct bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code? Explain. (2019, 2010, 2009 BAR)

Answer 1

A: Yes, a public officer charges under Sec. 3 (b) of R.A No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) may also be charged simultaneously or successively for the crime of direct bribery under Art. 210 of the Revised Penal Code, because two crimes are essentially different and are penalized under distinct legal philosophies. Whereas violation of Sec. (b) of R.A. No. 3019 is a malum prohibitum, the crime under Art. 210 of the Code is a mala in se. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022) NOTE: Although the charge for violation of R.A. No. 3019 and the charge for Indirect Bribery arose from the same act, the elements of the violation charged under R.A. No. 3019 are not the same as the felony charged for Indirect Bribery under the RPC. There is no double jeopardy if the two cases shall be filed against the accused even if they arose from the same incident.

Answer 2

A: The Sandiganbayan is not correct in convicting Luis and the members of the BAC. Criminal liability does not depend solely upon the allegedly scandalous irregularity of the bidding procedure. For even if it were true and proved beyond reasonable doubt that the bidding had been rigged, this pronouncement alone does not automatically result in finding the act of petitioner similarly culpable. It is presumed that he acted in good faith in relying upon the documents he signed and thereafter endorsed. The prosecution must show not only the defects in the bidding procedure, a circumstance which we need not presently determine, but also the alleged evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality on the purchase order and despite knowledge that the winning bidder did not offer the lowest price. In the instant case, Luis and the members of the BAC act of pursuing the subject procurements was motivated not by any corrupt intent to favor one car dealer over another or to unduly receive any pecuniary benefit. Such actuations were simply based on their honest belief that direct procurement was legally permissible. (Martel vs. People, G.R. Nos. 224720-23 & 224765-68, 2 Feb. 2021)

Answer 3

A: The Labor Arbiter should be held liable for Direct Bribery. Under Art. 210 of the RPC, public officer commits direct bribery by accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties. By accepting Mr. X’s offer of a luxury car, the Labor Arbiter agreed to render a ruling in Mr. X’s favor. The Labor Arbiter may also be held liable for violation of RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Under Sec. 3(e), it is considered a corrupt practice of any public officer to cause any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or give any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality when evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. There is manifest partiality when there is a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another (Fuentes v. People, G.R. No. 186421, 17 Apr. 2017). Here, the Labor Arbiter committed manifest partiality in favor of Mr. X. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 4

A: Governor Datu, Mayor Dolor and Bokal Diva are liable for violation of Sec. 3(b) of RA No. 3019 for receiving money in connection with government contract or transaction for the development of an economic and tourism hub where they have the right to intervene under the law. Likewise, Mr. Gangnam, is also liable for violation of Sec. 3(b) of RA No. 3019 on the basis of conspiracy. (Go v. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, 13 Apr. 2007) Mayor Dolor and Bokal Diva are liable for violation of **Sec. 3(b) of RA No. 3019** for receiving money in connection with government contract or transaction for the construction of the Blank Sports Arena or violation of Sec. 3(e) for giving Mr. Gangnam, a private party, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality and evident bad faith by entering an agreement for such construction, which is highly overpriced, or violation of Sec. 3(g) for entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction for such construction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same. Mr. Gangnam, for giving money to the said public officers or for entering such contract, is also liable for violation of Sec. 3(b) of RA No. 3019 on the basis of conspiracy. (Go v. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, supra) (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 5

A: NO. As a general rule, a private individual can be held liable for violation of R.A. No. 3019 if he conspired with a public officer in committing this crime (Go v. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, 13 Apr. 2007). However, there is no showing in this case that a public officer violated R.A. No. 3019 and Mr. Gulang conspired with that public officer in committing this crime. Hence, the charge against Mr. Gulang as a private individual without a co-accused, who is a public officer, is improper. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 6

(a) The answer would depend or be qualified by the implication of the phrase “to have his case calendared as early as possible.” If the phrase is interpreted as an unjust act and in violation of the rule to give priority to the older cases, **then she would be liable under direct bribery for an act which does not constitute a crime but is unjust.** He may also be held liable under Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 for “giving any private party any unwarranted benefits.” If the phrase is interpreted as a non-violation of the rules and regulations, then she can only be held liable for direct bribery. (b) A: Melda is not criminally liable because the act of volunteering to persuade is not a criminal act. It is the act of persuading that is considered a criminal act. The act does not fall under Art. 210 of the RPC on Direct Bribery nor does it fall under Art. 211 of the RPC on Indirect Bribery. Neither does it fall under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 3019 refers to acts of persuading another public official to violate rules and regulations. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 7

(a) Higino is liable for parricide under Art. 246 of the RPC for the death of his wife, Aika. Higino is also liable for infanticide under Art. 255 of the RPC. When a child was killed below 3-days-old, the crime is infanticide regardless of the person who killed such child. Moreso, a child who had been born less than 7 months and lived for at least 24 hours already acquired personality. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022) (b) YES. If the child died inside the womb of Aika, who was **only six months, the crime committed is complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion.** Killing the unborn child as a result of the violence employed against the mother without intent to abort is unintentional abortion. Since the child died inside the womb of the mother, unintentional abortion is committed regardless of viability of the victim. Because the same violence that killed the mother also caused unintentional abortion, the crime committed is a complex crime (People v. Pacayna, Jr. G.R. No. 179035, 16 Apr. 2008; People v. Robinos, G.R. No. 138453, 29 May 2002; People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 95851, 01 Mar. 1995; People v. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884, 30 Mar. 1988) (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 8

(a) The crime committed by Procopio is parricide qualified by the circumstance of relationship. Killing a spouse after having been surprised in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another woman is death under exceptional circumstance under Art. 247 of the RPC. However, in this case this is not death under exceptional circumstance because Bionci was having homosexual intercourse with another woman and not sexual intercourse with a man. “Homosexual intercourse “is not within the contemplation of the term “sexual intercourse” in Art. 247. However, the crime of parricide is attended by the circumstance of passion arising from a lawful sentiment as a result of having caught his wife in the act of infidelity with another woman. (People v. Belarmino, G.R. No. L-4429, 18 Apr. 1952) (b) NO, the answer will not be the same. Procopio will be liable for homicide in the instant case but he is entitled to a mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)

Answer 9

(a) Ricky committed parricide because the person killed was his own father and the law punishing the crime (Art. 246, RPC) does not require that the crime be knowingly committed. (b)The crime committed should be parricide if Ricky knew before the killing that Pedro is his father, because the moral basis for punishing the crime already exists. His having acted out of bitterness for having been abandoned by his father may be considered mitigating. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 10

A: Aldrich committed the crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. When Aldrich struck his wife, Carmi, with his fist, he committed the crime of maltreatment under Art. 266(3) of the RPC. Since Carmi died because of the felonious act of Aldrich, he is criminally liable of parricide under Art. 246, RPC in relation to Art. 4(1) 1 of the same Code. Since the unborn baby of Carmi died in the process, but Aldrich had no intention to cause the abortion of his wife, Aldrich committed unintentional abortion as defined in Art. 257, RPC. Inasmuch as the single act of Aldrich produced two grave or less grave felonies, he falls under Art. 48, RPC, i.e. a complex crime. (People v. Salufrancia, G.R. No. L-50884, 30 Mar. 1988) (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 11

A: YES. The actions for frustrated parricide and frustrated homicide will prosper, and Rafa will be found guilty of these crimes. The penalty, however, that the trial court can impose is only destierro not penalties for frustrated parricide and frustrated homicide, being the spouse of Rachel. (Art. 246, RPC) **ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:** NO. The actions for frustrated parricide and frustrated homicide will not prosper because Rafa is entitled to the benefit of Art. 247 of the RPC. Art. 247 of the RPC states that any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment. The action will prosper to allow the court to receive evidence. However, Rafa can be held liable only for destierro based on Art. 247 of the RPC. The act committed by Rafa amounts to at least serious physical injuries, so the penalty of destierro will be imposed. If the court finds that the act amounts to less than serious physical injuries, Rafa will not have any criminal liability. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 12

(a) NO, Art. 247 of the RPC is not applicable. Under the RPC, for Art. 247 to apply, the offender must catch his or her spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person. In People v. Marciano Gonzales (G.R. No. 46310, 31 Oct. 1939), the Court held that to avail of the privilege under Art. 247, the accused should surprise his wife in the "very act of sexual intercourse”. Sexual intercourse generally presupposes the penetration of the man’s sexual organ into that of a woman's. In this case, the paramour was of the same gender as the erring spouse. As such, there is legally, no sexual intercourse to speak of, hence, Art. 247 is not applicable. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: YES, Art. 247 of the RPC is applicable. The requisites of Art. 247 are: (1) a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury “while in the act” or immediately thereafter; and (3) he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. All the foregoing requisites are present in the case at hand. It is a given in the problem that Jojo caught Felipa and Alma in the “act of sexual intercourse.” The law did not qualify that the other person with whom the spouse be caught committing sexual intercourse be “male or female.” Hence, the gender of the paramour, Alma, being of the Same gender as the erring spouse, Felipa, is immaterial. NOTE: The answer given presupposes that Jojo and Felipa are legally married. (b) NO. Under Art. 333 of the RPC, adultery is committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a “man” not her husband. Thus, Felipa in having homosexual intercourse with Alma, a “woman,” is not committing adultery. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 13

A: NO, the court did not act correctly. Since the killing of Ken was committed under the exceptional circumstances in Art. 247, RPC, it is the consensus that no crime was committed in the light of the pronouncement in People v. Coricor (G.R. No. 48768, 04 Dec. 1947) that banishment (destierro) is intended more for the protection of the offender rather than as a penalty. Since the civil liability under the RPC is the consequence of the criminal liability, there would be no legal basis for the award of indemnity when there is no criminal liability. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 14

A: Murder is the unlawful killing of a person which otherwise would constitute only homicide, had it not been attended by any of the following circumstances: 1. With treachery or taking advantage of superior strength, or with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity; 2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise; 3. By means or on the occasion of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin; 4. On occasion of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity; 5. With evident premeditation; or 6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanely augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. The elements of murder are: (1) that a person was unlawfully killed; (2) that such a killing was attended by any of the above-mentioned circumstances; (3) that the killing is not parricide nor infanticide; and (4) that the accused killed the victim. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 15

A: Lina is liable for murder. Gagging the mouth of the child with stockings, placing him in a box, sealing it with masking tape, and placing the box in the attic were only the methods employed by the defendant in committing the murder qualified by treachery (People v. Lora, G.R. No. L- 49430, 30 Mar. 1982). Taking advantage of the defenseless condition of the victim by reason of his tender age, oneweek old, is treachery. (People v. Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, 04 Mar. 2004) She is not liable for kidnapping with murder. The essence of kidnapping or serious illegal detention is the actual confinement or restraint of the victim or the deprivation of his liberty. In this case, the victim was not deprived of his liberty since he immediately died. The demand for ransom did not convert the offense into kidnapping with murder. The defendant was well-aware that the child would be suffocated to death in a few moments after she left. The demand for ransom is only a part of the diabolic scheme of the defendant to murder the child, to conceal his body and then demand money before the discovery of the cadaver. (People v. Lora, G.R. No. L-49430, 30 Mar. 1982) Fely is not liable for murder as principal or accomplice since there is neither conspiracy or community of design to commit murder since her criminal intention pertains to kidnapping for ransom. In addition, her participation of demanding ransom for the release of the child is not connected to murder. Her criminal mind to assist Lina in committing kidnapping for ransom is not constitutive of a felony. Mens rea without actus reus is not a crime. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 16

A: NO, the conviction of murder should not be sustained because there was no intent kill. The intent of the accused, on the contrary is to treat Randy of his illness. However, considering that proximate cause of Randy’s death is the ritual, accused may be held criminally liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 17

A: Candido should be charged with murder qualified by treachery because the suddenness of the stabbing caught the victim by surprise and was totally defenseless. Being under the influence of dangerous drugs is a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime (Sec. 25, RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). Hence, the penalty for murder shall be imposed in the maximum. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Candido should be charged with homicide only because the incident which gave rise to the stabbing occurred accidentally. There is no conscious and deliberate adoption of the means, method, and manner of attack. However, the penalty for homicide shall be imposed in the maximum because Candido was under the influence of dangerous drugs when he committed the crime, which is a qualifying circumstance under Sec. 25 of R.A. No. 9165.

Answer 18

A: YES. B is criminally liable for Murder (qualified by treachery) because the death of A appears to be the proximate cause of the overt acts of B. A died of cardio-respiratory arrest which evidently was brought about by the convulsion and bleeding in the mouth of the victim due to the removal by B of the endotracheal tube twice. The two acts of B can be considered as the result of one criminal design. In People v. Umaging (G.R. No. L-52797, 31 Aug. 1981), the Supreme Court ruled that removal of the endotracheal tube is attempted murder, qualified by treachery, because the patient did not die. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 19

A: Homicide as an intentional felony has three stages, attempted, frustrated and consummated. In whatever stages homicide is committed, intent to kill must be established for being an indispensable element thereof. However, if the victim died as a consequence of wounds caused by an act committed with malice, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. Hence, the crime committed is consummated homicide. If the victim died as a consequence of an act committed with recklessness, the crime committed is Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. But if the victim did not die as a consequence of wounds caused by an act committed with malice, intent to kill must be established beyond reasonable doubt. If intent to kill is proven, the crime committed is frustrated or attempted homicide. If intent to kill is not proven, the crime committed is physical injuries. If the offender with intent to kill attempted to inflict or inflicted non-mortal wound upon the victim, he already directly commenced an overt act to commit homicide. Hence, the crime committed is attempted homicide if he failed to inflict mortal wounds upon the victim by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. If the offender with intent to kill inflicted mortal wounds upon the victim, he already performed all acts of execution which would produce the homicide as a consequence. Hence, the crime is either frustrated homicide if death is not produced despite the mortal character of the wound due to cause independent of the will of the offender or consummated homicide if death is produce. All the elements necessary for execution and accomplishment of homicide are present if the victim die due to wounds inflicted with the offender with intent to kill. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Elements of the crime – homicide as an intentional felony has three stages, attempted, frustrated and consummated. In whatever stages homicide is committed, intent to kill must be established for being an indispensable element thereof. However, if the victim died as a consequence of wound cause by an act committed with malice, intent to kill in conclusively presumed and the crime committed is consummated homicide. But if the victim did not die as a consequence of wounds cause by an act committed with malice, intent to kill must be established beyond reasonable doubt. If intent to kill is proven, the crime committed is frustrated or attempted homicide. If intent to kill is not proven, the crime committed is physical injuries. Thus, lack of intent to kill is a defense in attempted or frustrated homicide. Nature of the crime – if the offender with intent to kill attempted to inflict or inflicted non-mortal wounds upon the victim, he already directly commenced an overt act to commit homicide. Hence, the crime committed is attempted homicide if he failed to inflict mortal wounds upon the victim by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. If the offender with intent to kill inflicted mortal wounds upon the victim, he already performed all acts of execution which would have produced the homicide as a consequence. If death is not produced despite the mortal character of the wounds due to causes independent to the will of the offender, the crime committed is frustrated homicide. If death is produced, the crime committed is consummated homicide. Intentional felony and culpable felony – homicide regardless of stages must be committed with malice (general intent) and intent to kill (specific intent). Even if there is no intent to kill and evil intent, the offender is liable for culpable felony if the victim died or injured as a result of the recklessness of the former. If there is no intent to kill, evil intent, and recklessness on the part of the accused, he is not liable for his intentional act, which cause the death of or injury upon the victim because of the exempting circumstance of accident. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 20

A: NO, I do not agree. Although, mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where the mode adopted does not positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer, the immediate and without warning attack made by Buboy, consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means. methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly to insure such execution, without risk to himself. (People v. Gayon, GR No. 230221, 10 Apr. 2019) The sudden and unexpected attack made on the unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any chance to defend themselves and thereby ensuring the commission the crime constitutes treachery which qualifies the killing to the crime of Murder.

Answer 21

A: Ms. M should be charged with the crime of Homicide under the RPC. Art. 249 of the RPC punishes any person who shall kill another without the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248, including treachery. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made suddenly, and the victim’s helpless position was accidental. (People v. Lubreo, G.R. No. 74146, 02 Aug. 1991) In a number of cases, the Court held that treachery cannot be appreciated simply because the attack was sudden and unexpected. (People v. Vilbar, G.R. No. 186541, 01 Feb. 2012) ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Ms. M should be charged with Murder. She killed Ms. A by stealthily approaching the latter from behind and stabbing the latter’s neck with a pocketknife. Ms. M therefore employed means and methods which tend directly and specially to insure the execution of the planned killing, without risk to herself arising from the defense which Ms. A might make. Hence, there was treachery on Ms. M’s part, and treachery qualifies an act of killing to Murder. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 22

A: YES, Gaston is liable for Belle's death because even though Gaston has no intent to kill Belle rather just to scare Belle. "To scare" does not indicate intent to kill. However, under Art. 4 of the RPC, provides in part that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In other words, the rule is that when a person, by a felonious act, generates in the mind of another a sense of imminent danger, prompting the latter to escape from or avoid such danger and in the process, sustains injuries or dies, the person committing the felonious act is responsible for such injuries or death. (US v. Valdez, , G.R. No. L-16486, 22 Mar. 1921; People v. Apra, G.R. No. L-26789, 25 Apr. 1969) ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: YES, Gaston is liable for Belle's death because by his acts of revving the engine of his car and driving towards Belle is felonious, and such felonious act was the proximate cause of the vehicle to skid and hit Belle, resulting in the latter's death. Stated otherwise, the death of Belle was the direct, natural and logical consequence of Gaston's felonious act. (People v. Apra, G.R. No. L-26789, 25 Apr. 1969) (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 23

A: NO. I beg to disagree with A’s contention that his liability should be limited to slight physical injury only. He should be held liable for attempted homicide because he inflicted said injury with the use of a firearm which is a lethal weapon. Intent to kill is inherent in the use of a firearm. (Araneta, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. L-43527, 03 July 1990) (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 24

(a) As far as Okito is concerned, Lino is liable for frustrated homicide, assuming that the wound suffered by Okito is such that for reasons or causes independent of the will of Lino (such as timely medical attention) Okito would have died. If the injury is not serious enough, the liability is only attempted homicide. Intent to kill is manifest because of the use of a deadly weapon. For the injury on the arm of Tommy, Lino is liable only for physical injuries (serious, less serious or slight, depending on the nature of the injury). Apparently, there is no intent to kill. For Nereo, Lino should be liable for serious physical injuries as the wounding of Nereo was the natural and logical consequences of Lino’s felonious act. (b) Tommy is exempted from criminal liability for the injury to Nereo as he was performing a lawful act with due care and the injury was caused by mere accident (Art. 12(4)), or that he was in lawful exercise of a right (Art. 11(6)), that is, defense of a stranger. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 25

A: NO, the charge of death caused in a tumultuous affray will not prosper. In death caused by tumultuous affray under Art. 251 of the Revised Penal Code, it is essential that the persons involved did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally. In this case, there is no tumultuous affray since the participants in the rumble belong to organized fraternities. The killer of A, a member of SFC Fraternity could not be any other but member of the rival fraternity. Conspiracy is therefore present among the attackers from the rival fraternity and thus rules out the idea of an affray. The liability of the attackers should be collective for the crime of homicide or murder as the case may be. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 26

A: B, C, D, and E being participants in the tumultuous affray and having been proven to have inflicted serious physical injuries, or at least, employed violence upon A, are criminally liable for the latter’s death. And because it cannot be ascertained who among them inflicted the mortal injury on A, there being a free-for-all fight or tumultuous affray, B, C, D and E are all liable for the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under Art. 251 of the RPC. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 27

A: According to Justice Regalado, the crime of physical injuries is a formal crime since a single act consummates it as a matter of law; hence, it has no attempted or frustrated stage. Once the injuries are inflicted, the offense is consummated. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 28

(a) YES. Mrs. Robinson can be charged with either child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 or slight physical injuries if the injuries inflicted constitute slight physical injuries. Sec. 10 of R.A. No. 7610 provides that “Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty, or exploitation, or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Art. 59 of P.D. 603 but not covered by the RPC shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor.” In other words, Richard’s parents may choose to prosecute Mrs. Robinson under the RPC or R.A. No. 7610. I will advise them to consider R.A. No. 7610 as there was no showing of the extent of the physical injuries inflicted. (b) NO. Mrs. Robinson cannot be charged with both of child abuse and slight physical injuries, because the latter is deemed absorbed in the charge of child abuse. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 29

A: A shall be criminally liable for rape by committing an act of sexual assault against B, by inserting his penis into the anus of the latter. Even a man may be a victim of rape by sexual assault under par. 2 of Art. 266-A of the RPC, as amended, “when the offender’s penis is inserted into his mouth or anal orifice.” (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 30

A: It is consummated rape when it describes a penis touching the vagina is the penis penetrating the cleft of the labia majora, however minimum or slight. In other words, the penis' mere touch of the pudendum would not result in any degree of penetration since the pudendum is a muscular part located over the labia majora and therefore mere touch of or brush upon the same would only constitute attempted rape, not consummated. Similarly, a penis' mere grazing of the fleshy portion, not the vulva cleft of the labia majora, will also constitute only attempted rape and not consummated rape, since the same cannot be considered to have achieved the slightest level of penetration. Stated differently, the Court here elucidates that "mere touch" of the penis on the labia majora legally contemplates not mere surface touch or skin contact, but the slightest penetration of the cleft of the labia majora, however minimum in degree. (People v. Agao, GR No. 248049, 04, Oct. 2022) **NOTE: this case is beyond the cut-off period.** ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: To be held liable for attempted rape by carnal knowledge, the penis of the accused must not touch the labia of the pudendum of the victim, but his acts must be committed with clear intention to have sexual intercourse. Intent to have sexual intercourse is present if it is shown that the erectile penis of the accused is in the position to penetrate (Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 166441, 08 Oct. 2014) or the accused actually commenced to force his penis into the victim’s sexual organ. (People v. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, 11 Dec. 2013) If the offender touches the body of the victim through force, with lewd design but without clear intention to have sexual intercourse, the crime committed is acts of lasciviousness. (People v. Sanico, G.R. No. 208469, 13 Aug. 2014) (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 31

(a) NO. I do not agree with the recommendation for the filing of attempted rape. Intent to have sexual intercourse is an essential element of attempted rape. In other words, intent to lie with the victim must be closer. However, this intent is not established for failure to show that Aliswan had done acts to have sex with Amethyst (Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 116441, 08 Oct. 2014); or that Aliswan had actually commenced to force his penis into the victim’s sexual organ (People v. Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, 11 Dec. 2013). Moreover, he spontaneously desisted from committing further lascivious acts after undressing Amethyst which is a defense in attempted rape. Undressing the victim with lewd design merely constitutes Acts of Lasciviousness. (People v. Sanico, G.R. No. 208469, 13 Aug. 2014) However, I agree with the recommendation of separate charges instead of a special complex crime. Acts of lasciviousness cannot be merged with homicide to form a special complex crime. There is no special complex crime of acts of lasciviousness with homicide under the statute books. Moreover, to be held liable of a special complex crime, there must be a direct connection between the components thereof. In this case, the homicide is not directly connected with the acts of lasciviousness since the killing was motivated by personal grudge of Aliswan against Alesso, which has no link to the crime committed against Amethyst. (b) In People v. Lasala (G.R. No. L-12141, 30 Jan. 1962), the Supreme Court ruled that the crime committed in Less Serious Physical Injuries under Art. 265 of the RPC as the medical attendance if for a period of 10 days only. Considering, however, that the Less Serious Physical Injuries was inflicted with manifest intent to insult or offend the offended party or under circumstances adding ignominy to the offense, there shall be an added penalty of fine not exceeding P500 pesos. (Art. 265(2), RPC) (UPLC Suggested Answers) ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Amante may be charged for violation of R.A. No. 7610. Being 16 years old and a minor, the act of Amante constitutes child abuse as he maltreated Alisto when he inflicted on him physically with cruelty. Further, by draping his body with a prepared tarpaulin with a statement "rapist ako wag tularan,” it debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of Alisto. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2023)

Answer 32

A: YES. The charge of Rape through Forcible Abduction is correct. The rule is settled that if the main objective of the accused is to rape the victim, the crime committed is rape even if he abducted her forcefully. Forcible abduction is absorbed. The doctrine of absorption rather than Art. 48 of the RPC is applicable, since forcible abduction is an indispensable means to commit rape. (People v. Mejoraday, G.R. No. 102705, 30 July 1993; People v. Almanzor, G.R. No. 124916, 11 July 2002; People v. Sabadablab, G.R. No. 175924, 14 Mar. 2012) Where the victim was abducted with lewd design and brought to a house (People v. Magdaraog, G.R. No. L-40988, 15 Apr. 1988; People v. Buhos, G.R. No. L-40995, 25 June 1980; People v. Velasquez, G.R. No. 137383-84, 23 Nov. 2000) in a desolated place where she was raped, forcible abduction should be treated as a necessary means to commit rape, and thus, the crime committed is a complex crime of Rape through Forcible Abduction under Art. 48 of the RPC. The charge of sale of dangerous drugs is improper since this crime is consummated only upon the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the poseur buyer for a consideration. Since in this case, Solito has not yet delivered the marijuana to PO2 Masahol when the latter apprehended the former; therefore, the crime committed is not sale of dangerous drugs but Attempted Sale of Dangerous Drugs. In People v. Figueroa (G.R. No. 186141, 11 Apr. 2012), where the sale was absorbed when the police officers immediately placed accused under arrest, the crime committed is attempted sale. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 33

A: I will reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and convict Charlie for the crime of Qualified Rape. Under Art. 266-B of the RPC, the crime of Rape is qualified when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. In this case, Charlie was the common law spouse of BBB, AAA’s mother. At the time of the crime, AAA was below 18 years old. The following qualifying circumstances were alleged in the information and proven by the evidence. Thus, Charlie should have been convicted of the Qualified Rape and not Simple Rape only. (Compendious Bar Reviewer on Criminal Law: Based on Bar Exam Syllabus (2023) by Dean Nilo T. Divina)

Answer 34

A: NO. Roger may not be charged and convicted of the crime Rape with Serious Illegal Detention. Roger may be charged and convicted of multiple rapes. Each rape is a distinct off’ense and should be punished separately. Evidently, his principal intention was to abuse Flordeluna; the detention was only incidental to the rape. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 35

A: YES, I would convict the accused of rape. Since the victim is a mental retardate with an intellectual capacity of a child less than 12 years old, she is legally incapable of giving a valid consent to the sexual intercourse. The sexual intercourse is tantamount to a statutory rape because the level of intelligence is that of a child less than 16 years of age (as amended by R.A No. 11648). Where the victim of rape is a mental retardate, violence or intimidation is not essential to constitute rape. (People v. Trimor, G.R. 106541- 42, 31 Mar. 1995) As a matter of fact, R.A. No. 7659, the Heinous Crimes Law, amended Art. 335, RPC, by adding the phrase “or is demented.” (UPLC Suggested Answers) NOTE: in determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-A(l)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is established. (People v. Rabelas, GR No. 253603, 14 June 2021)

Answer 36

A: YES, the accused is liable for Serious Illegal Detention against the daughter of the judge. In the case at bar, when the accused detains the daughter of the judge and was not allowed to be released until the judge acquits him, there was actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty. Deprivation of liberty is qualified to serious illegal detention when the victim is a female punishable under Art. 267 of the RPC. The accused may also be liable for the crime Grave Coercion under Art. 286 of the RPC. Since the purpose of the accused is to compel the judge to acquit him, the taking of the judge’s daughter constitutes violence to control the judge to do something against his will. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)

Answer 37

A: Razzy is liable for **Kidnapping with Homicide.** Abducting Angelino is not forcible abduction since the victim in this crime must be a woman. Gender reassignment will not make him a woman within the meaning of Art. 342 of RPC. There is no showing, moreover, that at the time abduction is committed with lewd design; hence, his abduction constitutes illegal detention. Since Angelino was killed in the course of the detention, the crime constitutes Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Homicide under Art. 267. Having sexual intercourse with Angelino is not rape through sexual intercourse since the victim in this crime must be a woman. This act is not rape through sexual assault either. Razzy did not insert his penis into the anal orifice or mouth of Angelino or an instrument or object into anal orifice or genital orifice, hence, this act constitutes acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336. Since the acts of lasciviousness is committed by reason or occasion of kidnapping, it will be integrated into one and indivisible felony of kidnapping with homicide. (People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 179943, 26 June 2009; People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, 05 Apr. 2016) Max is liable for kidnapping with homicide as an accomplice since he concurred in the criminal design of Razzy in depriving Angelino his liberty and supplied the former material aid in an efficacious way by helping him beat the latter. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 38

A: This is Kidnapping with Ransom which is kidnapping or illegal detention committed by a private person for the purpose of extorting ransom. Since the victim is a woman, it is serious. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 39

A: The crime committed against Jeremias, the 6-year-old child, is Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention under Art. 267(4) of the RPC. The criminal intent of Virgilio is to deprive Jeremias his liberty to demand ransom. Whether or not the ransom was eventually obtained will not affect the crime committed because the demand for ransom is not an element of the crime; it only qualifies the penalty to death but the imposition of the penalty is now prohibited by R.A. No. 9346. As to Daday, the nanny of the child who was told to remain in the van and take care of the child until the ransom is paid, the crime committed by Virgilio is Serious Illegal Detention because the offended party deprived of liberty is a female (Art. 267(4), RPC). Virgilio also committed Grave Coercion (Art. 286, RPC) for seriously intimidating the driver with a gun pointed at him to drive to a deserted place.

Answer 40

A: C. Under Art. 280 of the RPC, qualified trespass to dwelling is committed by any private person who shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter’s will and by means of violence or intimidation. However, the provisions of Art. 280 shall not be applicable to any person who shall enter another’s dwelling for the purpose of preventing some serious harm to himself. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 41

A: Dante committed qualified trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay, and less serious physical injuries for the assault on Mamerto. The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling should not be complexed with frustrated homicide because when the trespass is committed as a means to commit a more serious crime, trespass to dwelling is absorbed by the greater crime and the former constitutes an aggravating circumstance of dwelling. (People v. Abedosa, G.R. No. L- 28600, 21 Mar. 1928) Dante committed frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay because he had already performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the intended felony of homicide were it not for causes independent of the act of Dante. Dante had the intent to kill judging from the weapon used, the manner of committing the crime and the part of the body stabbed. Dante is guilty of less serious physical injuries for the wounds sustained by Mamerto. There appears to be no intent to kill because Dante merely assaulted Mamerto without using the knife. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 42

A: C. A is criminally liable for grave coercion because the presumption of intent to gain is rebutted. A is not criminally liable for robbery since the presumption of intent to gain, an element of this crime, is rebutted because he took the personal property under a bona fide belief that he owns the property. However, A is liable for grave coercion because he used violence in seizing the property by reason of his mistaken belief that he owned it.

Answer 43

A: Coercion may be distinguished from illegal detention as follows: In coercion, the basis of criminal liability is the employment of violence or serious intimidation approximating violence, without authority of law, to prevent a person from doing something not prohibited by law or to compel him to do something against his will whether it be right or wrong; while in Illegal Detention, the basis of liability is the actual restraint or locking up of a person thereby depriving him of his liberty without authority of law. If there was no intent to lock up or detain the offended party unlawfully, the crime of illegal detention is not committed.

Answer 44

A: Evidently, the person tortured and maltreated by the agents of the law is a suspect and may have been detained by them. If so and he had already been booked and put in jail, the crime is Maltreatment of Prisoner and the fact that the suspect was subjected to torture to extort a confession would bring about a higher penalty, in addition to the offender’s liability for the physical injuries inflicted. But if the suspect was forcibly brought to the police headquarters to make him admit the crime and tortured/maltreated to make him confess to such crime, but later released because the agents failed to draw such confession, the crime is Grave Coercion because of the violence employed to compel such confession without the offended party being confined in jail. (US v. Cusi, G.R. No. L- 3699, 18 Mar. 1908) It is noted that the offended party was merely “brought” to the police headquarters and is thus not a detention prisoner. Had he been validly arrested, the crime committed would be Maltreatment of Prisoners. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 45

A: Isagani committed the crime of Grave Coercion (Art. 286, RPC) for compelling Roy, by means of serious threats or intimidation, to do something against the latter’s will, whether it be right or wrong. Serious threats or intimidation approximating violence constitute grave coercion, not grave threats. Such is the nature of the threat in this case because it was committed with a gun, is a deadly weapon. The crime cannot be robbery because intent to gain, which is an essential element of robbery, is absent since the necklace belongs to Isagani. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 46

A: The crime committed by Lina is Murder for killing a child of tender years. Fely shall not be liable for murder because there is no showing that she participated with Lina in putting the child in the box which caused the latter's death. The act of demanding ransom by Fely would not constitute the crime of Kidnapping since there was actually no “taking to another place” was committed for the purpose of detaining the child in exchange for ransom. Fely may be liable however for Light Coercion under Art. 287(2) of the RPC, which provides; any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 pesos to 200 pesos, or both, for demanding ransom for the release of the spouses' child to be paid within 24 hours. It cannot be said that such act constitutes Grave Coercion in the absence of violence employed. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 47

A: YES, the charge for Robbery against off-duty police officer will prosper. The elements of the crime of robbery under Art. 293 of the RPC are (1) that there is taking of personal property; (2) the personal property belongs to another; (3) the taking is with animus lucrandi; and (4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. There is intimidation when there is unlawful coercion; extortion, duress; putting in fear. To take, or attempt to take, by intimidation means “willfully to take, or attempt to take, by putting in fear of bodily harm.” As shown in United States v. Osorio (G.R. No. 6660, 17 Jan. 1912), material violence is not indispensable for there to be intimidation, intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient. (Jomar Ablaza v. People, G.R. No. 217722, 26 Sept. 2018) In this case, the demand of the police officer for PHP1,000 to refrain from arresting the motorcycle rider and because of fear of being incarcerated for a crime he did not commit and the motorcycle rider complied, the charge for robbery against the off-duty police officer is proper since the taking with intent to gain, committed through intimidation are present. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)

Answer 48

A: A is liable for robbery because the intimidation he employed on the maid before the taking of the money and other valuables. It is the intimidation of the person relative to the taking that qualifies the crime as robbery, instead of simply theft. The non-employment of force upon things is of no moment because robbery is committed not only by employing force upon things but also by employing violence against or intimidation of persons. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 49

(a) A is criminally liable for Robbery with Force upon Things, because the coconut shell with the coins inside, was taken with intent to gain and broken outside of their home. (Art. 299 (b)(2), RPC) (b) NO. A is not exempt from criminal liability under Art. 332 because said Article applies only to theft, swindling, or malicious mischief. Here, the crime committed is robbery. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 50

A: Mr. R committed Robbery with Homicide under Art. 293, in relation to Art. 294, par. 1 of the RPC. The elements of the crime are: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against the person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used it is generic sense, was committed. It must be established that the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery and the killing is merely incidental thereto. Here, Mr. R’s intent to commit robbery preceded the taking of Mrs. V’s life. The killing took place on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 51

A: The indictment for Robbery with Homicide is correct. Robbery with homicide, a special complex crime, is primarily a crime against property and not against persons, homicide being a mere incident of the robbery with the latter being the main purpose of the criminal. The elements of robbery with homicide are: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed. The indictment for Illegal Possession of Firearm is wrong. In the case of People v. Gaborne (G.R. No. 210710, 27 July 2016), the Supreme Court clarified the issue, to wit: In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 and R.A. No. 10591, to P.D. No. 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of firearm is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of murder. It is clear from the foregoing that where murder results from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is not qualified illegal possession but murder. In such a case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating circumstance. Thus, where murder was committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. The intent of Congress is to treat the offense of illegal possession of firearm and the commission of homicide or murder with the use of unlicensed firearm as a single offense. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 52

A: FALSE, the crime committed is still Robbery with Homicide because when someone dies, regardless who the person is and regardless the number of persons killed on occasion of Robbery, the crime committed is Robbery with Homicide.

Answer 53

A: The crime committed is robbery by a band since there were four (4) offenders acting in concert in committing the robbery and all the four were armed.The elements of this crime are: 1. unlawful taking of personal property belonging to another (the earnings of the taxi-driver);2. intent to gain in the taking; 3. violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things was employed in the taking; and4. there were more than three armed malefactors taking part in the commission of the robbery (Art. 296 in relation to Art. 294, Revised Penal Code)

Answer 54

A: YES, the police officer is liable for Theft. Theft is consummated when three (3) elements concur: (1) the actual act of taking without the use of violence, intimidation, or force upon persons or things; (2) intent to gain on the part of the taker; and (3) the absence of the owner’s consent. The police officer who is not authorized to take the mobile phone, not being included as subject of the search warrant and he took the same without to gain or animus lucrandi is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of thing subject of asportation. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)

Answer 55

A: YES, the staff member shall be liable for the crime of Theft. Theft is consummated when three (3) elements concur: (1) the actual act of taking without the use of violence, intimidation, or force upon persons or things; (2) intent to gain on the part of the taker; and (3) the absence of the owner’s consent. Intent to gain is presumed from all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. (Herman Medina v. People, G.R. No. 182648, 17 June 2015) The act of the staff member in taking the mobile phone, without the owner’s consent and his act of taking information therein to be used by the Senator that may be used by him in the session satisfies the element of intent to gain. The fact that the mobile phone was returned is of no moment as the crime had already been consummated. (Bar Q&A by Judge Alejandria, 2022)

Answer 56

A: YES. All the elements of the crime of theft are present: that there be taking of personal property; that the property belongs to another; and that the taking be done with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner.

Answer 57

A: There is no crime of Frustrated Theft, and this is wellsettled in the case of Valenzuela v. People. In that case, the SC held that unlawful taking/asportacion, is the deprivation of the one's personal property, is also the element which produces Consummated Theft. This is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing belonging to another. Without asportacion, there can only be attempted theft. That being the case, the crime of theft cannot be committed in the frustrated stage.

Answer 58

(a) Under Art. 308 of the RPC, theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence, against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent. While the CCTV captured Rica surreptitiously taking the necklace from a jewelry store without the knowledge and consent of the store owner, she cannot be charged with theft, because the taking was made under a claim of ownership. The fact of ownership negates any intention to gain, as Rica cannot steal the necklace which she claims to own. (b) Even if it was proven that the necklace was bought by the store from another person who was the real owner of the necklace, Rica still cannot be held liable for theft absent a felonious intent. “Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea”. A crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. The ruling in U.S. v. Vera (1 Phil 485, 31 May 1974) is emphatic; i.e., if a person takes personal property of another believing it to be his own, the presumption of intent to gain is rebutted and therefore he is not guilty of theft. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 59

(a) Bruno committed the crime of theft. The owner is known to Bruno because there are IDs found in the wallet. Under Art. 308 of RPC, “theft is likewise committed by any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner” (b) The chief of police is liable for theft. Although he is not the one who found the property, he is considered as finder in fact since the property was surrendered to him by the actual finder. He acquired the position occupied by the actual finder and assumed by voluntary substitution the obligation to surrender the property to the lawful owner. Appropriating the property is of the same character of that made by one who originally found the same. (People v. Avila, G.R. No. L-19786, 31 Mar. 1923) The liability of the finder in fact is the same liability of the finder in law. Thus, what the Chief of Police committed is Theft. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 60

A: PO1 Reyes is criminally liable. His contention that he has not committed any crime because he was not the one who found the bracelet and it turned out to be stolen also, is devoid of merit. It is enough that the bracelet belonged to another and the failure to restore the same to its owner is characterized by intent to gain. The act of PO1 Reyes of selling the bracelet which does not belong to him and which he only held to be delivered to its owner, is furtive misappropriation with intent to gain. Where a finder of lost or mislaid property entrusts it to another for delivery to the owner, the person to whom such property is entrusted and who accepts the same, assumes the relation of the finder to the owner as if he was the actual finder; if he would misappropriate it, he is guilty of theft. (People v. Avila, G.R. No. L-19786, 31 Mar. 1923) (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 61

A: The theft was consummated because the taking or asportation was complete. The asportation is complete when the offender acquired the exclusive control of the personal property being taken. In this case, when Sunshine wore the swimsuit under her blouse and pants and was on her way out of the store, with evident intent to gain, the taking constitutes theft and being complete, it is consummated. It is not necessary that the offender is in a position to dispose of the property. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 62

A: A committed the crime of Qualified Theft because he took the goods on the occasion of and taking advantage of the fire which broke out in the department store. The occasion of a calamity such as fire, when the theft was committed, qualifies the crime under Art. 310 of the RPC, as amended. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 63

A: The crime committed by A is Carnapping. The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the Anti- Carnapping Law (RA 6539, as amended) and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery. (People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, 08 June 2004) The concept of carnapping is the same as that of robbery and theft. Hence, rules applicable to theft or robbery are also applicable to carnapping. (People v. Asamuddin, G.R. No. 213913, 02 Sept. 2015) In theft, unlawful taking should be understood within the Spanish concept of apoderamiento. In order to constitute apoderamiento, the physical taking must be coupled with the intent to appropriate the object, which means intent to deprive the lawful owner of the thing, whether permanently or temporarily. (People v. Valenzuela, G.R. No. 160188, 21 June 2007) In this case, A took the car without the consent of B with intent to temporarily deprive him of the car. Although the taking was “temporary” and for a “joy ride”, the Supreme Court in People v. Bustinera (supra), sustains as the better view which holds that when a person, either with the object of going to a certain place, or learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft because by taking possession of the personal property belonging to another and using it, his intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 64

A: Domingo is liable for Qualified Theft. Although Tristan received the horse with the consent of the owner, Hannibal, his possession is merely physical or de facto since the former is the employee of the latter. Slaughtering the horse, which he physically possessed, and selling its meat to Pastor shall be considered as taking without the consent of the owner with intent to gain, which constitutes theft. (Balerta v. People, G.R. No. 205144 26 Nov. 2014) Since the horse is accessible to him, the theft is qualified by the circumstances of abuse of confidence. (Yangco v. People, G.R. No. 209373, 30 July 2014) Further, Domingo committed an act in violation of the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law (P.D. No. 533). Cattle rustling is the taking away by any means, method or scheme, without the consent of the owner/raiser of large cattle, which includes cows and horses, whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation or intimidation of any person or force upon things. It includes the killing of large cattle, or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner/raiser. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 65

A: The members of the group who, by means of violence against or intimidation, shall take possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, is criminally liable under Art. 312 of the RPC or Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Property. In addition, they may also be charged with other crimes resulting from their acts of violence. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 66

(a) Manuel and Teofilo committed the crime of Usurpation of Real Rights under Art. 312 of the RPC for employing violence against or intimidation of persons. The threats to kill employed by them in forcibly entering the land is the means of committing the crime and therefore absorbed in the felony, unless the intimidation resulted in a more serious felony. (b) The crime would still be Usurpation of Real Rights under Art. 312, RPC, even if the said offenders killed the caretaker because the killing is the violence against persons which is the means for committing the crime and as such, determinative only. However, this gives way to the proviso that the penalty provided for therein is in addition to the penalty incurred in the acts of violence (murder or homicide) executed by them. The crime is similar to a robbery where a killing is committed by reason thereof, giving rise only to one indivisible offense, plus the fine mentioned therein. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 67

A: Jorge can charge the 15 families of 2 separate crimes namely: (a) Violation of Art. 282, Grave threats x x x; and (b) Violation of Art. 312 which provides that: “Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. – Any person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him, shall be punished by a fine...” (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 68

A: The crime committed is Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. A capataz is a foreman for the government and since the falsification of the public document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper charge is Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 69

(a) Tristan is liable for Estafa through Misappropriation under Art. 315 of RPC. Their transaction is a commodatum. He received the cows with the duty to return the same thing deposited and acquired legal or juridical possession. Selling the cows as if he owned it constitutes misappropriation or conversion within the contemplation of Art. 315. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 70

A: B should be charged with 1 count of Estafa and 2 counts of violation of B.P. 22. Under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, estafa by postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation is committed when: (a) the offender postdated a check, or issued a check in payment of an obligation; and (b) such postdating or issuing a check was done when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. Here, B’s act of postdating checks in payment of an obligation was the efficient cause of the defraudation. Postdating the checks was committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. B should also be charged with two (2) counts of violation of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law. B.P. 22 may be violated by making or drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check, which check is subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. Here, all the elements of the offense are present. B issued two (2) checks, which was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. The gravamen of B.P. 22 is the issuance of the check, thus, the issuance of each bouncing check constitutes as one count of the offense. While a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and independent" from each other. (Rimando v. Aldaba, G.R. No. 203583, 13 Oct. 2014) (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 71

A: The crime committed is estafa through false pretenses (Art. 315 (2)(a)). Val defrauded the investors by falsely pretending to possess business or imaginary transactions. The fact that he sold all the equipment of his perfume business, and absconded with the money when the amounts to be paid by him to the investors reached millions of pesos shows that the transaction or his business is imaginary, and he defrauded the victims. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 72

A: NO. B is not liable for estafa because he is not just an entrustee of the washing machine which he sold; he is the owner thereof by virtue of the sale of the washing machine to him. The sale being on credit, B as buyer is only liable for the unpaid price of the washing machine; his obligation is only a civil obligation. There is no felonious misappropriation that could constitute estafa. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 73

A: NO. The President of the financing corporation does not incur criminal liability for estafa because a money market transaction partakes of the nature of a loan, such that nonpayment thereof would not give rise to estafa through misappropriation or conversion. In money market placement, there is transfer of ownership of the money to be invested and therefore the liability for its return is civil in nature. (Sesbreño v. CA, G.R. No. 84096, 26 Jan. 1995) (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 74

(a) NO, the proper charge is Attempted Arson. Under Art. 6 of the RPC, there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution that should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Here, Mr. A commenced the commission of arson by pouring gasoline on the house and lighting a match. However, he did not perform all the acts of execution which includes setting the rest house on fire. Thus, Mr. A should only be liable for Attempted Arson. (b) In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime was committed, there is a need to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice but death results by reason or on occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in the building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as a means to accomplish such goal, the crime committed is murder only; and (c) if the objective is to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but the fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed – homicide/murder and arson. (People v. Sota and Gadjadli, G.R. No. 203121, 29 Nov. 2017) Here the main purpose was to burn the house and the death of Mr. C was only incidental, hence, arson was committed, and the homicide is absorbed. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 75

A: Senio is liable for Attempted Arson. He manifested before his intention to burn the house of Bal to his friends. He then performed the act of pouring gasoline around the walls of the house to execute his criminal design to commit arson. This is not just a preparatory act, because it already ceased to be equivocal and revealed a clear intention to burn the house. In sum, he already commenced the commission of the crime of arson directly by overt acts but he did not perform all acts to execute his criminal design to commit arson by setting the house on fire due to a cause other than his spontaneous desistance, and that is, having been caught by the police. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 76

A: Eddie is liable for Destructive Arson in the consummated stage. It is destructive arson because fire was resorted to in destroying the house of Mario which is an inhabited house or dwelling. The arson is consummated because the house was in fact already burned although not totally. In arson, it is not required that the premises be totally burned for the crime to be consummated. It is enough that the premises suffer destruction by burning. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 77

A: A is guilty of the crime of concubinage by having sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife. Having sexual relations on a more or less regular basis in hotels, motels, and other places may be considered scandalous circumstances that offends public conscience, giving rise to criticism and general protest, such acts being imprudent and wanton and setting a bad example. (People v. Santos, 86 SCRA 705) **ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:** A is not guilty of any crime because a married man does not incur the crime of concubinage by merely having a paramour, unless under scandalous circumstances, or he keeps her in the conjugal dwelling as a mistress or cohabits with her in any other place. His weekly meetings with his paramour do not per se constitute scandalous circumstance. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 78

A: A, the married woman, committed the crime of adultery under Art. 333 of the RPC, as amended, for having sexual intercourse with a man not her husband while her marriage is still subsisting. But the man who had carnal knowledge of her, not knowing her to be married, shall not be liable for adultery. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 79

A: NO, the contention of Mr. O’s counsel is untenable. Under Art. 366 of the RPC, the elements of Acts of Lasciviousness are: (1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) That the lascivious act is committed against a person of either sex; and (3) That it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) By using force or intimidation; (b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or (d) When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented. Lascivious conduct is defined as “the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttock, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse , humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.” (Orsos v. People, G.R. No. 214673, 20 Nov. 2017) Here, when Mr. O touched the buttocks of the offended party, he was animated with lewdness; thus, acts of lasciviousness was committed. **ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:** YES, the contention of Mr. O’s counsel is tenable. Mere touching or massaging the buttocks does not clearly indicate sexual design. To be liable under acts of lasciviousness, the act must be one that shows perversity to gratify sexual arousal or desire. Circumstances in the problem fell short to qualify as one. Thus, unjust vexation is proper where it only brought annoyance and irritation to the woman. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 80

(a) Leoncio committed the crime of unjust vexation only because the act was done in the course of dancing. The act of dipping his private parts in Evelyn’s buttocks during a very seductive dance, although offensive to Evelyn, may be viewed as part of a dirty dancing. Lewd intent cannot simply be presumed from the act of dirty dancing. The fact that the act was perpetrated in a public place and with an audience, negates lewd designs or lascivious intent, which is essential in the crime of acts of lasciviousness. (b) NO, the crime would then be acts of lasciviousness. That the music for dancing had already stopped, puts an end to any pretense of dancing by Leoncio. His continued dirty acts absent the dancing as there was no music anymore is patently lewd and lascivious. More so, Evelyn already protested Leoncio’s lewd acts in the course of dancing. So where the dance ended, Leoncio’s continued dirty acts cannot be veiled as still part of dancing. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 81

A: 1.) Those who exercise moral influence over the victim, such as a priest who acts as spiritual adviser of the victim, or a teacher in the school where the victim is enrolled; 2.) A brother or ascendant by consanguinity of the victim, such as her uncle; and Those who are regarded as “domestic” in relation to the victim, enjoying the confidence and intimacy shared by members of the same household, such as household helpers and boarders living under the same roof and with same household as the victim. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 82

A: The couple A and B, and the doctor shall be liable for the crime of Simulation of Birth, penalized under Art. 347 of the RPC, as amended. The act of making it appear in the birth certificate of a child that the persons named therein are the parents of the child when they are not really the biological parents of said child constitutes the crime of simulation of birth. While C, the unwed mother, is criminally liable for “child trafficking,” a violation of Art. IV, Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7610. The law punishes inter alia the act of buying and selling of a child.ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The couple A and B, the unwed mother C, and the doctor being all involved in the simulation of birth of the newborn child, violate R.A. No. 7610. Their acts constitute child trafficking which are penalized under Art. IV of said law. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 83

(a) In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis (G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000), the Supreme Court laid down the elements of bigamy thus: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the subsequent marriage would not have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. (b) I would render a judgment of acquittal. A void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in the prosecution for bigamy even without a judicial declaration of absolute nullity. (Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149, 27 July 2021, J. Hernando) (c) I would render a judgment of acquittal. In the case of Pulido v. People (G.R. No. 220149, 27 July 2021, J. Hernando), the SC held that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity ofthe first and/or second marriages presented by the accused in the prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which they are secured. The aforesaid conclusion is anchored on and justified by the retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage, the legislative intent of Art. 40 of the Family Code and the fundamental rules of construction governing penal laws. The Family Code specifically provides that certain marriages are considered void ab initio namely, Arts. 35, 36 (on Psychological Incapacity), 37, 38, 44 and 53. These marriages are void from the beginning. To all legal intents and purposes, the void ab initio marriage does not exist and the parties thereto, under the lens of the law, were never married. While Art. 40 of the Family Code provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, the SC ruled that said requirement under Art. 40 is merely for purposes of remarriage and does not affect the accused's right to collaterally attack the validity of the void ab initio marriage in criminal prosecution for bigamy. (Pulido v. People G.R. No. 220149, 27 July 2021, J. Hernando)

Answer 84

A: Whether CBP could be held liable for bigamy or not, depends on whether the second marriage is invalid or valid even without a marriage license. Although as a general rule, marriages solemnized without license are null and void ab initio, there are marriages exempted from license requirement under Chapter 2, Title 1 of the Family Code, such as in Art. 27 which is a marriage in articulo mortis. If the second marriage was valid even without a marriage license, then CBP would be liable for bigamy. Otherwise, CBP is not liable for bigamy but for Illegal Marriage in Art. 350 for the RPC, specifically designated as "Marriage Contracted Against Provisions of Laws." (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 85

A: NO, the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy is computed from the time the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. The principle of constructive notice which ordinarily applies to land or property disputes should not be applied to the crime of bigamy, as marriage is not property. Thus, when Marcy filed a complaint for bigamy on 07 Mar. 1976, it was well within the reglementary period as it was barely a few months from the time of discovery on Oct. 10, 1975. (Sermonia v. CA, G.R. No. 109454, 14 June 1994) (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 86

A: I would grant the Motion to Quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, since there is no definite person or persons dishonored. The crime of libel or slander is a crime against honor such that the person/s dishonored must be identifiable even by innuendoes. Otherwise, the crime against honor is not committed. Moreover, A was not making a malicious imputation, but merely stating an opinion; he was delivering a lecture with no malice at all during a seminar workshop. Malice being inherently absent in the utterance, the statement is not actionable as defamatory. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 87

A: NO. The President and the Secretary of the Union are not liable for oral defamation or slander because there is no identity of the offended party. The individual defamed or slandered was not singled out. (People v. Uy Tioco, G.R. Nos. 9986 & 9891, 22 Dec. 1915)

Answer 88

A: YES. Mr. L’s contention that truth is a valid defense in libel is tenable. Under Art. 361 of the RPC, if the defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions, and the truth of the allegations is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. (Lopez v. People, G.R. No. 172203, 14 Feb. 2011)

Answer 89

A: YES, the crime of libel is committed. Fair comment on acts of public officers related to the discharge of their duties is a qualified privileged communication, hence, the accused can still be held liable for libel if actual malice is shown. In fair comment, actual malice can be established by showing that comment was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. (Guingguing v. The Honorable CA, G.R. No. 128959, 30 Sept. 2005) Journalists bear the burden of writing responsibly when practicing their profession, even when writing about public figures or matters of public interest. The report made by C describing a lawyer in the Bureau of Customs as corrupt cannot be considered as “fair” and “true” since he did not do research before making his allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations were baseless. The articles are not “fair and true reports,” but merely wild accusations. He has written and published the subject articles with reckless disregard of whether the same were false or not. (Erwin Tulfo v. People, G.R. No. 161032, 16 Sept. 2008) A, president of the publishing company, B, managing editor, and C, writer of the defamatory articles, are all liable for libel. Under Art. 360 of the RPC, the publisher, and editor of newspaper, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent. The law makes the publisher and editor liable for libel as if they were the author. (Tulfo v. People, supra) (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 90

A: I will acquit the concerned citizens and the newspapers involved from the crime of libel. One of the requisites of libel is the existence of malice on the part of the accused. In this case, the publication is made from a moral or social duty. Thus, there is an absence of malice. As a nominee for the public position of a Department Secretary, A’s moral, mental, and physical fitness becomes a public concern. The publication merely reflects on his public character and image as a public official. Hence, the act of publishing such criticisms is bereft of malice. (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 91

A: D. Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, serious physical injuries, and damage to property.

Answer 92

A: A. Reckless imprudence under Art. 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes. Hence, conviction or acquittal of such quasioffense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasioffense, regardless of its various consequences. Thus, AB may be convicted of one crime, either Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries or Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. (Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, GR No. 172716, 17 Nov. 2010) (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 93

A: The charge was improper. The pharmacist should be charged with criminal negligence, or **reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, because there was no intent to kill Olimpio.** The accused inexcusably lacked precaution in failing to dispense the proper medicine to the victim which caused the latter’s death. (Art. 365, RPC) (UPLC Suggested Answers)

Answer 94

A: NO, the conviction of murder should not be sustained because there was no intent kill. The intent of the accused, on the contrary, is to treat Randy for his illness. However, considering that proximate cause of Randy’s death is the ritual, **accused may be held criminally liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide**. (UPLC Suggested Answers)