Soul Mind & Body - Materialism Flashcards
materialism: Ryle’s philosophical behaviourism
Materialism is the belief that there is one substance which is matter and everything else is reducible to it, including the mind.
modern materialism
Modern materialism was partly made possible by the effect of Cartesian (Descartes) dualism on western thought.
- If matter is just extension and mind is non-spatial, then it is simple to bracket off the mind and focus purely on the physical substance.
ryle’s philosophical behaviourism
Gilbert Ryle calls Descartes’ theory ‘the ghost in the machine’ (ghost=mind, machine=body).
According to Ryle, there is no mind which exists as a separate entity to the body and to search for one is to make a category mistake.
By this, he means that the brain and mind belong to different logical categories but have mistakenly been associated together.
ryle’s cambridge/oxford analogy
One analogy for this is the foreigner who, visiting Cambridge or Oxford University for the first time, is shown all the different colleges and buildings but then asks ‘where is the University?’
The mistake is that he is looking for something separate from all the buildings he has been shown without realising that he has already seen the university.
In just the same way, Ryle argues that dualists are mistakenly searching for something over and above the brain, or behaviour, called the mind.
‘mental’ events = specific pattern
Ryle was a philosophical behaviourist who saw ‘mental’ events as just referring to a specific pattern of behaviour. ‘Mind’ is no longer internal; it is what we do with our bodies.
- Eg. when someone is depressed or angry or joyful, we look at the pattern of behaviour they exhibit in each different case. We cannot see beyond this behaviour
So mental terminology actually means something physical (eg. behaviour).
Gilbert Ryle on Descartes’ theory
‘The ghost in the machine’
> ghost - mind
> machine - body
limitations of Ryle’s philosophical behaviourism
Ryle was a philosophical behaviourist – who saw ‘mental’ events as just referring to a specific pattern of behaviour - ‘mind’ is no longer internal; it is what we do with our bodies.
counter-intuitive to humans
This approach is counter-intuitive to humans as subjects who have what they perceive as internal states of mind.
- Some of these internal states may not manifest as outward patterns of behaviour at all – so do they not exist?
ryle’s explanation for wishing
Ryle partly anticipates problematic states such as wishing, which seems to have no particular pattern of behaviour attached to it, by talking about ‘dispositions to behave’.
Appropriate behaviour is regarded as potential and can be anticipated given certain circumstances. So a person wishing to go on holiday may spend a lot of time on travel websites, for instance.
ward’s criticism of Ryle
Ward feels Ryle’s account is inadequate.
- Firstly, what about pretending? Someone who pretends to be angry and someone who is angry may exhibit the exact same behaviour, but one of them is not experiencing the same internal state.
Secondly, we do know our experience from the inside. When we feel pain, for instance, we know that such a feeling cannot be completely captured by a description of the way we behave when we feel it.
Thirdly, what about self-awareness? It is impossible to say how being aware of yourself as a thinking being is capable of being described in terms of behaviour or a ‘disposition to behave’ in a certain way.
ward’s criticism of Ryle summary
- pretending
> someone who pretends to feel X exhibits the same behaviour as someone who feels X without the same mental state - humans know experiences from the inside
> We feel pain & know that the feeling cannot be completely captured by a description - self-awareness
> Impossible to describe being aware of yourself as a thinking being in terms of behaviour
what does Gilbert Ryle call Descartes’ theory
the ghost in the machine
why does Ward think Ryle’s theory of body and mind is inadequate
ryle’s theory does not explain pretending
humans do know their experiences from the inside
ryle’s theory does not explain self-awareness
why is ryle’s theory on the mind/body counter-intuitive to humans
humans have internal states of mind that might not be manifested in outward patterns of behaviour but still exist
materialism: identity theory
Mind-brain identity is another model for the materialist explanation of consciousness.
mind-brain identity
Although we have different words for mental events and the physical processes which underlie them, they are the same really.
Talk of the ‘Evening Star’ and the ‘Morning Star’ seems to be about two different objects – but they both refer to the same thing – the planet Venus.
Neurologists can point to fMRI scans which correlate some mental states with certain patterns of activity.
But it is easy to oversimplify this and many mental states involve many different parts of the brain.
evaluation: difficulty explaining
There are some key aspects of mental states that are very difficult to explain if they are identical to brain states. For instance, qualia and intentionality:
- Qualia are felt experiences like smelling freshly-cut grass. They are properties of the world as seen from the subjective perspective and cannot be seen from the ‘outside-looking-in’.
- Intentionality describes the fact that thinking involves one’s attention being directed towards something.
limitations of materialism
Both of these properties of consciousness seem to point to something that current materialist theories are unable to account for.
After all, it is hard to see how even very complex arrangements of physical ‘stuff’ can give rise to the felt experience of tasting a hamburger.
Dennett’s counter-argument
But Dennett says that consciousness is ‘a bunch of tricks in the brain’ and that, although it is tempting to think so, we are not experts on our own thinking and our minds are constantly fooling us.
This means we must be wary of assuming things like qualia cannot be explained without positing ‘mind’.
which of these are true of qualia?
properties of the world as seen from the subjective perspective
felt experiences
