The Functions of Military Power: Cold War, Post­Cold War/Traditional­Non­Traditional Variations Flashcards

1
Q

Robert Art

“The Role of Military Power in International Relations”

A

i. Military power will remain central to the course of international relations. As long as anarchy obtains, force will remain the final arbiter to resolve the disputes thatrise among states. Most disputes will be settled short of the physical use of force. But as long as the physical use of force remains a viable option, military power will vitally affect the manner in which all states deal with one another in peacetime.

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2
Q

Thomas Schelling

Arms and Influence

A

i. “Like the threat of a strike in industrial relations, the threat of divorce in a
family dispute, or the threat of bolting the party at a political convention, the threat of violence continuously circumscribes international politics” (34). It has always done so. And with nuclear weapons, the power of coercion takes on new contours and dimensions. “Military strategy can no longer be thought of, as it could for some countries in some eras, as the science of military victory. It is now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence. The instruments of war are more punitive than acquisitive. Military strategy,whether we like it or not, has become the diplomacy of violence.” (34)

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3
Q

Alexander L. George

“Coercive Diplomacy”

A

i. Coercive diplomacy is to back ones demand on an adversary with a
threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible Here coercive diplomacy is restricted to defensive uses, ie. efforts to persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked on. He may be asked to stop what he’s doing or undo what hes done. It uses threats to punish the adversary but consists of only limited use of force if adversary does not conform

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4
Q

Edward Luttwak

“Give War a Chance”

A

i. Peacebuilding efforts conducted by the UN or NGOs tend to cause
greater suffering than nothing. It is through decisive victory or an exhaustion of the sides that sustainable peace may be achieved in conflict areas.

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5
Q

Michael Young

“You are all Worth Killing: Aid, Salafi Jihad, Counter­insurgency, and the Long War”

A

i. The changing international paradigm in which non­state actors are the primary perpetrators of conflict has changed the landscape for counter­insurgency and humanitarian aid. As INGOs become infused into the comprehensive approach to peacebuilding, they are losing the humanitarian space and are becoming an additional target for salafi jihad.

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6
Q

Richard Shultz

“Showstoppers: Nine Reasons Why We Never Sent Our Special Operations Forces After al Qaeda Before 9/11”

A

i. Dr. Schultz argues that the reason why the United States failed to use its elite counterterrorism forces against Al Qaeda prior to 9/11 was due to self­imposed restrictions, or showstoppers. Self­imposed criteria for
the use of Special Operations Forces prior to 9/11 kept premier U.S counterterrorism forces from conducting operations against Al Qaeda. Identifying these criteria are important to ensure we do not slip back into that same mentality of risk aversion as we wrap up operations in Afghanistan and the need to continually strike at terror organizations still exists.

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7
Q

George Bush

“Remarks at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy”

A

i. 9/11 marked a huge change in the way America looks at threats. Strategies such as containment and deterrence would not be effective against non­state actors therefore requiring a more offensive and preemptive strategy.

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8
Q

Lawrence Korb and Caroline Wodhams

“A Critique of the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy”

A

i. 2006 version of the NSS is claimed to be deficient on several counts. First,although a new NSS is required to be forwarded to Congress every year and previous administrations were quite successful in that, NSS 2006 is three years late. Second, while the language in NSS 2006 is less belligerent than NSS 2002, the essence is the same. The NSS 2006 glosses over the real issues, exaggerates successes, and emphasizes the wrong priorities. Finally,after more than five years in office, the administration fails to produce an achievable NSS that has a realistic chance of gaining the support of the American people on a bipartisan basis.

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9
Q

Eliot Cohen et al.

“Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency”

A

i. Counterinsurgency is a different type of approach requiring a fundamental shift in how the military approaches an environment and executes their mission. Written in early 2006 before the publication of the new counterinsurgency manual, this article provides some overarching principles regarding the conduct of counterinsurgency, especially for the military.

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10
Q

Peter Ackerman

“Skills of Conditions: What Key Factors Shape the Success or Failure of Civil Resistance?”

A

i. Knowledge and skill in conducting civil resistance is key and can increase the impact of a resistance with little influence from the preset conditions of the regime.Due to globalization and NGOs working for specific purposes, the preset conditions are more challenged these days and so become less important in civil resistance than the actual tactics used by the protesters.

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11
Q

Maria Stephan and Erica Chenowith

“Why Civil Resistance Works: the Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict”

A

i. Serbia/ OTPOR case study
ii. Majority non violent campaigns have achieved success 53% of the time compared with 26% of the for violent campaigns Reason 1: Abstinance from violence enhances the legitimacy of a campaign both domestically and internationally. Reason 2: Regime violence against non­violent groups is less probable as there would be backlash

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12
Q

Robert Art’s - The Four Functions of Military Power

A

Defense
Deterrence
Compellence
Swaggering

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13
Q

Art’s Function 1 - Defense

A

Defense- employs military power to (1) Ward off attacks through signaling; (2) Minimize damage to yourself by repelling the attacker

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14
Q

Art’s Function 2 - Deterrence

A

Deterrence - employs military power to threaten unacceptable damage to the opposition with the purpose of showing the adversaries that the damage you could inflict would prevent them from attacking you

  • The threat is directed at the population and economic infrastructure and is made peacefully
  • Seeks to dissuade by convincing an opponent that you will do overwhelming damage to their nation
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15
Q

Art’s Function 3 - Compellence

A

Compellence – use of force that deploys military power that stops an adversary from doing something by threatening something

  • Could just be a threat
  • When using compellence you need to target something that the other side cares about
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16
Q

Art’s Function 4 - Swaggering

A

Swaggering – deploying military might in exercise and during holidays because it casts a shadow of your abilities
- Forward deployed forces and security assistance programs help