Post-Stalin 'thaw' and bid for Peaceful Co-existence

Question 1

Impact of Death of Stalin (1953)

Answer 1

• Final years marked by several FP failures
  
  • e.g. Berlin Blockade/Yugoslavia’s defection from Cominform
• Provided new Soviet leadership w/ opportunity to pursue more constructive domestic/FP
• Raised possibility of new superpower relationship/relaxation of tensions

Question 2

De-Stalinisation

Answer 2

• Collective leadership attempted to reform Stalinist Soviet system (1953-55) by:
  
  • ending ‘personality cult’ politics
  • reforming Secret Police
  • arresting/executing Beria (1953), head of Secret Police (worried he’d be Stalin’s hard-line successor)
  • ‘new course’ in economic policy
    
    • greater emphasis on prod. of consumer goods

Question 3

Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, 1956

Answer 3

• Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s reign of terror
• Stalin was attacked for:
  
  • using purges/persecution to consolidate personal rule
  • reducing Communist Party to a compliant body, which endorsed his absolute control
• Speech wasn’t intended to remain secret; CIA obtained copies of speech
• USA regarded sign that real change taking place in USSR

Question 4

Role of Khrushchev in shaping superpower relations

Answer 4

• Adopted a softer/constructive tone towards West
• Believed superpowers had to accept e/o’s existence
  
  • called for peaceful economic competition b/w socialism/capitalism
• Also pursued competitive ideological policies:
  
  • boasted falsely USSR was producing missiles ‘like sausages’
    
    • tactics intended to convey impression of Soviet superiority in military tech
• Prepared to undertake high-risk ventures (leading to Berlin crisis and Cuban missile crisis)
• Khrushchev’s approach often contradictory:
  
  • believed in ‘peaceful coexistence’, yet often antagonistic
    
    • ​desire to prove Soviet strength on world stage/superiority of communism
      
      • unwilling to back down when dealing w/ US - would be seen as sign of weakness

Question 5

Soviet motives for peaceful co-existence

Answer 5

• As Marxists, Soviet leadership believed in inevitable triumph of communism over capitalism
• Khrushchev pursued co-existence - confident USSR’s econ. output would overtake West
  
  • claimed since 1929, Soviet industrial prod. +1.949% compared to US +1.34% (1956)
• End of 1940s, both consolidated respective EU spheres of interest
• Tactically recognised other’s area of influence:
  
  • gave superpowers greater sense of security - more willing to negotiate
• Econ/military implications of nuclear arms race provided reason for a more constructive relationship
• Cost/destructive power of weapons had sobering effect:
  
  • ‘There are only 2 ways — either peaceful co-existence or the most destructive war in history. There’s no third way’ — Khrushchev

Question 6

Key measures of peaceful co-existence

Answer 6

• End of Korean War (1953) — abandoned Stalin hard-line approach to cont’d conflict, influenced by concerns of economic impact of prolonging war
  
  • rep. clear sign that new USSR govt wanted to manage affairs differently from Stalinist regime.
  • armistice negotiated
• Cuts in Red Army (mid-1950s) — reduced Soviet forces partly to convince West of his peaceful intentions
  
  • in 2nd half of 50s, Red Army dec fr 5.8 million –> 3.7 million men
  • scaled down the army to save on military costs
    
    • convinced that nuclear weapons afforded USSR better protection
• Austrian State Treaty (1955) — Khrushchev ready to accept neutral Austria
  
  • hoped would be seen by West as proof of his willingness to negotiate on key issues
    
    • removed all foreign powers, paved way for the Geneva Summit (1955)/marked first occasion since 1945 that Soviet troops willingly left any part of EU
• Soviet withdrawal from Finland (1956) — Khrushchev removed Soviet presence fr Porkkala; wanted this to be seen by West as further evidence USSR desired more constructive relationship <3

Question 7

Internal threats to the Soviet system

Answer 7

• Possibilities of change limited - unity of E. bloc crucial to USSR’s position in CW
• Break b/w countries in bloc would undermine prestige - imply people unhappy w/ communism
• Berlin Rising, 1953:
  
  • demonstrated unpopularity of trad. communist policies
  • control over E. EU based on force than consent
  • West unwilling to intervene for fear of provoking war
• Hungary, 1956:
  
  • rising exposed problems w/ Khrushchev’s approach to E. Bloc
  • Khrushchev encouraged limited reform, but led to demands that threatened to destroy E. Bloc
    
    • exposed to dictatorial nature of Soviet control
• Exposed weakness of USA:
  
  • West refused to stop Red Army’s brutal suppression of rising
  • Soviet military action in Hungary demonstrated USRR determination to preserve sphere on West borders
  • after rising, USSR concluded US was unlikely to intervene in ‘Soviet’ EU
• E. EU Soviet sphere; any direct West involvement almost certainly trigger nuclear war w/ USSR.

Question 8

Eisenhower and Dulles — ‘New Look’ policy:

Signs of compromise and conciliation

Answer 8

• Publicly, Eisenhower stressed policy
• Privately prepared to act pragmatically to improve relations
  
  • Military b/g made him strongly aware of dangers of nuclear conflict
• Cautious of growth of military-industrial complex
  
  • ​concerned military sending (12% of GNP in the mid-50s) was too high
  • threatened to impinge on US living stnds
    
    • better relations w/ USSR would dec. likelihood of nuclear war, so govt could reduce military spending
• Intelligence gathered by U-2 spy planes showed USSR considerably behind in arms race
  
  • Eisenhower knew USSR couldn’t win nuclear war
  • gave USA upper hand in negotiations b/w superpowers
• ‘New Look’ policy went hand in hand w/ improving relations, as by strengthening US’ position
• Eisenhower hoped to force USSR to negotiate rather than risk war

Question 9

Key features of the ‘New Look’ policy

Answer 9

• Massive retaliation — Dulles convinced US should make greater use of nuclear threat/less reliance on conventional weapons
• Brinkmanship — e.g. US warning to China that if Korean War not concluded, would use nuclear weapons (1953); armistice was signed shortly after
• Inc. use covert operations — from 1953, US made regular use of covert operations
  
  • e.g. development U-2 spy planes to aid intelligence gathering
• Domino Theory (1954) — if Vietnam succumbed to communism, would be followed by Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia and Philippines
  
  • concerns prompted formation of SEATO (1954); US-S.E Asia military alliance
• Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) — designed to halt communist penetration of Mid East
  
  • committed US econ./military support to protect independence of any state in region, which was threatened by armed communist aggression

Question 10

‘Geneva spirit’ and conference diplomacy (1954-61)

Geneva Conference (1954)

Answer 10

• Was first indication of success of superpower diplomacy
• Though no process made on Korean peace treaty, settlement was negotiated of Indochina War (1946-54)

Question 11

‘Geneva spirit’ and conference diplomacy (1954-61)

Geneva Summit (1955)

Answer 11

• Helped shape superpower relations by est. a good working relationship b/w superpower leaders
• Restarting face-to-face diplomacy b/w leaders, which ceased after Potsdam (1945)
• Agreement couldn’t be reached on issues:
  
  • Germany — Soviet proposals to neutralise Germany rejected by West:
    
    • concerned this would inc. Soviet influence in central EU/undermine W. Germany’s pro-West stance.
    • West refused Soviet requests to recognise E. Germany
  • European security arrangements — Soviet plans put forward for replacing NATO/Warsaw Pact w/ a collective security system
    
    • West viewed this as communist scheme to dismantle NATO.
  • ‘Open skies’ initiative — Eisenhower suggested to prevent surprise attacks, both be allowed to take aerial photos over other’s airspace
    
    • Khrushchev rejected the proposal as an espionage plot.
• Despite this, summit changed mood in relations

Question 12

Paris Summit 1960

Answer 12

• Less successful due to Khrushchev and Eisenhower adopting a harder line
  
  • West feared US would give ground to USSR on key issues such as Germany
  • Khrushchev under China pressure - accused him of adopting ‘soft’ polices to US
• Neither particularly keen to negotiate, but U-2 spy plane incident led to rapid collapse of summit

Question 13

Vienna Summit, 1961

Answer 13

• Only constructive result was agreement to ensure neutral Laos
• Khrushchev felt he was able to dominate young/inexperienced Kennedy
  
  • misjudged Kennedy as weak — mistake shown in Cuban missile crisis

Question 14

End of thaw:

U-2 incident, 1960

Answer 14

• U-2 spy plane shot down by Soviet missile over Russia
• Khrushchev demanded US apology for spying/lying
  
  • Eisenhower admitted truth, but refused to apologise
• U-2 incident boosted Khrushchev’s standing, made him more determined to exert Soviet influence
  
  • his confrontational approach was partly due to deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations (Mao strongly opposed peaceful co-existence)
    
    • strong stance was probably designed to reassure Mao

Question 15

End of thaw:

German Question (1958-61) and Berlin Wall (1961)

Answer 15

• Issued ultimatum to West that called for removal of all occupying forces fr Berlin
  
  • Khrushchev wanted Berlin to become free city w/ existence of E. Germany recognised formally by West
  • West unwilling to give up W. Berlin due to immense propaganda value in undermining Socialist Bloc
• H.lighted role of personal diplomacy b/w individual superpower leaders in reducing international tension
• Khrushchev/Kennedy in Vienna (1961) — Khrushchev insisted West should recognise E. Germany, withdraw US troops fr Berlin
• Kennedy rejected, announced inc. in armed forceds
• Khrushchev didn’t want war over Berlin, built wall to prevent free movement b/w East/West Berlin
• Kennedy considered limited nuclear first strike against USSR, but option was dropped once clear there was no direct threat from W. Berlin