collapse of weimar 1929-33 Flashcards
economic factors in collapse of weimar- wsc
The WSC of 1929 resulted in a serious undermining of the De economy that had been recovering throughout the golden years with Germany seeing a 39% drop in national income between 29-32. H&H: when Americas sneezes, Europe catches a cold but it might bessaid that Germany had pneumonia” as their dependence on the USA to finance their growth -through “short term loans that were used to fund long term investments” (LEE), left them particularly vulnerable to the crash. As a result by 1933, 6 million people=unemployed. Here we see the long-term economic factors responsible for collapsing the Weimar Republic also, as unemployment had been an issue in Germany for years (never falling bellow 1 mill in golden years)
Yet, the Weimar Republic had survived previous economic disasters such as the hyperinflation crisis of 1923. Burleigh “chronic unemployment was as likely to lead to a day in bed as to seeking the overthrow of the Weimar constitution”. Therefore, economic factors have not solely collapsed the Weimar Republic in the past so it is likely that they would not just one decade later either. Importantly, part of the HI survival was down to pragmatic government response made by Schact, conversely it was government failures to respond to the economic factors that led to their causing of the fall of Weimar. As while spendings on welfare increased 500% between 1913-32 and reparations were stopped in 32, this was what H&H believe was “too little, too late”. As so many people had become destitute. In this period that the notion of Weimar possibly being a protective state became nullified, but the economic crisis alone was not at fault here, the political failures to act quickly instigated this perspective.
failure of political leaders in collapse of weimar- bruning
Bruning was chancellor from 1930-32 and has been referred to as the “hunger chancellor” because, in the acknowledgment of the worries that inflation had across German society, he was cautious to not implement any inflationary measures into Germany during the economic crisis. Instead, he employed various deflationary measures- such as reducing civil service employment- this new mc group had “sig. spending power” H&H and in stimulating their unemployment (with their industry having been protected during the actual depression), Bruning lost key moderate support.
Bruning’s choice to hold an election in 1930 was “irresponsible” (Kershaw) with elections not being due 1932, people were extremely frustrated with Weimar responses to the economic crisis and thus, many actively voted against Weimar parties with nearly 1/3 of the vote going to the KPD and NSDAP.
The fall of Weimar can also be seen from the political leaders that made “tragic miscalculations” Kershaw in under-estimating Hitler. As can be seen through his various speeches. But it is undeniable that Feuchtwantger: “the personality of thre fuhreer became a sig. historical factor” WITH Strasser complimenting the ability of H’s words to ‘get like an arrow to their target’. In this underestimation, they staged various intrigues, with von papen convincing Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as chancellor, so with Papen as vice-chancellor and a cabinet comprising of just 2 nazis, they thought they could control h (Fischer). At this point, the NSDAP did not have a majority, indeed they had lost 2 million votes between the 1932 elections, and yet still “Weimar’s thin thread for survival was snapped by political errors” Feuchtwanger
The retainment of H’burg as president and his ever-increasing use of article 48 during this period is what many have argued made people accepting of Autocracy, and thus allowed for the downfall of Weimar too.
failure of political parties in collapse of weimar- party split
In 1930 the Grand coalition (61% of deputies) split on the issue of employment benefit and Muller resigned as chancellor. Indeed, the left in Germany had been split since the founding of the Weimar Republic (E-G pact) which had allowed for anti-Weimar left wing parties like the KPD to rise significantly in this period. Evans: “the absence of any serious resistance on the part of the social democrats, the principle remaining defenders of democracy was decisive”. This shown to many that Weimar was doomed and thus, accelerated its fall with the presidential elections of 1932 Hindenburg became “the candidate for the left with SPD support.” Evans. He could not even achieve a majority in the first round of voting, despite having 8 years to build up an image of himself as president, when the lesser-known H was able to gain 40% of the vote. And yet still, parties like the SPD discounted H, proving the role of political parties in the collapse of the Weimar Republic over all else.
Weimar Parties also failed Weimar as the constitution was based on openness yet, there was a distinct perception of the parties as being antithetical to this. The KPD and NSDAP however, worked in a grassroots way, especially during the depression to establish themselves as people focused. “the gauleiter enjoyed considerable latitude to develop the party according to local circumstances” (H&H) as seen through the soup kitchens they set up through the NSDAP localised Gauleiter structure, so the fall of Weimar also came from the moderate parties failing to capitalise on the opportunity to humanise themselves in economic crisis to the people.
The SPD had consistently been the largest Weimar party, yet Hindenburg’s rule by decree as President, prevented them from passing policy, they “did not effectively embrace their radical democratic nature” (Harsch), in not providing any effective opposition to A48.
role of propaganda in nazi rise to power- important
H designed logo, right arm salute and uniformed the brownshirts = militaristic appearance to spread ideas of nationalism, made them memorable but more importantly this propaganda made them appear more organised. The SA was predominantly working class (3 million=wc) Perhaps proving that the key aim of propaganda for the party was to increase the recognition of the organisation of the party when faced by the tummel of other parties at the time, exaggerating the role propaganda itself had in its outlook.
Woods: “Nazis used uniforms to produce a fashionable aesthetic to serve as another arm of the Third Reich’s propaganda machine– specifically, through the stark uniform that so occupies our memory of the image of the Nazis.”
Nazi propaganda also worked through postering, music and cinema to capitalise off the worries of the public. Their posters were canonically anti-communist which aided bc of split left anyways
H&H “realised the importance of propaganda and used it to target many German’s specific grievances” (65% of members= anti-communist).
Ultimately, propaganda worked yet this niche understanding of their voter base came from the grip they had as an organised force, it was only due to their organisation that they were able to recognise and capitalise off of anti-commie message in this period.
role of propaganda- nazi organisation
Hitler=Fuhrer=Nationally→Gaultier=locally develop party (Strasser in North).
Gaultier’s reported to the Fuhrer yet also had their own responsibilities to increase support in a way these local to them would appreciate. H&H The Nazis’ success stemmed from their organisational structure throughout Germany. This responsibility structure created its own directed propaganda for those local, yet would have not have worked in its niche targeting had it not been for the specific. organisation network which truly understood the needs for those local. Eg. Nazi welfare soup kitchen schemes or becoming popular in rural areas during the agri depression. Anderson: Shrewd political leaders in the party. Who understood local messaging and could capitalise it as such
set up groups within their own party for specific demographics to find their own community within the Nazi organisation. Eg. Hitler Youth, Womens groups, Student groups. Image of Volksgemeinschaft was encouraged through propaganda but the fact that these groups actually existed is what makes organisation the key factor, as people could actually see and benefit from the communities offered by the Nazis.
role of propaganda- hitler
H understood and directed his campaigns to the specific audience he was talking to. For example, he talked about increased workers’ rights to industrial workers in his base in Munich throughout the depression period, while changing attitude when in conversation with the industrialists. Strasser himself acknowledged Hitler’s adaptable skills in reading a room which led to the Nazi rise to power as people felt represented
He was known for his charisma
Due to this perhaps any message would have perhaps had the ability to raise votes, he was his own propaganda machine and his Fuhrership regardless of propaganda message could have led to the nazi grip on power.
“Personality of the fuhrer became a sig historical factor” Feuchtwanger.
role of propaganda- wsc
totally undermined as a result of WSC (foreign investment etc)= over 6 million were unemployed by 1932= growth in extremism (Nazi vote increased 8 fold).
Rise in Nazis as Weimar loyalty felt futile under the crisis. Holtfrerich: “The Nazi rise to power was essentially linked to the Great Depression which was a world-wide phenomenon and had little to do with the domestic conflict.” VS Mcdonoguh “ther ewas an underlying anti-democratic mood in De which economic pressure magnified but it did not create”. Ppl had been offput by Weimar, the poor handling of the depression only worsened this with Bruning being nicknamed the “hunger-chancellor”, creating deflationary measures, where the NSDAP cpaitalised onthis by promising inflationary ones- being the only party to do so, leading to their catastrophic rise. This proves that the WSC alone did not turn people towards the Nazis, but their well thought out -and deseminated through propaganda- message on the WSC led to their rise.
Lee= the Nazis’ success depended on the vulnerability of the republic caused by the economic crisis from 1929. Hitler succeeded in collecting much of the electorate that had become disillusioned with the republic.
Therefore, less than the organisation of the Nazis as pre-wall street crash Coburg area gained 13/25 Nazi seats in their municipal election in June 1929, Nazi RIse, due to their direct local targeting as already occurring (even if this was due to own agri depression).
economy in hitler coming to power- wsc
The WSC of 1929 resulted in a serious undermining of the De economy that had been recovering throughout the golden years with Germany seeing a 39% drop in national income between 29-32. H&H: when Americas sneezes, Europe catches a cold but it might bessaid that Germany had pneumonia” as their dependence on the USA to finance their growth -through “short term loans that were used to fund long term investments” (LEE), left them particularly vulnerable to the crash. As a result by 1933, 6 million people=unemployed. Here we see the long-term economic factors responsible for collapsing the Weimar Republic also, as unemployment had been an issue in Germany for years (never falling bellow 1 mill in golden years)
Yet, Nazis did not come to power in crisis of 1923- Munich lack of success. Burleigh “chronic unemployment was as likely to lead to a day in bed as to seeking the overthrow of the Weimar constitution”. Therefore, economic factors have not solely caused their rise in the past so it is likely that they would not just one decade later either. Importantly, part of the HI survival was down to pragmatic government response made by Schact, conversely it was government failures to respond to the economic factors that led to their causing of the fall of Weimar. As while spendings on welfare increased 500% between 1913-32 and reparations were stopped in 32, this was what H&H believe was “too little, too late”. As so many people had become destitute. In this period that the notion of Weimar possibly being a protective state became nullified, but the economic crisis alone was not at fault here, the political failures to act quickly instigated this perspective.
failure of political leaders in hitler coming to power
Bruning was chancellor from 1930-32 and has been referred to as the “hunger chancellor” because, in the acknowledgment of the worries that inflation had across German society, he was cautious to not implement any inflationary measures into Germany during the economic crisis. Instead, he employed various deflationary measures- such as reducing civil service employment- this new mc group had “sig. spending power” H&H and in stimulating their unemployment (with their industry having been protected during the actual depression), Bruning lost key moderate support.
Bruning’s choice to hold an election in 1930 was “irresponsible” (Kershaw) with elections not being due 1932, people were extremely frustrated with Weimar responses to the economic crisis and thus, many actively voted against Weimar parties with nearly 1/3 of the vote going to the KPD and NSDAP.
The fall of Weimar can also be seen from the political leaders that made “tragic miscalculations” Kershaw in under-estimating Hitler. XYZ notes that the SPD struggled to comprehend the attractions of H, specifically his charisma. As can be seen through his various speeches. But it is undeniable that Feuchtwantger: “the personality of thre fuhreer became a sig. historical factor” WITH Strasser complimenting the ability of H’s words to ‘get like an arrow to their target’. In this underestimation, they staged various intrigues, with von papen convincing Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as chancellor, so with Papen as vice-chancellor and a cabinet comprising of just 2 nazis, they thought they could control h (Fischer). At this point, the NSDAP did not have a majority, indeed they had lost 2 million votes between the 1932 elections, and yet still “Weimar’s thin thread for survival was snapped by political errors” Feuchtwanger
The retainment of H’burg as president and his ever-increasing use of article 48 during this period is what many have argued made people accepting of Autocracy, and thus allowed for the downfall of Weimar too. Feldman comments that “Brüning’s reliance on emergency decrees had paved the way for a right-wing rule”
failure of political parties in hitler coming to power
In 1930 the Grand coalition (61% of deputies) split on the issue of employment benefit and Muller resigned as chancellor. Indeed, the left in Germany had been split since the founding of the Weimar Republic (E-G pact) which had allowed for anti-Weimar left wing parties like the KPD to rise significantly in this period. Evans: “the absence of any serious resistance on the part of the social democrats, the principle remaining defenders of democracy was decisive”. This shown to many that Weimar was doomed and thus, accelerated its fall with the presidential elections of 1932 Hindenburg became “the candidate for the left with SPD support.” Evans. He could not even achieve a majority in the first round of voting, despite having 8 years to build up an image of himself as president, when the lesser-known H was able to gain 40% of the vote. And yet still, parties like the SPD discounted H, proving the role of political parties in the collapse of the Weimar Republic over all else.
Weimar Parties also failed Weimar as the constitution was based on openness yet, there was a distinct perception of the parties as being antithetical to this. The KPD and NSDAP however, worked in a grassroots way, especially during the depression to establish themselves as people focused. “the gauleiter enjoyed considerable latitude to develop the party according to local circumstances” (H&H) as seen through the soup kitchens they set up through the NSDAP localised Gauleiter structure, so the fall of Weimar also came from the moderate parties failing to capitalise on the opportunity to humanise themselves in economic crisis to the people.
The SPD had consistently been the largest Weimar party, yet Hindenburg’s rule by decree as President, prevented them from passing policy, they “did not effectively embrace their radical democratic nature” (Harsch), in not providing any effective opposition to A48.
