Compatibilism about free will

Question 1

Incompatibilism vs compatibilism

Answer 1

Incompatibilism: we have free will only if determinism is false
- Hard determinism: we have free will only if determinism is false, determinism is true, so we don’t have free will. (D’Holbach believes this)
- Libertarianism: we have free will only if determinism is false, we have free will, so determinism is false (Chilshold believes this)
Compatibilism: we can have free will even if determinism is true (Ayer believes this)

Question 1

Agent causation

Answer 1

• Causation: the relation whereby one thing makes another thing happen
• Agent:
• an agent is a conscious person capable of rational action
• Chisholm believes that events are not the only things that serve as causes. Sometimes- in cases of genuinely free and responsible action - agents themselves cause other events to happen.

Question 2

Why agent causation is required for free will

Answer 2

Because (subject to a qualification) if events in Smith’s psychology event caused clicking send, then, since Smith doesn’t have responsibility for her psychology, she herself won’t have the power to determine her actions - her psychology will.

Question 3

Agent-causal free will and the falsity of determinism

Answer 3

Since Chisholm thinks that agents themselves, not agents’ beliefs and desires, cause their free and responsible actions, the facts about the world at any given time- including the facts about what beliefs and desires agents have - won’t determine, along with the laws, the facts at any given time.

Question 4

An objection to agent causation (L)

Answer 4

Libertarianism
1. What does saying that something event-caused the sending “click” add.
Agent-causation, not event-causation is conceptually fundamental
2. The agent -causing was caused by Smith’s agent-causing her agent-causing, which was caused by her agent-causing her agent-causing of her agent-causing, and so on.

Question 5

An objection to agent causation (C)

Answer 5

Compatibilism
- Believe that once we get clear on what we really mean by “free will” we will see that our having free will is perfectly compatible with determinism.
- The opposite of free action is not determined action, compatibilists insist, but coerced or compelled action.

Question 6

Hume’s contention

Answer 6

• The fact that you are causally determined to do something does not entail that you do not want or choose to do it.
• You do X freely if and only if you do X and doing X is what you choose to do (similar to Ayer)
• It doesn’t tell us what is wrong with the argument from determinism
• Another worry is that it isn’t a plausible analysis of what free action is

Question 7

Objections to Hume’s contention

Answer 7

1. addiction
   - you become addicted to something and this becomes so powerful that if you are given the option to follow your addiction, you are unable to choose to do anything else
2. mind control
   - someone manipulates your brain and causes your choices
   - thus you don’t have free will

Question 8

Strawson’s argument

Answer 8

Suggests a different route to the conclusion that free will is impossible, one which does not turn on claims about determinism or indeterminism.
- (P1) You do what you do because of the way you are.
- (C1) To be truly morally responsible for what you do, you must be truly responsible for the way you are - at least in certain crucial mental respects.
- (P2) You can’t be truly responsible for the way you are.
- (C2) You can’t be truly responsible for what you do.

Question 9

Strawson’s response to the compatibilist

Answer 9

• “One can be fully morally responsible even if the way one is is totally determined by factors entirely outside one’s control
• Response: “they know that the king of responsibility ruled out by the Basic Argument is impossible, and conclude that it can’t be the kind of responsibility that is really in question in human life”

Question 10

Strawson’s response to the libertarian

Answer 10

• “Through undetermined self-forming actions we can make ourselves thus being ultimately responsible for the way we are”.
• Response: How can the occurrence of partly random or indeterministic evens contribute to my being truly or ultimately morally responsible either for my actions or for my character?”

Question 11

Strawson’s response to agent-causal libertarians

Answer 11

• “One’s self “incorporates a power of decision that is independent of one’s [character, personality, and desires/inclinations] in such a way that one can after all count as truly and ultimately morally responsible in one’s decisions and actions, even though one isn’t ultimately responsible for one’s [character, personality, and desires/inclinations]”
• Response: (top of page 608 textbook)