Substance Dualism

Question 1

What is Substance Dualism?

Answer 1

The belief that mind and body are 2 distinct substances, as they have different properties (physical and non-physical).

Question 2

Intentionality and Qualia

Answer 2

The property of mental states whereby they are dorected towards an object. They are aboht soemthing, coukd be a desire or belief.
Qualia is the isolated experience of what soemthing is like. Phenomenal properties that are introspectivly accessable.

Question 3

Leibniz’ law

Answer 3

No two things can exactly resemble eachother. Two thungs are the same iff they have all of the same properties at the same time in the same place.

Question 4

Indivisibility argument

Answer 4

P1: The body has parts and can be divided.
P2: The mind is singular and verified and I cannot conceive of it as being divided.
P3: By Leibniz’s law, for two things to be the same they must share all properties.
C: The mind and body cannot be the same as they are ontologicslly distinct ideas.

Question 5

Objection:

Mental is divisible

Answer 5

Hume would say that we do not have an impression of a single, indivisible mind - instead, through introspection, we can find specific thoughts/feelings. He argues that what we call the mind is just a bundle of those distinct impressions, and therefore is divisible.

Question 6

Response:

To mental is divisible

Answer 6

Descartes would say that it is the same mind that thinks/feels,etc. These are not diffeent powes or porperties of the mind.

Question 7

Objection:

Not everything thought of as physical is divisible.

Answer 7

Issue 1:L Descartes thinks all physical things are divisible, but this may not be the case on a quantum level. Electrons for example cannot be divided.
Issue 2: Physical properties like colour cannot be divided. We cannot divide the colour red, but that doesnt make it a seperate substance. Descartes could argue that colour is a secondary property and there is mind-dependant.

Question 8

Conceivability argument

Answer 8

P1: I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mind existing seperatly to my body.
P2: Anything i can clearly and distinctly conceive of, god can make so.
P3: my mind existing seperatly to my body is metaphysically possible.
P4: By Leibniz’s law, if it is metaphysically possible for x and y to exist seperatly, then x and y kust not be identical.
C: My mind is not identical to my body - so they are distinct substances.

Question 9

Objection:
Mind without body is not conceivable.

Answer 9

Substance dualism says that mind is not physical. This means it cannot be investigated empirically, so by Ayers VP, Descartes’ claim is meaningless. Hume would make a similar claim, he says all ideas are copies of impressions, but we dont have an impression of a mind without a body, so we cant conceive of a mind and body as seperate.

Question 10

Objection:
What is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible

Answer 10

Similar arguemnt to Descartes’ is the batman example. This is a misapplicatiom of Leibniz’ law. They may appear different but that is because we have an incomplete picture of the life of Batman/Bruce Wayne. It is conceivable that they are two different people but it is metaphysically imoossible. Maybe Descartes is making the same mistake, he could have an incomplete picture of the mind and body, so is conceiving them as different - but they could still be the same.

Question 11

Response:
To what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible:

Answer 11

Descartes would argue his idea of bosy and mind is different to the above examples - they are not clear or distinct. Descares says he cant confuse his mind for his body in the same way that Batman and Bruce Wayne could be.

Question 12

Objection:

What is metaphysically possible tells us nothing of the physical world.

Answer 12

Descartes says that it is metaphysically possible for the mind and body to be seperate, but even if we can conceive of the mind and body as distinct substances Descartes still hasnt proved that they are. For example, the sky being purple. He still has to prove that it is impossible for the mind and body to be the same substance.

Question 13

Objection:

The conceptual interaction problem:

Answer 13

P1#; It is inconceivable for one thing to move another without contact.
P2: If it is inconceivable, then it is impossible.
P3:For two objects to be in contact with eachother they must both be extended in space.
P4: The body is extended.
P5: The mind is not extended.
C: It is impossible for a non-extended mind to move or interact with our extended body, so substance dualism is false.

Question 14

Objection:
The empirical interaction problem

Answer 14

P1: By law of the conservation of energy, the total amount of energy remains constant.
P2: Any non-physical to physical causation would have to introduce additional energy to the physical world.
C1: Non-physical to physical causation is metaphysically impossible.
C2: Substance dualism is false.

Question 15

Response to the the problem of interaction:
Pt. 1

Answer 15

Descrates thinks his arguments, (conceivability, cogito, indivisibility) are ebough to show the mind and bosy are different and do interact. He posts that the mind and body interact through the pineal gland, however this does jot solve the problem as he cant explain how the mind and body interacts with the pineal gland

Question 16

Response:

To the problem of interaction

Answer 16

Leibniz agreed with Elizabeth that mind couldnt possibly inteact with body, so tied to explain why it seems they do. He argued that the apparant interaction is because god set the world up in such a way that distinct substances appear to interact. When you get a cut the pain is made by god, not the cut. This is called ‘pre- established harmony’