Eliminitive Materialism

Question 1

What is eliminative mayterialism

Answer 1

Some or all common-sense (folk-psychological) mental states/properties do not exist and our common-sense understanding is radically mistaken. Basiclly there are no minds to be reduced to anything.

Question 2

Issue

Our certainty about the extistence of ou mental states takes priority over the considerations

Answer 2

E.M is counte intuiive. Whta could be more certain that our immediate thoughts, desires, emotions and beliefs. Descates cogito shows our existence as thinking things, that the mind does indeed exist. No argument can be stong nrough tio just give it up. Response: What is tue isnt always obvious, but ppl like Hume argue that the self itself doesnt exist. E.M’s dont deny psychological phenomena, just that folk psychology isnt the best explination for things like pain. Thiking is not defined by intentionality, and pain is not a matter of wualia.

Question 3

Issue:

Folk - psychology has good predictive and explanitory power (and so is the best hypothesis).

Answer 3

Chuchalnds criticism of folk psy’s for its explanitory failures concerning mental illness, sleep, learning, etc. is unfair. FP isnt intended to be a theory of these aspects of mental life, so it is no criticism that it doesnt explain them. It is only meant to explain human behaviou, or specifuically action. It is successful i doing so, cinerma example. Rresponse:

Question 4

Issue

The articulation of eliminative materialism is self-refuting.

Answer 4

Eliminativism presents arguments, which are expressions of beliefs and rely on beliefs about what words mean and how reasoning works, in order to change our beliefs about folk psychology. Yet, if we turn Paul Churchland’s prediction into a solid claim, eliminativism claims that there are no beliefs. But if that is true, what does eliminativism express and what is it trying to change? If there are no beliefs, including no beliefs about meaning, no beliefs linked by reasoning, then arguments for eliminativism are meaningless. An argument for eliminativism refutes itself – it concludes that there are no beliefs but it must presuppose that there are beliefs.

Question 5

RESPONSE:To self-refuting objection

Answer 5

Eliminativists reply that this objection begs the question. It presupposes that the correct theory of meaning and reasoning is the one that folk psychology gives (in terms of Intentionality).Eliminativism simply claims that we need a new theory of what it means to assert a claim or argument. What meaning is may turn out to be certain neurological processes.But we can press the objection. Eliminativism predicts that Intentional content will
be eliminated.Claims and arguments are all ‘about’ something. This idea can’t be eliminated in favour of some alternative.Eliminativists claim that they do not need
Intentional content to make their claims. Without having some alternative account
of meaning which doesn’t use Intentional content, this is what is inconceivable. We cannot conceive that folk psychology is false, because that very idea, ‘folk psychology is false’, presupposes the folk psychological concept of Intentional content. At least until we have another, better theory of meaning, the assertion that eliminativism is true undermines itself.