Term 2 Week 4 game theory the basics Flashcards
What is s1 and s2 in game theory
How does utility change in game theory?
s1 is action of person 1
s2 is action of person 2
It is no longer just individual utility but U(s1,s2) for
What are the rules of game theory
What is the difference between a static and dynamic game
static everyone plays at same time
dynamic they take turns
What is the number of players in game theory?
How do you denote set of actions?
How do we denote the utility of a player in the game
L = {1…..
S=(s1,s2,s3…sn) the full set of actions
What does prisoner’s dilemma illustrate?
How people do not cooperate even if it is in the best interest to.
What is the set up of Rock paper scissors? (Normal variant)
L = {1,2}
S1= {R,P,S} S2 = {R,P,S}
What is a best response?
Best response gives the most favourable outcome for a player taking as given the response of another player
What is a dominant strategy?
What is the implication of this?
When a player always chooses a strategy regardless of what opponent does.
A player can commit to a strategy without knowing the opponent’s
What is the difference between strictly and weakly dominant?
Strictly dominant is when S11 always has a higher payoff than S12
Weakly dominant is when it has greater than or equaled to payoff
What is a trap with strict and weak dominance
If something is strictly dominance it implies it is also weakly dominant
What is Nash-equilibrium?
Is there always one in pure strategies?
What is an example of a no pure strategy NE game?
-A solution concept in which no player has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from their strategy.
-There may be no pure strategy nash equilibria or be multiple
-Rock paper scissors
What is pareto efficiency within game theory?
An outcome is pareto efficient if there is no way to make someone win and no one to lose
What is the set up when a player plays strategies with probability?
{s1,2,,……} played with {p1,2…..
What does s1,2 and s2,2 show eg
first shows player second shows action
How do we denote a mixed strategy?
v1(p1,p2)