The psychology of choice Flashcards

1
Q

Types of choice

A
  1. People choose if they are told to choose!
    * Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231–259.
  2. Reducing uncertainty
    * Diagnostic hypothesis testing
    * Prediction
  3. Choosing between alternatives
    * Rational vs. irrational decision-making (a chose made despite the evidence that says its a bad choice)
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Choice- tights example

A

Brought people in to choose tights (even though they were identical)

They tended to choose the first thing (primary effect) or the last (recency effects).

When asked why they chose these, they tended to give a reason

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Normative/ prescriptive models
(the choice you should make)

  • what does rational mean?
  • what gets optimised?
A

“Rational” = selecting optimally

What gets optimised?
* Expected Value: Highest resource value (e.g., money) = objective value * probability
* Expected Utility: Highest psychological value (e.g., reducing risk or uncertainty) = subjective utility * probability

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Difference between expected utility and subjective utility?

A

Expected utility- how useful will the outcome be

Subjective utility- what you think its going to be worth to you

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Expected utility- an example

A

Take umbrella, rains= encumbered, dry
Take umbrella, does not rain= encumbered, dry
Do not take umbrella, rains= free, wet
Do not take umbrella, does not rain= free, dry

Each of these things has a utility

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

How to calculate expected utility

A

EU(A) = Sum of PA(O)U(O)

A= the act
o= an outcome
O= set of outcomes
EU(A)= expected utility of A
PA(O)= probability of act given an outcome
U(O)= utility of that outcome

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Violations of expected utility theory: certainty and framing
Treatment scenarios and what do people tend to chose?

A

falsify expectation of utility theory with framing

Scenario given and pp’s asked Which of the two choices for treating an epidemic would you choose? (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)

1.
Treatment A:
Certainty of saving 200 lives
Treatment B:
A 33% chance of saving 600 people, 66% possibility of
saving no one

Found- when given a positive frame, 72% chose A

  1. Treatment A:
    Certainty of 400 deaths
    Treatment B:
    A 33% chance that no people will die, 66% probability that all 600 will die.

Found- when they were given a negative frame, 22% chose A

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Expected utility theory- which frame is better when theres uncertainty?

A

Negative frame is better when theres uncertainty

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Prospect Theory (A descriptive theory)
Kahneman & Tversky (1979)

A
  1. Model
    - Editing – selecting desired outcomes against a reference point via heuristics (availability (what info is easily accessible), anchoring (what value are you comparing against), representativeness (how familiar- usual or unusual is the info)
    - Evaluation (subjective) –Value judgement based on calculation of anticipated utilities x probabilities
  2. Loss aversion
    - Faced with a risky choice leading to gains, individuals are risk-averse, preferring solutions that lead to a lower expected utility but with a higher certainty
    - Faced with a risky choice leading to losses, individuals are risk-seeking, preferring solutions that lead to a lower expected utility as long as it has the potential to avoid losses.
  3. Probability weighting
    - People attribute excessive weight to events with low probabilities and insufficient weight to events with high probability.

(mad cow disease- transferred from animals to people and gave you a kind of dementia. It came from cows. Only 40 people got this)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Heuristics and biases: representativeness

Tversky & Kahneman (1983)

A

Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which is more probable?

A) Linda is a bank teller.
B) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.

80% choose B → Conjunction fallacy (when a narrative concords with your stereotypes and prior knowledge, you tend to make a choice that is more restricted than a choice that requires less information)

(stereotype said in paragraph is requiring a conclusion made which requires much more information)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Heuristics and biases: anchoring

Stewart, N. (2009). The cost of anchoring on credit card
minimum payments.

Study and results

A

Participants received a mock credit card statement with balance of £435.76.
How much can they could afford to repay, and then to state how much they would repay. Participants saw either a statement that included a minimum payment of £5.42 or statement with no minimum

Result: Mean repayments higher by 70% without the minimum
payment: £99 (23% of the balance) vs. £175 (40% of the balance)

Anchoring by providing a minimum payment is reducing the amount that people pay back.

The amount of money people could re pay is not affected by the minimum payment.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

What is pseudodiganosticity?

A

Bias that comes from selecting info that doesn’t actually discriminate between hypotheses

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

Hypothesis testing and pseudodiganosticity:
Island study and results
Mynatt & Doherty (1977)

A

Study:
Find a piece of shard between two islands that has a red glaze and blue clay. You know that 85% of shards that were found previously on island A have red glaze.

You’re only allowed to make a phone call to ask for one piece of info- which can include how many shards from island B have a red glaze, how many shards from island A have a blue clay or how many shards form island B have a blue clay.

Results
Majority of participants choose Island A Blue clay
However, Bayes theorem – Island B red glaze is the rational choice

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Link pseudodiganosticity to island study:
Mynatt & Doherty (1977)

A

Belief that more information about
current hypothesis is the most diagnostic choice

You are confirming a choice that you’ve already made without testing the alternative hypotheses.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

Testing prospect theory: reference reversals
Class A
* Moderately interesting
* Moderately difficult
* Prof is so-so
* 11 am Tuesday
Class B
* Very interesting
* Very difficult
* Prof is very entertaining
* 9 am Monday

Choice 1: You must choose one to sign up for.
Choice 2: You are enrolled in both, but must drop one.
In both scenarios, what do people choose?

A

Choice 1: You must choose one to sign up for.
People typically choose Class A

Choice 2: You are enrolled in both, but must drop one.
People typically choose Class A

The one they choose is the one they reject

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Standard task
Betting, what do people choose?

Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971)

A

Q1: Which of the following bets would you choose?
* A) 75% chance of winning £10
* B) 25% chance of winning £50

People tend to choose Bet A

Q2: Imagine you have bought lottery tickets for both the bets, and you are asked to sell them. How much would you sell each bet for?
* A) 75% chance of winning £10
* B) 25% chance of winning £50

People typically choose Bet A, but sell bet B for a higher price → preference reversal (you value the low risk thing more when its a choice between low risk and high risk and value the high risk more when you are getting rid of one of them)

17
Q

How does prospect theory explain preference reversal?

A

Loss aversion –choosing a low number gives a perceived greater certainty of gain, but selling a high number gives a greater perceived
risk of loss

Anchoring – precise numbers determine the degree to which people value the utility of each bet

18
Q

Who tested prospect theory?

A

Ball, L. J., Bardsley, N. O., & Ormerod, T. C. (2012). Do preference reversals generalise? Results on ambiguity and loss aversion.

19
Q

Ball et al. manipulations

A

Selling treatment:
* In this part of the experiment we would like you to tell us how much you would be willing to sell a lottery ticket for.

Gift treatment:
* In this part of the experiment we would like you to tell us how valuable a lottery ticket is to you.

20
Q

Ball et al results

A
  • Classic effect of preference reversal replicated
  • No effect of transparency of bet values → not an anchoring effect
  • No effect of selling vs. gift treatment → not a loss aversion effect
21
Q

Ball et al.
Where does this leave Prospect theory?

A

Preference reversal may result from switching between System 1 and System 2 processes

22
Q

Name 2 biases

A
  1. The Disjunction Effect
  2. Delay discounting
23
Q

The Disjunction Effect

A

The data show that a majority of subjects accepted the second gamble after having won the first gamble,
and a majority accepted the second gamble after having lost the first game. Most subjects, however, rejected the second gamble when the outcome of the
first was not known. This pattern of preference clearly violates Savage’s STP (“Sure Thing Principle”)
- Amos & Eldar (1992)

occurs when one will do A given event E occurs and will do A given event E does not occur, yet will not do A when the outcome of event E is unknown

24
Q

Delay discounting

A

The depreciation of the value of a reward related to the time that it takes to be released.

High rates of delay discounting are found in subjects who are willing to forgo greater rewards available only after some length of time and who show a preference for smaller rewards that are available immediately.