the stresemann era 1924-29 Flashcards
economic stability- economic growth
general economic performance in germany was good as they were experiencing a period of growth however it was at best erratic. in 1926 unemployment grew to 10%. this was both due to lack of interest in controlling unemployment but also a greater concern over efficiency. luther sacked 700,000. although unemployment never fell below one million this was comparable to the economy of gb
economic stability- rising wages
bookbinder- indicative of increased prosperity. wages increased and german labours share of national income was 10% higher in the mid 1920s than it had been before 1914. number of strike days fell proving worker satisfaction
economic stability- article 165
working glass gains from corporatist nature of article 165 ‘workers and employees are called to co-operate. narrowed the gap between the working class and elites. only three million working days lost due to strikes in 1935 comapred to 11 million in 1913. mre gains expected from working class particularly when rationalization was putting many out of work in proletarian areas
economic stability- cartels and ruhr
1928 germany was second to us, economic powerhouse of the world. industrial relations were very poor and only held together by compulsory arbitration. ruhr lockout of 1928 underlined this as trade union wage demands far outweighed the productivity they promised. cartel system increased efficancy greatly, cartels were not limited to germany however and big buisness were still as powerful as ever. fordism- the use of mass production techniques from us helped bolster germanys roaring factories. mutual lack of co-operation between the state, employer and worker coupled with cautious investment took much of the shine off of the golden age.
economic stability- dawes plan
lee- Dawes plan and foreign treaties heralded a period of rapid economic recovery. dawes plan based on prosperity index which meant that reparations would only be paid if germany could afford to. dawes plan both corrosive and restorative through its package of start up loans as it encouraged over reliance on the states. short term loans from us used to fund long term investments such as opera houses and swimming pools. foreign investment was not matched by foreign export markets due to stigma of treaty of rapallo. internal consumer goods fell by 3 percent between 1928 and 1929.
economic stability- agriculture.
foreign investment bypassed agriculture which was in chronic need of modernisation. section under pressure after treaty of Versailles saw loss of fertile farm land. 500,000 hectares of land freed by settlement law but this only provided peasants with 2.4% entitled land. lack of redress meant 1/3 of farms were repossessed. farmers revenge- voted in mass for nsdap. whilst there were some cosideralble advances in the economy in urban areas, the countryside remained hostile to weimar.
political stability- farmers revenge
farmers revenge in 1928 ensured the the nsdap’s continued survival but barely registered on the national scene. the dnvp profited too from the junker backlash but were doing poorly after becoming second largest party in the reichstag. the dnvp was increasingly appealing outside of their electoral base- spicer ‘roman catholic clergy and laymen began to swap their alliances to the right. however mid to late 20s were mostly wilderness years untill 1929 when the young plan plebiscite gave the far right publicity once more.
political stability- bolshevism
the far right and moderates were united by shared fear of communism however the actual chances of there being a left takeover was lessened due to prosperity felt by wc during the golden age. however fear that kpd may attemt another insurrection remained. combined strength of red fighting league and its associates was immense. this made them enough of a threat for the sa to react and even moderates compelled to act by creating the reichsbanner. kpds paramilitaries undermined belief that there was political normalisation with 50 dead. kpds obstructive strategy hindered those hoping to create a golden age through political normalisation.
political stability- eberts death 1925
in some ways fortunate as it provided a break from the revolutionary period. grad coalitions meant that germans would be represented. however 6 chancellors from 24-29 highlighted that these coalitions were unstable. spd refusal to be a coalition partner damaged legitimacy of the party. stresemanns dvp only remained progressive untill his death and garnered little support. peukert argues that this was the ‘decisive event’ in the collapse of democracy. closest weimar came to a golden period as extremist vote fell flat.
political stability- leadership
Hindenburg. Anti-Weimar, even if he said he would uphold constitution. Does not allow for his abuse of article 48 as forcing order does not address ground issues (such as the 48 people killed between Sa AND KPD streetfighters). Interests of conservatives appeal here should be overlooked as democardcy is crucial, esp in WEIMAR. He did ot win a majority (48%), had the left vote not been split (KPD ran a candidate, ⅔ of pres candidates=anti-democracy, therefore, weimar=leadership is not stable), a pro-Weimar Pres in Marx may have very likely been elected. This suggests that the extremists themselves were not popular with the majority of De, but this does not discredit that they got into influential positions - even during allegedly ‘golden’ periods, proving the instability of leadership and governments in this period
stresemann- west
Locarno: accepted Western borders. Erfüllungspolitik with key powers works as following Locarno, Zone 1 occupation of COlogne ended. THis is a particularly complex strategy for the regaining of Germany’s reputation which is why it is perhaps viewed as “too subtle” by H&H as a means for the German public to see how this would work.
1926 Inter-Allied Miliatry control Commission negotiations which ended the surveillance of De’s military from the allies as a clause of Versailles. Marxist view of Ruge echoes that the long term international policy was perhaps not golden as it prepares for Germany’s “war-like” expansion, surely successful foreign policy cannot be coloured by intense militarisation. De prestige went better as it was a much easier way for the public to see De’s successes, yes S’mann got Nobel Peace prize for Locarno, yet it didn’t feel like a move for national interest.
stresemann- east
treaty of berlin 1926 secret and public econ and military clauses. success put pressure on west and saw “pragmatic” policy build allies on both sides, threatening West. People liked this as it built up army and actively broke Versailes. Yet, still RWigers opposed it builds relations eith Far Left. didnt severe eastern borders in Locarno pact, open for protection. peukert: should have accepted Eastern borders and built up econ and political influence there instead”. Soft power way of creating long-term allies, they could have hd control over. Short-sightendness for the issue of De’s migrants was a stab-in their own back
stresemann- prestige
Great power status in league of nations in 1926. no longer alienated, accepted and powers willing to engage. trusted w veto. “Through S’mann’s guiding hand, De had rehabilitated itself in the eyes of the world” Thomson and Llewellyn. Being no longer seen as an outcast and S’mann using this opportunity to spread issues of National Interest like Rhineland occupation. Yet their rehabilitation is perhaps not entirely true as they were banned from some aspects of Great Power participation which included action against aggressors due to their military limitations.
stresemann- economic
Dawes plan - reduced econ burden through US loans (other countries wanted to see De’s success) yet payment rescheduling was confirmed without De input.
Young plan (1928) reducing sum to 37,000 million marks with De’s increased international prestige allowing for them to be part of the renegotiation discussions. Was just rejected by 5.8 million despite major NSDAP campaign supporting the idea that it reaffirmed Versailles with continuing reparations payments for 58 years. H&H “siltent majority” accepted it and saw the merits of Henig’s view that Stresmann’s decision here was one of “realism” as respect from former enemies before full versailles revision is probably more doable than demanding revision of such a treaty
stresemann- disarmament
pressed for general disarmament to be in line with versailles treaty. 1926 preliminary disarmament meeting was held at geneva however nothing came of this. kellog briand pact in 1928 with 70 other countries signed renouncing the use of force however had no practical effect. minor success when inter allied military control commission monitoring germanys compliance with treaty of Versailles was withdrawn, allowing him to secretly rearm
