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conceptual and historical psychology > the mind-body problem today > Flashcards

the mind-body problem today Flashcards

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1
Q

what is decarte’s substance dualism?

A
  • The mind and brain are made up of separate things
  • no answer for interaction problem
  • claimed they interact via the pineal gland
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2
Q

what are Epiphenomenalists?

A

Bodily states can cause bodily & mental states. Mental states cannot.

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3
Q

what is Lebinz’s parallelism?

A
  • Mental and physical states cause each other, but are separate processes on separate paths.
  • The mind and brain do not interact directly = they are live parallels caused by God
  • no mind-body problem
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4
Q

what is the mind-body problem?

A

If the mind and body are different substances which cannot interact, then:
- Either mind and body do not interact, or:
- The mind and body are not separate substances, or:

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5
Q

what is monism?

A
  • the mind-body are not different substances, but are one substance
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6
Q

what is substance?

A

Idealists = argue it’s mental
Materialists = argue it’s physical
Neutral monists = argue there is a single substance, which has both mental and physical aspects.

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7
Q

what are dualisms?

A
  • substance dualism (Descartes)
    property dualism:
  • emergent materialism (Chalmers)
  • Epiphenomenalism (Huxley)
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8
Q

what are dual-aspects?

A
  • Parallelism
  • panpsychism
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9
Q

what are modern dualisms?

A

monisms:
Physicalisms
- Computational functionalism (Putnam).
- Eliminative materialism (Churchland).
- Type identity theory (Place).
- Behaviourism (Ryle).

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10
Q

what is methodological behaviourism?

A
  • Scientific psychology should focus on observable behaviour.
  • Metatheoretical stance on how to ‘be’ science.
    e.g. Skinner and Watson etc
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11
Q

what is philosophical behaviourism?

A
  • Substance dualism leaves a ‘ghost in the machine’.
  • Mental states are actually statements about the ‘behaviour’ of the mind.
  • Treating them as separate statements is a ‘category mistake’.
  • Eliminate the need for ‘mind’ by reducing it to ‘behaviour’.
  • don’t not immediately act upon every (mental / physiological) state.
  • We are capable of not acting on our impulses. So this cannot be a complete picture.
  • Unless ‘states’ are really ‘dispositions
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12
Q

what are some critiques of philosophical behaviourism?

A
  • We’re required to deny our own mental states acknowledging only our behaviours.
  • We’re required to deny our own experiences
  • To endorse philosophical behaviourism requires feigning ignorance about ones own self
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13
Q

what does Ryle believe about philosophical behaviours?

A

States can reference behaviours, but behaviours can also reference states.
- E.g. bumping; hitting. The same physical attributes, but different intentionality.
- Wincing: Only makes sense with reference to mental states.
- Neuroscience / neuropsychology shows concepts like ‘pain’ & ‘trust’ map onto certain brain areas.

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14
Q

what is the epiphenonmenalism to the mind-body problem?

A

a position in the philosophy of mind according to which mental states or events are caused by physical states or events in the brain but do not themselves cause anything.

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15
Q

how does Epiphenomenalism explain emotion?

A
  • Caused by neurochemical interactions in the brain.
  • No causal efficacy: Cannot influence behaviour / emotion / thought.
  • James-Lang theory = physical changes in the body happen first, which then leads to the experience of emotion
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16
Q

what supports epiphenomenalism?

A
  • Neuropsychology: Many reactions / functions don’t require conscious functioning
  • Neurophysiology: conscious awareness follows the brain states
  • Behaviourism: Predicted on stimulus / response without reference to the mind
17
Q

arguments are against epiphenomenalism?

A
  • Evolutionary: If the mind serves no function, why did it evolve?
  • Interaction: How do the mind / body interact?
  • Empirical: But, the mind has a ‘conscious veto’ over behaviour.
  • Logic: If the mind can’t affect the brain, how do we know about it?
18
Q

how does panpsychism explain emotion?

A
  • Consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe.
  • Emotions are a fundamental property of consciousness.
  • All things have emotions, to some extent.
  • Thought not separate from experience.
18
Q

what is Panpsychism?

A
  • everything has mental properties (a mind)
  • The mind is a non-physical property of all matter
  • physical: space, time, energy, mass
  • mental: ephemeral, yet fundamental
19
Q

what are Nagels 4 premises in support of Panpsychism?

A
  • The mind is real
  • everything is matter
  • The mind cannot be reduced to physical states
  • The mind does not emerge from physical states
20
Q

what are some arguments against panpsychism?

A
  • it’s not falsifiable
  • It cannot be tested empirically.
  • Meaningless: It’s not even a theory yet
  • Panpsychists claim there’s not evidence against it, therefore can’t argue against it (Russel’s teapot)
21
Q

what is emergent/non-reductive materialism?

A
  • There are causal relationships between body and mind.
  • All mental states caused by physical states.
  • Not all mental states cause other mental states.
  • Mind dependent on, but not reducible to, body.
22
Q

what is the emergent/non-reductive view of emotions?

A
  • ‘Caused’ by physiological and neurochemical reactions within the brain.
  • Causal efficacy: Can influence behaviour / emotion / thought.
  • As brain structure / processes become more complex, the brain becomes capable of more complex functions.
  • Functions not present in individual components arise
  • ‘Emotion’ a property of complex brain interactions.
  • Levels of explanation: From ‘simple’ neurochemical interactions to metaphysical experiences.
23
Q

arguments for emergent / non-reductive materialism?

A
  • physical properties can be described on multiple levels
  • the higher-order properties emerge from lower-order ones
24
Q

arguments against emergent/non-reductive materialism?

A
  • Higher-order properties emerge from lower-order (and other) properties. But are still physical states.
  • From whence do mental states arise?
  • What are mental states for?
  • If mental states cause physical states, then mental states are physical too!
  • Over-determination
25
Q

What is Type-Identity theory?

A
  • Mind and brain are the same
  • metal states group into types & correlate with brain states
  • Scientific progress will remove the mystique
  • key distinction: Between meaning and reference
  • when talking about mental states, we mean something different from brain states
26
Q

how does Type-Identity theory explain emotion?

A
  • Direct 1-2-1 relationship between emotional states and brain states.
  • Every emotion has an associated pattern of brain activity.
  • Emotions are physical processes
  • But what comes first?
  • Neuroanatomy or feeling?
  • Bundle theory: Combine different chemical processes in different quantities to make the full gamut of emotional experience.
27
Q

Arguments for type-identity theory?

A
  • Developments in neuroscience show physical and mental states are the same thing.
  • Many substances affect both physical and mental states (alcohol, caffeine, nicotine).
  • Brain damage affects physical and mental states equally.
  • Resolves mind-body problem (by ignoring it).
28
Q

what are some arguments against type-identity theory?

A
  • Equating brain and mind implies different brains should not produce different states.
  • Ignores mind-body problem (rather than resolving it).
  • ‘Neuronal chauvinism’: Can only neurons support mental states?
29
Q

what is functionalism?

A
  • Mental states do not have to be brain states
  • Mental states are functional relationships between sensory inputs, other states, behavioural outputs
  • Preserving the functional relationships preserves the mental states.
  • Derived from philosophical behaviourism.
  • Specified in terms of input / output.
30
Q

how does functionalism explain emotion?

A
  • Functional states within the brain that serve a specific purpose
  • Results of complex interactions between physical components of the brain.
  • Cognitive, behavioural, psychological components
  • Multiple paths to achieving the same emotional states (many things can make you happy).
  • Emotions have a positive adaptive purpose. They achieve something for us.
31
Q

arguments for functionalism

A
  • Philosophical version of information theory and cognitive psychology.
  • Philosophical response to computers & the Turing Mach
  • Accepts mental states exist, have causal roles, and arise in multiple different ways.
  • supported by neuroscience
32
Q

arguments against functionalism

A
  • Can minds have minds?
    -Processing for input and output forgets about meaning.
  • Functionalism ignores intentionality.
33
Q

what is eliminative materialism?

A
  • Materialist approach.
  • Eliminative: It aims to remove ‘mentalist’ terms.
  • Developing science and understanding will surpass these terms and render them obsolete.
34
Q

how does eliminative materialism explain emotion?

A
  • Folk-psychological categories which are not actually meaningful / useful.
  • Everything is caused by biological / physiological processes which we do not understand yet.
  • Speak instead of neuroscientific concepts (brain activation, neurotransmitters).
35
Q

arguments for eliminative materialism?

A
  • History of science riddled with examples of this:
    Heat → Mean kinetic energy,
    Phlogiston → Oxidisation (burning),
    Elan Vital → Organic biochemistry,
    Witches → hysteria → Mental illness.
  • Folk-psychology akin to folk-physics.
35
Q

arguments against eliminative materialism?

A
  • counter-intuitive
  • Folk-psychological theories easily refutable.
  • Causality: Assumes psychology is grounded in neuroscience.
  • Can we really solve the mind-body problem by just ignoring the mind?
  • We cannot get rid of ‘mental’ talk, and still speak of the same phenomenon just because we kept the hardware.

conceptual and historical psychology (9 decks)

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