Theories of Mind 2: Behaviourism

Question 1

‘Ghost in the Machine’ - against Cartesian Dualism

Answer 1

Argument developed by Ryle
Ryle argues Descartes made a basic category error by considering the body and mind to be two ‘things’ or substances that have to interact in order to produce life or consciousness. For Descartes, in order for me to be able to lift my arm, an act needs to take place in my soul (willing hand to rise), and then needs to be transferred to my body so that my hand actually lifts up. In other words, a mental act in the non-physical mind or soul has to cause a movement in the physical body. It is impossible for a non physical thing to move a physical one (Ryle). This is a ‘ghost in the machine’ as it is a failed argument (like a ghost in my computer making it work).

Question 2

Behaviourism

Answer 2

Ryle shows using the ghost in the machine argument that we are thinking about the mind in the wrong way. The mind is not a thing but a series of functions. For example, it makes no sense to regard my piano playing as something separate from me. The older homunculus argument that there is a little person inside of me that plays the piano (Aristotle) would cause the problem of infinite regress. If that little person causes me to be conscious, then how is that tiny being conscious etc. The mind is simply a convenient construct (Ryle). I can say “Liszt possessed excellent piano playing skills” and also “Liszt possessed a cocker spaniel”. Liszt’s piano playing skills are not separate to Liszt. It is simply a useful convention of language to speak this way.

Question 3

Ryle- behaviourism/ mental states

Answer 3

We cannot know anything about the mechanics of the mind. Therefore we should not try to speculate about internal mental states, instead we should categories them in terms of behaviour. Tim may look sad, but he may not necessarily be sad as we do not know what is going on inside Tim’s mind. The selves of others are inaccessible to external analysis. Ryle was a behaviourist- language about mental states was not meaningful unless it could be explained in terms of behaviour