Task 4

Question 1

Reproduction restraint

Answer 1

Adaptations that evolve because it increased the likelihood of survival for the population in bad times

Question 2

Evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)

Answer 2

Strategy which, if adopted by the population in a given environment, cannot be invaded by an alternative strategy that is initially rare

Question 3

Kin selection

Answer 3

Evolutionary strategy that favours the reproductive success of an organism’s relatives, even at a cost to own reproduction and survival

Question 4

Hamilton’s rule

Answer 4

Kin selection causes genes to increase in frequency when the genetic relatedness of a recipient to an actor multiplied by the benefit to the recipient is greater than the reproductive cost to the actor (r*b > c)

Question 5

Inclusive fitness

Answer 5

Ability of an individual organism to pass on its genes to the next generation, taking into account the shared genes passed on by the organism’s close relatives

Question 6

Alloparenting

Answer 6

An individual other than the biological parent of an offspring that performs the functions of a parent

Question 7

Cooperation

Answer 7

Action / process of working together to the same end

Question 8

Altruism

Answer 8

Selfless concern for the well-being of others – behaviour that benefits others at costs for the actor

Question 9

Mutual-benefits behaviour

Answer 9

Behaviour that is beneficial both to the actor and the recipient (type of cooperation)

Question 10

By-product benefits

Answer 10

Situations where the mutual benefit arises simply from every individual following its own immediate self-interest

Question 11

Direct reciprocity

Answer 11

We help individuals that helped us (=tit-for-tat)

Question 12

Indirect reciprocity

Answer 12

elp is given to individuals based on their reputation, bad acts (such as not helping) reduce an individual’s reputation while good acts (such as helping) increase an individual’s reputation.

Question 13

Green beard effect

Answer 13

Explanation of selective altruism among individuals of a species. Occurs when an allele produces 3 effects: a perceptible trait (the green beard), recognition if this trait by others, preferential treatment of individuals with the trait

Question 14

Eusociality

Answer 14

Highest level of organization of animal sociality, is defined by the following characteristics: cooperative brood care, overlapping generations within a colony of adults, and a division of labour into reproductive and non-reproductive groups.

Question 15

Philopatry

Answer 15

Tendency of an organism to stay in or habitually return to a particular area.

Question 16

Reproductive altruism

Answer 16

Behaviour that increases other organisms’ fitness and permanently decreases the actor’s own fitness

Question 17

Ultimate explanations

Answer 17

Why something occurs – “real” reason behind a behaviour, concerned with the fitness consequences of a trait or behaviour and whether it is (or is not) selected

Question 18

Proximate explanations

Answer 18

How something occurs, concerned with the mechanisms that underpin the trait or behaviour

Question 19

Parochial altruism

Answer 19

Self-sacrifice to benefit our own group (“in-group love”) and to hurt or sabotage out-groups (“out-group aggression”)

Question 20

Grudger

Answer 20

Always co-operates unless the other defects – then he only defects (he is pissed off)

Question 21

Tit-for-tat

Answer 21

nice” strategy, is forgiving and allows cooperation again, retaliating, only copying and therefore cannot win, only tie or loose, just reacts to the previous action of the other (no past and no future matters

Question 22

Tit-for-two-tat

Answer 22

Forgiving tit-for-tat = 2 defections are required before the person using this strategy gets “pissed off” and defects as well

Question 23

Joss

Answer 23

Strategy that is basically tit-for-tat but sometimes tries defecting

Question 24

Tester

Answer 24

Strategy starts of cooperating and then defects to see what the opponent does and to find out their strategy

Question 25

Network reciprocity

Answer 25

If a co-operator pays a cost, c, for each neighbour to receive a benefit, b, and defectors have no costs, and their neighbours receive no benefits, network reciprocity can favour cooperation. The benefit-to-cost ratio must exceed the average number of people, k, per individual: b / c > k

Question 26

Group selection

Answer 26

Multi-level selection = Selection on the lower level (within groups) favours defectors, whereas selection on the higher level (between groups) favours co-operators, b/c > 1+(n/m)

Question 27

Race encoding

Answer 27

Humans encode the race of each individual they encounter, which is caused by mechanisms that are automatic

Question 28

Generous tit-for-tat

Answer 28

f the other cooperates, you cooperate – if the other doesn’t cooperate, you sometimes do not cooperate as well

Question 29

Stay-loose-shift

Answer 29

You keep your strategy as long as you win and if you lose, you change your strategy

Question 30

Prisoner’s dilemma

Answer 30

Situation in which two players each have two options whose outcome depends crucially on the simultaneous choice made by the other, often formulated in terms of two prisoners separately deciding whether to confess to a crime