Key Concepts Flashcards
Friction
Clausewitz’s concept that the mixture of opponents’ actions, unforeseen developments, and unintended consequences cause well-laid military plans to lose relevance and require adjustments.
Contributes to Clausewitz’s view that war is an art and not a science.
War as Art, not Science
Clausewitz’s view that due to friction, fog of war, and the inherent unpredictability of conflict prevent military planners from using an entirely scientific approach to warfighting.
War as Policy by Other Means
Clausewitz’s belief that war was an extension of state policy-making. War was not an abnormal state of affairs.
Fog of War
Clausewitz’s concept that unpredictability in warfare leads military commanders and policy makers to make decisions based of available information that, by its nature, is limited and flawed.
Nature of States in Warfare
Clausewitz’s belief that the nature of a state affects how it prosecutes war. Influenced by his observations of the French Republic and its characteristics which enabled mass conscription.
“The Enemy Gets a Vote”
War is an iterative act in which opponents are constantly trying to evolve to counter prevailing military tactics. Derived from Clausewitz’s observations that policy makers and military commanders do not know how their enemies will react to war plans.
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): Definition
“Occurs when a nation’s military seizes an opportunity to transform its strategy, its military doctrine, its training, organization, equipment, and operations to bring about major change in the nature and conduct of warfare which gives them a great advantage”
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): Impact for Policy Makers
Actual or perceived superiority alters states’ analysis of the threat environment, odds of success, and desire to use force
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): Case Studies
1) Napoleon (political): political organization, levee en masse (draftees)
2) WWII (technological): blitzkrieg and airpower
3) USA 1990s (technological): networked warfare, precision munitions, “American Way of War”
4) Israel in the War against Hizbollah
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): Two Dimensions
1) Technological (e.g. WWII blitzkrieg and US in 1990s)
2) Political (e.g. French Republic and Napoleon)
The Trinity
Clausewitz’s belief that successful military policy could only be achieved by harmonizing three political forces:
1) Population: support and provide the people to fight the war
2) Military: skilled commanders needed to plan and execute operations
3) Policy makers: effective provisioners of the effort
All 3 affected by the ambiguity factors (i.e. Fog of War)
Center of Gravity (CoG)
Strategic pressure points which combatants can exploit to undermine the efforts of their opponenets. Affecting CoGs will throw opponents off balance, cause fog and friction for them, and accelerate arrival of Churchill’s “unwelcome guests”.
Example: US public opinion during Vietnam. North Vietnam intentionally pursued a campaign of attrition against the US in order to pressure public support against continuing the conflict.
Just War Theory
Jus ad bellum
- Legitimate authority to take nation to war
- Just cause
- Last resort
Jus in bello
- Proportionality
- Discrimination
Peace Operations
PLEASE UPDATE
Peacekeeping
Definition: Neutral peacekeepers that get involved only when mutually agreed upon by combatant states.
Example: Suez post-1956
Peace Enforcement
Definition: Active enforcement of existing peace agreements up to and including force.
Example: Bosnia 1995 (after initial failure of peacekeeping mission)
Peace Building
Definition: Institution building that goes along with maintaining peace
Example:
Contrast Liddell Hart with Clausewitz
Liddel Hart: Indirect Approach and focus on grand strategy
Clausewitz: direct approach and focus on military operations
