Theism and the problem of evil

Question 1

Types of beliefs

Answer 1

Theism: God exists and we can know this
Atheism: God does not exist and we can know this
Agnosticism: We cannot know whether God exists, so we should withhold judgment on the matter

Question 2

The ontological argument

Answer 2

• By Anselm: “God is a perfect being”
• Then, “we can think about God, whatever we can think about exists in the mind, therefore God exists in the mind”
• Therefore, either God exists in the mind alone or God exists both in the mind and in reality
• If X exists in the mind alone, then X is not perfect
• Therefore, if God exists in the mind alone, then God is not perfect
• But, God is perfect
• Therefore, God does not exist in the mind alone
• Therefore, God exists both in the mind and in reality
• The argument is a priori as if successful, would show that a perfect being must exist, that the denial of such a being would be a contradiction since existence is built into the very concept of it

Question 3

Objection to Anselm’s argument

Answer 3

• Gaunilo’s worry
  a. This argument is too good to be true. If it works for an absolutely perfect being like God, then it must work for absolutely perfect islands, absolutely perfect shoes, etc.
• Note: this objection, if good, only shows that something is wrong with the argument; it doesn’t tell us what that something is
  b. A worry about (2)
• This presupposes that it makes sense to speak of 2 different kinds/ways of existing (in the mind of someone and in reality). But Gaunilo asks; isn’t the claim that something “exists in the mind” a misleading way of saying that one understands what is being talked about? Surely there is only one kind or way of existing: existing.
  c. Two worries about (5)
• First, even if existence is a property, is it really a great-making property? Is cancer made greater - better, more perfect - by existing?
• Second, existence plausibly isn’t a property. If it isn’t, then existence isn’t a great-making property and (5) is false
  d. A worry about strategy
• Anselm’s argument can be accused of trying to define something (God) into existence, and that arguably can’t be done

Question 4

Paley’s argument from design

Answer 4

• the “teleological argument”
  
  • P1L is very plausible - let’s grant it. As Paley says, the structural complexity and functionality of eyes and such make them appear designed.
  • Let’s grant P3L as well. It is a plausible principle widely employed on philosophy, science, and everyday life.
  • The central step is P2L, the claim that the only reasonable explanation of the appearance of design is that natural objects are the creations of an extremely powerful intelligent designer.
    Paley accepts the premise because he thinks that the order underlying the appearance of design can be explained only by positing a mind that creates it.

Question 5

Darwin’s argument from design

Answer 5

• aka the teleological argument
  - His theory of evolution by natural selection explains this order without positing a creating mind.
  
  • The explanation proceeds in terms of random genetic mutation and heritable variation.
  • But, it doesn’t explain the origin of life itself.
  • It also presupposes an even deeper underlying order in the physical universe - where did that come from?
    This leads us to the global argument from design and Hume’s character Cleanthes’s claim that the universe is like a vast machine.

Question 6

Cleanthes’ global argument from design

Answer 6

Three main objections
- When Cleanthes compares the universe to a machine, what he is doing is drawing our attention to the fact that the world is ordered. But does its order really invite comparison to obvious creations of intelligence?
- Assume that P1G is true. While intelligence is one possible cause of order in the universe, we can imagine at least two other possible causes, none of which need to involve intelligence: plant + animal reproduction. The point is that the universe’s orderliness may be intrinsic to it, something it possesses by virtue of its biological, chemical, or physical nature, which isn’t explained by appeal to intelligence.
- All C1 says is that there is an intelligent designer. This can’t rule out that the intelligent designer is bad at worldmaking, that there is more than one intelligent designer and that the intelligent designer/s is/are mortal to have human form
- But none of these hypotheses is compatible with the standard monotheistic conception of God.

Question 7

local vs global

Answer 7

• The “local argument from design (Paley) draws our attention to the resemblance between particular parts of the world and obvious creations of intelligence, then argues that these parts of the world must themselves be creations of intelligence too.
• The “global” argument from design (Cleanthes) is similar in form but different in scope. It draws our attention to the resemblance between the universe as a whole and obvious creations of intelligence, then argues that the universe itself must itself be a creation of intelligence too.

Question 8

priori vs posteriori

Answer 8

A proposition is a priori if it can be known or reasonably believed independently of sense experience.
A proposition is a posteriori if it is not a priori.

Question 9

The logical argument from suffering

Answer 9

• (P1) No morally good being would allow suffering if they were able to prevent it.
• (P2) An omnipotent being would always be able to prevent suffering
• (C1) If there were a morally good, omnipotent being, then there would be no suffering
• (P3) There is suffering
• (C2) There is no being who is both morally good and omnipotent

Question 10

Flaws in the logical argument from suffering

Answer 10

• P1, the “no tolerance principle, is false
• Case of a loving parent; allowing a child to feel upset to teach them a lesson
• Change it to… (P1*) No morally good being would allow suffering if they were able to prevent it unless they had a good reason to permit it.
• But now, the argument does not follow
• So, add P2.5: there is no good reason that a morally good, omnipotent being could have to allow suffering
• Now, the argument is valid. But now everything turns on whether P2.5, the “no good reason” principle, is true.
• This matters because the force of the argument is now considerably weakened.
• Now, you add probably to the arguments
  (P1) No morally good being would allow suffering if they were able to prevent it.
  (P2) An omnipotent being would always be able to prevent suffering
  (P2.5): Probably there is no good reason that a morally good, omnipotent being could have to allow suffering
  (C1) If there were a morally good, omnipotent being, then probably there would be no suffering
  (C2) Probably there is no being who is both morally good and omnipotent