Sino-Soviet relations (1949-76)

Question 1

Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (1950):

Reasons for the Treaty

Answer 1

• PRC isolated from West as it was a communist state
• Obvious ideological affinity b/w China/USSR
• USSR economy needed to be rebuilt
  
  • Est. new trading partner in USSR’s interest

Question 2

Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (1950)

Terms of the Treaty

Answer 2

• Alliance — guaranteed USSR would come to China’s aid when in conflict w/ capitalist nations
• Mutual assistance — agreed to trade/share knowledge
  
  • set up joint stock company to mine in Xinjang
  • Soviet experts helped to set up/run 141 Chinese business enterprises
• Friendship — USSR granted aid to China
  
  • loan of $300 million
  • equipment for 50 construction projects

Question 3

**Sino-soviet co-operation during **Korean War

Answer 3

• Mao wanted to unite Korea by military means
• Stalin pushed for Chinese military involvement in pref. to a direct Soviet presence in Korea
• USSR provided air support/military advisors
• Stalin left strategic matters to Mao, but reserved right to intervene/overrule
• Stalin’s actions driven by self-interest rather than proletariat int’lism
  
  • demanded China to pay for military support received
  • made USSR seem like arms merchants than genuine Communist int’lists
    
    • by working w/ USSR, feeling of comradely cooperation b/w communist powers engendered, yet nature of relationship gave sense of inequality/moral superiority
• Seeds of Sino-Soviet split were sown during Korean War

Question 4

Confrontation over Taiwan

Answer 4

• Mao unsuccessful attempts to take Taiwan signif. due to response of superpowers:
  
  • In US, Congress quick to defend Taiwan
    
    • signed Mutual Defence Treaty (1954), guaranteed Taiwan’s independence
• Khrushchev publicly agreed to retaliate against US if China invaded/bombed by US forces
• Privately clearly didn’t want to be involved
  
  • showed USSR unwilling to help China to achieve its military goals

Question 5

Great Leap Forward (1958)

Answer 5

• Mao launched policy that was clear rejection of USSR’s model of econ. development
  
  • whereas USSR stressed role of epertise and working class in developing econ. GLF based on enthusiasm of peasants
    
    • claimed that GLF was superior to 5-Year-Plans
• Demonstrated that Mao was willing to forge his own path, inc. independent of USSR
• Mao inc. convinced Khrushchev wasn’t a real revolutionary
  
  • was administrator concerned w/ organisation and not w/ change
• By initiating GLF, MAo consciously undermining Khrushchev’s leadership of communist world

Question 6

Reasons for Sino-Soviet split:

Personal differences/political rivalries

Answer 6

• Competing claims to leadership of Int’l communism (GLF)
• Failure of Khrushchev visit to China (1958/1959)
• China developing nuclear programme
  
  • a-bomb (1964)
  • h-bomb (1967)
• Mao publicised Khrushchev backdown during Cuban Misile Crisis
  
  • demonstrated his lack of resolve when dealing w/ US

Question 7

Reasons for the Sino-Soviet split after 1958:

Ideological differences

Answer 7

• Khrushchev pursued policy of reconciliation w/ Tito (Yugoslav leader) had been unwilling to impose Stalin’s policies in 1948
  
  • Mao regarded this as ideological revisionism
• Peaceful coexistence vs cont’d revolution:
  
  • Mao heavily critical of Khrushchev’s pursuit of improved relations w/ US; saw Peaceful Coexistence as showing weakness against capitalist power
    
    • heightened during Khrushchev’s visit to US (1959)
    • Mao saw this as abandoning millions of comrades struggling to free themselves of capitalist oppression
• Khrushchev’s Secret Speech (1956) - criticisms of Stalin’s domestic policies:
  
  • Stalin’s application of ideology contained errors, communism must be applied in different ways
  • Mao’s domestic policies based on Stalin’s —* greatly offended*
  • accused Khrushchev of “encouraging” anti-communism of E.EU
• ​Khrushchev highly critical of Great Leap Forward (1958)
  
  • ​publically criticised in 1959
  • Mao responded - called him ‘revisionist’, no longer on true path of communism
• China encouraged fellow-communist Albania/Romania to assert greater independence fr Moscow
• Khrushchev criticised Mao for splitting the communist movement, thus helping the capitalists — Mao thought the same!
• Differences over Test Ban Treaty (1963)

Question 8

Reasons for the Sino-Soviet split after 1958:

National/strategic interests

Answer 8

• Arguments over USSR’s refusal to reduce its ties to Mongolia, which China considered to be within its sphere
• Tension over Taiwan (1950)
• Sino-Indian Border Conflict (1962) exposed divisions​
  
  • Rather than back ally, Khrushchev publicly criticised China’s war involvement
  • signalled support for India by sending aid with $800 million
• Khrushchev backed Indonesia in Sino-Indonesian disputes (1959-62) by sending massive Soviet military aid to China’s enemy
• Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968) — was invaded to bring more independent communist govt back into line w/ Moscow’s direction
  
  • Chinese understood that USSR could use such actions elsewhere
• Sino-Soviet border disputes - Damanksy/Chenbao (1969)
  
  • manifestation rather than cause??!!!

Question 9

Reasons for the Sino-Soviet split after 1958:

Conclusion

Answer 9

• Fact Khrushchev labelled as ‘Rightist/Revisionist’ after Secret Speech suggests ideological diff imp, but was encouraged by national interests:
  
  • Great Leap Forward consolidated power of Left in CCP by attacking revisionism as enemy
• Border disputes usually manifestations of division rather than cause:
  
  • Long borders shared b/w countries remain on stable relations e.g. US/Canada
• Ideology provided excuses to present divisions

Question 10

Significance of Sino-Soviet split for superpower relations

Answer 10

• Split weakened Soviet, providing opportunity for US
• Communist nations around world could choose to follow China, rather than USSR
  
  • USSR lost ideological/moral authority in communist world
• Public dispute alerted US govt of divisions in communist world
• Nixon considered developing Sino-US relationship to exploit difficulties b/w China/USSR

Question 11

Launching ‘ping-pong’ diplomacy

Answer 11

Negotiations and public meetings developed working relationship b/w China and US

Altered balance of the Cold War

Question 12

Chinese motives for rapprochement

Answer 12

• Worried of reports of pre-emptive Soviet nuclear strike
• Need to strengthen position against power that emerged as more imp threat to Chinese security — USSR!
• Mao hoped alliance w/ US could be used to confront USSR, forcing it to accept exp. of China’s borders

Question 13

US motives for rapprochement

Answer 13

• Nixon wanted to exploit Sino-Soviet split by using relationship w/ China to put pressure of USSR to compromise w/ West
• Hoped friendship w/ China would allow US to focus entire nuclear arsenal on USSR

Question 14

Reasons for rapprochement between USA and China after 1969

Answer 14

• Chinese govt decided it was in its interest to seek rapprochement (friendliness) w/ US
• Main motive was need to strengthen position against power that emerged as more imp threat to Chinese security — USSR!
• Chinese security couldn’t be adequately be protected by sustaining hostility to US at same time as relations w/ USSR deteriorated to dangerous level
  
  • Thus some sort of accommodation w/ US was necessary
• Geological interpretation h.light threat to Chinese security - escalating war in Vietnam that threatened to inc. US involvement in region; continued conflict w/ Taiwan; hostile neighbours e.g. SK/Japan; tension w/ India over their shared border.

Question 15

Impact of the Sino-US rapprochement and its achievements

Answer 15

• Relaxed trade/travel restrictions w/ China (1969)
• US recognised PRC (1969
• US backs entry into UN (1971)
• By 1971, both willing to progress contacts but obstacles remained
  
  • US support for Taiwan, military situation in Vietnam, division of N/SK, emergence of Japan as an econ. world power
• 1971 Kissinger (US Sec. of State) visited China, est. good working relationship w/ Enlai (key CCP member)
• 1972 Nixon visited China:
  
  • a communiqué produced
    
    • allowed both to stress diff as well as common ground
      
      • Presented visit as a diplomatic success, that didn’t involve abandonment of principles
• Chinese govt put pressure on USSR by visiting countries in E. EU to strengthen ties w/ China at expense of USSR
  
  • visits to Yugoslavia/Romania particularly successful
• Trade b/w China/USSR grew considerably from $5 million to $500 million a year
  
  • US refused to trade in goods w/ military use, but didn’t stop allies (Br) from doing so
• Improved links w/ US caused tension b/w China and allies
  
  • Albania accused China of betraying world proletarian revolution
• Links provided series of opportunities for both China/US to embarrass/undermine USSR
  
  • a communiqué issued after Nixon’s visit to China implied a joint stand against USSR actions
• For US, closer links w/ China valuable way of exerting pressure on USSR to extract concessions from them
  
  • was to become key in negotiations undertaken during Détente

Question 16

Implications of the Sino-US rapprochement from US-Soviet relations

Answer 16

• US govts took pleasure in discomfort that closer links w/ China caused USSR
  
  • idea of a communist bloc in Asia severely dented by new direction taken by Chinese leadership
• USSR saw world in multi-polar terms; now had to engage in triangular diplomacy, involving US/ China
• Chinese support for USSR in FP, no longer guaranteed
  
  • if USSR didn’t offer concessions to US, could be pushed further towards a closer friendship w/ China
• This weakening of Soviet position was in part responsible for bringing USSR to negotiating table, to make concessions.
• Nixon’s visit to China (1971) had effect of making the USSR more amendable to US wishes.