Causal determinism and the problem it is thought to pose for free will

Question 1

Causal determinism

Answer 1

• A statement of all of the facts at a time t (including the facts about people’s environments and heredity), together with a statement of the laws of nature, logically entails what will happen at any future time t + n.
• If this claim is true, then it is plausible that an omniscient being, one who knew all of the facts at t and all of the laws of nature, would be able to perfectly predict what will happen at t + n.
• Many philosophers and scientists have thought that determinism is true. The trouble is that there is reason to think that if determinism is true, then we lack free will.

Question 1

The argument from determinism

Answer 1

• (P1) Everything that happens is determined by prior events (determinism).
• (P2) One acts freely only if one has the power to act otherwise (choice condition).
• (P3) If one’s actions are determined, then one lacks the power to act otherwise.
• (C) No one ever acts freely. (P1, P2, P3)

So determinism together with the choice condition and P3 entail that we do not have free will

Question 2

The argument from indeterminism

Answer 2

• (P1) Not everything that happens is determined by prior events (indeterminism, the denial of determinism).
• (P2) One acts freely only if one has the power to determine which actions one performs (control condition).
• (P3) If one’s actions are not determined by prior events, then one lacks the power to determine which actions one performs.
• (C) No one ever acts freely. (P1, P2, P3)

So indeterminism together with the control condition and the new P3 entail that we do not have free will.

Question 3

The dilemma of determinism

Answer 3

• So free will looks incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism.
• Since determinism and indeterminism exhaust the space of possible views, it would appear that free will is impossible.

Question 4

Free will: sources of difficulty

Answer 4

The dilemma of determinism
- the plausible choice and control conditions appear to place impossible-to-satisfy demands on free will
The problem of ultimate responsibility
- the idea that we can ever really deserve anything seems to require that we can be causa sui, which would appear to be impossible